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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis examines how the concept of ‘self-determination’ has 
featured in high-level international discourse at key moments in the 
20th and 21st centuries. The exact language of ‘self-determination’ was 
internationalised in 1918 by Woodrow Wilson in the political context 
of the First World War, and in reaction to Lenin’s earlier references to 
the concept, which he had developed between 1903 and 1917. 
Subsequently, ‘self-determination’ has been cited in important 
international legal settings, as in the League of Nations’ Aaland 
Islands case (1920–1921), in the UN Charter (1945), during the UN 
discussions on General Assembly Resolution 1514 (1960) and the 
International Covenants on Human Rights (1966), and at the 
International Court of Justice proceedings on Kosovo (2008–2010). 
Together, these uses of ‘self-determination’ constitute the ‘self-
determination moments’ of my thesis.  
 
Taking a hitherto unexplored approach to ‘self-determination’, this 
thesis builds on previous scholarship on the concept – produced 
primarily within the fields of international law and international 
relations – and examines it from the perspective of intellectual and 
international history. Applying the methodology of Quentin Skinner, 
the thesis shows that the significant international mentions of ‘self-
determination’ have sought legitimation. Specifically, the thesis 
argues that the central international references to ‘self-determination’ 
over the past hundred years have sought legitimation by invoking two 
different ideas of freedom: a ‘radical’ idea of freedom, and a ‘liberal-
conservative’ one. Based on a wide-ranging analysis of archival 
materials, published primary sources, original interviews, and relevant 
secondary works, the thesis finds that the liberal-conservative idea of 
freedom has dominated the international appearances of ‘self-
determination’ at the selected ‘self-determination moments’. 
However, it is the radical idea of freedom that has repeatedly triggered 
the re-emergence of ‘self- determination’ as a meaningful concept in 
international discourse, and kept its potency alive. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
‘Self-determination’ emerged as a significant international concept in the 
early 20th century, when Vladimir Ilyich Lenin and Woodrow Wilson 
brought the exact term into international political discourse.1 During the 
decades following Lenin’s and Wilson’s statements and writings, the two 
most ambitious organisations in contemporary international affairs re-
asserted the language of ‘self-determination’ in legal contexts. First, the 
League of Nations invoked ‘self-determination’ in the 1920–1921 Aaland 
Islands case. Second, and more importantly, the UN codified the concept in 
its 1945 Charter as well as in the 1960 Declaration on the Granting of 
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (the ‘Decolonisation 
Declaration’) and in the two International Covenants on Human Rights 
(ICHRs) in 1966. And attesting to the current international importance of 
the concept of ‘self-determination’ is the fact that it featured in the 2008–
2010 proceedings on Kosovo’s declaration of independence at the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ), the UN Court.  
 
All these appearances of the concept of ‘self-determination’ have revealed 
diverging perspectives on its conceptual and practical meaning. Lenin and 
Wilson mentioned it with two very different conceptualisations in mind. The 
1960s Decolonisation Declaration and the 1966 ICHRs were preceded by 
lengthy discussions between state delegates at the UN on what was meant 
by ‘self-determination’. Also the inclusion of the term in the UN Charter 
and in the ICJ case on Kosovo disclosed contrasting understandings. The 
politicians, diplomats, lawyers, and institutions that reiterate ‘self-
determination’ as a concept of international import have confirmed both its 
importance and its ambiguity. One hundred years after its first appearance in 
international discourse, the concept still oscillates between institutional 
formalisation and controversy. 
 
What has remained constant in international invocations of ‘self-
determination’ is the linkage with ideas of freedom. From Lenin’s and 
                                                
1 In this thesis ‘discourse’ broadly refers to texts – political, legal, and diplomatic – 
including recorded oral statements. 
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Wilson’s earliest public references to ‘self-determination’, freedom has been 
used to explain and legitimise arguments and ideas about the concept. 
Originally, the term was unfamiliar; but also later, it has lacked an 
unambiguous definition. Agents2 drawing upon the concept in international 
discourse have thus used the idea of freedom to give it meaning. Along with 
its 20th-century formalisation in international law, its connection with 
freedom is what has made ‘self-determination’ an authoritative international 
reference point. Combined, its legal status and linkage with ideas of 
freedom may explain its continuous re-appearance in international affairs, as 
well as the various attempts to lay claim to it. 
 
Manifestations of ‘self-determination’ in international discourse have been 
characterised by the presence of two conflicting ideas of freedom. These 
will be explained below: suffice it here to note briefly that while the ‘liberal-
conservative’ idea of freedom has given priority to the value of peace, the 
‘radical’ idea has brought equality to the fore. The former idea has 
dominated international references to ‘self-determination’, but also the 
radical version has been evident at each central historical moment studied 
here. Whenever the concept of ‘self-determination’ has emerged on the 
international agenda, proponents of each idea of freedom have implicitly 
sought to appropriate it, by employing their preferred idea as its standard of 
legitimation. Through this dynamic, international mentions of ‘self-
determination’ serve to reveal which understandings of freedom have been 
present in international affairs at specific times in history. 
 
This thesis analyses the international discourse on ‘self-determination’ at 
key points, or ‘moments’, in the 20th and 21st centuries, seeking to explain 
how this discourse has encompassed the two ideas of freedom. As will be 
seen, all 20th-century ‘self-determination moments’ ended with formal 
‘victory’, in terms of institutional and legal adoption, for what I call the 
‘liberal-conservative’ idea. This would indicate that in international affairs 
of the past hundred years, freedom has been understood primarily in liberal-
conservative terms. On the other hand, also the ‘radical’ idea of freedom has 
                                                
2 I refer jointly to the persons, institutions and states who use the language of ‘self-
determination’ as ‘agents’ or ‘actors’. 
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kept re-surfacing. It has been decisive in triggering the international re-
appearances of the concept of self-determination, and was asserted more 
strongly in connection with the ICJ case, to be dealt with at the end of this 
thesis.  
 
In this introduction, I discuss the state of research on self-determination and 
how my dissertation can add to this literature. After introducing the 
methodological approach followed here, I describe my understanding of the 
two ideas of freedom that have been expressed with ‘self-determination’. 
Finally, I provide an outline of the thesis and its chapters. 
 
Historiography 
Despite its importance in recent international history, the concept of self-
determination has tended to be overlooked by historians. True, it has 
received some attention by historians dealing with either nationalism,3 or the 
achievement of independence of specific states, especially in the context of 
decolonisation.4 But whereas historians in the first category have strictly 
equated references to ‘self-determination’ with nationalist calls for 
secession, the latter have narrowly applied the concept to the process of 
granting independence to former colonies. Typically, diplomatic and 
international historians have discussed self-determination with regard to 
definite events in time and place. Such a focus on historically precise 
applications has left unaddressed the questions of how the term became part 
of international discourse, how it later re-appeared, and the ideas of freedom 
with which it has been associated. Above all, ‘self-determination’ in 
international discourse has yet to be explored from the perspective of 
intellectual history. 
 
That the interest of historians has been thus restricted has left the field 
                                                
3 See e.g. John Breuilly: Nationalism and the State, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1982; 
John Breuilly: ‘Changes in the Political Uses of the Nation: Continuity or 
Discontinuity?’, pp.67–101 in Len Scales and Oliver Zimmer (eds): Power and the 
Nation in European History, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005. 
4 Below I indicate how the approach of this thesis differs from the focus of diplomatic 
histories of decolonisation. For two examples from the historical literature on specific 
countries’ independence, see S. Anatol Lieven: The Baltic Revolution: Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania and the Path to Independence, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT, 1994; 
Cedric Thornberry: A Nation is Born: The Inside Story of Namibia’s Independence, 
Gamsberg Macmillan, 2004. 
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primarily to scholars of international law, with some contributions from 
international relations and political philosophy. Echoing the disagreement 
over the concept at the level of international affairs, such scholars have 
discussed its meaning and value for as long as it has been part of 
international discourse. Works from different disciplines have variously 
described self-determination as a ‘right’, ‘remedy’, ‘principle’, ‘process’, 
and ‘claim’ – with more detailed characterisations ranging from the 
‘plebiscite principle’,5 ‘self-government’,6 ‘the ability of an individual or a 
group to make choices free from the bounds of the institutional framework 
within which they live’,7 to ‘a human need or urge’,8 a ‘doctrine of the 
legitimacy of political institutions’,9 and ‘a struggle for inclusion’.10  
 
Scholars of self-determination have also shared with the politicians, state 
delegates and lawyers who have spoken about the concept internationally 
the inclination to either advocate or reject it.11 Not unlike these international 
agents, scholars have often argued either for or against letting ‘self-
determination’ have prominent place in international affairs, depicting the 
concept as a force for either destructive exclusivism or empowering 
liberation. With this polarised approach, they have failed to recognise that it 
                                                
5 Theodore Woolsey: ‘Self-determination’, American Journal of International Law, 13(2), 
1919, pp.302–305, at p.302. 
6 Avishain Margalit and Joseph Raz: ‘National Self-determination’, Journal of Philosophy, 
87(9), 1990, pp.439–461, at p.440. 
7 Robert McCorquodale: ‘Introduction’, pp.i–xxi in Robert McCorquodale (ed.): Self-
determination in International Law, Ashgate, Dartmouth, 2000, at p.xi. 
8 Gerry J. Simpson: ‘The Diffusion of Sovereignty: Self-determination in the Post-colonial 
Age’, Stanford Journal of International Law, 32, 1996, pp.255–286, at p.275. 
9  James Summers: Peoples and International Law: How Nationalism and Self-
determination Shape a Contemporary Law of Nations, Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden, 2007, 
p.44. 
10  Karen Knop: Diversity and Self-determination in International Law, Cambridge 
University Press, New York, 2002, p.13. See also Ian Brownlie: ‘An Essay in the 
History of the Principle of Self-determination’, pp.90–99 in Grotian Society Papers (C. 
H. Alexandrowicz, ed.), Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1968, at p.90; David B. Knight 
and Maureen Davies: Self-determination: an Interdisciplinary Annotated Bibliography, 
Garland Publishing, New York, 1987. 
11 For opposite views see James Anaya: ‘A Contemporary Definition of the International 
Norm of Self-determination’, Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems, 3(1), 
1993, pp.131–164, as contrasted with Amitai Etzioni: ‘The Evils of Self-determination’, 
Foreign Policy, 89, 1992/1993, pp.21–35. Only a handful of scholars have so far noted, 
and then without much elaboration, self-determination’s ‘built-in ambivalence’ of 
progressiveness and threat (Antonio Cassese: Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal 
Reappraisal, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1995, pp.5–6): that it may be able 
to suspend the usual legal norms (Nathaniel Berman: ‘Sovereignty in Abeyance: Self-
determination and International Law’, Wisconsin International Law Journal, 7(1), 
1988/1989, pp.51–105, especially pp.58, 75), by using ‘the language of bottom–up mass 
politics’ against the usual elitism of international law (Summers 2007, p.xxxvi).  
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is precisely the complex, diverging potentialities of self-determination that 
have sustained it as a powerful international concept. Some one hundred 
years after its establishment in high-level international affairs, it still 
provokes strong reactions, all the while evading repeated attempts to pin it 
down.  
 
These ‘good’ versus ‘bad’ approaches are united in their assumption that the 
meaning of ‘self-determination’ is sufficiently uniform to enable a decisive 
position on it. But its record in international affairs pulls it away from such 
definitional attempts. Over the course of the past century, ‘self-
determination’ has meant different things – conceptually and in practice – to 
different people at different times. Ernesto Laclau has described as a 
‘floating signifier’ a notion that does not per se denote a precise meaning 
that remains constant once it has been articulated, but is (re)defined in 
situations of change. 12  Rather than seeking to define such ‘floating 
signifiers’, we should understand them in terms of ongoing attempts to 
hegemonise their content and fix their meaning.13 Although this thesis is 
similarly sceptical to the possibility of fixing ‘self-determination’ with one 
single authoritative, lasting definition, neither does it share Laclau’s 
emphasis on the always-changing content of floating signifiers.14 I see ‘self-
determination’ as a concept found in the tension between the liberal-
conservative and radical ideas of freedom. 
 
Beyond this broad understanding, this thesis does not operate with a 
definition that would sum up the concept in different words than ‘self-
determination’. I hold that the concept does not exist separately from the 
particular language of ‘self-determination’: it cannot be fully expressed with 
different words – the term and concept are one and the same.15 In the 
absence of any definition, it is also impossible to identify how and when the 
                                                
12 Ernesto Laclau: New Reflections on the Revolution of our Time, Verso, London, 1993, 
p.28. Claude Lévi-Strauss was the first to employ the term ‘floating signifier’. 
13 Laclau 1993, p.28. 
14 Ibid., pp.18–19, 31. 
15 See Annabel Brett: ‘What is Intellectual History now?’, pp.113–131 in David Cannadine 
(ed.): What is History Now?, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2002, especially p.117; 
Reinhardt Koselleck: Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time, Columbia 
University Press, New York, 2004, pp.84–85. I am aware of Koselleck’s specification of 
‘concepts’ as interconnected with words, in contrast to ‘ideas’, but the distinction 
between ‘concepts’ and ‘ideas’ is not central to this thesis.  
 12 
12 
‘concept’ might have been articulated in different terms. Such identification 
would require definitional guidance on what these other terms might have 
been, but no such guidance can be found. 16  Consequently, this thesis 
concentrates on international appearances of the specific term ‘self-
determination’, in English.17 English was also a widely used and unifying 
language in 20th- and 21st-century international affairs. Both the League of 
Nations and the UN produced official records in English (although, of 
course, not only in English). In this thesis, only Lenin’s references to ‘self-
determination’ were not originally, or officially, produced in English. The 
decision to nevertheless rely on English versions of Lenin’s language of 
‘self-determination’ results from its international import, especially the 
influence on Woodrow Wilson. Wilson’s internationalisation of ‘self-
determination’ reacted not only to Lenin’s broader ideas, but also to his use 
of this word, as Wilson had read it in English. 
 
I return later to the historiography of the specific moments covered in this 
thesis, but will note here that my exclusive concentration on ‘self-
determination’ in international discourse entails an historical starting point 
different from that of other scholars. Most of the literature has commenced 
with the alleged conceptual ancestors of self-determination and found these, 
inter alia, in ‘ancient’ times,18 ‘early medieval Western Europe’,19 the Age 
of Enlightenment, 20  and the French and American revolutions. 21  Also 
democratic theory, liberalism, and nationalism have been indicated as being 
among the predecessors.22 Usually, after such a start, the literature has 
proceeded to discuss the post-1945 legal application of self-determination, 
examining actual cases such as those of East Timor and socialist 
                                                
16 Ibid., p.325. 
17 See also Quentin Skinner: ‘A Genealogy of the Modern State’, Proceedings of the 
British Academy, 162, 2009, pp.325–370, at p.325. 
18 Simpson 1996, p.261. 
19 Summers 2007, p.86. 
20 Thomas D. Musgrave: Self-determination and National Minorities, Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1997, p.1. 
21 E.g. Cassese 1995, pp.11–22. By contrast, Gilbert Murray: ‘Self-determination of 
Nationalities’, Journal of the British Institute of International Affairs, 1(1), 1922, pp.6–
13 insists on the ‘clearly’ German origin of the concept. 
22 See e.g. Deon Geldenhuys: Contested States in World Politics, Palgrave Macmillan, 
London 2009, p.29; Alfred Cobban: The Nation State and National Self-Determination, 
Collins, London 1969. 
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Yugoslavia.23 
 
By contrast, my examination of ‘self-determination’ starts with the 
introduction of this exact language into international discourse. In 1918, 
Wilson cited ‘self-determination’ internationally in response to Lenin’s 
earlier references. This is a pivotal moment, also since the international 
import of self-determination relates to its association with ideas of freedom 
and its inclusion in international law: Both features stem from the 
international emergence of the concept with the words and ideas of Lenin 
and Wilson. This is not to deny that the language of ‘self-determination’ 
may have drawn upon earlier philosophical traditions or historical 
developments. But the introduction of this precise phrase, in English, in 
international political and legal discourse – which is the focus of this thesis 
– came in 1918, and was due to Lenin and Wilson. 
 
                                                
23 See, inter alia, S. Joseph, J. Schulz and M. Castan: ‘Right of Self-determination – Article 
1’ pp.99–107 in S. Joseph, J. Schulz and M. Castan (eds): The International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights: Cases, Materials and Commentary, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2005; James Crawford: ‘The Right of Self-Determination in International 
Law: Its Development and Future’, pp.7-67 in Philip Alston (ed.): People’s Rights, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford 2000a. For separate analysis of specific cases as 
matters of ‘self-determination’, see Steven Hillebrink: The Right to Self-determination 
and Post-colonial Governance. The Case of the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba, TMC 
Asser Press, The Hague, 2008 and John R. Ballard: Triumph of Self-determination: 
Operation Stabilise and United Nations Peacekeeping in East Timor, Praeger Security 
International, Westport, CT, 2008; Obiora Chinedu Okafor: Re-defining Legitimate 
Statehood: International Law and State Fragmentation in Africa, Martinus Nijhoff, 
London, 2000; Raphael Chijoke Njoku: ‘Nationalism, Separatism, and Neoliberal 
Globalism: A review of Africa and the Quest for Self-determination since the 1940s’, 
pp.338–361 in Don H. Doyle (ed.): Secession as an International Phenomenon: From 
America’s Civil War to Contemporary Separatist Movements, University of Georgia 
Press, Athens, GA 2010; Kwame Nimako: ‘Nkrumah, African Awakening and Neo-
colonialism: How Black America Awakened Nkrumah and Nkrumah awakened Black 
America’, The Black Scholar, 40(2), 2009, pp.54–70; Prakash Sinha: ‘Self-
determination in International Law and its Applicability to the Baltic Peoples’, pp.256–
285 in Adolf Sprudzs and Armins Rusis (eds) Res Baltica: A Collection of Essays in 
Honor of the Memory of Dr. Alfred Bilmanis (1887–1948), A.W. Sijthoff-Leyden, 1968; 
Bryan O’Linn: The Priority for Namibia Today: An Honourable Peace, Namibia 
Publications, London, 1985; Peter Radan: The Break-up of Yugoslavia in International 
Law, Routledge, London, 1988; Stefan Oeter: ‘The Dismemberment of Yugoslavia: An 
Update on Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Montenegro’, German Yearbook of 
International Law, 50, 2007, pp.457–521; Payam Akhavan: ‘Self-determination and the 
Disintegration of Yugoslavia: what Lessons for the International Community?’, pp.227–
248 in Donald Clark and Robert Williamson (eds): Self-determination: International 
Perspectives, MacMillan Press, London 1996; Carey Levine: ‘The Legacy of Humpty 
Dumpty: The Role of Recognition in the Dissolution of Yugoslavia’, pp.126–135 in 
Metta Spencer (ed.): The Lessons of Yugoslavia, Elsevier Science, New York, 2000; 
Hurst Hannum: ‘Self-determination, Yugoslavia, and Europe: Old Wine in New 
Bottles?’, Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems, 3, 1993a, pp.57–69.  
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Despite disagreements on the definition and value of self-determination, 
scholars have tended to ask the same questions about the concept.24 At the 
bottom line, their interest has been in its possible implementation in actual 
politics and law – in formulating criteria and guidelines fit to produce 
pragmatic solutions to current conflicts.25 Turning to past cases, scholars of 
international law have aimed at formulating legal criteria; international 
relations scholars have sought policy recommendations; and political 
philosophers have looked for moral standards as to when self-determination 
might be warranted in practice. 26  This criteria-centred orientation has 
included scholars such as Antonio Cassese, Hurst Hannum, and Allen 
Buchanan.27 These and others have suggested conditions for granting groups 
                                                
24 This is the case even when titles promise new approaches, such as Nihal Jayawickrama: 
‘The Right of Self-determination: A Time for Reinvention and Renewal’, pp.354–374 in 
Clark and Williamson (eds) 1996; Hurst Hannum: ‘Rethinking Self-determination’, 
Virginia Journal of International Law, 34(1), 1993b, pp.1–69; Ephraim Nimni: 
‘Nationalism, Ethnicity, and Self-determination: A Paradigm Shift’, pp.21–37 in Keith 
Breen and Shane O’Neill (eds): After the Nation? Critical Reflections on Nationalism 
and Postnationalism, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2010; Robin C. A. White: 
‘Self-determination: Time for a Re-Assessment?’, Netherlands International Law 
Review, 28, 1981, pp.147–170. 
25 The separate reviews of Knop 2002 by Hurst Hannum, Robert Hayden and Wendy 
Lacey are telling, in their search for something ‘useful’ in the scholarship on self-
determination, ‘Book forum’ AUSTLII, 9, 2003, accessed 30 March 2011, 
www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MqLJ/2003/9.html. 
26 For recent examples of political philosophy, see Christopher Wellmann: ‘The Morality 
of Secession’, pp.19–36 and Aleksandar Pavkovic: ‘By the Force of Arms. Violence and 
Morality in Secessionist Conflict’, pp.259–276; both in Doyle (ed.) 2010; Allen E 
Buchanan: ‘The Right to Self-determination: Analytical and Moral Foundations’, 
Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law, 8(2), 1991, pp.41–50; Margaret 
Moore: The Ethics of Nationalism, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001; Margalit and 
Raz 1990, p.439; Allen Buchanan: ‘Uncoupling Secession from Nationalism and 
Intrastate Autonomy from Secession’, pp.81–114 in Hannum and Babbitt (eds) 2006; 
Nicolaus Tideman: ‘Secession as a Human Right’, Journal of Moral Philosophy, 1(1), 
2004, pp.9–19; Anna Moltchanova: National Self-Determination and Justice in 
Multinational States, Springer, London and New York, 2009, p.5; Tamar Meisels: 
Territorial Rights, Springer, Tel Aviv, 2009. See also Burke A. Hendrix: Ownership, 
Authority, and Self-determination, Pennsylvania State University Press, Pennsylvania, 
2008, pp.1, 181; Geneviève Nootens: ‘Liberal Restrictions on Public Arguments: Can 
Nationalist Claims be Moral Reasons in Liberal Public Discourse?’, pp.237–260 in 
Jocelyne Couture, Kai Nielsen and Michel Seymour (eds): Rethinking Nationalism, 
University of Calgary Press, Calgary, 1996, e.g. p.255; the contributions in Margaret 
Moore (ed.): National Self-determination and Secession, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 1998. For policy-oriented perspectives see e.g. Kamal S. Shehadi: ‘Ethnic Self-
determination and the Break-up of States’ Adelphi Paper, 283, December 1993, 
International Institute for Strategic Studies; Marc Weller: Escaping the Self-
determination Trap, Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden, 2008a; Chadwick 2011; Yonah 
Alexander and Robert A. Friedlander (eds): Self-determination: National, Regional and 
Global Dimensions, Westview Press, Boulder, CO, 1980; Dino Kritsiotis (ed.): Self-
determination: Cases of Crisis, University of Hull Law School, Hull, 1994. 
27  Key works: Cassese 1995; Hurst Hannum: Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-
determination: The Accommodation of Conflicting Rights, University of Pennsylvania 
Press, Philadelphia, PA, 1996; Allen Buchanan: Secession: The Morality of Political 
Divorce from Fort Sumter to Lithuania and Quebec, Westview, CO, 1991. 
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‘self-determination’, such as exhaustion of all other means, documented 
human rights violations against claimants,28 as well as the representativeness 
of group leaders29 and their commitment to human rights and democracy.30  
 
The criterion that scholars have most frequently proposed for implementing 
self-determination is that the group seeking it must constitute a properly 
defined ‘people’.31 According to this line of thought, only proper definition 
as a self-determination ‘unit’ can make a group eligible for self-
determination – defining the self, they say, goes to the heart of the 
problématique.32 Legal scholars Jan Hendrik W. Verzijl and James Crawford 
have both pointed out that it is meaningless to have a legal ‘right’ to self-
determination without a clear ‘right-holder’.33 Avishai Margalit and Joseph 
Raz have similarly held that the issue of the ‘self’ is more important than the 
possible outcomes of disputes on self-determination.34  
 
                                                
28 Nanda 1981, p.275. See also Lee C. Buchheit: Secession: The Legitimacy of Self-
determination, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT, 1978, p.219. 
29  Jonathan I. Charney: ‘Self-determination: Chechnya, Kosovo, and East Timor’, 
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 34, 2001, pp.455–468, at p.464: Cassese 
1995, p.167; James Crawford: Creation of States in International Law, Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 2006, p.387; David Makinson: ‘Rights of Peoples: Point of View of a 
Logician’, pp.69–92 in James Crawford (ed.): The Rights of Peoples, Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1988, e.g. p.77. 
30  Daniele Archibugi: ‘A Critical Analysis of the Self-determination of Peoples: A 
Cosmopolitan Perspective’, Constellations 10(4), 2003, pp.488–505, at p.500. 
31 See e.g. Alina Kaczorowska: Public International Law, Routledge, London, 2010, 
pp.579-580, 598, 602, 607-611. 
32 E.g. Richard N Kiwanuka: ‘The Meaning of “People” in the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights’, American Journal of International Law, 82, 1988, pp.80–101; 
Rupert Emerson: ‘Self-Determination’, American Journal of International Law, 65, 
1971, pp.459–475, at p.463; Hans Kelsen: The Law of the United Nations: A Critical 
Analysis of its Fundamental Problems, Stevens and Sons, London, 1950, pp.50–53; 
McCorquodale 1994, pp.866–8; Makinson 1988, e.g. p.72; Hannum 1996, e.g. p.31; 
Anthony Whelan: ‘Wilsonean Self-determination and the Versailles Settlement’, 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 43, January 1994, pp.99–115, at p.103; 
Joshua Castellino: International Law and Self-determination, Martinus Nijhoff, The 
Hague, 2000, e.g. pp.45, 64; Rodolfo Stavenhagen: ‘Self-determination: Right or 
Demon?’, pp.1–8 in Clark and Williamson (eds) 1996, at p.6; Musgrave 1997, p.148; 
Clyde Eagleton: ‘Self-determination in the United Nations’, American Journal of 
International Law, 47(1), Jan 1953, pp.88–93, at pp.91–92; Christian Tomuschat: 
‘Secession and Self-determination’, pp.23–45 in Marcelo G. Kohen (ed.): Secession: 
International Law Perspectives, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006, at p.23; 
Margalit and Raz 1990, pp.442–443; David Copp: ‘International Law and Morality in 
the Theory of Secession’, Journal of Ethics (2), 1998, pp.219–245, especially pp.227, 
229; David Miller: ‘Secession and the Principle of Nationality’, pp.62–75 in Moore 
(ed.) 1998, at p.69; Summers 2007, xxxiii–xxxiv; also Natan Lerner: Group Rights and 
Discrimination in International Law, Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1991, p.36. 
33 Verzijl 1968, e.g. p.322; Crawford 2006, p.115.  
34 Margalit and Raz 1990, pp.442–447 for criteria; p.454 for the latter question. 
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Others have noted the paradox involved in the search for a defined self-
determination beneficiary. Nathaniel Berman has asked whether 
international law can ‘recognize a right accruing to an entity which, by its 
own admission, lacks international legal existence’.35 And Karen Knop has 
maintained that achieving an international legal status as a right-holder 
equal to other right-holders can be a pivotal part of self-determination 
claims. 36  Although beyond the scope of this thesis, these latter 
conceptualisations interestingly point to framing ‘self-determination’ in 
terms of what Hannah Arendt called the ‘right to have rights.37 
 
In endeavouring to define the unit entitled to self-determination, scholars 
have often turned to ideas of the nation – implying, with varying degrees of 
enthusiasm, that the ‘self’ is inevitably shaped along national lines.38 On this 
point, the cross-disciplinary literature on self-determination has intersected 
with the large body of thought on ‘nationalism’.39 A premise of linking self-
determination with nationalism is that the type of political freedom sought 
with reference to ‘self-determination’ is grounded in national affiliation, and 
that the unit demanding it seeks legitimation by purporting to constitute a 
nation. 40  Similar assumptions have guided authors discussing self-
                                                
35 Berman 1988/1989, p.52. 
36 Knop 2002, p.374. 
37 See Hannah Arendt: The Origins of Totalitarianism, Harcourt, Brace, New York, 1985. 
For recent discussions, see Ayten Gündodu: ‘“Right to have rights”: Arendt and 
Agamben on Politics of Human Rights’, Paper for the UMN Political Theory 
Colloquium, 3 March 2006; Andrew Schaap: ‘Enacting the Right to have Rights: Jaques 
Rancière's Critique of Hannah Arendt’, European Journal of Political Theory, 10(1), 
2011, pp.22–45. 
38 See Musgrave 1997, pp.102–117; Cobban 1969; Ian Brownlie: ‘The Rights of Peoples in 
Modern International Law’, pp.1–16 in Crawford (ed.): 1988, at p.5. In Couture et al. 
(eds) 1996, David Miller: ‘Secession and the Principle of Nationality’ pp.261–282 is 
positive to such a definition, at p.265; Omar Dahbour: ‘The Nation-State as a Political 
Community: A Critique of the Communitarian Argument for National Self-
determination’, pp.311–344 is negative, at p.339.  
39 For a few examples, see Ernest Gellner: Nations and Nationalism, Blackwell, Oxford, 
2007; Breuilly 2005; John Hutchinson: Nations as Zones of Conflict, Sage, London, 
2005; Breen and O’Neill (eds) 2010; Antony D. Smith: Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, 
History, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2003a and Antony D. Smith: Nationalism and 
Modernism: A Critical Survey of Recent Theories of Nations and Nationalism, 
Routledge, London, 2003b: Liah Greenfeld: Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity, 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1992. 
40 See e.g. Michael Walzer: ‘The New Tribalism: Notes on a Difficult Problem’, Dissent, 
Spring 1992, pp.164–171; Jeff Spinner: The Boundaries of Citizenship: Race, Ethnicity, 
and Nationality in the Liberal State, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MD, 
1994, e.g. p.142; most contributions in David Wippman (ed.): International Law and 
Ethnic Conflict, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 1998 are based on the same 
assumption, although Lea Brilmayer (in ‘The Institutional and Instrumental Value of 
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determination in the context of minorities 41  and indigenous peoples, 42 
indicating that these demand ‘self-determination’ due to their particular 
‘national’ or ‘ethnic’ identities. A vast majority of scholars appear to assume 
that nationalism lies at the core of ‘self-determination’ and the claimants’ 
aim of statehood. 43 
 
My thesis is not concerned with these preoccupations.44 There is no need to 
define the identity and eligibility criteria of a self-determination claimant in 
order to explore the concept of self-determination in international affairs or 
its associated ideas of freedom. Understanding ‘self-determination’ in 
international discourse does not require a general definition of the ‘self’. 
Neither of the two ideas of freedom used to legitimate language on ‘self-
determination’ originally stressed claimants’ intra-group identity, as will be 
shown in the next two chapters. From my perspective, in any given ‘self-
determination moment’, the question is not how a claimant may be defined 
                                                                                                                        
Nationalism”, pp.58–85) disputes that claims are based on such homogeneity, at p.59. 
41 See e.g. Patrick Thornberry: ‘Self-Determination, Minorities, Human Rights: A Review 
of International Instruments’, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 38, 1989, 
pp.867–889; Margaret Moore: ‘On National Self-Determination’, Political Studies, 
45(5), 1997, pp.900–913, at pp.902–903. See also Summers 2007. 
42 E.g. Chris Tennant: ‘Indigenous Peoples, International Institutions, and the International 
Legal Literature from 1945–1993’, Human Rights Quarterly, 16, 1994, pp.1–57; Philip 
S. Deloria: ‘Chapter One – The Era of Indian Self-Determination: An Overview’, 
pp.191–197 in Kenneth R. Philip (ed.): Indian Self Rule: First-Hand Accounts of 
Indian–White Relations from Roosevelt to Reagan, Utah State University Press, Salt 
Lake City, UT, 1986; Glen Coulthard: ‘Beyond Recognition: Indigenous self-
determination as Prefigurative Practice’ pp.187–203 in Leanne Simpson (ed.): Lighting 
the Eight Fire: The Liberation, Resurgence, and Protection of Indigenous Peoples, 
Arbeiter Ring, Winnipeg, 2008; Glenn T. Morris: ‘In Support of the Right to Self-
Determination for Indigenous Peoples under International Law,’ German Yearbook of 
International Law, 29, 1986, pp.277–316; James Anaya: Indigenous Peoples in 
International Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004, pp.97–128; Gudmundur 
Alfredsson: ‘The Right of Self-determination and Indigenous Peoples’, pp.41–54 in 
Christian Tomuschat (ed.) Modern Law of Self-determination, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2001; Karen Engle: The Elusive Promise of Indigenous Development: Rights, 
Culture, Strategy, Duke University Press, Durham, NC, 2010; Erica-Irene A. Daes: ‘The 
Right of Indigenous Peoples to “Self-determination” in the Contemporary World 
Order’, pp.47–57 in Clark and Williamson (eds) 1996, at p.53; Hannum 1996, p.454; 
Tomuschat 2006, p.37. 
43 Berman 1988/1989, p.53; Wayne Norman: Negotiating Nationalism: Nation-building, 
Federalism, and Secession in the Multinational State, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2006, p.183.  
44 Cassese 1995, pp.326–327; McCorquodale 1994, p.868 and Summers 2007, p.xxxvii, 
indicate views closer to those of my own. Also not accepting the ‘self’ as their starting 
point, some political philosophers understand ‘self-determination’ as a case of ‘polity 
formation’, Zoran Oklopcic: ‘Eight Thesis on Self-determination: From Self-
determination of Peoples to Principles of Polity-formation?’, University of Toronto, 
undated, p.4; or a ‘speech act’, Uriel Abulof: ‘We the peoples? The Birth and Death of 
Self-determination’, Tel Aviv University and Princeton University Woodrow Wilson 
School, 2010. 
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on national, linguistic, historical or territorial lines, or according to other 
such criteria. Rather, my interest lies in identifying which ideas of freedom 
have been used to legitimate the international ‘self-determination’ discourse. 
 
In conceptual terms, moreover, once the demand for political freedom has 
been made as a call for ‘self-determination’, the political ‘self’ is already 
there – in the words of Peter Hallward – as a ‘people who participate in the 
active willing of a general will as such’.45 He puts this point well:  
 
Such a will is at work in the mobilization of any emancipatory 
collective force – a national liberation struggle, a movement for 
social justice, an empowering political or economic association, and 
so on. ‘The people’ at issue here are simply those who, in any given 
situation, formulate, assert and sustain a fully common (and thus 
fully inclusive and egalitarian) interest, over and above any divisive 
or exclusive interest.46 
 
This understanding suggests that it is the aspirational and future-oriented 
features of ‘self-determination’, and not the current character of its subjects, 
that is conceptually constitutive of the ‘self’. Since willing ‘self-
determination’ thus itself creates the relevant unit, a general definition 
becomes superfluous.  
 
In this light, the massive scholarly concentration on the ‘self’ appears as a 
distraction, unduly shifting attention to claimants’ identity. The international 
language on ‘self-determination’ has not sought legitimation primarily by 
emphasising the internal characteristics of the claimant group, but by 
appealing to freedom – whether understood in liberal-conservative or in 
radical terms. The scholarly preoccupation with the question of the claiming 
‘unit’ has obscured these crucial features of the international ‘anatomy’ of 
self-determination. Furthermore, decades of probing for definite legal, 
moral, and policy criteria as to when and how to grant self-determination to 
                                                
45 Peter Hallward: ‘The Will of the People: Notes Towards a Dialectical Voluntarism’, 
Radical Philosophy, 155, May/June 2009, pp.17–29, at p.18.  
46 Ibid., p.18. That this usually has meant being present on a certain territory is a feature of 
self-determination demands beyond the scope of my thesis; for some analysis, see 
Robert David Sack: Human Territoriality: Its Theory and History, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1986; Lea Brilmayer: ‘Secession and Self-Determination: 
A Territorial Interpretation’, Yale Journal of International Law, 16, 1991, pp.177–202; 
and Lea Ypi: ‘What’s Wrong with Colonialism’, Philosophy & Public Affairs, 41(2), 
2013, pp.158-191. 
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a properly pigeonholed ‘self’ have not yielded success. Disagreement 
persists among scholars, policymakers, and lawyers. It is thus time to move 
on. In removing ‘self-determination’ from the narrowly pragmatic-oriented 
literature, this thesis is the first work of intellectual history to embark on an 
analysis of the concept in international affairs. 
 
Another point on which my approach departs from most existing works 
concerns their objections to the ‘political’ nature of self-determination.47 
Scholars of international law have often argued that this has made it an 
excessively vague, ‘manipulative’,48 meaningless and incoherent,49 ‘slogan-
like’50 concept, associated with ‘slipperiness’51 and ‘evils’.52 Even scholars 
who favour ‘self-determination’ have seemed wary of its political 
connotations. Of course, in the real world, questions of self-determination 
do involve assessing and comparing political demands. The outcome will 
rarely, if ever, satisfy more than one side.53 However, rather than denying 
that self-determination is a political concept, or dismissing it for that reason, 
this thesis sees its political nature as essential to understanding its use in 
international affairs.54 
                                                
47  See e.g. Karl Josef Partsch: ‘Fundamental Principles of Human Rights: Self-
determination, Equality and Non-discrimination’, pp.61–86 in Karel Vasak (gen. ed.) 
and Philip Alston (English ed.): The International Dimensions of Human Rights, Vol. I, 
Greenwood Press, Westport, CT, 1982, p.68. 
48 Simpson 1996, p.259. 
49  See e.g. Thomas M. Franck: The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1990, pp.153–156, 162. 
50 Jan Hendrik W. Verzijl: International Law in Historical Perspective, A. W. Sijthoff, 
Leyden, 1968, p.321. 
51 Eirin Jenne: ‘National Self-determination: A Deadly Mobilizing Device’, pp.7–36 in 
Hurst Hannum and Eileen F. Babbitt (eds): Negotiating Self-determination, Lexington 
Books, Oxford, 2006, at p.7. 
52 Etzioni 1992/1993. See also Elizabeth Chadwick: Self-determination in the Post-9/11 
Era, Routledge, London, 2011, p.141. A few legal scholars do mention the political 
nature of self-determination and secession without drawing equally negative 
conclusions: Summers 2007, p.316; Christian Tomuschat: ‘Self-determination in a Post-
colonial World’, pp.1–20 in Tomuschat (ed.) 2001, at p.1; Knop 2002, p.374 Hurst 
Hannum: ‘Self-determination in the Twenty-first Century’, pp.61–80 in Hannum and 
Babbit (eds) 2006, at p.77. 
53 Some scholars have recognised this, including Brilmayer 1991, p.193; Margaret Moore: 
‘The Territorial Dimension of Self-determination’, pp.134–157 in Moore (ed.): National 
Self-determination and Secession, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998. Arnold 
Toynbee: ‘Art 7: Self-Determination’, Quarterly Review, London, 1925, pp.317–338, at 
p.323. 
54 On this point, deeper insights are found within the field of political philosophy, where, 
for instance, Charles Tilly acknowledges the confrontational character of self-
determination, ‘National Self-Determination as a Problem for All of Us’, Daedalus, 
122(3), 1993, p.31; The Politics of Collective Violence, Cambridge University Press, 
New York, 2003. See also Rogers Brubaker: ‘Myths and Misconceptions in the Study of 
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For instance, in inescapably political terms, self-determination claimants 
tend to be agonistic55 in demanding radical freedom against and from the 
domination and ‘other-determination’ of a certain ‘enemy’.56 Also at the 
level of high-level international affairs, those favouring the ‘radical’ idea of 
freedom in their ‘self-determination’ discourse have promoted total 
liberation57 from such an ‘other’ through the establishment of a new body 
politic. In practice, this has meant backing peoples’ free choice of secession 
and political independence, or unification with another political entity. As 
scholars of critical legal theory have pointed out, international law – of 
which the language of ‘self-determination’ is part – itself partakes in the 
deeply political, ‘conflictual’ process driving international affairs.58 
 
In effect, by normatively59 demanding a new political and legal order and a 
group’s disassociation from an existing structure, the radical idea present in 
calls for ‘self-determination’ has signified an ‘ultimate’ form of political 
dissent.60 Like the agents expressing this radical idea at international level, 
concrete claimants of ‘self-determination’ have not sought merely to 
improve an existing order in terms of, for instance, human rights: no, they 
have demanded liberation in terms of their gaining the power to decide on 
the basic framework in which laws are created and rights protected. The 
question of whether such liberation has been at all realisable in the 
globalised 20th and 21st centuries is beyond the scope of this thesis. But ever 
since ‘self-determination’ became part of international law, the concept has 
                                                                                                                        
Nationalism’, pp.233-260 in Moore (ed.) 1998, at pp.234, 240. 
55 See Chantal Mouffe: On the Political, Routledge, London, 2005, and Carl Schmitt – 
whom Mouffe also draws upon: The Theory of the Partisan: A Commentary/Remark on 
the Concept of the Political, Buncker & Humboldt, Berlin 1963, p.65. 
56 See Schmitt 1963, p.65: ‘The heart of the political is […] the distinction of friend and 
enemy’. For another helpful discussion of the ‘political’ see Jacques Rancière: ‘Ten 
Theses on Politics’, Theory and Event, 5(3), 2001, pp.1–16. 
57  As being set ‘free from imprisonment, slavery, or oppression’, Oxford English 
Dictionary, oxforddictionaries.com/, accessed 2 April 2013. 
58 See China Miéville: Between Equal Rights: A Marxist Theory of International Law, 
Pluto Press, London 2005, p.27, with reference to Schmitt. See also Martti 
Koskenniemi: ‘National Self-determination Today: Problems of Legal Theory and 
Practice’, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 43, April 1994, pp.241–249, at 
p.244  
59 See Schmitt 1963, p.24. 
60  See also Brilmayer 1991, pp.187, 191; Bill Bowring: The Degradation of the 
International Legal Order? The Rehabilitation of Law and the Possibility of Politics, 
Glasshouse, Oxford, 2008.  
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opened for the possibility of disbanding the state units on which this law 
rests, thereby undermining it from within.61 
 
The liberal-conservative idea of freedom is no less political than the radical 
one. International discourse has brought out the liberal-conservative idea 
when agents have sought to legitimise their arguments and ideas about ‘self-
determination’ through reference to peace and non-interference with 
existing borders and orders. The political implications of couching ‘self-
determination’ in such terms have been to conservatively favour the 
established status quo and those benefiting from it. In fact, the radical idea 
present in international ‘self-determination’ discourse has contained 
conservative features as well. Generally, the radical idea has not called for 
the creation of a completely new type of political association, but has 
aspired for yet another state.62 Further, the central aim of the radical idea has 
been to achieve a status of equality with existing states and systems. It has 
not sought to elevate the status of pre-existing states, or to arrange politics 
along wholly different organising lines.63  
 
Of these propensities indirectly competing to determine international 
language on ‘self-determination’, the radical push for freedom as new state 
creation has induced alarm among scholars. Noting the threat this could 
pose to the territorial integrity of established states, scholars have claimed 
that the very notion of ‘self-determination’ is a ‘reason for grave concern’.64 
Allowing the concept an international role, they have held, might bring 
‘chaos’,65 ‘disruption and subversion’,66 ‘violence and destruction – even 
                                                
61 Summers (2007) concedes that a law of self-determination may be a ‘contradiction in 
terms’, but falls short of reflecting the concept’s subversive potential: pp.319, 387. 
62 See also Ian Hurd: ‘Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics’, International 
Organization, 53(2), 1999, pp.379–408, at p.393; Miéville 2005, pp.270–271; Robert H. 
Jackson: ‘Quasi-States, Dual Regimes, and Neoclassical theory: International 
Jurisprudence and the Third World’, International Organization, 41(4), 1987, pp.519–
549, at p.523. 
63 Craig Calhoun: The Roots of Radicalism: Tradition, the Public Sphere and Early 
Nineteenth Century Social Movements, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, 2012, 
has pointed out that an appreciation of tradition has also historically been part of radical 
movements, pp.82–120. For a related legal perspective, see James Crawford: 
‘Democracy and the Body of International Law’, pp.91–122 in Gregory Fox and Brad 
Roth (eds): Democratic Governance and International Law, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2000b, at p.97. 
64 Verzijl 1968, p.335 
65 Etzioni 1992/1993, p.28. 
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war’.67 On the other hand, a few other scholars have seen such arguments as 
produced by a state-centred ‘bias’, and pointed out that a world dominated 
by states is bound to contest a concept of ‘self-determination’ that allows for 
secession from such states.68 They have, however, highlighted this without 
considering the concept of ‘self-determination’ in international affairs from 
an intellectual history viewpoint, and without investigating the ideas of 
freedom evoked with it. 
 
Methodology 
The approach of this thesis has been inspired by certain parts of the 
methodology of Quentin Skinner. 69 As one of the ‘Cambridge school’ 
historians, Skinner has developed his method of intellectual history at least 
since his ground-breaking ‘Meaning and Understanding in the History of 
Ideas’, published in 1969.70 John Pocock is another key name of the 
Cambridge school; but, despite the similarities in their methods, the 
differences between them have led me to refer to Skinner’s scholarship 
                                                                                                                        
66 Verzijl 1968, p.324. 
67 Etzioni 1992/1993, p.34 
68 Robert McCorquodale: ‘Self-Determination: A Human Rights Approach’, International 
Comparative Law Quarterly, 43, October 1994, pp.857–885, at p.885; Tomuschat 2001, 
pp.4–5, 8; Thomas Franck: ‘Postmodern Tribalism and the Right to Secession’, pp.3–27 
in Cathrine Brölman, René Lefeber, Marjoleine Zieck (eds): Peoples and Minorities in 
International Law, Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1993, at p.13; Marc Weller: ‘Settling 
Self-determination Conflicts: Recent Developments’, European Journal of International 
Law, 20(1), 2009, pp.111–165, at p.112; Ved P. Nanda: ‘Self-Determination under 
International Law: Validity of Claims to Secede’, Case W. Res. J. International Law, 13, 
1981, pp.257–276, at p.263. 
69 Among Skinner’s works of intellectual history that have influenced this thesis are 
Hobbes and Republican Liberty, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2008; Liberty 
Before Liberalism, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1998; Skinner 2009; and 
‘The Paradoxes of Political Liberty’, The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, Harvard 
University, 1984. For his methodology, see the next footnote; for his scholarship on 
freedom, see below.  
70  History and Theory, 8, 1969, pp.3–53. Skinner’s major articles on methodology 
(including ‘Meaning and Understanding’) are compiled in Visions of Politics Volume I: 
Regarding Method, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002, upon which I have 
relied in the summary that follows. For appreciations and criticism by others, see James 
Tully (ed.): Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and his Critics, Polity Press, 
Cambridge, 1988, which also contains a few of Skinner’s articles and his reply to his 
critics. See also Donald R. Kelly: ‘Horizons of Intellectual History: Retrospect, 
Circumspect, Prospect’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 48(1), Jan-Mar 1987, pp.143–
169; Joseph M. Levine: ‘Intellectual History as History’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 
66(2), 2005, pp.189–200; Bhikhu Parekh and R. N. Berki: ‘The History of Political 
Ideas: A Critique of Q. Skinner’s Methodology’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 34(2), 
1973, pp.163–184; Emile Perreau-Saussine: ‘Quentin Skinner in Context’, Review of 
Politics, 69(1), 2007, pp.106–122. For an illuminating interview with Skinner see 
Teresa Bejan: ‘Quentin Skinner on Meaning and Method’, Art of Theory, 2011, accessed 
2 November 2012, www.artoftheory.com/quentin-skinner-on-meaning-and-method/. 
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alone rather than that of the Cambridge school as a whole.71 Moreover, I cite 
Skinner rather than the Cambridge school, because the parts of Skinner’s 
approach I am using the least are both those he is best known for, and those 
most closely linked to that school.72 
 
To be concrete, I am following Skinner principally in examining how ideas 
and terms are used in argument;73 I have a special interest in the uses of 
ideas as standards of legitimation in international discourse.74 As Skinner 
has pointed out, expressions of political thought always seek legitimation, 
and are ‘inhibited’ by how they can plausibly be legitimised.75 In this thesis, 
                                                
71 Pocock concentrates even more than Skinner on language and has stated that historians 
of political thought ‘are and should be rhetoricians rather than logicians’ – a position I 
do not fully share, John Pocock: Political Thought and History: Essays on Theory and 
Method, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009, p.27, see also pp.25–27, 51–66. 
For more on his methodology, see Pocock: ‘The Concept of a Language and the Métier 
d’historien: Some Considerations on Practice’, pp.19–38 in Anthony Pagden (ed.): The 
Languages of Political Theory in Early-modern Europe, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1987, at pp.22, 24. For some comparative analyses of their approaches, see 
Skinner and Pocock, in ‘What is Intellectual History?’ History Today, 35(10), 1985, 
pp.46–55; Peter L. Janssen: ‘Political Thought as Traditionary Action: The Critical 
Response to Skinner and Pocock’, History and Theory, 24(2), May 1985, pp.115–146; 
Mark Bevir: ‘Mind and Method in the History of Ideas’, History and Theory, 36(2), 
1997, pp.167–189, and Michael Printy: ‘Skinner and Pocock in Context: Early Modern 
Political Thought Today’, History and Theory, 48, February 2009, pp.113–121. For 
Pocock’s critiques of Skinner, see Pocock: ‘Quentin Skinner: The History of Politics 
and the Politics of History’, Common Knowledge, 10(3), Fall 2004, pp.532–550 and 
Pocock: ‘Concepts and Discourses: A Difference in Culture? Comment on a Paper by 
Melvin Richter’, pp.47–58 in Hartmut Lehmann and Melvin Richter (eds): The Meaning 
of Historical Terms and Concepts: New Studies on Begriffsgeschichte, German 
Historical Institute, Washington, DC, Occasional Paper 15, 1996, at p.55. Pocock’s 
seminal work of history of political thought is The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine 
Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, NJ, 1975. 
72 See below on the specific parts of Skinner’s approach followed here. John Dunn might 
be mentioned as another historian associated with the Cambridge school, see e.g. his 
intellectual histories of, respectively, politics, and democracy, The Cunning of 
Unreason: Making Sense of Politics, HarperCollins, London 2000; Setting the People 
Free: The Story of Democracy, Atlantic Books, London, 2005; on methodology, John 
Dunn: ‘The Identity of the History of Ideas’, Philosophy, 43(164), 1968, pp.85–104. For 
some discussion on the Cambridge school, see Bevir 1997; Efraim Podoksik: ‘How is 
Modern Intellectual History Possible?’ European Consortium for Political Research, 
European Political Science, 9, 2010, pp.304–315. 
73 Skinner 2002, p.86. 
74 See ‘The Idea of a Cultural Lexicon’ pp.158-174 in Skinner 2002. See also Hurd 1999 
on legitimation in international affairs. For a legal perspective, see Martti Koskenniemi: 
‘Hierarchy in International Law: A Sketch’, European Journal of International Law, 8, 
1997, pp.566–582, and above all Martti Koskenniemi: From Apology to Utopia: The 
Structure of International Legal Argument, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
2005. As noted, in this thesis, ‘discourse’ encompasses statements and documents 
issued in high-level political, legal and diplomatic contexts; I return later to those to be 
explored specifically. 
75 Skinner 2002, p.156. Although Skinner refers to legitimation of political action, I take 
this to include ideas and arguments as well, since he understands political ideas in terms 
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I assume that the agents who have used the language of ‘self-determination’ 
internationally sought legitimation for their arguments and ideas. They 
would have done so in order to achieve their instrumental aims of 
convincing immediate audiences – and to enhance their general international 
moral authority, which would again increase their appeal and make their 
arguments more effective.  
 
Like Skinner, I assume that such agents have sought legitimation for their 
discourse on ‘self-determination’ by citing standards they expected to be 
appropriate and valued in the international forums and formats where they 
have operated. 76  Only by employing such standards could they have 
reasonably expected to persuade their various addressees. Individuals did 
not and could not set these legitimising standards themselves, nor would 
they have been drawn to create new or unusual ones.77 Their generally 
brief78 expressions of ‘self-determination’ would have been more likely to 
succeed if founded upon conventions already widely appreciated – rather 
than imaginative and unfamiliar ones. Thus, these agents relied on terms and 
ideals already there, in the domain of international argumentation.79 
 
Crucially, ‘self-determination’ has hence been expressed internationally 
with reference to the legitimising standards already prevalent at the specific 
international moments and forums in question.80 As such, the international 
‘self-determination’ discourse can reveal what these overarching standards 
have been. The standards invoked by agents when talking about ‘self-
determination’ may indeed have been so dominant and taken for granted 
                                                                                                                        
of their uses in argument, and the making of such arguments as speech acts. 
76 This, of course, presupposes that the actors have been rational – which actors, in my 
view, prima facie should be assumed to be. See Skinner: ‘Some Problems in the 
Analysis of Political Thought and Action’, pp.97–118 in Tully (ed.) 1988, at p.113: 
‘unless we begin by assuming the agent’s rationality, we leave ourselves with no means 
of explaining his behaviour’. See also Mark Bevir: The Logic of the History of Ideas, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999, pp.158–159. 
77 Skinner 2002, p.156. 
78 Some of the longer contributions in the ICJ Kosovo proceedings were a partial 
exception; but note that the final 45-page ICJ opinion mentioned ‘self-determination’ 
only in two of its paragraphs. 
79 See e.g. Murray Edelman: ‘Political Language and Political Reality’, PS, Winter 1985, 
pp.10–19, at p.17; Morton A. Kaplan and Nicholas deB. Katzenbach: The Political 
Foundations of International Law, Wiley, New York, 1961, p.343. Why these standards 
are ‘already there’ is not a topic for my thesis, nor is the precise mechanics of 
conceptual change – although I briefly return to this below. 
80 For the following, see Skinner 2002, p.156.  
 25 
25 
that presenters might have been unaware of using them.81 
 
Specifically, as indicated, 20th- and 21st- century international expressions of 
‘self-determination’ have sought primary legitimation with reference to the 
standard of freedom. Given the initial novelty of the exact language of ‘self-
determination’ in international discourse, as well as the lack of a definition 
of the concept, agents have sought to make sense of it to their audiences by 
referring to the recognised standard of ‘freedom’. Such discourse has hence 
reflected the ideas of freedom prevailing internationally at these different 
time-points. At each moment studied in this thesis, the liberal-conservative 
and radical ideas of freedom have shifted in shaping the international 
language of ‘self-determination’, according to the then-current international 
standing of these ideas. Thus, the dominance of the liberal-conservative idea 
indicates that, at those moments, international discourse conceptualised 
‘freedom’ in predominantly liberal-conservative terms. 
 
In identifying uses of the concept of ‘self-determination’ in international 
discourse I rely on speeches, minutes, and other documents from what is 
often understood as the distinct areas of politics and law. Here I follow legal 
scholar Martti Koskenniemi in considering international politics and 
international law as inseparable domains.82 Rather than unfolding on a plane 
separate from politics, conflict or morality, the creation and codification of 
international law appeal to and manifest the same legitimising standards that 
at any given time guide international politics.83 In my view, the languages of 
politics and law emerge from the same context, and make up one sphere of 
discourse directed towards the same aim of legitimation.84 Accordingly, 
                                                
81 See e.g. W. H. Walsh: ‘The Causation of Ideas’, History and Theory, 14(2), 1975, 
pp.186–199, at p.191. 
82 See e.g. Martti Koskenniemi: The Politics of International Law, Hart, Oxford, 2011a; 
Koskenniemi 2005. See also the contributions in James Crawford and Martti 
Koskenniemi (eds): The Cambridge Companion to International Law, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2011; Hurd 1999; Miéville 2005; Antony Anghie: 
Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2005. For a diplomatic history perspective, see Mark Mazower: No 
Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United 
Nations, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 2009; also Mark Mazower: ‘The 
Strange Triumph of Human Rights, 1933–1950’, Historical Journal, 47(2), 2004, 
pp.379–398, at p.380; Fox and Roth 2000. 
83 See also Kaplan and Katzenbach 1961, e.g. p.354. 
84 See e.g. Koskenniemi 2011a, p.v; Cass R. Sunstein: Legal Reasoning and Political 
Conflict, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996; Ronald Dworkin: A Matter of 
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‘international discourse’ in this thesis incorporates what might elsewhere 
have been referred to as either political or legal language. 
 
Understanding the discourse of ‘self-determination’ and its legitimising 
ideas of freedom in use at key moments requires examining these uses in 
context.85 When delineating the relevant contexts for my investigation, I am 
again influenced by Skinner, although only in part. In theory, ‘context’ in 
intellectual history can involve an almost infinite universe of possibilities.86 
Skinner mainly attends to the ‘wider linguistic context’ of utterances: the 
language conventions determining the range of expressions available to an 
agent at a given time.87 The political and social context then enters as ‘the 
ultimate framework for helping to decide what conventionally recognisable 
meanings it might in principle have been possible for someone to have 
intended to communicate’ at a certain time and place.88 This thesis places 
more emphasis on textual analysis than what Skinner’s methodology would 
call for, and demarcates context as the forums and formats of international 
expressions of ‘self-determination’. While using the wider international 
setting as a basic reference point, I leave its details to diplomatic historians, 
who have already covered the specific moments in depth.  
 
In the following, chapters 1 and 2 take up issues of context in examining 
why the phrase ‘self-determination’ became part of international discourse 
in the early 20th century.89 Context in chapter 1 includes the socialist 
positions against which Lenin argued when articulating his concept of ‘self-
determination’, as well as the textual source from which he seems to have 
                                                                                                                        
Principle, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1985. For a different perspective, see 
Martin Loughlin: Sword and Scales: an Examination of the Relationship between Law 
and Politics, Hart, Oxford, 2000, e.g. p.217. 
85 For a recent summary of the content–context relation in intellectual history, see Darshan 
Vigneswaran and Joel Quirk: ‘Past Masters and Modern Inventions: Intellectual History 
as Critical Theory’, International Relations, 24, 2010, pp.107–131, pp.108–112. 
86  ‘[L]inguistic, economic, rhetorical, institutional, biographical, social, political, 
international’ settings may all – alone or in combinations – be seen as decisive, Leslie 
Butler: ‘From the History of Ideas to Ideas in History’, Modern Intellectual History, 
9(1), 2012, pp.157–169, at p.164. See also Martin Jay: ‘Intention and Irony: The 
Missing Encounter Between Hayden White and Quentin Skinner’, History and Theory, 
52, February, 2013, pp.32–48, at p.35; Edelman 1985. 
87 Skinner 2002, p.87. See also pp.101–102. 
88 Ibid., p.87. 
89  See also Quentin Skinner ‘Intellectual History and the History of the Book’, 
Contributions to the History of Concepts, 1(1), 1 March 2005, pp.29–36(8), at p.34. 
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picked up the term. Throughout the thesis, I pay similar attention to how 
textual references constitute part of the context of new ‘self-determination’ 
utterances. Chapter 2 recognises Lenin’s earlier advocacy of ‘self-
determination’ as having generated the context in which Wilson 
internationalised this specific language. Wilson’s pivotal mentions of ‘self-
determination’ came in two speeches he made during and on the First World 
War. The main focus of these first two chapters, however, is on the central 
texts in which Lenin and Wilson referred to ‘self-determination’. 
 
At the moments covered by chapters 3, 4, and 5, ‘self-determination’ was 
already part of the arsenal of international rhetoric, so the relevant context 
can help to explain how ‘self-determination’ was used internationally, and 
how these uses expressed the two different ideas of freedom.90 Chapters 3 to 
5 explore how the language of ‘self-determination’ was employed by state 
representatives when they addressed specific documents and cases at the 
highest levels of international affairs, as well as how this language was 
incorporated in the documents resulting from such deliberations. The forums 
for these expressions of ‘self-determination’ were primarily various UN 
organs, as well as (briefly) the League of Nations.91 The formats of these 
expressions were the language conventionally used in such settings, and the 
documents adopted after the discussions.  
 
Interestingly, the agents who have referred to ‘self-determination’ in the 
international contexts of my thesis have been of a different kind than those 
usually featuring in works of intellectual history. 92  Intellectual history 
                                                
90 See also ibid., p.34. 
91 For continuities between the two organisations, see Mazower 2009.  
92 The reasons for not describing my undertaking as a ‘genealogy’ or ‘conceptual history’ 
are explained below – I also avoid calling it a ‘history of ideas’ project in order to 
maintain a distance to the method associated with Arthur O. Lovejoy and his view that 
the history of political thought should be understood in terms of ‘unit-ideas’. See his 
Great Chain of Being: A Study of the History of an Idea, Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, MA, 1936; Essays in the History of Ideas, Capricorn Books, Ontario, 1960 
and ‘Reflections on the History of Ideas’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 1(1), 1940, 
pp.3–23. For various summaries and attempts at categorisation, see e.g. The Cambridge 
History of Twentieth-Century Political Thought, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge 2003; Kelly 1987; Levine 2005; Anthony Grafton: ‘History of Ideas: Precept 
and Practice, 1950–2000 and Beyond’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 67(1), Jan 2006, 
pp.1–32; the contributions in History Today 1985; Jotham Parsons: ‘Defining the 
History of Ideas’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 68(4), 2007, pp.683–699; Dominick 
LaCapra and Steven L. Kaplan: Modern Intellectual History: Reappraisals and New 
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typically focuses on intellectuals, such as political theorists and scholarly 
authors who developed their ideas at length in books, articles and lectures. 
By contrast, my thesis enquires into how political, diplomatic, institutional, 
and legal agents have used the language of ‘self-determination’ in overt 
interpolations into international affairs. Of the agents to appear, only Wilson 
and Lenin were in part speaking on their ‘own’ behalf, as individuals 
expressing ideas of ‘self-determination’ and freedom. The remaining agents 
were either acting as representatives of states, or were institutions whose 
positions were conveyed by individuals who might not have been personally 
involved in arriving at them. 
 
Given the kinds of agents that express ‘self-determination’ in international 
affairs, the question of authorial intentions has a different role in my thesis 
than in the work of Skinner. Like Skinner, I do regard expressions of ‘self-
determination’ and ideas of freedom as political acts shaped by political 
intentions,93 and do see agents’ intention to legitimise their arguments and 
ideas as crucial to understanding the concept in international discourse. I 
also agree that identifying relevant intentions does not involve searching for 
motivations possibly hidden in agents’ psychology or biography.94 However, 
Skinner is famous for focusing on authors’ ‘intentions in acting’ – and this 
is not reflected in my thesis.95 In one sense, the intentions implied in this 
                                                                                                                        
Perspectives, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 1982; Maurice Mandelbaum: ‘The 
History of Ideas, Intellectual History, and the History of Philosophy’, History and 
Theory, 5(5): The Historiography of the History of Philosophy, 1965, pp.33–66; Dunn 
1968; Roy Harvey Pearce: ‘A Note on Method in the History of Ideas’, Journal of the 
History of Ideas, 9(3), 1948, pp.372–379; Richard Rorty, J. B. Schneewind, Quentin 
Skinner (eds): Philosophy in History: Essays on the Historiography of Philosophy, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1984; Paul A. Roth: ‘Narrative Explanations: 
The Case of History’, History and Theory, 27(1), 1988, pp.1–13; Hayden White: ‘The 
Question of Narrative in Contemporary Historical Theory’, History and Theory, 23(1), 
1984, pp.1–33; Robert B. Pippin: ‘Philosophy is its own Time Comprehended in 
Thought”, Topoi, 25, 2006, pp.85–90; Drew Maciag: ‘When Ideas had Consequences, 
or, Whatever Happened to Intellectual History?’, Reviews in American History, 39(4), 
December 2011, pp.741–751. 
93 See ‘Interpretation and the Understanding of Speech Acts’, pp.103-127 in Skinner 2002. 
For other intellectual history perspectives on intentions, see e.g. Bevir 1999 on ‘weak 
intentionalism’, pp.67–69; and a criticism of this idea in Vivienne Brown: ‘On Some 
Problems with Weak Intentionalism for Intellectual History’, History and Theory, 41(2), 
May 2002, pp.198–208. 
94 Skinner does however show an interest in agents’ educational background. 
95 Skinner 1988, p.263. Drawing on the works of John L. Austin, Skinner explains this in 
terms of ‘illocutionary acts’ and ‘illocutionary forces’. Since intentions have a different 
role in my thesis than in Skinner’s work, I do not use this terminology. See also Skinner 
2002, pp.98, 104, 108–109. For a critique of Skinner’s approach on this point see Keith 
Graham: ‘How do Illocutionary Descriptions Explain?’, pp.147–155 in Tully (ed.) 1988, 
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thesis are more straightforward than those of many historical thinkers. For 
instance, in the 1960 UN debate on the Decolonisation Declaration, state 
delegates explicitly sought to convince the UN General Assembly (UNGA) 
to either adopt or reject the proposed drafts. In the 2008–2010 ICJ case on 
Kosovo, country representatives aimed – and openly argued – to convince 
the Court that Kosovo’s declaration of independence was either legal or 
illegal. My focus on expressions of ‘self-determination’ in the international 
public arena does not require going beyond these openly cited intentions.96  
 
While other schools of intellectual history have been considered when 
developing this thesis’ methodology, their influence has been so limited that 
they will only be briefly mentioned here for the purpose of clarifying my 
own approach. For instance, the method of genealogy associated with 
Michel Foucault and Friedrich Nietzsche has not been adopted, since 
genealogies typically pursue the contingency of concepts with the aim of 
denaturalising them, effectively making them appear suspicious, if not ripe 
for rejection.97 On this point this thesis is more in line with Skinner’s98 hope 
that intellectual history can leave us ‘[e]quipped with a broader sense of 
possibility’,99 ‘free[ing]  us to re-imagine [concepts] in different and perhaps 
more fruitful ways’, 100  even ‘improv[e]’ current notions. 101  In another 
difference from the genealogical approach, I am as interested in the 
                                                                                                                        
pp.151–155; for Skinner’s reply, see Skinner 1988, pp.263–272. 
96 Regardless of whether these were sincerely held – although sincerity should by ‘default’ 
be assumed: see Bevir 1999, pp.144-151, especially p.145. 
97  Friedrich Nietzsce: The Genealogy of Morals, Dover, New York, 2003; Michel 
Foucault: Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, Random House, New York, 
2005; Foucault: Lecture delivered in May 1978, ‘Qu' est-ce que la Critique?’ Bulletin de 
la Société Française de Philosophie, 84(2), April–June 1990 and ‘Nietzsche, 
Genealogy, History’, 1977, accessed 11 November 2012, 
noehernandezcortez.files.wordpress.com/2011/04/nietzsche-genealogy-history.pdf. I do 
however share with the genealogical approach a doubt of it being possible to write a 
coherent history of ‘self-determination’ culminating ‘naturally’ in a present-day 
understanding, and a focus on the language of ‘self-determination’, rather than the 
causality of its appearances. See also Gérard Noiriel: ‘Foucault and History: The 
Lessons of a Disillusion’, Journal of Modern History, 66(3), 1994, pp.547–568. Jens 
Bartleson: A Genealogy of Sovereignty, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995; 
and Bruce Cumings: ‘“Revising Postrevisionism”, or, The Poverty of Theory in 
Diplomatic History’, Diplomatic History, 17(4), 1993, pp.539–570.  
98 While titling at least one of his works a ‘genealogy’ (Skinner 2009), Skinner generally 
does not follow the conventional genealogical approach. Bartleson 1995 critiques 
Skinner from a genealogy perspective, pp.65–68. 
99 Skinner 1998, p.117. See also Skinner 1984, pp.248–250; Brett 2007, pp.127–128. 
100 Skinner 2009, p.326. 
101 Skinner 2002, p.127. 
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consistencies among international appearances of ‘self-determination’ as in 
the aspects of contingency and change.102  
 
This thesis is neither a work of conceptual history or Begriffsgeschichte as 
pioneered by Reinhart Koselleck.103 Unlike Koselleck, I doubt whether it is 
possible to define one concept clearly and write its history in time as an 
unbroken narrative, 104  and have instead framed my thesis in terms of 
moments105 at which ‘self-determination’ suddenly became internationally 
important. 106  Also, rather than sharing Koselleck’s wariness of seeing 
                                                
102 See Bartleson 1995, p.75. Also Skinner has expressed scepticism regarding constants 
and ‘truths’ in intellectual history: Skinner 2002, p.88. 
103 From 1972, Koselleck initiated and edited the Geschichtlichte Grundbegriffe, a 9,000-
page German-language encyclopaedia of concepts. See his Koselleck 2004; The 
Practice of Conceptual History: Timing History, Spacing Concepts, Stanford University 
Press, Stanford, CA, 2002; ‘Social History and Conceptual History’, Politics, Culture, 
and Society, 2(3), 1989a, pp.308–324; ‘A Response to the Comments on the 
Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe’ (GG), pp.59–70 in Lehmann and Richter (eds) 1996; 
‘Social History and Begriffsgeschichte’, pp.23–35 in Iain Hampsher-Monk, Karin 
Tilmans and Frank Van Vree (eds): History of Concepts: Comparative Perspectives, 
Amsterdam University Press, Amsterdam, 1998; ‘Linguistic Change and the History of 
Events’, Journal of Modern History, 61(4), 1989b, pp.649–666; For an example of his 
own production of conceptual history, published in English, see Reinhart Koselleck and 
Michaela W. Richter: ‘Crisis’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 67(2), 2006, pp.356–400. 
For useful summaries and discussions of GG and Koselleck, see in particular Helge 
Jordheim: ‘Against Periodization: Koselleck’s Theory of Multiple Temporalities’ 
History and Theory, 51, May, 2012, pp.151–171; Keith Tribe: ‘The Geschichtliche 
Grundbegriffe Project: From History of Ideas to Conceptual History. A review article’, 
Comparative Studies in Society and History, 31(1), 1989, pp.180–184; Melvin Richter: 
‘A German Version of the “Linguistic Turn”: Reinhart Koselleck and the History of 
Political and Social Concepts’, pp.58–79 in Dario Castiglione and Iain Hampsher-Monk 
(eds): The History of Political Thought in National Context, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2001; James Schmidt: ‘How Historical is Begriffsgeschichte?’, 
History of European Ideas, 25, 1999, pp.9–14; Michael Freeden: ‘Ideologies and 
Conceptual History’, Journal of Political Ideologies, 2(1), 2006, pp.3–11. For other 
analyses of Koselleck’s conceptual history, and its relation to the Cambridge school, see 
e.g. Melvin Richter: The History of Political and Social Concepts: A Critical 
Introduction, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995; Lehmann and Richter (eds) 1996; 
and Hampsher-Monk et al. (eds), 1998; Pasi Ihalainen: ‘Between Historical Semantics 
and Pragmatics: Reconstructing Past Political Thought through Conceptual History’, 
Journal of Historical Pragmatics, 7(1), 2006, pp.115–143; Helge Jordheim and Iver B. 
Neumann: ‘Empire, Imperialism and Conceptual History’, Journal of International 
Relations and Development, 14(2), 2011, pp.153–185. For a useful comparison between 
Koselleck and Skinner, see Kari Palonen: ‘Rhetorical and Temporal Perspectives on 
Conceptual Change: Theses on Quentin Skinner and Reinhart Koselleck’, Revised 
version of paper presented at the Finnish Institute in London, 18–20 June, 1998. 
104 Like the contributions in Terence Ball, James Farr, Russell L. Hanson (eds): Political 
Innovation and Conceptual Change, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989. 
105 It is noteworthy that all the ‘moments’ in this thesis lasted for years – as Pocock’s 
‘Machiavellian Moment’ lasted for several decades, Pocock 1975.  
106 This is also a result of taking seriously Skinner’s warning against a ‘mythology of 
coherence’ in writing intellectual history; indeed, constructing a coherent, ‘closed’ 
history of ‘self-determination’ would seem like a fabrication, unsupported by its actual 
appearances, Skinner 1969, pp.16–17 (referring primarily to ‘coherence’ within one 
specific author’s oeuvre or particular work, but still in a manner useful as applied here). 
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politics or ideology as drivers of conceptual change,107 I understand the 
international ‘self-determination’ discourse as political interventions bound 
by the standards of legitimation admitted by the currently-dominant 
ideologies of the time. From my point of view, conceptual change might 
occur precisely when new political dynamics make the hierarchies between 
standards shift, and new terms with novel conceptual affiliations become 
legitimised with reference to old ones.108 
 
All intellectual history arguably involves some ‘uncertainty’ that a proper 
selection and evaluation of valid material might help to minimise.109 In this 
regard, my interest in how the language of ‘self-determination’ has been 
invoked and legitimised internationally at key moments entails a closer 
focus on the primary texts in which ‘self-determination’ was actually 
mentioned than what strict adherence to either Skinner’s or Koselleck’s 
methods would demand.110 Rather than aiming to explain the ‘entire process 
of conceptual change’, 111  or seeking to uncover the causes of the 
international ‘self-determination’ discourse, my thesis examines this 
discourse itself at key moments.112 Specifically, for chapters 1 and 2, I have 
consulted the speeches, articles and other statements of Lenin and Wilson, 
found in print and online document collections. Although my focus is on 
international, public expressions of ‘self-determination’, I have benefited 
from the primary records of their contemporaries, as found, for instance, in 
memoirs and printed compilations. Further, I found unpublished materials 
for chapters 1 and 2 at the UK National Archives (TNA) in London, and at 
the League of Nations Archives at the UN Office in Geneva (LNA).  
                                                
107 E.g. Koselleck 2004, p.83. Positing that linguistic change occurs at a different pace 
than political change, he makes the relation between language use and political power 
seem frail, Koselleck 1996, p.66. Freeden 2006 claims that the study of ideologies may 
benefit from Koselleck’s approach, but does not present these as already covered by it. 
Skinner 2002, pp.173–174 does regard ideas a determinant of political action. 
108 Conceptual change may also occur if the position of a particular language user becomes 
inserted into how a concept is being understood – like with Wilson’s silent 
appropriation of Lenin’s mentions of ‘self-determination’, see Chapter 2. 
109 See Adrian Blau: ‘Uncertainty and the History of Ideas’, History and Theory, 50, 
October 2011, pp.358–372. 
110 Also, I deal with neither techniques of textual production, nor reception of texts beyond 
the immediate forums in which they were presented. 
111 Skinner on Koselleck, 2002, p.187. 
112 I am grateful to Quentin Skinner for helping me clarify this point. Pål Wrange 
describes this as  ‘the discursive production of the concept […] in its instances’: 
Impartial or Uninvolved? The Anatomy of 20th Century Doctrine on the Law of 
Neutrality, Stockholm University, 2007, p.49. 
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For chapters 3 to 5, the essential primary sources have been the international 
legal texts that authoritatively cite ‘self-determination’, and archival 
materials that shed light on the making of these texts. These key texts are 
the League of Nations’ two reports on the Aaland Islands case (1920–1921), 
the UN Charter (1945), the UNGA Decolonisation Declaration (1960), the 
ICHRs (1966), and the ICJ advisory opinion on Kosovo’s declaration of 
independence (2010).  
 
My analysis of these texts has been informed by other primary material I 
have sought out at the UN archives (ARMSNY) and libraries in New York, 
at the Columbia University archives in New York, the LNA and the UN 
archives (UNOGA) in Geneva, the TNA, as well as the archives of the 
School of Oriental and African Studies, and the London School of 
Economics (LSE) and British Library collections in London. Further, much 
material, particularly related to UNGA and ICJ, as well as the Foreign 
Relations of the United States (FRUS) records, has been available online.113 
For chapter 5, I conducted direct interviews with selected participants in the 
ICJ Kosovo case, as well as other relevant actors, primarily in Kosovo, on 
conditions of anonymity.114 These interviews were semi-structured and were 
conducted in person, through Skype, or by email. Wherever relevant, I also 
cite media reporting.  
 
I have incorporated secondary sources too, as briefly outlined in this 
introduction. Works of international law, international relations, and 
political philosophy proved useful in narrowly addressing ‘self-
determination’. For the wider political context, I have also turned to works 
of international and diplomatic history. However, such secondary works are 
referred to only to the extent they might help in understanding ‘self-
determination’ in international discourse and the ideas of freedom used to 
legitimise the concept. 
                                                
113  UNGA at www.un.org; ICJ at www.icj-cij.org/; FRUS at 
uwdc.library.wisc.edu/collections/FRUS, all accessed 20 May 2013. 
114 Several interviewees were lawyers who were constrained by attorney–client privilege. 
They were selected from different legal teams participating in the proceedings, and on 
the basis of their insight into other relevant developments, such as Kosovo’s declaration 
of independence and the international administration of Kosovo. 
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‘Self-determination’ and Freedom 
The relation of ‘self-determination’ to ideas of freedom is essential to 
understanding the concept’s appearances in international discourse. 
Throughout the last hundred years, international references to the concept 
have been characterised by the presence of two ideas of freedom, and the 
implicit rivalry between them. Explaining how international language on 
‘self-determination’ has expressed these two ideas is a key concern of this 
thesis. ‘Freedom’ is among the most discussed topics of political theory and 
philosophy, and it is not the aim of this thesis to examine or critique this 
vast body of literature. Instead, I analyse the liberal-conservative and radical 
ideas of freedom, as defined below, narrowly as they have materialised in 
international discourse on ‘self-determination’ in specific forums and 
formats at key moments. Rather than attempting to explore issues of 
freedom more broadly, I consider these two ideas strictly as they appeared 
internationally in 20th- and 21st-century language on ‘self-determination’.  
 
Both the radical and liberal-conservative ideas of freedom should be 
understood in terms of the absence of a contrasting feature: they are 
‘negative’ ideas of freedom, against and from something else. 115  My 
interpretation of these two ideas – indeed, my identification of more than 
one variant of negative freedom – has been influenced by the works of 
                                                
115 For the authoritative distinction between ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ concepts of freedom, 
see Isaiah Berlin ‘Two Concepts of Liberty: an Inaugural Lecture Delivered before the 
University of Oxford on 31 October 1958’, Clarendon Press, London 1959. Given that 
claims for self-determination, as stated, always seek freedom from ‘other-
determination’, negative freedom is the relevant perspective to apply here, and potential 
conceptualisations of ‘positive’ freedom will not be pursued. For other distinctions – 
which space constraints prevent me from investigating further – see Benjamin Constant: 
‘The Liberty of the Ancient Compared with that of the Moderns: Speech Given at the 
Athenee Royal in Paris’, pp.307–328 in Political Writings: Benjamin Constant, 
Biancamaria Fontana (trans. and ed.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1988; 
and Charles Taylor ‘What’s Wrong with Negative Liberty’ in Alan Ryan (ed.): The Idea 
of Freedom, Essays in Honour of Isaiah Berlin, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1979, 
pp.175–193, which distinguishes between freedom as an ‘opportunity’ and an ‘exercise’ 
concept. For a more recent distinction, see Philip Pettit: ‘Agency-freedom and Option-
freedom’, Journal of Theoretical Politics, 15(4), 2003, pp.387–403. For Skinner’s 
critique of Berlin’s distinction, see in particular Skinner 1998, pp.113–116. For two of 
many other discussions of the positive/negative freedom distinction, see Gerald C. 
MacCallum, Jr.: ‘Negative and Positive Freedom’, Philosophical Review, 76(3), 1967, 
pp.312–334; John N. Gray, ‘On Negative and Positive Liberty’, Political Studies, 28, 
1980, pp.507–526. For an argument against making any distinction, see Efraim 
Podoksik: ‘One Concept of Liberty: Towards Writing the History of a Political 
Concept’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 71(2), 2010, pp.219–240. 
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Quentin Skinner and Philip Pettit on republican liberty.116 Although, like 
Skinner, Pettit and other scholars, I employ the terms ‘freedom’ and ‘liberty’ 
interchangeably, I do prefer ‘freedom’, since ‘liberty’ is sometimes used 
with reference to individuals only – and ‘self-determination’ applies to 
groups.117 Significantly, the ‘radical’ idea of freedom discussed in this thesis 
resembles to some extent what Pettit, Skinner and others call ‘republican’ 
liberty. 118  And my interpretation of the ‘liberal-conservative’ idea of 
                                                
116 For early versions see Skinner 1984 and Philip Pettit: ‘A Definition of Negative 
Liberty’, Ratio (New Series), II(2), December, 1989, pp.153–168; they later developed 
their theories in the works referred to below. Skinner’s early work sometimes referred to 
this idea as ‘neo-Roman’; however, ‘republican’ is now the convention. See also 
references above, and his ‘On the Slogans of Republican Political Theory’, European 
Journal of Political Theory, 9, 2010, pp.95–102; ‘The Republican Ideal of Political 
Liberty’, pp.293–309 in Gisela Bock, Quentin Skinner, and Maurizio Viroli (eds): 
Machiavelli and Republicanism, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993. Among 
Pettit’s works, my analysis is based in particular on his ‘Freedom as Antipower’, Ethics, 
106(3), 1996, pp.576–604; Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government, 
Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1997; ‘Freedom with Honor: A Republican Ideal’, Social 
Research, 64(1), 1997, pp.52–76; A Theory of Freedom: From the Psychology to the 
Politics of Agency, Oxford University Press, 2001; ‘Republican Freedom: Three 
Axioms, Four Theorems’, Princeton Law and Public Affairs Working Paper Series, no 
07-004, 2008; ‘The Power of a Democratic Public’, pp.73–93 in Reiko Gotoh and Paul 
Dumouchel (eds), Against Injustice: The New Economics of Amartya Sen, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 2009a; ‘A Republican Law of Peoples’, European Journal 
of Political Theory, 9, 2010, pp.70–94. For a useful interview, see Maria Dimova-
Cookson: ‘Republicanism, Philosophy of Freedom and the History of Ideas: An 
Interview with Philip Pettit’, Contemporary Political Theory, 9, 2010, pp.477–489. His 
On the People’s Terms: A Republican Theory and Model of Democracy, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2012 provides suggestions for institutionalising the 
republican programme.  
117 For one textbook-example, see Katrin Flikschuh: Freedom: Contemporary Liberal 
Perspectives, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2007, p.177, note 5. For a recent, related view of 
‘self-determination’ claimants, see Kristina Roepstorff: The Politics of Self-
determination: Beyond the Decolonization Process, Routledge, New York, 2013, pp.75–
86. 
118 For historical perspectives see Martin van Gelderen and Quentin Skinner (eds): 
Republicanism: A Shared European Heritage, Volume II: The Values of Republicanism 
in Early Modern Europe, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002; Z. S. Fink: 
The Classical Republicans: An Essay in the Recovery of a Pattern of Thought in 
Seventeenth-century England, Northwestern University Press, Evanston, IL, 1962; Bock 
et al. (eds) 1993; Daniel J. Kapust: Republicanism, Rhetoric, and Roman Political 
Thought: Sallust, Livy, and Tacitus, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011; 
John W. Maynor: Republicanism in the Modern World, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2003; 
Hans Baron: The Crisis of the Early Italian Renaissance: Civic Humanism and 
Republican Liberty in an Age of Classicism and Tyranny, Princeton University Press, 
New Jersey, 1966. For political theory perspectives, see in particular Cécile Laborde 
and John Maynor: Republicanism and Political Theory, Blackwell, Oxford 2008; 
Michael Sandel: Democracy's Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy, 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1996, and Anita L. Allen and Milton C. 
Regan, Jr. (eds): Debating Democracy’s Discontent: Essays on American Politics, Law, 
and Public Philosophy, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998; David Boucher: 
‘Oakeshott, Freedom and Republicanism’, BJPIR, 7, 2005, pp.81–96; Patricia 
Springborg: ‘Republicanism, Freedom from Domination, and the Cambridge Contextual 
Historians’, Political Studies, 49, 2001, pp.851–876; M. Victoria Costa: ‘Neo-
republicanism, Freedom as Non-domination, and Citizen Virtue’, Politics, Philosophy 
and Economics, 8(4), 2009, pp.401–419; Maurizio Viroli: Republicanism, Hill and 
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freedom is informed by Pettit’s and Skinner’s analyses of ‘liberal’ liberty.119 
While my separation between the two ideas also draws on the work of other 
contemporary scholars,120 it differs from other distinctions.121 Shortly I will 
explain my reasons for moving away from Pettit’s and Skinner’s ‘republican 
v liberal’ terminology, to one of ‘radical v liberal-conservative’ ideas. 
 
Of the two ideas of freedom, the liberal-conservative idea has dominated the 
appearances of ‘self-determination’ in international discourse. The most 
authoritative international documents citing ‘self-determination’ from the 
last hundred years, such as the 1945 UN Charter, conceptualised self-
determination primarily in liberal-conservative terms. Although it will be 
                                                                                                                        
Wang, New York, 2002. 
119  See e.g. Pettit: ‘Liberalism and Republicanism’, Australian Journal of Political 
Science, 28 (Special issue), pp.162–189, 1993a; Pettit: ‘Negative Liberty, Liberal and 
Republican’, European Journal of Philosophy, 1(1), 1993b, pp.15–38; Skinner 1998. 
The two have been accused of lacking nuances in their construction of liberalism, see 
e.g. Charles Larmore: ‘A Critique of Philip Pettit’s Republicanism’, Noûs, 35, 
Supplement s1, October 2001, pp.229–243, at p.7. For liberal perspectives see e.g. 
Matthew H. Kramer (ed.): Rights, Wrongs and Responsibilities, Palgrave, New York, 
2001; Ian Carter: A Measure of Freedom, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999; 
Robert Nozick: Anarchy, State and Utopia, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1990; John 
Christman and Joel Anderson (eds): Autonomy and the Challenges to Liberalism, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2005; Geoffrey Brennan and Loren Lomasky: 
‘Against Reviving Republicanism’, Politics, Philosophy and Economics, 5(2), 2006, 
pp.221–252; Richard Dagger: ‘The Sandelian Republic and the Encumbered Self’, 
Review of Politics, 61(2), 1999, pp.181–208 (and Sandel’s reply: Michael Sandel: 
‘Liberalism and Republicanism: Friends or Foes? A Reply to Richard Dagger’, Review 
of Politics, 61(2), 1999, pp.209–214). 
120 For other discussions of the distinction between republican and liberal ideas of 
freedom, see Bryan Garsten: ‘Liberalism and the Rhetorical Vision of Politics’, Journal 
of the History of Ideas, 73(1), 2012, pp.83–89; Ronen Shnayderman: ‘Liberal vs. 
Republican Notions of Freedom’, Political Studies, 60, 2012, pp.44–58; the chapters of 
Laborde and Maynor (eds) 2008. Departing from the commonplace contrasting of 
republicanism with liberalism, Miguel Vatter: ‘The Quarrel between Populism and 
Republicanism: Machiavelli and the Antinomies of Plebeian Politics’, Contemporary 
Political Theory, 11(3), 2012, pp.242–263; and Nadia Urbinati: ‘Competing for Liberty: 
The Republican Critique of Democracy’, American Political Science Review, 106(3), 
2012, pp.607–621 instead juxtapose republicanism to respectively, ‘populism’ and 
‘democracy’. 
121 For instance that used by Jürgen Habermas, e.g. in Between Facts and Norms, MIT 
Press, Cambridge, MA, 1998 and ‘The Concept of Human Dignity and the Realistic 
Utopia of Human Rights’, Metaphilosophy, 41(4), 2010, pp.464–480. While arguing for 
the ‘co-originality’ and co-dependency of ‘liberal’ and ‘republican’ ideas, Habermas’ 
focus differs from mine. His concern is with democracy within one body politic, 
whereas my thesis investigates ‘self-determination’ on the international arena. Further, 
Habermas refers to a ‘liberal’ concern with individuals, and a ‘republican’ orientation 
towards collective popular will – and proposes to reconcile them. However, both the 
two ideas of freedom expressed internationally with ‘self-determination’ have 
concentrated primarily on groups. See also Johan Karlsson, ‘Democracy versus Human 
Rights: Why Held and Habermas do not Resolve the Tension’, Norwegian Centre for 
Human Rights, 2010; Stefan Rummens: ‘Debate: The Co-originality of Private and 
Public Autonomy in Deliberate Democracy’, Journal of Philosophy, 14(4), pp.469–481. 
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demonstrated that the Court’s final opinion in the ICJ case on Kosovo had 
radical implications, the states participating in the preceding proceedings 
overwhelmingly asserted the liberal-conservative idea. As Skinner has 
shown, a liberal idea of freedom has dominated political thinking ever since 
Thomas Hobbes argued against a different, republican, view in the 17th 
century.122 More recently, the liberal idea has figured in the influential 
theories of John Rawls.123  
 
Clearly, liberalism, conservatism and associated ideas of freedom are 
understood in a variety of ways, and the ‘liberal-conservative’ idea 
addressed in this thesis may differ from some of these. In this thesis, the 
term ‘liberal-conservative’ is applied with exclusive reference to one of the 
ideas of freedom I have identified in international ‘self-determination’ 
discourse. At the same time, this liberal-conservative idea has entailed some 
elements that should uncontroversially justify the label. In unmistakably 
liberal terms, the liberal-conservative idea has presented interference with 
action as the greatest threat to freedom. Freedom, it has expressed, simply 
means no interference: if interference is present, freedom is absent. To 
establish freedom means to end interference. Defining freedom as non-
interference as an elementary characteristic of liberal freedom has been 
endorsed by proponents as well as sceptics of liberalism.124 
 
Moreover, peace and stability have defined the content of the liberal-
conservative idea of freedom. Like the ‘liberal peace thesis’ of international 
relations theory,125 the liberal-conservative discourse on ‘self-determination’ 
                                                
122 See in particular Skinner 2008; also 1998, p.60; and 1984, pp.230–231, 245; also Pettit 
1997. For the historical shift from the republican to the liberal idea, see Pettit 1993b, 
pp.33–34. 
123 John Rawls: A Theory of Justice, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999 and The Law 
of Peoples, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 2002 – see pp.38–41, 85 on 
‘self-determination’. See also Pettit 1993b, pp.29–30. 
124 See the above references. 
125 The link between the liberal peace thesis and ‘democratic peace theory’ is disputed – 
and this footnote leaves no scope to pursue this – but the following works might 
nevertheless clarify some scholarly conceptualisations: Michael W. Doyle’s ‘Kant, 
Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 12(3), 1983, 
pp.205–235; ‘Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part 2’, Philosophy and 
Public Affairs, 12(4), 1983, pp.323–353; and Bruce M. Russett: Grasping the 
Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, NJ, 1993; Doyle: ‘Three Pillars of the Liberal Peace’, American Political 
Science Review, 99(3), 2005, pp.463–466. For later discussions, see Christopher Layne: 
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has portrayed order and stability within and between states as the ultimate 
insurance against interference with the actions of states and individuals. 
Thus it has presented peace and freedom as inherently connected. At one 
level, such discourse has portrayed peace as an ultimate form of freedom – 
since peace means no interference in the form of violence, disruption and 
instability. Any concept of ‘freedom’ that did not entail peaceful order 
would be no true freedom, on this view: lack of peace would mean some 
kind of interference, which, by definition, would quell freedom. At the same 
time, language legitimised with the liberal-conservative idea has cited 
‘peace’ and ‘stability’ as more valuable standards than ‘freedom’ referred to 
on its own. It has depicted the worth of ‘freedom’, ‘self-determination’ or 
any other political standard as inextricably bound up with the ability to 
serve peace and stable order.  
 
While valuing peace above all other standards, the liberal-conservative idea 
has not abandoned its appreciation of freedom as non-interference. Liberal-
conservative international rhetoric on ‘self-determination’ has not 
challenged the standard of ‘freedom’ as such, nor openly approved of 
interference. Typically, however, this outlook has focused narrowly on non-
interference with states, including with their freedom of trade – or, 
sometimes, on individuals’ freedom from state interference. 126  This 
perspective has usually not addressed peoples, groups and other non-state 
collectives. And it has ignored potential ways that freedom may be harmed 
other than through interference.  
 
Positing peace as the aim of all politics, discourse drawing upon this liberal-
conservative idea has portrayed political legitimacy as closely linked to the 
capacity of the ruler(s) to preserve the peace. Since the maintenance of 
                                                                                                                        
‘Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace’, International Security, 19(2), 1994, 
pp.5–49; John M. Owen: ‘How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace’, International 
Security, 19(2), 1994, pp.87–125; Henry Farber and Joanne Gowa: ‘Common Interests 
or Common Polities. Reinterpreting the Democratic Peace’, Journal of Politics, 58(2), 
1997, pp.393–417; Sebastian Rosato: ‘The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory’, 
American Political Science Review, 97(4), 2003, pp.585–602; International 
Peacekeeping Special Issue ‘Liberal Peacebuilding Reconstructed’, 16(5), 2009; John 
Heathershaw: ‘Unpacking the Liberal Peace: the Dividing and Merging of 
Peacebuilding Discourses’, Millennium 36(3), 2008, pp.597–621. 
126 It could be noted here that liberal theories of freedom generally prioritises the 
individual before the group or collective level.  
 38 
38 
peace, on this account, legitimates power, governmental sovereignty has 
been considered legitimised if it has produced peaceful outcomes. In 
international ‘self-determination’ discourse, an a priori assumption of the 
liberal-conservative orientation has been that peace is in the interest of all 
people – also those who have not themselves articulated such an interest. No 
matter what claimants of ‘self-determination’ themselves might say, peace 
is the real priority. Consequently, rulers would be considered justified in 
taking action to protect the peace also without consulting their subjects. 
Such an understanding surfaced in Wilson’s 1918 language of ‘self-
determination’, as well as in the 1960 UN decolonisation debate.  
  
These characteristics also display the conservative propensities of the 
liberal-conservative idea. Besides treasuring freedom as non-interference, 
this outlook, with its robust appreciation of stability, has been inclined to 
reject change, and opt for solidification of existing order. In this view, 
change might be allowed – if at all – only gradually, ‘naturally’, and under 
guarantees of non-interference and peace. Obviously, it is the beneficiaries 
of the existing legal and political order who could be expected to value the 
status quo and regard disruptive changes as an interfering threat to (their 
own) freedom.127 Indeed, in international discourse on ‘self-determination’, 
it has been those who were already strong at a given moment who have 
tended to express the liberal-conservative idea. That it was such agents’ 
ideas of ‘self-determination’ and freedom that won out over the period 
covered by this thesis hints at a conservative and self-consolidating streak in 
international affairs as a whole.128 
 
The same prioritisation of peaceful, settled order, without interference with 
states and individuals has informed the liberal-conservative assessment of 
whether and how to realise self-determination in practice. At different 
moments, international arguments for implementing self-determination only 
if, and in ways that would serve the peace have expressed the liberal-
conservative idea, as have those who reject the concept outright, on the 
                                                
127 See also Martti Koskenniemi: ‘International Law in the World of Ideas’, pp.47–63 in 
Koskenniemi and Crawford (eds), 2011b, at pp.48, 58; also Miéville 2005; Koskenniemi 
2005, p.607. 
128 For a related perspective, see Crawford 2000b, pp.95–97. 
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grounds that it threatens the current order. Others have revealed their 
affinities by stating that self-determination need not involve the creation of 
new states at all, as such an outcome might be disruptive. It is thus the 
liberal-conservative idea that has been at the heart of proposals for realising 
self-determination within existing state structures, for instance through the 
provision of individual human rights, minority rights, or some territorial 
autonomy. From the 1990s, the academic literature has advanced such 
proposals using the language of ‘internal self-determination’, a phrase state 
participants in the 2008–2010 ICJ Kosovo case employed too. 
 
On the whole, this liberal-conservative idea has been embedded in the cross-
disciplinary scholarship on self-determination. Tellingly, most scholars have 
conceptualised demands for freedom and ‘self-determination’ as reactions 
against interference.129 Without questioning the aim of advancing stable 
peace as non-interference with approved agents, scholars have gone on 
directly to discuss what sort of interference might legitimise ‘self-
determination’. Those holding that the concept should have a strong 
international role have listed forms of interference against which it might be 
granted, such as non-democratic, ‘alien’ or ‘foreign’ rule. 130  So far, 
however, only colonialism has been widely recognised as a form of 
interference that would warrant the application of self-determination.131 
Scholars who oppose ‘self-determination’ have relied on the liberal-
conservative idea as well. For instance, when warning that the concept 
threatens the freedom of states by allowing interference with their peaceful 
                                                
129 For one early indication, see Buchheit 1978, p.3. See also Mikulas Fabry: Recognizing 
States: International Society and the Establishment of New States Since 1776, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2010, p.10. 
130 E.g. Franck 1990, pp.169–170; Margalit and Raz 1990, p.460; Moltchanova 2009, 
p.xvii; Hurst Hannum: ‘Self-determination in the Post-colonial Era’, pp.12–44 in Clark 
and Williamson (eds) 1996, at p.35. See also David Lefkowitz: ‘On the Foundation of 
Rights to Political Self-determination, Secession, Non-intervention, and Democratic 
Governance’, Journal of Social Philosophy, 39(4), 2008, pp.492–511. 
131 Buchheit 1978, p.18; Hannum 1996, p.469. See also Roland Burke: Decolonization 
and the Evolution of International Human Rights, University of Pennsylvania Press, 
Philadelphia, PA, 2010, pp.37–39; Charney 2001, p.467; Hannum 1993b, p.57; 
Kaczorowska 2010, p.581. Rhona K. M. Smith: Textbook on International Human 
Rights, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010, p.281. Even scholars arguing against 
limiting self-determination to colonialism, such as McCorquodale 1994, p.883; 
Tomuschat 2001 e.g. p.2; S. Prakash Sinha: ‘Is Self-determination Passé?’, Columbia 
Journal of Transnational Law, 12(2), 1973, pp.260–273, at p.272, merely call for 
applying it to additional types of interference: see also McCorquodale 1994, pp.862, 
863 and 874. 
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sovereignty, and when cautioning that self-determination may lead to 
anarchy and violence. 132  The limited imagination exhibited by this 
scholarship has not yet had room for the question of whether self-
determination might signify freedom from something other than 
interference.  
 
What these scholarly, legal and policy positions have overlooked is the 
‘radical’ idea of freedom that has also appeared in international language on 
‘self-determination’. The international discourse drawing on the radical idea 
has juxtaposed freedom against domination, dependence and inequality, 
rejecting the liberal-conservative belief that interfering with action is the 
only way in which freedom may be curtailed. And it has not seen peace as 
the supreme legitimising standard. In the radical view, even if no action has 
been interfered with, an agent is unfree if it is dependent on the arbitrary 
will of someone else. Dependence and domination involve unpredictability, 
unaccountability, as well as a status of inequality that takes someone’s 
freedom away even if the superior party has not actually interfered.133 As 
long as a ‘master’ has the power to interfere, and may do so arbitrarily, the 
subordinated, dependent agent remains unfree.134 
 
This radical idea of freedom closely resembles the ‘republican’ idea 
examined by Pettit and Skinner. And a central aim of my thesis is to build 
on their and other scholars’ works on freedom, and apply their insights to a 
setting of international history.135 However, there are several reasons for my 
choice of a different terminology. First of all, ‘republican’ freedom is 
strongly connected to a specific historical and philosophical scholarship, 
                                                
132 E.g. Musgrave 1997, p.181; Matthew Craven: ‘Statehood, Self-determination, and 
Recognition’, in Malcolm D. Evans (ed.): International Law, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford 2010, pp.203–251, at p.233; Thomas Franck and Paul Hoffman: ‘The Right of 
Self-determination in Very Small Places’, New York University Journal of International 
Law and Politics, 1976, pp.331–386 at p.384; Cassese 1995, pp.333–334; Daniel Patrick 
Moynihan: Pandaemonium: Ethnicity in International Politics, Oxford University Press, 
1993, p.148. 
133 Richard Dagger conceptualises such absence of freedom in terms of lack of autonomy, 
see his ‘Autonomy, Domination and the Republican Challenge to Liberalism’, pp.177–
203 in Christman and Anderson (eds) 2005. 
134  Pettit applies the notion of ‘resilient non-interference’ to his understanding of 
republican freedom, where arbitrary interference is not just absent or unlikely, but 
impossible (Pettit 1993b, especially pp.17–22). For discussion, see Carter 1999, p.243. 
135 As distinct from international relations. See also Dagger 2005, p.188. 
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engaged with early modern republican thinkers. By contrast, I deal with the 
radical idea only in terms of its appearance in international expressions of 
‘self-determination’.  
 
Moreover, whereas equality is pivotal to the radical idea of freedom 
identified in this thesis, it is not completely clear how essential equality is to 
the republican notion of freedom. True, republican freedom does seem to 
call for equal freedom.136 Recently, however, Nadia Urbinati has alleged that 
republicanism disregards equality, and that it tends to see democracy as 
threatening a ‘de facto a kind of tyrannical domination’.137 In her view, it is 
democracy and not republicanism that can add ‘the meaning of equal 
liberty’ to the theory of freedom.138 Phrased in her terms, the radical idea of 
freedom expressed in international ‘self-determination’ discourse would 
appear more ‘democratic’ than ‘republican’.139  
 
International language on ‘self-determination’ rooted in the radical idea has 
implicitly presented freedom as equality as the main legitimising standard of 
the concept. To begin with, such language has presented peoples’ demands 
for self-determination as legitimate due to their status of inequality and 
arbitrary dependence on a dominating agent. And it has backed the 
realisation of their freedom as (re)establishing for them a status of being 
their own law-makers – not subordinated to any ‘master’ with arbitrary 
powers.140 Liberating a group from conditions of dependence, to such an 
equal status, would in the radical view realise that group’s freedom.  
 
Radical ‘self-determination’ discourse has expressed that in practice, the 
                                                
136 Pettit emphasises equality more strongly than Skinner, but it is not presented as the 
pivotal feature of either scholar’s understanding of republican freedom. See Pettit 
1993a, p.162; 1996, p.586. Pettit 2012 cites equality in the context of identifying 
systems for social justice, pp.77–79. 
137 Urbinati 2012, pp.613–614. Daniel Kapust similarly claims that republicanism is 
compatible with paternalism: ‘Skinner, Pettit and Livy: The Conflict of the Orders and 
the Ambiguity of Republican Liberty’, History of Political Thought, 25(3), 2004, 
pp.377–401. Viroli (2002, p.10) has described the democratic ideal as a ‘radical version’ 
of republicanism. 
138 Urbinati 2012, p.619. 
139 Pettit 2012 states that republicanism provides a ‘more radical ideal of freedom’ than 
liberalism, but retains the label ‘republican’, p.11. 
140 Pettit sometimes effectively captures that freedom is a matter of status, see Pettit 1996 
p.602. 
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concept means leaving all options open, including the option of a people 
establishing a new state on a par with others in the international system. 
Claimants of self-determination have thus generally decreed the radical idea 
in demanding a state of their own. Calls for ‘self-determination’ as radical 
equality have sometimes been articulated as a demand for unification with 
another body politic, as in the Aaland Islands case, and with Kosovo at some 
points in its history. A related, albeit somewhat less radical, policy demand 
has been the historical re-establishment of countries, as in the cases of the 
1990 German reunification, and the 1991 restoration of independence to 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania after the Soviet period.  
 
Leaving all options open, including statehood, is only one of the features 
that distinguishes the radical idea of freedom from the recent literature on 
‘self-determination as non-domination’. 141  While inspired by republican 
theories of freedom, this ‘non-domination’ approach has been advanced 
primarily by scholars of political science looking for practical compromise 
solutions to actual conflicts. Their joint goal has been to identify outcomes 
that would not result in statehood. Concentrating primarily on the 
applicability of self-determination rather than the ideas the concept 
involves, these scholars have proposed responding to demands with 
arrangements internal to a pre-existing state. Above all, they have proposed 
forms of federalism as an alternative to the creation of new states. Finally, 
this strand of scholarship has stressed the internal features of ‘self-
determination’-seeking groups more strongly than called for by either the 
radical or liberal-conservative ideas.142 
                                                
141 Developed especially by Iris Young, e.g. in: ‘Self-determination as Non-domination: 
Ideas Applied to Palestine/Israel’, Ethnicities, 5(2), 2005, pp.139–159; ‘Two Concepts 
of Self-Determination’, pp.176–198 in Stephen May, Tariq Modood and  Judith Squires 
(eds): Ethnicity,  Nationalism and Minority Rights, Cambridge University Press, New 
York, 2004; and Global Challenges: War, Self Determination and Responsibility for 
Justice, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2007. For related, though different, perspectives, see 
Michael Murphy and Siobhán Harty: ‘Post-sovereign Citizenship’, Citizenship Studies, 
7(2), 2003, pp.181–197; Derek Kornelsen: ‘Circumscribed Spheres of Belonging and 
Action: Framing Indigenous Self-Determination in Terms of “Non-Domination”’, APSA 
Annual Meeting Paper, 2011; James Bohman: ‘Republican Cosmopolitanism’, Journal 
of Political Philosophy, 12(3), 2004, pp.336–352; David Held: Cosmopolitanism: Ideals 
and Realities, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2010, pp.83–84; Roepstorff 2013. For an 
insightful, though equally practically oriented, critique of Young, see Jacob T. Levy: 
‘Self-determination, Non-domination, and Federalism’, Hypatia, 23(3), 2008, pp.60–78, 
especially p.69. 
142 Young 2005 p.141 claims that such features are not important, but nevertheless 
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Although my thesis explores the radical idea of freedom in international 
language on ‘self-determination’, 143  this idea appears to be alert to 
conditions within a body politic as well. As the name suggests, the ‘radical’ 
concern with equality has gone from the ‘roots’ upwards.144 The radically 
legitimised ‘self-determination’ discourse has indicated a concern for the 
free status of a group’s individual members by, for instance, calling for 
referenda in which everyone would have an equal say. And it has held that 
no one, whether within a group or outside it, can legitimately speak in its 
name or for its interests, unless assigned such a position by the group’s 
equal members. This idea has framed a group’s freedom as independence 
and equality not only as a question of realising collective freedom – but as a 
necessary condition for individual freedom as well. Thus, the two ideas of 
freedom cannot be described simply as one being concerned with 
individuals, and the other with collectivities. While both have appeared in 
the group-centred discourse of ‘self-determination’, both have been attentive 
to individual freedom as well. 
 
An important attribute of the radical idea is that it has attached to the 
concept of ‘self-determination’ the idea that freedom is a matter of equal 
and independent status. This contrasts sharply with the liberal-conservative 
focus on the legitimising standard of freedom as peace, as an outcome or 
stage. From the radical perspective, how a group might choose to act upon 
its free status is irrelevant, even if its free actions might threaten the peace. 
 
In fact, the radical international ‘self-determination’ discourse has often 
disregarded both peace and existing law and order. As a major difference 
with the liberal-conservative idea, the radical idea has not acknowledged 
peace as the most fundamental of all values. Instead, it has presented 
                                                                                                                        
proceeds to discuss ‘self-determination’ for groups constituted according to their 
distinguishable identities. 
143 This, indeed, is another feature that distinguishes it from conventional understandings 
of ‘republican’ freedom: see in particular Sandel 1996. Although Pettit, Skinner and 
others have recently touched upon the international implications of republican freedom, 
these perspectives still remain relatively little-studied. See the whole issue of European 
Journal of Political Theory, 9(1), 2010, including Skinner 2010 and Pettit 2010, Cecile 
Laborde: ‘Republicanism and Global Justice: A Sketch’, pp.48–69. 
144 See Calhoun 2012, especially p.12. 
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freedom and equality as standards of legitimation in their own right, 
irrespective of their contributions to order or stability. On this point, the 
radical idea analysed in this thesis has again diverged from republican ideas 
of freedom. According to republican theories, law should be endorsed as a 
possibly non-arbitrary form of interference that might preserve and enhance 
people’s freedom.145 Adherence to existing law, however, has not been 
central to the radical idea: on the contrary, that idea has aspired to 
contravene established law and break up legally existing states. It has 
justified achieving freedom even by the use of force in violent liberation 
struggles.146  
 
One rare point of convergence between the two ideas of freedom in 
international discourse on ‘self-determination’ has been that also the radical 
idea has disparaged interference, especially of an arbitrary kind.147 However, 
such radical discourse has presented interference as inherently connected to 
dependence and inequality: It has rejected dependence and inequality in part 
for leaving subjugated peoples vulnerable to arbitrary interference – and 
condemned interference for producing, and being a symptom of, conditions 
of dependence. And although the two ideas have been united in rejecting 
interference, they have been separated by the legitimising standards they see 
as primary: liberal-conservative peace and non-interference (for states and 
individuals); or radical equality and non-dependence (for non-state groups 
and the individuals within them).  
                                                
145 See e.g. Pettit: ‘Law and Liberty’, pp.39–59 in Samantha Besson and José Louis Martí 
(eds): Legal Republicanism: National and International Perspectives, 2009b. Skinner 
contrasts such an understanding with a liberal view of the law as preserving freedom 
through coercing other people (to refrain from interfering with ‘our’ actions) Skinner 
1984, pp.244–245. 
146 For international law approaches to the use of force to achieve ‘self-determination’, see 
e.g. Heather A. Wilson: International Law and the Use of Force by National Liberation 
Movements, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1988; Noelle Higgins: Regulating the Use of 
Force in Wars of National Liberation – The Need for a New Regime. A Study of the 
South Moluccas and Aceh, Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden, 2010 
147 While Skinner seems to see republican freedom as restricted both by actual interference 
and by a condition of dependence on someone’s arbitrary will, Pettit concentrates on the 
latter. See in particular his ‘Keeping Republican Freedom Simple: On a difference with 
Quentin Skinner’, Political Theory, 30(3), 2002, pp.339–356. See also Skinner 1998, 
p.69; Gerald Lang: ‘Invigilating Republican Liberty’, Philosophical Quarterly, 62(247), 
2012, pp.273–293, at p.288; Ian Shapiro: ‘On Non-domination’, University of Toronto 
Law Journal, 62, 2012, pp.293–335; Dagger 2005, pp.188–189. Shnayderman 2012, 
pp.53–55, claims that Skinner now agrees completely with Pettit. But I still see a slight 
difference in emphasis in their approaches. For a critique of Pettit’s position, see 
Michael David Harbour: ‘Non-domination and Pure Negative Liberty’, Politics, 
Philosophy and Economics, 11(2), 2001, pp.186–205. 
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Crucially, the two ideas have denounced different types of actual 
interference as well. Agents who have implicitly promoted the liberal-
conservative viewpoint have condemned the obstruction of state freedom of 
action, including in the economic arena, and sometimes state interference 
with private individuals. By contrast, the radical perspective has objected to 
oppression and exploitation of non-state groups – and indirectly, to the 
obstruction of individual freedom that such oppression entails. Whereas the 
former outlook was internationally reflected in the important international 
legal documents invoking ‘self-determination’, the latter appeared in the 
later writings of Lenin, and at times during the 1950–1960 UN debates. 
 
It should be stressed that no agent using the language of ‘self-determination’ 
internationally in the 20th and 21st centuries has referred to these ideas of 
freedom in explicit or ‘ideal’ form. No articulated conflict between the two 
ideas has ever occurred, and each ‘moment’ examined in this thesis has 
contained elements of both ideas, sometimes within one and the same 
statement. Agents did not themselves announce that they were expressing 
‘liberal-conservative’ or ‘radical’ ideas: they signalled their conceptual 
affiliations by choosing terms such as ‘peace’, ‘stability’, or ‘equality’, or by 
lauding violent struggle. This was how the tension between the two ideas as 
legitimating standards for arguments and ideas of ‘self-determination’ came 
to characterise the central appearances of the concept in international 
discourse.  
 
Although the liberal-conservative idea of freedom was to dominate 
international references to ‘self-determination’, the radical idea emerged 
first, in the thinking of Lenin, and was expressed at every important point in 
time. Each international ‘self-determination moment’ started with a radical 
pronouncement that provoked liberal-conservative attempts to appropriate 
the meaning of the concept. And even the incorporation of the liberal-
conservative idea in the authoritative legal ‘self-determination’ documents 
did not prevent the radical idea from reappearing. Although both scholarship 
and international discourse have tended to use ‘self-determination’ with 
primary reference to the liberal-conservative idea, it can still be plausibly 
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conceptualised in radical terms. The continuing legal, political and scholarly 
disputes over ‘self-determination’ indicate not only disagreement on what 
should count as interference, or agents, internationally, but also lingering 
unease over the meaning of ‘freedom’ in international discourse. 
 
Chapter Outline and Chapter Historiography 
This thesis is organised in five chapters, each concentrating on international 
references to ‘self-determination’ at specific moments. The first two 
chapters explain why and how the concept emerged in international affairs 
through the language of Lenin (from 1903 to 1917), and Wilson (in 1918). 
Chapter 3 examines how understandings of self-determination played out in 
the immediate post-World War One international handling of the Albanian 
question, and how it featured in the Aaland Islands case of the League of 
Nations. It then explores the codification of ‘self-determination’ in the 1945 
UN Charter. The fourth chapter concentrates on the UN debates between 
1950 and 1960 that resulted in the 1966 ICHRs and the 1960 Decolonisation 
Declaration, which defined ‘self-determination’ as decolonisation. Chapter 
5 examines the language of ‘self-determination’ in the 2008–2010 ICJ 
proceedings on Kosovo. Throughout, I focus on how the liberal-
conservative and radical ideas of freedom appeared in international 
mentions of ‘self-determination’, reflecting the visions of freedom dominant 
in international affairs at the time. 
 
In addition to its proposed contribution to the scholarship on freedom, and 
the literature on ‘self-determination’, it is my hope that this thesis will add 
to the body of thought on each of the historical moments dealt with here. 
Concerning the first two chapters, on the first ‘self-determination moment’, 
I find the existing literature to be limited in several respects. In particular, 
there has been no thorough, comparative analysis of Lenin’s and Wilson’s 
words and ideas on ‘self-determination’.148  
 
Legally-oriented scholarship might have largely ignored the era of these two 
                                                
148  ‘Wilson vs. Lenin’, pp.368–395 in Arno Mayer: Political Origins of the New 
Diplomacy 1917–1918, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT, 1959 compares the two 
men’s influence on the European left, but does not focus primarily on self-
determination. Also insightful is Abulof 2010. 
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men, since ‘self-determination’ did not feature in the most central 
international law documents of the period. Diplomatic historians, on their 
part, have naturally concentrated on the diplomacy and policy decisions of 
the two, such as those related to the First World War and the 1917 Russian 
Revolutions. Furthermore, historical scholarship has tended to concentrate 
on merely one of the two leaders, dealing superficially, if at all, with the 
other.149 Many historians have also either idealised Lenin’s or Wilson’s 
sincerity and commitment to self-determination150 – or (over)emphasised 
that they were actually motivated by tactical, hard-headed concerns.151 Much 
attention has been paid to the discrepancy between their statements and 
actual ‘self-determination’ policies.152 What has been missing is a study of 
the roles of both Lenin and Wilson in internationalising the concept of ‘self-
determination’, as is an analysis of the ideas of freedom they employed in 
legitimising their references to the concept. 
 
Seeking to close this scholarly gap, in the first two chapters I explore, 
through the words of Lenin and Wilson, how ‘self-determination’ became 
important to international discourse. Chapter 1 concentrates on Lenin and 
the public materialisation of his language of ‘self-determination’. After 
                                                
149 For example the perceptive Trygve Throntveit: ‘What was Wilson Thinking? A Review 
of Recent Literature on Wilsonian Foreign Policy’, White House Studies, 10(4), 2011a, 
pp.459–474, which, nevertheless, oversimplifies the position of Lenin and the 
Bolsheviks on self-determination as ‘every ethnic-nationalist aspiration must be realized 
in a sovereign state’, p.460. 
150 E.g. William G. Carleton: ‘A New Look at Woodrow Wilson’, Virginia Quarterly 
Review, 38(4), 1962, pp.545–566; John Milton Cooper: Woodrow Wilson: A Biography, 
Knopf, New York 2009; Erez Manela: The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and 
the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism, Oxford University Press, New 
York, 2007; Ray Stannard Baker: What Wilson did at Paris, Doubleday, Page, New 
York, 1920; B. I. Zhuchkov: Lenin on the Nationality Problem, Novosti, Moscow, 
1968; S. Gilov: The Nationalities Question: Lenin’s Approach, Progress Publishers, 
Moscow, 1983; Elizabeth Mauchline Roberts: Lenin and the Downfall of Tsarist Russia, 
Methuen, London, 1966. 
151 See e.g. Edward Hallett Carr: The Bolshevik Revolution 1917–1923, Norton, New York 
1978, Vol. I, p.258; Stanley W. Page: Lenin and World Revolution, New York 
University Press, New York, 1959, pp.347, 353; Gerard J. De Groot: The First World 
War, Palgrave, New York 2001, p.181; Mayer 1959, pp.301, 377–380, 393; Michla 
Pomerance: Self-determination in Law and Practice: The New Doctrine in the United 
Nations, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1982, p.12. 
152 For a good account, particularly regarding Wilson see Margaret MacMillan: Paris 
1919: Six Months that Changed the World, Random House, New York, 2001, especially 
pp.222, 227, 362. See also Linda Killen: ‘Self-determination vs. Territorial Integrity’, 
Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity, 10(1), 1982, pp.65–78, 
and for Lenin’s policy, see e.g. Richard K. Debo: Survival and Consolidation: The 
Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia 1918–1921, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 
Montreal, 1992; Robert Service: Lenin: A Biography, Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2000, 
especially pp.403–413, 452–455. 
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examining the context of his formulation, the chapter then turns to Lenin’s 
actual words, and concludes by investigating the influence of the First 
World War on his pronouncements, and the creation of the context in which 
Wilson reacted to Lenin’s concept of ‘self-determination’. In chapter 1, I 
argue that the concept arose polemically in Lenin’s discourse, and that he 
legitimised it – with momentous implications – with reference to the 
negative, ‘radical’, idea of freedom. 
 
By the end of the war, Lenin had expressed his key ideas of ‘self-
determination’; Wilson had internationalised the concept through his own 
use; and the international image of the concept had become linked to the 28th 
US president. My second chapter proceeds in a manner similar to the first. It 
opens by examining the context of Wilson’s utterances, his actual language, 
and the liberal-conservative idea of freedom he used to legitimise it. I show 
that Wilson’s concept of ‘self-determination’ was much less clear than 
Lenin’s, and that his commitment to it was questionable. Then I argue that 
the mandate system in effect came to reflect what Wilson had in mind when 
he spoke of ‘self-determination’. 
 
Analysing how Lenin and Wilson launched the phrase ‘self-determination’ 
into the language of international affairs in these first two chapters sheds 
light on why this concept emerged internationally in the first place. This 
‘why’-orientation is less relevant for the later international moments in 
which the concept featured. In the following three chapters, I focus even 
more strictly on the discourse of ‘self-determination’ and the ideas of 
freedom used to legitimise it, than on the underlying causes and intentions. 
By the time of its subsequent important international occurrences, the 
concept had already become part of the language of international affairs, so 
I concentrate more on how ‘self-determination’ was cited and legitimised. 
 
Thus, chapter 3 starts by investigating international conceptualisations of 
self-determination in the years following Wilson’s internationalisation. It 
examines how the concept was understood during the post-World War One 
international handling of the Albanian question and the Aaland Islands case. 
The limited scholarly literature – mainly from the field of diplomatic history 
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– on these two cases has simply not dealt with self-determination from the 
perspective of intellectual history.153 Although legal scholarship occasionally 
mentions the Aaland Islands case, the analysis has operated with the narrow 
aim of identifying implementable legal lessons or criteria.154 In chapter 3, 
my analysis of these two cases finds that their international treatment 
indicated a further entrenchment of the ideas of Woodrow Wilson. 
 
Also explored in chapter 3 is the inclusion of ‘self-determination’ in the UN 
Charter, formally making this language part of international law. Here 
scholars have mainly discussed what legal status ‘self-determination’ might 
have gained thereby: for instance, whether the concept could thenceforth be 
described as a legal right, principle, rule, value, or norm, and what duties it 
emplaced on states and on the UN.155 This has been seen as critical, as the 
obligations and privileges following from a legal right are stronger than 
those entailed by a ‘mere’ principle. In general, most authors have agreed 
that its incorporation in the UN Charter did turn ‘self-determination’ into 
some sort of a legal right.156  
 
From an intellectual history perspective, however, seeking to pin down the 
appropriate legal prefix to ‘self-determination’ after its 1945 codification in 
the UN Charter is more of a digression. The Charter-focused, predominantly 
legal, scholarship analysing self-determination in the post-First World War 
era has also seemed oblivious to the growing body of scholars who examine 
rights157 and international law158 as contested notions per se. Labelling self-
                                                
153 E.g. James Barros, The Aaland Islands Question: Its Settlement by the League of 
Nations, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT, 1968. 
154 See e.g. Nathaniel Berman: ‘“But the Alternative is Despair”: European Nationalism 
and the Modernist Renewal of International Law’, Harvard Law Review, 106, 1993, 
pp.1792-1903, at pp.1862–1873; Hannum 1996, pp.370–375; Cassese 1995, pp.27–33.  
155 See e.g. Knop 2002, p.10; Crawford 2000a, p.9; David Raic: Statehood and the Law of 
Self-determination, Kluwer Law International, New York, 2002, p.145; McCorquodale 
1994, p.858; Summers 2007, pp.379, 387, 393; Cassese 1995, pp.134–140; Anaya 1993.  
156 See e.g. Pomerance 1982, p.73; Hannum 1996, pp.33, 45; Hannum 1993b, p.31; 
McCorquodale 1994, p.858. However, Verzijl 1968, e.g. p.324, disagrees. 
157 For a few examples, see Duncan Kennedy: A Critique of Adjudication (fin de siècle), 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1997, pp.318–319; Stephen P. Marks: 
‘Emerging Human Rights: A New Generation for the 1980s?’, Rutgers Law Review, 33, 
1980/1981, pp.435–452, at p.435; Eugene Kamenka, ‘Human Rights: Peoples’ Rights’, 
pp.127–139 in Crawford (ed.) 1988, at p.135; Philip Alston: ‘Conjuring up New Human 
Rights: A Proposal for Quality Control’, American Journal of International Law, 78, 
1984, pp.607–621, at p.607. See also Martti Koskenniemi: ‘The Effect of Rights on 
Political Culture’, pp.99–116 in Philip Alston (ed.): The EU and Human Rights, Oxford 
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determination as a legal ‘right’ does not go far in explaining the actual use 
of the concept or elucidate the ideas it has brought to the fore. Neither legal 
scholars nor diplomatic historians appear to have been interested in the ideas 
of freedom implied in the international legalisation of ‘self-determination’, 
or in how these related to earlier understandings. In chapter 3, I take up 
these questions and argue that, while it was of great legal import, also the 
inclusion of ‘self-determination’ in the UN Charter was a reiteration of ideas 
already internationalised by Wilson’s discourse. 
 
Ever since the concept was included in the UN Charter, many scholars have 
tended to see the story of ‘self-determination’ in international affairs as a 
battle between self-determination and the territorial integrity of states.159 
While this juxtaposition does correspond with some aspects of the contrast 
between the radical and liberal-conservative ideas, my focus is different. 
The liberal-conservative idea has prevailed internationally among opponents 
as well as proponents of self-determination. And that idea championed more 
than simply territorial integrity: it cherished peace, order, freedom from 
interference, as well as orderly change, if any. The radical idea, in turn, has 
not been characterised solely by its support for self-determination in terms 
of statehood. Its distinguishing feature has been to legitimise demands for 
‘self-determination’ as calls for freedom as equality of status; for freedom 
from domination, dependence and inequality, as well as from certain forms 
of interference. The ‘self-determination v territorial integrity’ distinction 
might prove useful in a search for implementable legal criteria for conflict 
resolution. My concentration, however, is on the ideas of freedom involved 
                                                                                                                        
University Press, Oxford 1999, at p.110; Costas Douzinas: The End of Human Rights: 
Critical Legal Thought at the Turn of the Century, Hart, Oxford, 2000; Costas 
Douzinas: Human Rights and Empire: The Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism, 
Routledge, New York, 2007, p.113; Allen Buchanan: ‘What’s so Special about Rights?’, 
Social Philosophy and Policy, 2(1), 1984, pp.61–83, especially p.81; Mazower 2004; 
Susan Marks: The Riddle of All Constitutions: International Law, Democracy, and the 
Critique of Ideology, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000. 
158 See e.g. Matti Koskenniemi: The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of 
International Law 1870–1960, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001, p.500; 
Loughlin 2000, p.217; Sunstein 1996; Dworkin 1985. For a ‘self-determination’-
oriented analysis, see Lauri Malksoo: ‘Justice, Order and Anarchy: the Right of Peoples 
to Self-determination and the Conflicting Values of the Law’, Juridica International, 
IV, 1999, pp.75–79. 
159 See e.g. Reisman, W. Michael: ‘Coercion and Self-determination: Construing Charter 
Article 2(4)’, American Journal of International Law, 78(3), 1984, pp.642–645; Michael 
M. Gunter: ‘Self-determination or Territorial integrity: The United Nations in 
Confusion’, World Affairs, 141(3), 1979, pp.203–218. 
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when ‘self-determination’ has been referred to internationally. 
 
Chapter 4 studies the UN debates that unfolded between 1950 and 1960, 
resulting in the adoption of ‘self-determination’ in the highly significant 
1960 UNGA Decolonisation Declaration, as well as in the two 1966 ICHRs. 
During that decade of UN debates, state delegates argued about the 
international meaning and value of ‘self-determination’. The resultant three 
UN documents cited the concept in an identically formulated article, further 
adding to its standing in international politics and law. Important scholarly 
works have already covered these UN discussions.160 However, while of 
great importance to the legal and diplomatic history of self-determination, as 
well as to the intellectual history of human rights, the questions motivating 
this literature differ from those informing my thesis. The main interest in 
self-determination of scholars on this era has been the trajectory of the 
concept in international law. They have, moreover, analysed it largely in 
terms of a strict individual-rights-versus-state-rights contradiction – not by 
exploring its legitimising ideas of freedom. 
 
Also the diplomatic history of decolonisation has touched upon issues raised 
in chapter 4, but with a different orientation. Traditionally, the history of 
decolonisation has been written from the perspective of colonial capitals, 
detailing the various administrative, diplomatic and political challenges 
experienced in connection with withdrawal from colonies.161 Works of this 
                                                
160 Above all, Cassese 1995; Samuel Moyn: The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History, 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 2010; and Burke 2010. 
161 For examples of this traditional approach, see Martin Thomas, Bob Moore, L. J. Butler: 
Crises of Empire: Decolonization and Europe’s Imperial States 1918–1975, Hodder 
Education, London, 2008; John Gallagher (ed.) The Decline, Revival and Fall of the 
British Empire, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1982; Franz Ansprenger: The 
Dissolution of the Colonial Empires, Routledge, London, 1989; Stewart C. Easton: The 
Rise and Fall of Western Colonialism: A Historical Survey from the Early Nineteenth 
Century to the Present, Pall Mall Press, London, 1964; Muriel Evelyn Chamberlain: 
Decolonization, Blackwell, Oxford, 1999; Raymond F. Betts: France and 
Decolonization, 1900–60, Palgrave Macmillan, London 1991; W. H. Morris Jones and 
George Fischer (eds): Decolonization and After: The British and French Experience, 
Frank Cass, London, 1980; John Darwin: Britain and Decolonisation: Retreat from 
Empire in the Post-war World, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 1988; Nicholas J. White: 
Decolonization: The British Experience since 1945, Pearson Education, Essex, 1999; 
Martin Lynn (ed.): The British Empire in the 1950s: Retreat or Revival?, Palgrave 
Macmillan, London, 2006; Dan Horowitz: ‘Attitudes of British Conservatives towards 
Decolonization in Africa’, African Affairs, 69(274), January 1970, pp.9–26. Both Martin 
Shipway: Decolonization and its Impact, Blackwell, Oxford, 2008; and Jan Nederveen 
Pieterse: Empire and Emancipation: Power and Liberation on a World Scale, Nijmegen, 
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kind have tended to ask why colonialism ended, when it did so, and whether 
its termination resulted from pressure from colonial movements, the self-
interested calculations of colonial powers, or international, Cold War 
developments. More recent critical approaches have also been oriented 
towards explaining the political and diplomatic interests driving the policy 
of decolonisation, seeking to identify its immediate causes.162 However, the 
concept of self-determination and affiliated ideas of freedom as expressed in 
UN discourse during the 1950–1960 debates have not been explored. 
Chapter 4 seeks to remedy this. I find that while the 1960 Declaration made 
‘self-determination’ legally implementable as decolonisation, it also 
reduced the independence prospects of the concept to colonies, and 
weakened its association with the radical idea of freedom. 
 
Scholarship on the two ICHRs, which contained the exact same wording on 
‘self-determination’ as the 1960 Declaration, was comparatively sparse until 
the 1990s, when they were enlisted in support of what was called ‘internal 
self-determination’. In a context of heightened international attention to 
human rights,163 scholars then came to define ‘internal self-determination’ as 
a ‘right to democratic governance’164 and human rights within existing 
                                                                                                                        
Amsterdam, 1989, are somewhat more interested in the local-level dynamics that led to 
the independence of former colonies. Frank Füredi: Colonial Wars and the Politics of 
Third World Nationalism, I. B. Tauris, London, 1994, focuses on the British response to 
colonial independence movements, and partially on their nature and demands. For a 
development perspective, see Bruno Kreisky and Humayun Gauhar (eds): 
Decolonization and After: The Future of the Third World, South Publications, London, 
1987.  
162 For instance W. R. Louis: End of British Imperialism: The Scramble for Empires, Suez, 
and decolonization. Collected Essays, I. B. Tauris, London, 2006a; Frederick Cooper: 
Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History, University of California Press, 
London, 2005; Robert J. C. Young: Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction, 
Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, 2006. Neta Crawford: Argument and Change in World 
Politics: Ethics, Decolonization, and Humanitarian Intervention, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2002 analyses international argumentation on colonialism, but 
regarding decolonisation focuses narrowly on the delegitimation of colonial discourse. 
163  See e.g. Jack Donnelly: ‘Human Rights: A New Standard of Civilization?’, 
International Affairs, 74(1), 1998, pp.1–23; McCorquodale 1994, p.858; James Mayall: 
‘Nationalism and Imperialism’, pp.104–122 in Cambridge 2003, at pp.115, 117. For 
historical background, see Moyn 2010; Andrew Moravcsik: ‘The Origins of Human 
Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe’, International 
Organization, 54(2), 2000, pp.217–252; Nicholas N. Kittrie: The War against Authority: 
From the Crisis of Legitimacy to a New Social Contract, Johns Hopkins University 
Press, Baltimore, MD, 1995, especially p.212; John P. Humphrey: ‘Political and Related 
Rights’, unpaginated in Theodor Meron (ed.): Human Rights and International Law: 
Legal and Policy Issues, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1986. 
164 Thomas M. Franck: ‘The Emerging right to Democratic Governance’, American 
Journal of International Law, 86(1), 1992, pp.46–91. See also Moltchanova 2009, p.83. 
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states,165  possibly autonomy166 or federalism.167  It was claimed that the 
ICHRs, along with other key documents,168 showed that ‘internal self-
determination’ was the only way to realise the concept after the 1960 
Declaration had restricted its prospects of state creation to colonies alone.169 
 
From the perspective of international and intellectual history, however, 
‘internal self-determination’ does not seem to be the same concept that 
earlier international discourse had referred to as ‘self-determination’.170 
Moreover, the phrase ‘internal self-determination’ was created by the very 
international legal and international relations scholarship which has come to 
take it for granted,171 but is nowhere to be found in the actual legislation 
drawn upon in its support. For scholars, their intention in promoting this 
‘internal’ notion seems to have been to open for pragmatic compromise,172 
                                                
165 E.g. Georg Nolte: ‘Secession and External Intervention’, pp.65–93 in Kohen (ed.) 
2006, at pp.72–73; Anaya 2004, pp.103–106; Smith 2010, p.276; Simpson 1996, 
especially p.283. See also Allen Buchanan: Justice, Legitimacy and Self-determination: 
Moral Foundations for International Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004, 
p.373; Hannum 1996, in particular pp.458–468, Hannum 1993b, p.66; McCorquodale 
1994, p.872; Cassese 1995, p.337; and Brownlie 1988.  
166 Patrick Thornberry: ‘Images of Autonomy and Individual and Collective Rights on 
International Instruments on the Rights of Minorities’, pp.97–124 in M. Suksi (ed.): 
Autonomy: Applications and Implications, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 1998, 
at p.111; Chris Armstrong: ‘Global Egalitarianism or National Self-determination?’, 
pp.253–268 in Breen and O’Neill (eds) 2010; Musgrave 1997, e.g. p.207; Adina Preda: 
‘‘The Principle of Self-determination and National Minorities’, Dialectical 
Anthropology, 27, 2003, pp.205–225; Cassese 1995, pp.348–352. 
167 Patrick Thornberry: ‘The Democratic or Internal Aspect of Self-determination with 
some Remarks on Federalism’, pp.101–138 and Otto Kimminich: ‘A “Federal” Right of 
Self-determination?’, pp.83–100, both in Tomuschat (ed.) 2001; Edward McWhinney: 
Self-determination of Peoples and Plural-ethnic States in Contemporary International 
Law: Failed States, Nation Building and the Alternative, Federal Option, Martinus 
Nijhoff, Leiden, 2007. See also Weller 2009, pp.115–158. 
168 Especially the ‘Friendly Relations Declaration’, UNGA Resolution 2625 (XXV), 
‘Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations’, 24 
October 1970; but also the Helsinki Final Act, 1 August 1975 (a non-binding accord 
between North American and European states); and later, the Indigenous Peoples 
Declaration, UNGA resolution 61/295, 2007. See e.g. Cassese 1995 pp.52–53, 65–66 on 
the ICHRs and p.70 on the Friendly Relations declaration; Hannum 1996, pp.49, 469. 
169 For similar, earlier views, see e.g. Partsch 1982, p.65; UN official John P. Humphrey: 
Human Rights and the United Nations: A Great Adventure, Transnational Publishers, 
New York, 1984, p.129. 
170 See Moyn 2010, p.208. 
171 For examples, see McCorquodale 1994, p.869; Jean Salmon: ‘Internal Aspects of the 
Right to Self-determination: Towards a Democratic Legitimacy Principle?’, pp.253–282 
in Tomuschat (ed.) 2001; Hurst Hannum: ‘The Specter of Secession: Responding to 
Claims for Ethnic Self-determination’, Foreign Affairs, 77(2), 1998, pp.13–19; Gentian 
Zyberi: ‘Self-Determination Through the Lens of the International Court of Justice’, 
Netherlands International Law Review, 56, 2009, pp.429–453, at p.430; Kaczorowska 
2010. For an early expression, see Buchheit 1978, p.14. 
172 See e.g. Weller 2009; Paul R. Williams and Francesca Jannotti Pecci: ‘Earned 
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‘[t]ak[e] the sting out173 of the wider concept, limit its scope, kill off hopes 
of independence expressed with radical ‘self-determination’ demands,174 and 
remove the threat posed to the territorial integrity of states.175 Such a variant 
of ‘self-determination’ might be preferable to those who already have a state 
of their own. But disregarding independence as a possible outcome would 
render the concept meaningless to its claimants, and would ignore its 
international and intellectual history.176 Since the focus of this thesis is on 
‘self-determination’ in international discourse, however, these scholarly 
debates will not be pursued further. I analyse ‘internal self-determination’ 
only when it actually became part of international discourse on ‘self-
determination’, as in the 2008–2010 ICJ case on Kosovo. 
 
The fifth and final chapter of this thesis explores the international discourse 
of ‘self-determination’ in the ICJ proceedings on Kosovo. Historians have 
yet to analyse not only this particular ICJ case, but indeed the history of 
Kosovo as a whole after its 1998–1999 war against Serbia. The most recent 
past of Kosovo has instead been covered by journalists and international 
relations scholars, usually seeking to improve the international 
administration established in post-war Kosovo in 1999.177 Some legal works 
                                                                                                                        
Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between Sovereignty and Self-determination’, Stanford 
Journal of International Law, 40(2), 2004, pp.347–386; Asbjørn Eide: ‘In Search of 
Constructive Alternatives to Secession’, pp.139–176 in Tomushcat (ed.) 2001; Asbjorn 
Eide: ‘Peaceful Group Accommodation as an Alternative to Secession in Sovereign 
States’, pp.87–110, at p.87 and Kumar Rupesinghe: ‘Conflict Resolution: Current 
Options and New Mechanisms’, pp.337–355, at p.340, both in Clark and Williamson 
(eds) 1996; Donald Horowitz: ‘Self-determination: Politics, Philosophy, and Law’, 
pp.181–214 in Moore (ed.) 1998. 
173 Jan Klabbers: ‘The Right to be Taken Seriously: Self-Determination in International 
Law’, Human Rights Quarterly, 28(1), 2006, pp.186–206, at p.191. 
174 See McCorquodale 1994, pp.878, 884; also Hannum 1996, p.473; Norman 2006, p.73; 
Klabbers 2006, pp.202–203; Eileen F. Babbitt: ‘Negotiating Self-determination: Is it a 
Viable Alternative to Violence?’, pp.159–166 in Hannum and Babbitt (eds) 2006, at 
p.165 and Weller 2009, pp.112, 114; Weller 2008a. 
175 See Moltchanova 2009, especially p.5; McCorquodale 1994, p.864. By contrast, 
Cassese 1979 and Burke 2010 (especially pp.47–55) indicate that ‘internal’ self-
determination expands the concept. 
176 See also Miéville 2005, p.269; Christopher H. Wellman: ‘A Defense of Secession and 
Political Self-determination’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 24(2), 1995, pp.142–171; 
Crawford 2006, p.107; Brilmayer 1991; Tomuschat 2001, p.11; Toynbee 1925, p.317; 
Hannum 1993b, p.39; Hannum 1996, p.39; Tilly 1993.  
177 For recent international relations examples see Nina den Boer and Chris van der Borgh: 
‘International Statebuilding and Contentious Universities in Kosovo’, Journal of 
Intervention and Statebuilding, 5(1), 2011, pp.67–88; Andreas Ernst: ‘Fuzzy 
Governance: State-building in Kosovo since 1999 as Interaction between International 
and Local Actors’, Democracy and Security, 7, 2011, pp.123–139; Gezim Visoka: 
‘International Governance and Local Resistance in Kosovo: The Thin Line Between 
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have shared this concern,178 while others have concentrated on the lack of 
accountability, transparency, or representativeness of Kosovo’s international 
administration. 179  Meanwhile a growing body of legal scholarship has 
examined the ICJ case itself, seeking either to praise or attack the Court’s 
final advisory opinion, and identifying legal lessons to be learned from the 
case.180  
                                                                                                                        
Ethical, Emancipatory and Exclusionary Politics’, Irish Studies in International Affairs, 
22, 2011, pp.99–125; and the coverage of Kosovo in Dominik Zaum: The Sovereignty 
Paradox: The Norms and Politics of International Statebuilding, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2007; and Oisin Tansey: Regime Building: Democratization and 
International Administration, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009. See also Blerim 
Reka: UNMIK as an International Governance in Post-war Kosova: NATO’s 
intervention, UN Administration and Kosovar Aspirations, Logos, Skopje, 2003; 
Bernhard Knoll: ‘From Benchmarking to Final Status? Kosovo and the Problem of an 
International Administration’s Open-Ended Mandate’, European Journal of 
International Law, 16(4), 2005, pp.637–660. For journalistic examples, see the 
problematic Iain King and Whit Mason: Peace at Any Price: How the World Failed 
Kosovo, Hurst, London, 2006; also Tim Judah: Kosovo. War and Revenge, Yale 
University Press, New Haven, CT, 2002; Tim Judah: Kosovo: What Everyone Needs to 
Know, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008; and James Pettifer and Miranda Vickers: 
The Albanian Question: Reshaping the Balkans, I. B. Tauris, London, 2007, which 
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System: the United Nations Missions in Kosovo and East Timor’, American Journal of 
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114, EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris, December 2008b. For useful document 
collections on the international lead-up to the Kosovo war, see Marc Weller (ed.): The 
Crisis in Kosovo 1989–1999: From the Dissolution of Yugoslavia to Rambouillet and 
the Outbreak of Hostilities, Documents and Analysis Publishing, Cambridge, 1999; 
Heike Krieger (ed.): The Kosovo Conflict and International Law: An Analytical 
Documentation, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999. 
179 Oeter 2007, pp.504–505; Fabry 2010, pp.206–207, as well as Gezim Visoka: ‘The 
“Kafkaesque Accountability” of International Governance in Kosovo’, Journal of 
Intervention and Statebuilding, 6(2), 2012, pp.189–212. See also Geldenhuys 2009, 
pp.107–116; Ombudsperson Institution in Kosovo: ‘Special Report no. 1 on the 
Compatibility with Recognized International Standards of UNMIK Regulation No. 
2000/47 on the Status, Privileges and Immunities of KFOR and UNMIK and their 
Personnel in Kosovo (18 August 2000) and on the Implementation of the Above 
Regulation’, 26 April 2001; Malin Palm: ‘Accountability and Effectiveness of CSDP 
Missions: The Role of Civil Society’, European Peacebuilding Liaison Office, 2010; 
Human Rights Watch: ‘Better Late than Never: Enhancing the Accountability of 
International Institutions in Kosovo’, 13 April 2009, accessed 8 February 2013, 
www.hrw.org/en/reports/2009/04/13/better-late-never; Débora García-Orrico: ‘Kosovo’, 
in Security Council resolutions under Chapter VII: Design, Implementation and 
Accountabilities, FRIDE 2009, p.142; Lindsey Cameron: Accountability of 
International Organisations Engaged in the Administration of Territory, University 
Centre for International Humanitarian Law, 2006, pp.5–6; David Marshall and Shelley 
Inglis: ‘The Disempowerment of Human Rights-based Justice in the United Nations 
Mission in Kosovo’, Harvard Human Rights Journal, 16(84), 2003, pp.95–146; 
Christian Tomuschat (ed.): Kosovo and the International Community – A Legal 
Assessment, Kluwer, The Hague, 2002. 
180  For recent representative compilations, see James Summers (ed.): Kosovo: A 
Precedent? The Declaration of Independence, the Advisory Opinion and Implications 
for Statehood, Self-determination and Minority Rights, Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden, 2011; 
special issue of the German Law Journal, 11(8), 2010; and contributions from Frowein, 
Bogdandy and Jacob, and Fleiner, all in Ulrich Fastenrath, Rudolf Geiger, Daniel-
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From my perspective, the important questions involved in the ICJ Kosovo 
case are how ‘self-determination’ was invoked during the proceedings and 
how these references expressed ideas of freedom. I see the case as having 
illuminated current international understandings of self-determination and 
the ideas of freedom that have dominated international discourse. In chapter 
5, I argue that the Kosovo case indicates that, while most states involved in 
the proceedings understood self-determination chiefly as an ‘internal’, 
liberal-conservative, stability-promoting notion, the final language of the 
ICJ advisory opinion served to keep the radical idea alive. 
 
With these chapters, I show how the concept of ‘self-determination’ has 
been used internationally at important moments in the course of the past 
hundred years, and how the two ideas of freedom have functioned as its 
standards of legitimation. As I assume that the arguments and ideas on self-
determination sought legitimation with reference to the ideas of freedom 
prevailing internationally at various times, this investigation also reveals 
what these ideas were. It emerges that, although the liberal-conservative 
idea has dominated the international ‘self-determination’ discourse, the 
radical idea has kept reoccurring. Indeed, the radical idea may have been the 
real driver behind the international appearances of ‘self-determination’, 
consistently reviving the currency of the concept by provoking liberal-
conservative reactions. 
                                                                                                                        
Erasmus Khan, Andreas Paulus, Sabine von Schorlemer & Christoph Vedder (eds): 
From Bilateralism to Community Interest: Essays in Honour of Bruno Simma, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2011. See also Mushfig Mammadov: ‘“Traditional Gap” in 
the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion on Kosovo’, Caucasian Review of International Affairs, 
4(4), 2010, pp.313–324; Simone Florio: ‘Serbia vs. Kosovo: International Law and 
Politics of Secession’, Central and Eastern European Forum Yearbook, University of 
Granada, 2011, pp.1–18; Eric De Brabandere: ‘The Kosovo Advisory Proceedings and 
the Court’s Advisory Jurisdiction as a Method of Dispute Settlement’, The Hague 
Justice Portal, 2012, pp.1–6; Marko Divac Öberg: ‘The Legal Effects of United Nations 
Resolutions in the Kosovo Advisory Opinion’, American Journal of International Law, 
105, 2011, pp.81–90; Dinah Shelton: ‘Self-determination in Regional Human Rights 
Law: from Kosovo to Cameroon’, American Journal of International Law, 105, 2011, 
pp.60–81; David Harland: ‘Kosovo and the UN’, Survival, 52(5), 2010, pp.75–98; 
Richard Falk: ‘The Kosovo Advisory Opinion: Conflict Resolution and Precedent’, 
American Journal of International Law, 105, 2011, pp.50–60. 
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1. TOWARDS INTERNATIONALISATION: LENIN’S CONCEPT OF 
‘SELF-DETERMINATION’ 
 
The significance of ‘self-determination’ in international discourse stems 
from the legitimation of the concept with reference to freedom, and from its 
legal formalisation. Both these features must be understood in light of the 
emergence of the specific term ‘self-determination’ in the language of 
international affairs early in the 20th century. The Russian Bolshevik leader 
Vladimir Ilyich Lenin and US President Woodrow Wilson both made crucial 
references to the concept, but it was Wilson who really put the language of 
‘self-determination’ on the international agenda. However, he came to 
mention it in response to Lenin’s earlier pronouncements. It is therefore 
important to explore the language and ideas of both these men in order to 
explain the internationalisation of ‘self-determination’.  
 
This chapter examines Lenin’s discourse of ‘self-determination’; chapter 2 
focuses on Wilson’s use of the term. How these two leaders employed this 
language is the core of the first international ‘self-determination moment’ to 
be examined in this thesis. It is a central issue, for two main reasons. First, it 
was Lenin and Wilson who made ‘self-determination’ a key reference point 
in international affairs. To be sure, ideas often associated with the concept – 
such as freedom, popular sovereignty, and political legitimacy – can be 
traced back much further in history. But ‘self-determination’ as an exact 
term did not gain international prominence prior to Lenin and Wilson. My 
focus is exclusively on the language of ‘self-determination’ in high-level 
international affairs: and it was with Lenin and Wilson that this precise 
language became internationally important. 
 
The second reason for examining Lenin’s and Wilson’s discourse of ‘self-
determination’ in these two first chapters is that they set the terms for how 
the concept would recur in all later important international moments. Both 
leaders used their ideas of freedom to explain and legitimate their positions 
on self-determination. Lenin did so most directly, by advocating ‘self-
determination’ as a radical idea compassing freedom as equality, which, if 
realised, would necessarily imply the option of complete political 
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independence and creating new states. Such an understanding was to 
reappear in all subsequent international moments. But because the 
overarching aim for Lenin was freedom as equality in the form of socialist 
internationalism, in practice he conditioned his concept of self-
determination on criteria that were not to become internationally prevailing. 
Also Wilson’s contrasting and more ambiguous references to ‘self-
determination’ implied freedom as a legitimating standard, albeit in different 
ways. 
 
Foreshadowing later international appearances, Lenin’s and Wilson’s uses 
of the language of ‘self-determination’ were informed by wider, and 
changing, international contexts. Particularly during the First World War, 
their statements posited the concept as having a global role in ending a 
conflict which, they somehow agreed, had been produced by the corruption 
and non-sustainability of an ‘old world’. Both men saw the times they lived 
in as challenging, but also as charged with great opportunity. In different 
ways, both Lenin and Wilson seemed intent on using the war as a catalyst 
for a new and better order, to be shaped according to their political ideals. 
While they diverged greatly in other respects, both presented ‘self-
determination’ as lying at the heart of their visions for a new and better 
world. And both made use of this language in order to win over their 
audiences. Also in the later course of history, ‘self-determination’ was to 
gain significance at times of international change and possible regeneration. 
 
Note that I study Lenin’s and Wilson’s concepts of ‘self-determination’ as 
they themselves presented this, in public writings and statements. I do not 
seek to idealise either of the two, nor do I a priori question their sincerity. In 
exploring Lenin’s and Wilson’s discourse of ‘self-determination’ I draw on 
close readings of how they themselves publicly referred to the concept. 
Relevant parts of their broader thinking as well as records from their 
contemporaries are utilised to the extent to which they can illuminate how 
and why Lenin and Wilson presented their ideas as they did. Further, if I 
touch upon their personalities, broader ideologies, and wider historical 
contexts, that is solely in order to shed light on their contributions to 
internationalising the language of ‘self-determination’. The same priorities 
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guide my selection of sources from the vast secondary literature on these 
two leaders and their times. 
 
Lenin’s Concept of ‘Self-determination’: Context and Language 
Lenin employed the language of the ‘right of nations to self-determination’ 
in numerous publications between 1903 and 1917. 1  Ideologically, his 
discourse was a product of Marxist thinking. Politically, his earliest ideas on 
‘self-determination’ were formulated in the context of intra-socialist debate 
on the ‘national question’, whereas his later expressions were influenced by 
the First World War. To Lenin, the ‘national question’ and ‘self-
determination’ were parts of the same conceptual problématique. It could be 
mentioned that the intense post-Second World War scholarly preoccupation 
with which ‘unit’ might be eligible for self-determination stands in stark 
contrast to the socialist focus of Lenin’s time. Endeavouring to define this 
unit in general terms was not central to Marxist discussions on self-
determination or the national question: they referred loosely to ‘nations’.2 
 
When Lenin began to address the right of nations to self-determination, 
there existed no ‘standard’ socialist approach to the national question.3 Both 
Karl Marx and the first Socialist International (1866) had left the tensions 
between Marxism and nationalism unresolved. Neither had clarified 
whether, or how, to reconcile ‘national’ solidarity with socialism’s 
insistence on class as the prime foundation for political action. At the time 
of Lenin’s earliest references to ‘self-determination’, the exact relationship 
between socialist freedom and national liberation was as yet undefined, and 
the right of nations to self-determination was a controversial topic among 
Lenin’s socialist contemporaries.  
 
                                                
1 In the following, my main reference to works of Lenin and other Marxists is the Marxists 
Internet Archive (MIA): www.marxists.org, latest accessed 30 May 2013. Of Lenin’s 
collected works, the website has digitalised the version originally published by Progress 
Publishers, Moscow. Below I cite the original publication dates of works, as well as 
their web address. References to Russian names of publications follow the transcription 
standard used on the website. 
2 However, Stalin did address a ‘nation’s’ distinguishing features in ‘Marxism and the 
National Question’, see below, Prosveshcheniye, 3–5, March–May 1913, accessed 9 
February 2011 www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1913/03.htm. 
3 For a brief analysis of various Marxist approaches to the issue of nationalism, see 
Breuilly 1982, pp.21–28. See also Walker Connor: The National Question in Marxist 
Leninist Theory and Strategy, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1984. 
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Self-determination was not originally pushed onto the socialist agenda by 
urgent political developments that required policy action. Nor were 
socialists at the time in any position to take any such action. True, Lenin’s 
writings on ‘self-determination’ did sometimes refer to policy issues such as 
the situation for nationalities living within the Russian Empire.4 And later he 
incorporated the concept into his political theories of imperialism and the 
First World War. The language of ‘self-determination’ started to gain 
significance in Lenin’s published writings and appear in Russian Social 
Democratic Labour Party (RSDLP or ‘the party’ hereafter) resolutions from 
19035 – a time of socialist debate on the standing of national groups within 
the socialist parties in Russia and Europe. Nevertheless, it was not primarily 
such concrete issues of policy that drove Lenin and his contemporaries in 
their preoccupation with self-determination. To them, the concept was 
important for reasons of theory and ideology. 
 
Lenin and his socialist contemporaries took theoretical and ideological 
disputes extremely seriously, 6  and in the early 1900s, the socialist 
discussions on self-determination unfolded with strong positioning and hard 
fronts. Moreover, the debate emerged at a time seen as full of dramatic 
promise of gaining the power to establish a new political order. When Lenin 
started to engage in the socialist discussion on self-determination, the 
RSDLP was in a process of ideological and organisational consolidation, 
albeit without firmly anchored leadership. Lenin had spent most of the early 
                                                
4 E.g. Lenin: ‘The National Question in Our Programme’, Iskra, 44, 15 July 1903, accessed 
8 January 2011, www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1903/jul/15.htm (the identical 
text is found in Lenin: Collected Works, Vol. 6, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1961, 
pp.454–463, but hereafter MIA versions are used where available); Lenin: ‘The 
Agrarian Programme of Social-Democracy in the First Russian Revolution, 1905–
1907’, Zhizn i Znaniye, 1917, accessed 14 May 2011, 
www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1907/agrprogr/index.htm6 and Lenin: ‘Critical 
Remarks on the National Question’, Prosveshcheniye, 10–12, 1913, accessed 7 January 
2011, www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1913/crnq/index.htm. On the political role 
of minorities in Russia at the time, see e.g. Rex A. Wade: The Bolshevik Revolution and 
Russian Civil War, Greenwood Press, Westwood, CT, 2001, p.87; David R. Marples: 
Lenin’s Revolution: Russia, 1917–1921, Pearson Education, Essex, 2000, p.5; Edward 
Acton: Rethinking the Russian Revolution, Routledge, New York, 1990, p.145. 
5 It was also included in RSDLP resolutions of 1913 and 1917. In the following, ‘the party’ 
will be used with reference to the socialist party led by Lenin, whatever its name at the 
time – the RSDLP was also called the Russian Social Democratic Workers’ Party or the 
Russian Social Democratic Party; later, the ‘Bolsheviks’, and with the establishment of 
the USSR, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. 
6 Mayall 2003, p.115 – however, also suggesting that the advocacy of ‘self-determination’ 
was a result of tactics rather than ideology. 
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years of the new century outside of Russia, but had actively followed 
developments there and written much on ideology and politics. In 1912, he 
had sided with the majority, ‘Bolshevik’, faction of the party when the 
‘Menshevik’ grouping split off.7 All the same, Lenin’s leadership position 
was not certain prior to his return to Russia after the February 1917 
Revolution, after which the Bolsheviks took power in October that year.8 It 
was precisely during this 1903–1917 period that self-determination, as part 
of these broader power struggles, became a matter of ‘utmost’ and ‘specific 
importance’ to Lenin and the party.9  
 
‘Self-determination’ thus arose in Lenin’s discourse through ideologically 
charged polemic exchanges with fellow socialists. It seems as though his 
initial participation in the socialist debate might have been as much about 
positioning himself as the leading figure of contemporary Marxism as it was 
about self-determination per se. Almost all of Lenin’s interventions on the 
concept were combatively directed at various critics of his positions, and his 
earliest statements targeted socialist adversaries above all. Achieving the 
power to realise his political vision necessitated convincing fellow socialists 
of his approach on key issues. Since ‘self-determination’ had become a 
central part of the socialists’ debating programme, especially from 1903, 
convincing others of his line on this issue became part of Lenin’s general 
drive to gain power.10  
 
In fact, Lenin’s public discourse on ‘self-determination’ was articulated 
during periods when he was fighting for party, state or global domination of 
                                                
7 See e.g. Neil Harding: ‘The Russian Revolution: an Ideology in Power’ in Cambridge 
2003, pp.239–266, especially p.242; Carr 1978, pp.26, 37; Page 1959, p.4; Christopher 
Read: Lenin: A Revolutionary Life, Routledge, New York, 2005, p.73; Stephen J. Lee: 
Lenin and Revolutionary Russia, Routledge, London, 2003, p.8. 
8 See e.g. Read 2005, p.78; Page 1959, p.353; Leon Trotsky: Lenin, G. G. Harrap, London, 
1925, pp.79–80; the following date references are to the ‘old’-style Julian calendar used 
at the time. 
9 Lenin: ‘To Alexandra Kollontai’, written after 19 March 1916, in Lenin on the United 
States, International Publishers, New York, 1970, pp.138–139. See also Lenin: ‘The 
Discussion On Self-Determination Summed Up’, written in July 1916 and published in 
October 1916 in Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata 1, accessed 8 January 2011, 
www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1916/jul/x01.htm. For a summary of the Marxist 
debate on self-determination at the time, see e.g. Neil Harding: Lenin’s Political 
Thought, Haymarket Books, Chicago, IL, 2009, pp.298–299. 
10 On various views on Lenin’s drive for power, see e.g. Service 2000, p.330; Rex A. 
Wade: The Russian Revolution, 1917, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005, 
p.210; Read 2005, p.67; Lee 2003, p.25; Marples 2000, p.10. 
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a sort that few expected he would be able to achieve.11 This might have 
fuelled his eagerness for winning the argument. Certainly the intensity and 
length with which he argued for ‘self-determination’ indicated that a great 
deal was at stake for him. As Leon Trotsky, who in 1917 became the 
Bolshevik Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, put it: Lenin ‘possessed the 
tenseness of striving towards his goal’.12 According to Trotsky, Lenin tended 
to concentrate all his energy and all his being into the cause for which he 
was struggling.13 His 1903–1917 advocacy of ‘the right of nations to self-
determination’ certainly brought some of this to the fore. 
 
Given that the socialist debate concerned the ideological correctness of 
backing ‘self-determination’ as an answer to the ‘national question’, Lenin 
sought to assert the concept as ideologically correct.14 When seeking to win 
over other socialists to his stance, Lenin cited certain well-established 
authoritative texts. Aside from Marx’s unelaborated references to issues of 
nationality and nationalism,15 Lenin relied upon a report from the 1896 
London Congress of the Second International.16 On the issue of ‘self-
determination’, he wrote in 1914: ‘No one can seriously question the 
London resolution’.17 Quoting the German version of the Political Action 
Commission’s report from the London Congress, Lenin stated that the 
Second International supported ‘the full right of all nations to self-
determination’.18 He then used the Second International’s alleged support 
for self-determination to prop up his own position.19 
                                                
11 See Orlando Figes: A People’s Tragedy, The Russian Revolution 1891–1924, Pimlico 
Random House, London 1996, pp.386, 388–389. 
12 Trotsky 1925, pp.161–162, original emphasis.  
13 Ibid. See also Carr 1978, p.23. 
14  See e.g. Lenin 1903: ‘The National Question’. These points have been under-
emphasised in the literature on Lenin’s idea of self-determination, despite some brief 
mentions, e.g. in Carr 1978, p.68; a partial exception is provided by Abulof 2010. 
15 See Joseph A. Petrus: ‘Marx and Engels on the National Question’, Journal of Politics, 
33(3), 1971, pp.797–824; Bill Bowring: ‘Marx, Lenin and Pashukanis on Self-
determination: Response to Robert Knox’, Historical Materialism, 19(2), 2011, pp.113–
127. 
16 See Dick Geary: ‘The Second International: Socialism and Social Democracy’, pp.219–
243 in Cambridge 2003. 
17 Lenin: ‘The Right of Nations to Self-Determination’, written February–May 1914, 
published April–June 1914, Prosveshcheniye Nos. 4, 5 and 6, accessed 1 February 2012, 
www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1914/self-det/index.htm, conclusion. 
18 Lenin 1914: ‘The Right of Nations’. 
19  Also in Lenin’s ‘The Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-
Determination’, written January–February 1916, published April 1916, Vorbote, 2 – in 
Russian, October 1916, Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata, 1, accessed 3 February, 2012, 
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Lenin claimed that the Russian version of the Second International’s report 
had ‘wrongly’ translated the German Selbstbestimmungsrecht as ‘autonomy’ 
and not ‘self-determination’.20 However, it is not clear that German had 
been the official language of the Congress of the Second International – or 
indeed if the conference had operated with any one official language at all.21 
The Congress had been held in London, and, as the English-language report 
had noted: ‘Every speech or remark has to be translated into French and 
German’ (i.e. from English).22 The English version of the report made no 
mention of ‘self-determination’, referring instead to ‘the full autonomy of all 
nationalities’.23 This leaves the actual stance of the Second International on 
‘self-determination’ unclear. 
 
Lenin never presented the Second International’s alleged sponsorship of 
‘self-determination’ as the overarching reason for his own advocacy and 
ideas. He did, however, use the German report to justify his specific 
language of what would later always be translated into English as ‘self-
determination’ – including, crucially, in the texts Wilson read and reacted to 
in 1918.24 Lenin’s use of the report of the Second International underlines 
his eagerness to legitimise the concept of ‘self-determination’ as 
ideologically correct. The equivocal issue of translation involved in Lenin’s 
choice of terminology gives rise to the question of how much chance might 
have been involved when he launched the exact term that Wilson would 
later make international as ‘self-determination’.25 Lenin did not explain why 
he favoured the term ‘self-determination’ above ‘autonomy’. Nor did others 
                                                                                                                        
www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1916/jan/x01.htm. 
20 Lenin 1914: ‘The Right of Nations’, part 7, note 1. 
21 Wilhelm Liebknecht: ‘Our recent Congress’, Justice, 15 August 1896, accessed 30 May 
2011, www.marxists.org/archive/liebknecht-w/1896/08/our-congress.htm discusses the 
problem of translation during the Congress, indicating that it did not have an official 
language. 
22 Will Thorne, Secretary to the Organising Committee: ‘Full report of the Proceedings of 
the International Workers’ Congress, London, July and August, 1896 (the fourth 
congress of the second international)’, The Labour Leader, Glasgow, undated, p.14.  
23 Ibid., p.32, emphasis added. English was the native language of the reporter of the 
Political Action Commission, G. Lansbury. 
24 See especially ‘David Roland Francis to Robert Lansing’, Petrograd 31 December 1917, 
recorded on 1 January 1918, pp.411–412 in Arthur S. Link (ed.): The Papers of 
Woodrow Wilson (PWW), Vol.45, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1984. 
25 Hence I am open to the possibility of chance in intellectual history, although I realise 
that intellectual history scholarship usually avoids this notion; see Koselleck 2004, 
p.116. 
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follow up on this: neither his fellow socialists at the time, nor later 
international agents drawing upon the language of ‘self-determination’, 
problematized or challenged the term as such. 
 
When arguing for ‘self-determination’ in early 20th-century socialist debates, 
Lenin explicitly attacked two other views in particular. 26  In fact, his 
discourse of self-determination took shape in directly confronting these 
other two positions. The first broadly answered the national question with 
‘autonomy’.27 Two groups of socialists put forward such an argument, each 
promoting slightly differing versions. One of these held that the Social 
Democratic party should be decentralised along national lines. The national 
question these socialists sought to answer was an intra-party one, and they 
did not phrase their response in terms of ‘self-determination’. Lenin’s 
disagreement with such ‘autonomists’ peaked in 1903, when he fell out with 
the ‘Bundists’, a Jewish group in the RSDLP that sought nationally-based 
devolution of power and the formation of its own party, the Bund. 
Countering the Bundists, Lenin argued that, for reasons of ideology and 
organisation, the proletariat should not be divided party-politically 
according to language or nationality.28 Such divisions, in his view, would 
only damage the socialist cause. In 1903, that very conflict led to a rift 
between the Bundists and the party.29  
 
Lenin phrased his case against the second kind of ‘autonomists’ even more 
harshly. That group, represented by Austrian socialists Otto Bauer and Karl 
Renner, answered the national question by demanding the reform of existing 
political structures and limited self-rule for national groups within large 
                                                
26 See also Bowring 2008. 
27 For analysis, see e.g. R. Craig Nation: War on War: Lenin, the Zimmerwald Left, and the 
Origins of Communist Internationalism, Duke University Press, Durham, NC, 1989, 
pp.106–109; Carr 1978, pp.418–419. 
28 Lenin: ‘Do the Jewish Proletariat need an “Independent Political Party”?’, Iskra, 34, 15 
February 1903, accessed 8 February 2012, 
www.marxists.org/archive/Lenin/works/1903/feb/15.htm. 
29 Second Congress of the RSDLP, 17 (30) July – 10(23) August 1903: ‘Draft resolution 
on the Place of the Bund in the Party’, written in June/July 1903, published in Lenin 
Miscellany VI, 1927, accessed 8 February 2011, 
www.marxists.org/archive/Lenin/works/1903/2ndcong/2.htm#v06zz99h-470; Lenin: 
‘The Latest Word in Bundist Nationalism’, Iskra, 46, 15 August 1903, accessed 12 
February 2011, www.marxists.org/archive/Lenin/works/1903/aug/15b.htm; Lenin 1903: 
‘Do the Jewish Proletariat’. See also Carr 1978, p.419. 
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multinational states. National and cultural autonomy, they held, was the 
proper Marxist response to the national question – not creating new states. 
In ruling out secession and promoting solutions within the territories of 
existing states, these Austro-Marxist ‘autonomists’ presaged what scholars 
in the late 20th century would advocate as ‘internal self-determination’. They 
did, however, not articulate their position on the national question with 
language of that kind. Arguing for ‘internal’ solutions instead of ‘self-
determination’, they did not claim these would be a way of actually realising 
the concept. 
 
Lenin firmly rejected any such ‘internal’ response to the national question.30 
The Austro-Marxists’ tendency to compromise to achieve mere autonomy, 
he wrote, was ‘meaningless, pompous’ and ‘contradict[ed] the entire history 
of democracy’.31 Positioning himself against the arguments that claimed that 
autonomy would suffice, Lenin advocated the right to ‘self-determination’ 
as the freedom to secede and attain statehood, and be equal to other existing 
states.32 To him, freedom as ‘self-determination’ inescapably implied the 
choice of secession and full political independence; without having such an 
option, a people would not be free.33 He never took up the possibility of 
actually realising self-determination without achieving the status of 
independent statehood. The national question, he would say, could not be 
answered with any ‘internal’ autonomy variant: the only right solution was 
to promote self-determination as the right to create a new state. 
 
In practice, Lenin understood ‘self-determination’ to include a group’s 
freedom to advocate for secession, and its right to settle the question of 
                                                
30 Especially in 1916 ‘The Socialist Revolution’; ‘National-Liberalism and the Right of 
Nations to Self-Determination’, Proletarskaya Pravda, 12, 20 December, 1913, 
accessed 30 January 2011, www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1913/dec/20.htm. 
31 Lenin 1913 ‘National-Liberalism’.  
32 E.g. in Lenin 1914: ‘The Right of Nations’; Lenin: ‘The Revolutionary Proletariat and 
the Right of Nations to Self-Determination’, written in German not earlier than October 
16 (29), 1915, published in Lenin: Miscellany VI, 1927, accessed 29 January 2011, 
www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1915/oct/16.htm; Lenin 1916 ‘The Socialist 
Revolution’; Lenin: ‘A Caricature of Marxism and Imperialist Economism’, written 
August–October 1916, published in Zvezda 1–2, 1924, accessed 29 January 2011, 
www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1916/carimarx/index.htm 
33 See also e.g. Lenin 1916: ‘The Socialist Revolution’ and Lenin 1903: ‘The National 
Question’ for interchangeable uses of ‘independence’, ‘freedom’ and ‘self-
determination’. 
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whether to secede through a referendum among the equal members of that 
group.34 When in 1913, an RSDLP resolution defined ‘self-determination’ as 
‘the right to secede and form independent states’, this thus reflected the 
party’s endorsement of Lenin’s understanding of the concept as the 
ideologically proper one. 35  ‘Self-determination’, according to the party 
resolution, meant ‘the constitutional guarantee of an absolutely free and 
democratic method of deciding the question of secession’.36  
 
Lenin’s response to the ‘autonomists’ – in unambiguously equating ‘self-
determination’ with the freedom to establish a new state – would be echoed 
in all subsequent international appearances of the concept. At each later 
moment when ‘self-determination’ became important in international 
discourse, agents would presume that statehood was the main way of 
realising the concept, whether they supported or opposed this as an 
outcome. By indicating that all ‘nations’ should have such a right because 
that would realise their freedom as equality, Lenin also introduced equality 
as a key legitimising standard for the concept of self-determination. 
  
Josef Stalin actually held what resembled an ‘autonomist’ view on the 
national question, although Lenin never directly mentioned Stalin as one of 
his opponents on ‘self-determination’. Early in 1913, at Lenin’s request, 
Stalin had produced the first extensive inter-party analysis of nations and 
nationalism, ‘Marxism and the National Question’.37 Lenin had great hopes 
for this investigation, but the final result must have disappointed him.38 
While asserting many of Lenin’s ideas, Stalin’s examination had departed 
from Lenin’s concept of self-determination by insisting that the ‘only 
correct solution’ to the national question was ‘regional autonomy’.39 This 
position conflicted with Lenin’s view that the national question could be 
                                                
34 Lenin 1916: ‘The Socialist Revolution’, part 3. 
35 ‘Resolutions of the Summer’, 1913, Joint Conference of the Central Committee of the 
RSDLP and Party Officials, September 1913 in Notification and Resolutions of the 
Summer, 1913, Joint Conference of the Central Committee of the RSDLP and Party 
Officials, RSDLP Central Committee, accessed 29 January 2011, 
www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1913/sep/30b.htm, Article 4. 
36 Ibid., Article 5. 
37 Stalin 1913. 
38 See Michael V. Kryukov: ‘Self-determination from Marx to Mao’, Ethnic and Racial 
Studies, 19(2), 1996, pp.352–378, especially pp.355–356. 
39 Stalin 1913. 
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answered only with self-determination as the radical right to full 
independent statehood. 
 
Moreover, Stalin’s discourse had sought primary legitimation for the right 
of nations to self-determination with reference to their freedom from 
interference – a standard not emphasised as strongly in Lenin’s discourse at 
that time. Although Stalin’s 1913 text mentioned ‘equal rights’ as a value to 
be preserved, too, his principal assertion of ‘self-determination’ in that 
document was as follows:  
 
The right of self-determination means that only the nation itself has 
the right to determine its destiny, that no one has the right forcibly to 
interfere in the life of the nation, to destroy its schools and other 
institutions, to violate its habits and customs, to repress its language, 
or curtail its rights.40 
 
With this approach, Stalin in 1913 denounced forms of interference that 
Lenin would condemn more strongly in his later writings on ‘self-
determination’, produced in the context of the First World War. 
 
Further, the emphasis of Stalin’s text diverged somewhat from that of Lenin 
on what constituted a ‘nation’ or, more broadly, what agents might benefit 
from self-determination. Stalin defined a ‘nation’ specifically as ‘a 
historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of 
a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up 
manifested in a common culture’.41 His support for ‘the right of nations to 
self-determination’ hence embraced the concept as freedom from 
interference for groups whose identity met these precise criteria.  
 
While seemingly endorsing this definition – as well as the general view that, 
at that time, nations might be the proper beneficiaries of self-determination 
– Lenin did not insist on a precise list of intra-group conditions for either 
nationhood or self-determination. On the contrary, he stressed that it would 
be better to avoid ‘nationally’ defined attachments. In 1913, Lenin described 
the task of supporting ‘self-determination’ as a ‘largely a negative one’ and 
                                                
40 Ibid., emphasis in original. 
41 Ibid., emphasis omitted. 
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made the following key distinction: ‘Combat all national oppression? Yes, 
of course! Fight for any kind of national development, for “national culture” 
in general? – Of course not.’42 Locating the national question and self-
determination in a wider ideological context, Lenin’s focus was on the 
economic and political role the concept of ‘nation’ played in the 
development towards socialism. To use a phrase introduced long after his 
time, Lenin would consider a group a possible ‘self-determination unit’ 
without it having fully qualified according to the identity-oriented criteria 
laid down by Stalin.43 Regardless of whether this reflected minor tactical 
divergences between Lenin and Stalin or serious theoretical rifts, it did 
reveal a different rhetorical emphasis. 
 
While Lenin made no mention of Stalin in his writings on self-
determination, the second socialist position against which Lenin argued 
directly was that put forward by Rosa Luxemburg of the Polish Social 
Democrats. Luxemburg was totally opposed to any right to self-
determination, rejecting the concept as being a vague and destructive 
distraction from matters of class. It was class, Luxemburg insisted, and not 
national affiliation, which was the ideologically correct source of political 
mobilisation; self-determination would only serve to disturb this focus. 
Moreover, endorsing the concept would, in the view of Luxemburg, permit 
the bourgeoisie to use it to divide the proletariat along national lines.44 In 
1903, her Polish Social Democrats had split from the Polish Social 
Democratic Party on the very issue of self-determination. While the latter 
had demanded independence for Poland, Luxemburg’s faction had been 
opposed.45  
 
It appears that Lenin saw Luxemburg’s disagreement as a particularly 
                                                
42 Lenin 1913: ‘Critical Remarks’. 
43 See Kryukov p.357; G. Starushenko: The Principle of National Self-determination in 
Soviet Foreign Policy, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1963, pp.13–19.  
44 Rosa Luxemburg: ‘The National Question’ 1909, first published in the article series ‘The 
National Question and Autonomy’ in Luxemburg’s Cracow Magazine, Przeglad 
Socialdemokratyczny, 1908–1909, accessed 27 January 2011, 
www.marxists.org/archive/luxemburg/1909/national-question/index.htm; Rosa 
Luxemburg: ‘Foreword to the Anthology: The Polish Question and the Socialist 
Movement’ 1905, accessed 27 January 2011, 
www.marxists.org/archive/luxemburg/1905/misc/polish-question.htm 
45 See e.g. Nation 1989, pp.106–109.  
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serious challenge. His published writings argued against her views with 
greater fervour than he expended on the autonomists. In 1914, his main 
discussion on self-determination, ‘The Right of Nations to Self-
determination’, was formulated in explicit opposition to Luxemburg’s 
standpoints. All arguments similarly rejecting ‘self-determination’ after her 
1908–1909 ‘The National Question and Autonomy’, Lenin wrote, had 
simply repeated her line.46  
 
Lenin responded to Luxemburg’s stance by maintaining that there was a 
huge difference between his ideologically true backing of an ‘unconditional’ 
right to self-determination as secession, and supporting actual demands for 
realising that right in practice.47 Any claim for self-determination, Lenin 
stressed, would always have to be subjected to detailed analysis before 
determining whether or not political independence should be advanced in 
that particular case. Already in 1903 Lenin had highlighted the distinction 
between promoting a right to self-determination, and backing real-life calls 
for implementing it.48 Advocating a right to self-determination, in Lenin’s 
view, did not preclude the necessity of robustly opposing actual secessionist 
claims at times. On this issue, Stalin’s 1913 discussion of the national 
question reaffirmed Lenin’s attitude, signalling its incorporation into the 
general party line.49 
 
As part of Lenin’s response to Luxemburg’s outright rejection of the right to 
self-determination, he spelled out the precise historical, economic and 
geopolitical conditions under which he held it would be ideologically 
correct for socialists to back it. Between 1913 and 1916 in particular, Lenin 
detailed the circumstances under which he thought the right to self-
determination could suitably be advocated. Thus, although not outlining any 
specific internal standards for identifying a theoretical self-determination 
‘unit’, Lenin did invoke externally determined criteria in his support of the 
concept. These were stipulated with reference to his overall aim of socialist 
freedom, and underlined the Marxist framework in which he formulated his 
                                                
46 Lenin 1914: ‘The Right of Nations’. 
47 Ibid.; Lenin 1903: ‘The National Question’. 
48 Lenin 1903: ‘The National Question’. 
49 Stalin 1913. 
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language of ‘self-determination’. They also highlighted the contingencies 
inherent in his concept of self-determination, as well as in his idea of the 
‘nation’.  
 
In 1913, Lenin hinted at a historically determined conditioning of both self-
determination and nationhood in averring, with reference to Marx, that 
national identity and nationalism were products of a particular phase of 
bourgeois capitalism.50 As he saw self-determination as part of the national 
question, this claim indicated that he considered support for self-
determination, too, as bound up with the historical development of 
capitalism. Indeed, Lenin’s 1914 ‘The Right of Nations to Self-
determination’ would explain specifically that any claim for self-
determination must be analysed in light of the stage of capitalism in which it 
was raised.51 The approach to be taken in any particular instance should be 
determined by what would, at that point in history, best serve the progress of 
capitalism towards socialism. 
 
According to Lenin’s 1914 analysis, two different stages of capitalist 
development warranted two contrasting attitudes to self-determination. The 
first of these stages was characterised by the collapse of feudalism and 
absolutism, and the formation of states and bourgeois-democratic societies 
by a process whereby national movements would be transformed into mass 
movements. Lenin explained that, since capitalism required the bourgeoisie 
to ‘capture the home market’, it tended, for practical reasons, to organise 
itself in ‘politically united territories whose population speak a single 
language’. Historically, under such circumstances, national movements had 
contributed to the global victory of capitalism over feudalism.52 In Lenin’s 
view, this phase of capitalist development made it necessary for all classes 
to unite in fighting for political freedom as ‘the rights of the nation’.53 At 
this stage, demands for realising self-determination would be appropriate 
                                                
50 Lenin 1913: ‘Critical Remarks’. On the historical contingency of nationalism and self-
determination, also Lenin: ‘Draft Theses on National and Colonial Questions for the 
Second Congress of the Communist International’, 5 June, 1920, accessed 9 January 
2012, www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1920/jun/05.htm; Gilov 1983, p.28; Carr 
1978, pp.234–241. 
51 Lenin 1914: ‘The Right of Nations’.  
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid. 
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and should be supported. 
 
By contrast, according to Lenin’s 1914 tract, the second historical stage 
would have no place for self-determination. In history’s progress towards 
socialism, this second phase, the ‘eve of capitalism’s downfall’, would be 
made up of fully formed capitalist states with clear antagonisms between the 
proletariat and the bourgeoisie.54 No mass bourgeois-democratic movements 
would exist any longer at this point in history: the antagonism between 
united capital and the working-class movement would now be international. 
And it was this antagonism, Lenin predicted, that would result in the defeat 
of capitalism through socialist revolution, with internationalism overcoming 
national self-determination.55  
 
In 1915, Lenin added another dimension to his calculus of self-
determination – an economic one. The ‘division of nations into oppressor 
and oppressed’,56 he wrote, posed distinct requirements as to the correct 
Marxist position on the national question. According to this division, the 
proletariat of oppressor nations should promote the right of oppressed 
nations to self-determination. Meanwhile, the workers of oppressed nations 
should advocate ‘unity and the merging of the workers of the oppressed 
nations with those of the oppressor nations’. 57  Otherwise, he warned, 
workers of the oppressed nations would ‘involuntarily become the allies of 
their own national bourgeoisie, which always betrays the interests of the 
people and of democracy, and is always ready, in its turn, to annex territory 
and oppress other nations.’ 58  Already in 1913, Lenin had stated that 
secession might be acceptable only where liberation movements were 
progressive and were fighting capitalist oppressors: any nation that stood 
‘for its own bourgeois nationalism’ found no support in his thinking.59 As he 
expressed it again in 1914: ‘We fight against the privileges and violence of 
the oppressor nation, and do not in any way condone strivings for privileges 
                                                
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid. See also Young 2006, p.287. 
56 Lenin 1915: ‘The Revolutionary Proletariat’. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Lenin 1913: ‘Critical Remarks’. 
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on the part of the oppressed nation.’60 
 
Lenin further developed his criteria for the right of nations to self-
determination with a geopolitically defined classification. Three different 
categories of nations, he held in 1916, had different obligations regarding 
self-determination. 61  One of these groups consisted of the advanced 
capitalist countries, like the USA and the Western European powers. For 
this group, Lenin explained, the era of bourgeois, progressive, national 
movements had passed, and the advanced capitalist countries were now 
subjugating other nations, in their colonies as well as at home. Lenin 
demanded that the proletariat of such oppressor countries should support the 
self-determination of the nations they dominated. This would both hasten 
the advance of the oppressed nations towards socialist revolution, and in 
turn also benefit the domineering states themselves.62 Citing Marx, Lenin 
stated: ‘no nation can be free if it oppresses other nations’.63  
 
The second grouping in Lenin’s geopolitical categorisation model was made 
up of Austria, the Balkans and Russia. There, he wrote, bourgeois-
democratic national movements had developed only recently, and the 
proletariat should support the right to self-determination as a way to merge 
the class struggle of the oppressors with that of the workers of the oppressed 
nations.64 Third and last among Lenin’s geopolitical groups was the category 
of ‘semi-colonial’ China, Persia and Turkey, as well as the colonies. Here 
Lenin’s analyses seemed informed by his having followed various 
developments in these vast parts of the world.65 In the nations belonging to 
this category, he explained, bourgeois-democratic movements had not yet 
developed, and he encouraged support for their revolutionary elements. 
Self-determination for this category should be backed, as unconditional and 
                                                
60 Lenin 1914: ‘The Right of Nations’. 
61 Lenin 1916: ‘The Socialist Revolution’. 
62 Ibid.; also Lenin 1914: ‘The Right of Nations’. The party’s 1913 ‘Resolutions of the 
Summer’ expresses the same reasoning. 
63 Lenin 1916: ‘The Socialist Revolution’. 
64 Ibid. 
65 See e.g. Lenin: ‘Lenin’s remark on the arrest of B. G. Tilak in 1908’, 1911, pp.134–135 
in Ravindra Kumar (ed.): Selected Documents of Lokamaya Bal Gangadhar Tilak 1880–
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immediate freedom.66  
 
Apart from insisting on these multifaceted criteria in responding to 
Luxemburg’s objections, Lenin maintained that granting nations the right to 
self-determination would give them a status of freedom and equality that 
would in fact remove their incentive to secede.67 Within the international 
system of the time, Lenin, like Marx, saw the benefits of larger states as 
obvious; and he thought that nations, too, would recognise this if they were 
allowed full equality.68 Giving nations the right to self-determination as 
independence, Lenin argued, would ‘attract’ them ‘to union with great 
socialist states’.69 In 1915, he explained why he supported the concept: 
 
[N]ot because we [the social democrats] have dreamt of splitting up 
the country economically, or of the ideal of small states, but, on the 
contrary, because we want large states and the closer unity and even 
fusion of nations, only on a truly democratic, truly internationalist 
basis, which is inconceivable without the freedom to secede.70  
 
In Lenin’s thinking, within a larger political structure, an un-dominated 
nation with equal rights that included the full right to self-determination 
would have no need or desire to break away. The free and equal status 
implied by the right to self-determination would then have made its actual 
exercise as independent statehood meaningless. And even on the off-chance 
that nations should opt for secession when allowed that right, their equal 
status would enable closer ties of solidarity between them.71 Instead of 
dividing the working class, Lenin thus claimed against Luxemburg, self-
determination would strengthen unity among equal nations across national 
                                                
66 Lenin 1916: ‘The Socialist Revolution’. 
67 Lenin: ‘Is a Compulsory Official Language Needed?’ Proletarskaya Pravda, 14(32), 18 
January 1914, accessed 1 May 2011, 
www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1914/jan/18.htm; Lenin 1913: ‘Critical 
Remarks’. See also Harding 2009, p.300. 
68 Lenin 1913: ‘Critical Remarks’; Lenin 1916: ‘The Socialist Revolution’; also his ‘Note 
to the Theses “Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination”’, 
1916, accessed 27 January 2011, 
www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1916/feb/00.htm. 
69 Lenin 1916: ‘The Discussion’.  
70 Lenin 1915: ‘The Revolutionary Proletariat’. 
71 Lenin: ‘A Letter to S. G. Shahumyan’, Bakinsky Rabochy, 48, March 1918 [written 
1913] accessed 1 February 2011, 
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boundaries.72 The extent to which Lenin’s positions did attract support from 
peoples within Russia and the Soviet Union is an issue on which views have 
diverged, and of which a full outline is beyond the scope of this chapter.73 
 
What these arguments show is that Lenin’s discourse of ‘self-determination’ 
both directly and implicitly relied on the ideal of equality as a standard of 
legitimation. Choosing to seek legitimation for his polemic interventions on 
self-determination with reference to equality indicates that this was an ideal 
Lenin expected would appeal to his audiences of the time. In 1914, Lenin 
explained how he conceived of this standard: ‘By political equality [we] 
Social-Democrats mean equal rights, and by economic equality [...] the 
abolition of classes.’74 Later he contrasted this idea of equality with the 
false, bourgeois ‘abstract or formal posing of the problem’;75 and said that: 
‘Freedom and equality’, if acclaimed in any bourgeois society would ‘in 
practice [only signify] wage-slavery for the workers’.76 It was his own, 
better, idea of equality Lenin had in mind in invoking this standard in his 
‘self-determination’ discourse.  
 
While the precise wording and timing of Lenin’s arguments on self-
determination had been induced by intra-socialist debate on the national 
question, his reliance on this specific standard of equality showed that his 
discourse was rooted in his broader thinking. Fundamentally, Lenin always 
supported self-determination in the context of achieving freedom as equality 
in classless, internationalist socialism, without national categories. 77 
Believing that self-determination could play a role in reaching this goal, he 
also assumed that once socialism had been realised, the whole national 
                                                
72 See e.g. Lenin 1913: ‘The Working Class and the National Question’, Pravda, 106, 10 
May 1913, accessed 8 January 2011, 
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74 Lenin: ‘A Liberal Professor on Equality’, Put Pravdy, 33, 11 March, 1914 emphasis in 
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question, including issues of ‘self-determination’, would disappear with the 
emergence of internationalist equality.78 Rather than matters of national 
affiliation, internationalism was a recurrent theme in Lenin’s writings.79 For 
Lenin, as Trotsky explained, internationalism functioned as ‘a guide to 
revolutionary action embracing all nations,’ with the planet ‘considered as 
one single battlefield’.80  
 
Lenin’s defence of self-determination with reference to freedom as equality 
established a negative idea of freedom as the principal legitimising standard 
for the concept. He argued that the right to self-determination was legitimate 
as a way to realise a people’s freedom as a status of equality and 
independence, as a freedom against and from certain ills. At times, Lenin 
cited specific forms of restrictions on freedom against which self-
determination could be granted, such as tyranny, absolutism, monarchy, 
annexations, and capitalist oppression.81 They all amounted to conditions of 
inequality, dependence as well as certain forms of interference – and, for 
that reason, they legitimised ‘self-determination’.82 Although Lenin believed 
that self-determination, if granted as a right, would rarely be put into 
practice, he repeatedly legitimised it by invoking it against threats to 
freedom.  
 
With his discourse, Lenin attached to the language of ‘self-determination’ an 
idea similar to what early modern republican theorists, centuries earlier, had 
articulated as freedom from domination and dependence.83 Lenin, however, 
diverged from these thinkers on central counts, and expressed ‘self-
                                                
78 Lenin 1916: ‘The Discussion’. 
79 See e.g. Lenin 1914: ‘The Right of Nations’. 
80 Trotsky 1925, p.143. 
81 E.g. in Lenin: ‘The Social Significance of the Serbo-Bulgarian Victories’, Pravda, 162, 7 
November 1912, accessed 27 January 2011, 
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determination’ with reference to a radical rather than ‘republican’ idea of 
freedom. For instance, while republican theories had been oriented towards 
conditions within an existing state, Lenin’s concept of ‘self-determination’ 
focused on the international domain. Freedom as self-determination, in his 
view, entailed an equal right of a people to create a new, independent state, 
equal to other states. Moreover, unlike the liberty promoted by republican 
theorists, Lenin’s ‘self-determination’ had little concern for law and order. 
On the contrary, if the use of violence or total revolution would promote the 
advancement of freedom as equality under socialism, he would actively 
encourage such developments.84 
 
Lenin’s complex concept of the right of nations to self-determination also 
provided an important ideological answer to the tension between Marxism 
and nationalism. That he won the early 20th-century socialist debate on the 
national question is evident from the fact that his theory was incorporated 
into key party resolutions, especially in 1913 and 1917.85 The nations of 
Russia, these resolutions held, should have the full right to ‘self-
determination’ as the right ‘to secede and form independent states’.86 
Calling for the ‘complete equality for all nations’, these resolutions asserted 
self-determination as a way to eliminate ‘national oppression’ by ‘ensur[ing] 
complete solidarity among the workers of the various nations.’87 They 
embraced Lenin’s distinction between supporting the right to self-
determination, and ‘the expediency of a given nation’s secession’.88 And 
they emphasised that the latter should always be determined strictly with a 
view to ‘the interests of the proletarian class struggle for socialism’, and 
should never allow for an alliance with the bourgeoisie.89  
                                                
84 See e.g. Chapter 1 in Lenin’s The State and Revolution: The Marxist Theory of the State 
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86 The same phrase occurs in the 1913 ‘Resolutions of the Summer’ and in ‘Resolution on 
the National Question’ of the Seventh (April) All-Russia Conference of the RSDLP 
(Bolsheviks) 24–29 April 1917, accessed 28 January 2012, 
www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1917/7thconf/29e.htm.  
87 RSDLP 1917: ‘Resolution on the National Question’. 
88 RSDLP 1913: ‘Resolutions of the Summer’. 
89 Ibid. 
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Not long after Lenin’s discourse of ‘self-determination’ had been formalised 
with these resolutions, the Bolsheviks took power in Russia with the 
October 1917 Revolution. Lenin then faced the challenge of applying his 
theories to real calls for independence, from nations like the Finns, the 
Ukrainians, and the Baltic peoples, to name but a few.90 Examining Lenin’s 
policies towards all these demands is beyond the constraints of this chapter, 
and is a topic already covered by others.91 But it is worth noting that while 
contradictions between Lenin’s advocacy of self-determination and his 
rejection of real independence claims may appear glaring,92 he always 
presented his policies within the ideological framework above. Explaining 
his decisions as prioritising socialist development, Lenin maintained his 
theoretical support for self-determination until the end.93 The justice and 
fairness of placing ‘self-determination’ decisions with the party, and 
ultimately, with Lenin as party leader, is of course questionable. However, 
the internal logic of his concept of ‘self-determination’ did remain intact. 
 
The First World War and Lenin’s Concept of Self-determination 
The First World War came to influence Lenin’s discourse on self-
determination, 94  and shape the way Wilson would respond to and 
internationalise the concept. After all, many of Lenin’s central writings on 
self-determination were produced during the war, and they directly 
presented what he saw as its causes, nature and possibilities. Lenin saw the 
war as a product of capitalism, more specifically of its ‘imperialist’, highest 
                                                
90 See e.g. Jurij Borys: The Sovietisation of Ukraine: 1917–1923. The Communist Doctrine 
and Practice of National Self- Determination, Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 
Edmonton, 1980; Edward Hallett Carr: The Bolshevik Revolution 1917–1923, Vol III, 
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VI, Henry Frowde and Hodder & Stoughton, London 1924, pp.311–333; Debo 1992; 
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on Poland and Finland; as well as Figes 1996, pp.375–377, 703–713. 
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December, 1922, accessed 20 February 2011, 
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94 For the war’s impact on Lenin’s political thought, see also Harding 2009, pp.20–26; 
Read 2005, pp.116–126; Pieterse 1989: pp.4–13. 
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stage.95 In his seminal 1917 pamphlet Imperialism he explained this as a 
period when large monopolies had replaced free competition,96 and capitalist 
powers contended for exclusive economic and political control.97 The war 
itself, was in Lenin’s words, ‘imperialistic (that is, annexationist, 
plunderous)’.98 Given the specific characteristics of imperialism, he also saw 
the war as inevitable. Since imperialism strove solely for control, it was 
bound to produce violence99 – both from the rivalry between capitalist 
powers, and from imperialist oppression in the colonies.100 In Lenin’s view, 
it was primarily capitalist rivalry that had generated the First World War.  
 
The capitalist struggle for colonies was central to the rampant, violent 
competition of imperialism. In a world ‘completely divided up’,101 Lenin 
wrote, colonial annexations were driven by capitalist aims of achieving 
monopolist control over ever-new territories and raw materials.102 While he 
was ‘obviously not’ against the use of force in general,103 Lenin rejected 
annexations because they violated the right of nations to self-
determination. 104  Annexations, he wrote in 1916, ‘establish[ed] state 
frontiers contrary to the will of the population.’105 As he explained:  
 
National self-determination means political independence. 
Imperialism seeks to violate such independence because political 
annexation often makes economic annexation easier, cheaper (easier 
to bribe officials, secure concessions, put through advantageous 
legislation. etc.), more convenient, less troublesome.106  
 
For Lenin, opposing imperialist domination and supporting the right of 
nations to self-determination was one and the same thing.107 
                                                
95 For Lenin’s views on imperialism, see in particular his Imperialism: The Highest Stage 
of Capitalism, Pluto Press, London 1996 [originally written in 1916 and published in 
1917], as well as his extensive Collected Works: Notebooks on Imperialism, Vol. 39, 
Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1968.  
96 Lenin 1996, p.101. 
97 Ibid., pp.89, 77. 
98 Ibid., (preface to the French and German editions, written in 1920), pp.3–4. 
99 Ibid., p.83. 
100 Ibid., pp.97 and 125. See also ‘Resolution on the National Question’ 1917.  
101 Lenin 1996, p.90. 
102 Ibid., p.83. 
103 Lenin 1916: ‘The Discussion’. 
104 Lenin 1996, p.125. 
105 Lenin 1916: ‘The Discussion’, emphasis in original. 
106 Lenin 1916: ‘A Caricature’. 
107 See also Harding 2009, p.66; Young 2006, pp.107–134. 
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In Lenin’s view, the violence that imperialism would inevitably spark in the 
colonies by violating the self-determination of colonial people had 
emancipatory potential. Such violence, he believed, would be incited when 
imperialist oppression awakened the national consciousness of exploited 
peoples and revolutionised social relations. By being able to maintain 
economic growth only through increased repression, imperialism would 
provoke people to awareness and armed struggle.108 It was this dynamic, 
Lenin explained in his 1917 Imperialism pamphlet, which would exacerbate 
the antagonisms of capitalism and trigger violent reactions, even 
revolutionary liberation.109 Lenin’s wartime critique of imperialism thus 
underscored that his concept of freedom as self-determination put no 
superior value on peace. In fact, he recognised violence as sometimes 
necessary to achieve real freedom. As I will show, Lenin’s discourse on the 
relationship between self-determination, freedom, and peace contrasted 
profoundly with the positions that Woodrow Wilson would champion. 
 
Lenin’s analysis of imperialism entailed strong support for colonial 
independence. ‘Liberation of the colonies’, he wrote in 1916, ‘means self-
determination of nations. Europeans often forget that colonial peoples too 
are nations, but to tolerate this “forgetfulness” is to tolerate chauvinism.’110 
Lenin was not the first socialist to argue in such terms.111 Karl Kautsky, for 
instance, had in 1910 noted that imperialism ‘deceived and disposed of 
foreign peoples as if they were cattle’. Moreover, as Kautsky put it: 
 
[Imperialism] rest[ed] on the assumption that only the peoples of 
European civilization are capable of independent development. The 
men of other races are regarded as children, idiots or beasts of 
burden, to be treated with more or less mercy – at any rate they are 
beings of a lower kind, which can be controlled according to our 
                                                
108 Lenin 1996, p.125. 
109 Ibid., pp.125, 97. 
110 Lenin 1916: ‘A Caricature’. 
111 See e.g. Rosa Luxemburg: The Accumulation of Capital, Routledge, London 2003 (first 
published in 1913); Karl Kautsky: ‘Imperialism and the War’, International Socialist 
Review, November 1914, accessed 20 February 2011, 
www.marxists.org/archive/kautsky/1914/09/war.htm; Karl Kautsky: ‘Ultra-
Imperialism’, Die Neue Zeit, September 1914, accessed 20 February 2011, 
www.marxists.org/archive/kautsky/1914/09/ultra-imp.htm. 
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whim.112 
 
For Lenin, advocacy of the right of all dominated and colonial people to 
self-determination as independence ‘without exception’ was underpinned by 
the same logic that sustained his overall conceptualisation. While generally 
expecting colonial national revolts to benefit the development towards 
socialism, he would always evaluate actual individual cases specifically 
with this end in mind.113 The common assumption among scholars that 
Lenin ‘first and foremost’ saw self-determination as ‘a postulate of anti-
colonialism’ 114  is thus untenable. 115  Not only did Lenin present ‘self-
determination’ as a much broader solution to the ‘national question’ – in 
line with his own logic, he would not support colonial independence in any 
case where it obstructed socialist development. 
 
With his support for colonial self-determination, Lenin seemed to contradict 
his rejection of the calls during the First World War to ‘defend the 
fatherland’, defined in national terms, in Russia and Europe.116 During the 
war, a wave of patriotism had spread through the fighting countries, with 
people across the political and class spectrums rallying around their flags 
and leaders.117 Lenin had little but scorn for such support for a national 
‘fatherland’ war effort, considering it as a distracting, ‘despicable betrayal 
of socialism’. 118  While his argument here resembled Luxemburg’s 
objections to self-determination, there was a key difference. Luxemburg 
opposed any ‘defence of the fatherland’ and ‘self-determination’ in all 
contexts,119 whereas Lenin generally backed the concept in connection with 
nations revolting against imperialism. These should, in his view, be 
encouraged to rebel, and could even call their fight for freedom a ‘defence 
                                                
112 Kautsky 1910, pp.75–76. 
113 See Lenin 1916: ‘A Caricature’. 
114 Cassese 1995, p.44. 
115 See also Bowring 2011, p.125. 
116 Lenin 1916: ‘The Discussion’; also Figes 1996, p.293; Mayer 1959, pp.60–63, 380–
381. 
117 See Geary 2003, p.237, on how this affected various groups within the Second 
International. 
118 Lenin 1920: ‘Draft Resolution’. See also Carr 1978, p.66.  
119 Rosa Luxemburg: ‘Either/Or’, Ausgewählte Reden und Schriften, II, Berlin: Dietz 
Verlag, 1951, in Dick Howard (ed.): Selected Political Writings of Rosa Luxemburg, 
Monthly Review Press, New York, 1971, pp.347–351. 
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of the fatherland.’120 Both Lenin’s support for colonial independence and his 
criticism of ‘defending the fatherland’ were legitimised with reference to his 
Marxist ideology – moreover, both positions were directed against 
imperialism. 
 
Lenin’s indictment of imperialism with the language of ‘self-determination’ 
underscored that he sought to legitimise the concept as a negative idea of 
freedom. He denounced the imperialist drive for ‘domination’ as a quelling 
of ‘liberty’,121 and presented ‘self-determination’ as the liberating cure for 
the un-freedom that imperialism produced. When Lenin also condemned 
imperialism for its oppression, exploitation and annexations, he indicated 
that he saw specific forms of interference as a threat to peoples’ freedom as 
well. From the start, his discourse of ‘self-determination’ had rejected forms 
of capitalist interference along with dependence and domination, but before 
the war he had not presented interference as a key form of freedom 
restriction. What distinguished Lenin’s wartime attacks on imperialism from 
his earlier language was that he now depicted interference as a major way in 
which freedom could be quelled, and self-determination justified as a 
remedy. Interference in the form of capitalist oppression and exploitation, 
he seemed to argue, precluded real freedom as equality. With these ideas, 
Lenin was expressing a very early variant of what late-20th century 
scholarship would call ‘remedial’ self-determination, which state parties in 
the 2008–2010 ICJ case on Kosovo would invoke as well. 
 
This change of emphasis in the idea of freedom Lenin used to legitimise his 
language of ‘self-determination’ confirms not only that the First World War 
and his analysis of imperialism influenced his conceptualisation. It also 
suggests that, during the war, Lenin might have targeted his discourse at a 
different audience than with his earlier arguments. Given that agents seek 
legitimisation for their arguments and ideas with standards they believe will 
convince their specific audiences, a shift in legitimising standards may 
imply a corresponding shift in the intended addressees. Indeed, during the 
war, Lenin did direct his discourse at audiences far beyond the group of 
                                                
120 Lenin 1916: ‘The Discussion’. 
121 Lenin 1996, p.83. 
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socialists to whom he had initially presented his concept of ‘self-
determination’. In so doing, he also revealed a widening of his ambitions. 
 
One purpose of Lenin’s use of the language of ‘self-determination’ during 
the war seems to have been to inspire a global audience to undertake 
revolution, worldwide. First, he hoped that promoting self-determination as 
a right to freedom from imperialist oppression would incite rebellion in the 
colonies, thereby threatening capitalist domination and sparking a global 
revolutionary wave. 122  Moreover, he aimed for revolt and uprising in 
Europe. According to Lenin and the Bolsheviks, such destabilising 
developments in Europe, on the domestic front of the imperialists, would 
‘sharpen the revolutionary crisis’ within the capitalist powers.123 And this, 
they believed, could bring the war as a whole to an immediate, 
revolutionary end and advance the onset of socialism.124 Reflecting such 
concerns, whereas Lenin’s pre-war rhetoric on ‘self-determination’ had 
taken issue primarily with internal socialist critics, his pronouncements 
during the war took direct aim at external, capitalist opponents.125 
 
Also at another level Lenin seems to have sought revolutionary 
developments with his wartime references to ‘self-determination’. His 
insertion of the concept into the ideological rivalry between the warring 
parties appears to have been an attempt to attract a more global audience to 
his radical vision. Ideology and propaganda were powerful weapons in the 
First World War, with mass media and propaganda machines ensuring that 
appeals reached worldwide populations.126 Belligerents targeted groups at 
                                                
122 See also Trotsky 1925 p.93; Zhuchkov 1968, p.43; Nation 1989, p.232; Carr 1978, 
pp.245–246, 428; Mayer 1959, pp.24, 264, 301; Richard K. Debo: Revolution and 
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Liverpool, 1979, p.48; Figes 1996, pp.294, 537–538. 
123 Lenin 1916: ‘The Discussion’. See also Carr 1978, pp.55, 62; Carr 1953, p.9. 
124 See in particular Lenin: ‘The Tasks of the Proletariat in Our Revolution (Draft Platform 
for the Proletarian Party)’ (The ‘April Theses’), Priboi Publishers, 1917, accessed 20 
February 2011, www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1917/tasks/index.htm. See also 
Carr 1978, pp.65–67; Carr 1953, pp.7; Mayer 1959, pp.97, 245.  
125 See e.g. Lenin 1915: ‘The Revolutionary Proletariat’ and 1916 ’The Discussion’. 
126 See De Groot 2001, pp.146–148. Mayer 1959, pp.7–8; Figes 1996, p.541 for the spread 
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America. The First Telling of the Amazing Atory of the Committee of Public Information 
that Carried the Gospel of Americanism to Every Corner of the Globe, Harper, New 
York, 1920a, and George Creel: The War, the World, and Wilson, Harper, New York, 
1920b. See also Herbert E. Brekle: ‘War with words’, pp.81–91 in Ruth Wodak (ed.): 
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home and abroad with messages on their war efforts, broader ideologies and 
values.127 In this setting of wartime ideological battles, Lenin and Wilson 
alike seemed to recognise the propaganda value of the language of ‘self-
determination’. This, however, is not to suggest that their advocacy was 
exclusively tactical: for both men, their mentions of ‘self-determination’ 
were in line with their broader orientations.128  
 
The ideological aspects of the war intensified in 1917 with the two Russian 
revolutions as well as the US entry into the war in April of that year.129 
President Wilson painted the war as an issue of morality and virtue, and 
sought to legitimise the American engagement with reference to standards 
of freedom from interference, and, above all, peace. The next chapter 
examines Wilson’s statements on ‘self-determination’ in this context.130 In 
contrast to the language and ideals of the US president, by 1917 Lenin had 
posited ‘self-determination’ as a revolutionary weapon, primarily against 
imperialism, for achieving freedom as equality. In Russia itself, the 1917 
February revolution resulted in the overthrow of the tsar and the installation 
of a Provisional Government, which partly shared, partly competed for 
power with the revolutionary socialist ‘Soviet of Workers’ Deputies’ in 
Petrograd.131 After the October revolution that same year, Russia’s fate was 
suddenly in the hands of the Bolsheviks. While little was generally known 
of them, it was clear that their ideology of radical socialism differed from 
                                                                                                                        
Language, Power and Ideology: Studies in Political Discourse, John Benjamins, 
Amsterdam, 1989, especially pp.83–87. 
127 Regarding the role of the media, Churchill (1929) notes that by the time of the Paris 
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1959, pp.54, 372.  
128 despite the claims of some, e.g. Chamberlain 1999, p.10. 
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130 The morally charged US discourse during the war is also exemplified by former 
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Peace of Righteousness’, Outlook, 23 September 1914, pp.169–178, at p.178. 
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Gatrell: Russia’s First World War: A Social and Economic History, Pearson, Harlow, 
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the visions of the other fighting countries’ leaderships.  
 
Although Russia and the USA were formal allies until March 1918,132 under 
these circumstances the Bolsheviks and the US administration eyed each 
other as ideological competitors. It was not yet clear in 1917 that the war 
would end with the break-up of empires and the territorial reorganisation of 
Europe, but the ‘old ways’ of diplomacy and imperialism already appeared 
frayed. 133  In this context, both the Bolsheviks and the US president 
represented something new. With greater moral credibility than the other 
warring parties, their discourse launched rivalling concepts for the post-war 
order and the standards that should guide a new and better world. Without 
doubt, Lenin and Wilson were the main competitors in this wartime 
ideological rivalry. Standing for dramatically differing ideas, both set out to 
persuade key international audiences of their line.134 
 
From the perspective of the USA and its Western Allies, the growing 
political and ideological power of Lenin and the Bolsheviks and their 
uncompromising calls for revolution were disconcerting.135 Before the war, 
the Bolsheviks’ appeal outside of Russia had been limited, but their wartime 
demands for peace and emancipatory change found popular resonance, in 
war-weary Europe – and beyond.136 In this situation, Western public opinion 
                                                
132 when Russia signed the Brest–Litovsk treaty with Germany, see below. 
133 For an expression of this attitude from 1919, see L. Oppenheim: The League of Nations 
and Its Problems: Three Lectures, Longmans, Green, London, 1919 
134 On Wilson, see e.g. Carleton 1962, p.566. 
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Memorandum by Sidney Edward Mezes, David Hunter Miller, and Walter Lippmann’ – 
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from William Bullitt received by Wilson on 18 November 1918, pp.121–123 in PWW 
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PWW 1988, Vol. 59. 
136 In reaction, Wilson’s propaganda chief George Creel called for the establishment of an 
American Bureau of Public Information in Europe; see ‘A Memorandum by George 
Creel’, 31 January 1918, pp.200–203 in PWW 1984, Vol. 46. In another expression of 
American nervousness about the Bolsheviks’ appeal, New York Times: ‘Prey of 
Agitators’, 23 August 1919, warned that ‘a campaign for self-determination for the 
negroes of all corners of the earth’ was praising Lenin and Trotsky. For the Bolsheviks’ 
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and the European Left became core addressees for the parties’ wartime 
statements.137 Furthermore, Western Allies feared that the Bolshevik call for 
immediate peace would mean that Russia would withdraw from the war, 
leaving their side strategically disadvantaged.138 That did indeed happen: 
March 1918 saw the signing of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty between the 
Bolsheviks and the Central Powers, which relieved the latter from having to 
fight on the Eastern front.139 Even before this, Germany had been keen on 
destabilisation in Russia – an attitude that in turn had inflamed Allied and 
US suspicions that the Germans were ‘behind’ the Bolsheviks’ rise to 
power.140 
 
Seen from Lenin’s point of view, Wilson’s worldwide prestige, his ‘liberal’ 
credentials, and effective propaganda machinery141 challenged his own plans 
to win people over to radical Marxism.142 While the US president partly 
used comparable language and, like Lenin, contrasted his new world vision 
with the old ways of empire and annexations, he was calling for change 
along liberal-conservative lines, not radical and socialist ones. After the war, 
Lenin deplored Wilson’s wartime seduction of European liberals, who, he 
said, ‘call[ed] themselves pacifists and socialists, who sang praises to 
“Wilsonianism”, and who insisted that peace and reform were possible 
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their numbers suggested, p.58. See also Memorandum of Lloyd George, ‘Some 
Considerations for the Peace Conference’, 25 March 1919 in Ray Stannard Baker: 
Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement, (hereafter: ‘Baker’) Vol.III, Doubleday, Page, 
New York 1922, p.449, as well as pp.451–452; Carr 1953, p.12; Mayer 1959, pp.31, 
34–35, 265, 333–334, 387–391. See also Lenin 1915: ‘The Revolutionary Proletariat’ 
and 1916 ‘The Discussion’, referring in particular to German and Polish leftists. 
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under imperialism.’143  
 
In changing his emphasis on legitimating standards for ‘self-determination’ 
during the war, Lenin seems to have taken note of Wilson’s rapidly 
spreading appeal.144 Even though Wilson hardly ever used the specific term 
‘self-determination’, the ideas associated with the concept, and from 1918, 
this language itself, was seen as central to his message – and this Lenin 
appeared intent on sabotaging.145 In using ‘self-determination’ against the 
USA and its allies with reference to these countries’ interference with the 
freedom of colonial peoples, Lenin appeared resolved to retain ownership of 
the concept, and to highlight the hypocrisy of the capitalists’ normative 
commitments.146  
 
Preceded and brought on by the intra-socialist debate on ‘self-
determination’, in 1917, the concept started to surface in the ideological 
battle between the warring parties.147 First, under pressure from Lenin’s 
ideology and the competing legitimacy of the Petrograd Soviet, 148  the 
Russian Provisional Government’s ‘Declaration of War Aims’ pronounced 
in March 1917: ‘[T]he objective of free Russia is not the domination of 
other nations, nor the expropriation of their… property, nor the forcible 
seizure of foreign territories, but the ratification of a stable peace on the 
basis of national self-determination.’149 Shortly after the October revolution, 
the Bolsheviks endorsed the right to self-determination for all peoples in 
Russia, and called for a democratic peace based on ‘no annexations or 
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indemnities and the self-determination of nations’.150 In a further attempt to 
undercut the moral authority of their ideological opponents, the Bolsheviks 
also made public all secret treaties from the tsarist era.151 
 
The most important international articulation of Lenin’s concept of ‘self-
determination’ came soon after, with the address of Bolshevik Foreign 
Commissioner Trotsky, ‘To Peoples and Governments of Allied Countries’, 
of 31 December 1917. With that address, the Bolsheviks demanded that the 
Allies clarified their war aims. Targeting the Allies’ double standards, the 
Bolsheviks asked if the Allied Powers were ‘willing on their part to give the 
right of self determination to the peoples of Ireland, Egypt, India, 
Madagascar, Indochina, et cetera’ – like the Russian Revolution had given 
this right to the peoples of Finland and Ukraine:152 
 
[I]t is clear that to demand self determination for the peoples that are 
comprised within the borders of enemy states and refuse self 
determination to the peoples of their own state and their own 
colonies would mean the defence of the most naked, the most 
cynical imperialism.153  
 
In a direct challenge to Western colonial powers, the statement proclaimed 
Lenin’s ideas of ‘self-determination’, putting weight on its anti-imperial 
force. 
 
Once these public statements had injected Lenin’s language of ‘self-
determination’ into the war’s combative, moralising rhetoric, other warring 
parties too came to incorporate the term in their speeches. In December 
1917, Wilson might have included only an implicit reference in his State of 
the Union address, when he called for ‘the principle’ to be ‘brought under 
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Russia’, signed Lenin and Stalin, accessed 30 April 2011, 
www.marxists.org/history/ussr/government/1917/11/02.htm 
151 See L. Trotsky: ‘Note of Foreign Minister Trotsky to the Allied Embassies in Petrograd 
Offering an Armistice’, 21 November 1917, pp.188–189 in James Brown Scott: Official 
Statements of War Aims and Peace Proposals, December 1916 to November 1918, 
Carnegie Endowment for International Law, Washington, DC, 1921.  
152 English version in ‘David Roland Francis to Robert Lansing’, Petrograd 31 December 
1917, recorded on 1 January 1918, PWW 1984, Vol. 45, pp.411–412.  
153 Ibid., pp.412–413. 
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the patronage of its real friends.’154 In that same month, the ‘Christmas’ 
address of Austria-Hungarian Foreign Minister Ottokar Czernin referred to 
‘self-determination’ explicitly, and stated that the Central Powers granted 
‘validity to this principle everywhere in so far as it is practically realizable’ 
– and as long as the other parties in the war did so as well.155  
 
On 5 January 1918, British Prime Minister David Lloyd George declared, 
‘we are fighting for a just and lasting peace’, which required that ‘a 
territorial settlement must be secured, based on the right of self-
determination or the consent of the governed’.156 Although some have 
claimed that, with this statement, Lloyd George ‘coined the phrase self-
determination’,157 it came years after Lenin had already elaborated this 
discourse in numerous published works, and moreover in the aftermath of 
the Bolsheviks’ international wartime appeals. Three days after Lloyd 
George’s address, Wilson held his ‘Fourteen Points’ speech, and a month 
later, he properly internationalised the language of ‘self-determination’. 
These developments form the subject of the next chapter. 
 
Conclusions 
Lenin’s 1903–1917 discourse of ‘self-determination’ is crucial to 
understanding the subsequent international appearances of the concept. 
Lenin presented the realisation of self-determination as synonymous with 
establishing a separate state. While the criteria for the concept that came to 
figure in international discourse after Lenin’s time were certainly not based 
                                                
154 Wilson: ‘Fifth Annual Message’, 4 December 1917, Miller Center of Public Affairs, 
University of Virginia, accessed 21 February 2011, 
millercenter.org/scripps/archive/speeches/detail/3799 
155 ‘Statement of Count Czernin at Brest–Litovsk of the Terms on which the Central 
Powers were willing to Conclude a General Peace’, 25 December 1917, pp.221–222 in 
Scott (ed.) 1921.  
156 Lloyd George, David: ‘British War Aims’, 5 January 1918, WWI Document Archive, 
accessed 21 February 2011, 
wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Prime_Minister_Lloyd_George_on_the_British_War_Aims. 
The speech was so similar to what Wilson then planned that he reportedly considered 
cancelling his Fourteen Points Speech: Victor S. Mamatey: The United States and East 
Central Europe 1914–1918: A Study in Wilsonian Diplomacy and Propaganda, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1957, pp.175–176. See also Trygve 
Throntveit: ‘The Fable of the Fourteen Points: Woodrow Wilson and National Self-
determination’, Diplomatic History, 35(3), 2011b, pp.445–481, especially pp.459–460. 
157 Cooper 2009, p.421; also p.426. 
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on his radical socialism, 158  his framing of its content as independent 
statehood was to lie at the heart of all its later significant international 
appearances. Whenever ‘self-determination’ was mentioned later in 
important international contexts, the creation of a new state would appear as 
the ‘default’ way of implementing the concept, and as the option that 
anyone referring to it had to either endorse or oppose.  
 
Also seminal was Lenin’s legitimation of self-determination with reference 
to a negative idea of freedom, collectively understood. ‘Self-determination’, 
to Lenin, primarily meant a group’s freedom from inequality, domination 
and dependence; he employed freedom as equality as the supreme aim and 
justifying foundation of the concept. In certain instances of oppression and 
exploitation, Lenin added freedom from interference as well, as a standard 
of legitimation. He was not concerned with peoples’ intra-group identity 
qualifications, and would allow them to use violence in achieving freedom 
as self-determination. With this approach, Lenin firmly linked the 
international ‘self-determination’ discourse to ideas of freedom, filling the 
concept with positive moral associations.  
 
Lenin also more specifically sketched out the radical idea of freedom 
associated with ‘self-determination’ that would come to compete with the 
liberal-conservative idea over determining how the concept appeared 
internationally. Whereas the liberal-conservative idea came to feature more 
visibly in the international discourse of ‘self-determination’, the radical 
version implied in Lenin’s thought never disappeared – although later it 
would rarely be seen as affiliated with his specific brand of socialism.  
 
Finally, Lenin’s language of ‘self-determination’ was central in inducing 
Wilson to take up and fully internationalise the concept in 1918. In 1917, 
the international insertion of ‘self-determination’ into the wartime 
ideological rivalry was, conceptually and politically, due to Lenin. By that 
time, he had been grappling with the concept for some fourteen years, and 
indirectly raised the stakes for internationally ‘owning’ it. Without the 
                                                
158 For a few later suggestions on how to condition statehood on the basis of ‘self-
determination’, see e.g. Norman 2006, pp.208–212, and Tideman 2004. 
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setting engendered by Lenin’s discourse, Wilson might not have referred to 
‘self-determination’ on the international platform at all, and the 
internationalisation of the concept might have taken a very different form. 
Through Lenin’s words, the radical idea of freedom attached to self-
determination thus provided the original spark for making the concept 
international. This dynamic was repeated at subsequent international 
moments in which the language of ‘self-determination’ appeared, when 
radically legitimised discourse would trigger rhetorical liberal-conservative 
efforts to gain ascendency and ownership of the concept. 
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2. WOODROW WILSON’S INTERNATIONALISATION OF ‘SELF-
DETERMINATION’ 
 
US President Woodrow Wilson internationalised the concept of ‘self-
determination’ in 1918. From a position of world power, he filled the 
concept with morally charged language, and ensured for it a global 
audience. Without Wilson’s international discourse of ‘self-determination’, 
the later institutionalisation of the concept and its codification in 
international law with the 1945 UN Charter would have been much less 
likely. Indeed, Wilson is widely seen as so significant to the concept of 
‘self-determination’1 that its international framing has become associated 
also with parts of his policy and ideas that did not explicitly involve it. A 
case in point is his Fourteen Points speech. Despite the lack of any mention 
of ‘self-determination’ in that speech, it has become a key reference point 
for the concept.2 
 
Like Lenin’s discourse, Wilson’s language of ‘self-determination’ took 
shape in the historical context of its time. Wilson’s major pronouncements 
of the concept occurred in a setting generated by Lenin’s previous 
references, and at a moment of world war. This chapter examines the 
environment of Wilson’s articulations of ‘self-determination’, before 
exploring this language itself and its standards of legitimation. Since self-
determination at that time was seen as bound up with resolving concrete 
territorial settlements resulting from the First World War, this chapter will 
analyse Wilson’s use of the concept in this light. It should be noted that, 
although Wilson’s discourse was rooted in his broader political thought,3 the 
                                                
1 For examples, see Manela 2007; Kittrie 1995, p.249; Easton 1964, p.123.  
2 See Throntveit 2011b, especially, pp.445, 450, 476; Manela 2007, especially pp.47–51; 
Carleton 1962, p.563. 
3 Wilson had been a university professor before entering politics. Of earlier influences on 
Wilson’s political thought on ‘self-determination’, Guiseppe Mazzini could briefly be 
mentioned – Wilson paid him tribute in Genoa on 5 January 1919, ‘Remarks about 
Giuseppe Mazzini’ and ‘Further remarks in Genoa’, PWW 1986, Vol.53, pp.614–15. 
See also Guiseppe Mazzini: ‘On Nationality’, 1852, Modern History Sourcebook, 
accessed 11 May 2011, www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1852mazzini.html and Stefano 
Recchia and Nadia Urbinati (eds): A Cosmopolitanism of Nations: Guiseppe Mazzini’s 
Writings on Democracy, Nation Building, and International Relations, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, NJ, 2009. Although Mazzini, contrary to what is claimed by 
the editors in that volume’s introduction (p.3), rarely mentioned ‘self-determination’, 
his thoughts on popular legitimacy seem to have inspired parts of Wilson’s discourse, 
see e.g. pp.194, 233. 
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focus of this chapter is strictly on his internationalisation of ‘self-
determination’, not on locating his conceptualisation within his overall 
ideas.4 
 
Wilson’s public statements on ‘self-determination’ were both fewer and less 
clear than Lenin’s, but Wilson, too, sought legitimation for the concept with 
reference to an idea of freedom. Although vague and fraught with tensions, 
Wilson’s ‘self-determination’ discourse invoked a negative idea of freedom 
– but one different from that of Lenin. Wilson’s rare mentions of ‘self-
determination’ implicitly suggested that self-determination would be 
legitimate only as a means to ensure freedom from interference in the form 
of peace and stability for the political agents that met his approval. As will 
be shown, it was versions of Wilson’s articulation of ‘self-determination’ 
and its legitimation by this liberal-conservative idea of freedom that tended 
to reappear in later international occurrences of the concept. 
 
Wilson’s Concept of ‘Self-determination’: Presentation and Content 
When Wilson made his key public pronouncements of ‘self-determination’ 
in 1918,5 the wartime ideological rivalry was at its height. With official 
appeals laying out conflicting visions for peace, the warring parties 
competed to glorify their own war efforts while denigrating the virtues of 
their opponents. 6  Targeting global audiences, their messages aimed at 
                                                
4 For a review of recent literature addressing Wilson’s thinking, see Throntveit 2011a; also 
David Steigerwald: ‘The Synthetic Politics of Woodrow Wilson’, Journal of the History 
of Ideas, 50(3), 1989, pp.465–484; Stephen Wertheim: ‘The League that wasn’t: 
American Designs for a Legalist-sanctionist League of Nations and the Intellectual 
Origins of International Organization 1914–1920’, Diplomatic History, 35(5), 2011a, 
pp.797–836. Revealingly, Wilson’s favourite philosopher was Edmund Burke: see 
Harley Notter: The Origins of the Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson, Johns Hopkins 
Press, Baltimore, MD,1937, pp.29, 68; and ‘Wilson and the Liberal Peace Program’ 
pp.91–125 in Arthur S. Link: Wilson: The Diplomatist. A Look at his Major Foreign 
Policies, Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, MD, 1957; David Hunter Miller: The 
Drafting of the Covenant (DHM), Vol. I, Knickerbocker Press, New York, 1928, p.43, 
memorandum from Isaiah Bowman after a meeting with Wilson on 10 December 1918 
and Wilson’s ‘Remarks to Foreign Correspondents’, in PWW 1984, Vol.47, p.288. 
5 Wilson’s speeches are accessed primarily at The American Presidency Project (APP) 
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=65405, the Woodrow Wilson Presidential 
Library (WWPL) www.woodrowwilson.org/; and Scripps Library and Multimedia 
Archive (SLMA), millercenter.org/Scripps.  
6 Mamatey 1957, pp.136–137 traces such ‘peace exchanges’ to the resolution of the 
German Reichstag 19 July 1917, but Chapter 1 explained that ‘self-determination’ 
already been included in the Russian Provisional Government’s statement on war aims 
27 March 1917. In this context, Wilson’s adviser ‘Colonel’ House (see below) urged the 
President to formulate a strategy on war aims on 17 August, 1917 House 1928, Vol.III, 
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contributing to winning the war, and to taking the lead in the envisaged 
post-war international order. As the previous chapter showed, Lenin’s 
influence had in 1917 made ‘ownership’ of the language of ‘self-
determination’ a central part of the war’s ideological competition. 
 
In this high-stakes international environment, the US administration had 
significant expectations for the propaganda value of Wilson’s words. After 
the war, in 1920, the head of the US Committee on Public Information 
described Wilson’s wartime speeches as having been the country’s ‘most 
effective weapons’ in conveying to the world ‘the motives, purposes, and 
ideals of America so that friend, foe and neutral alike might come to see us 
as a people without selfishness and in love with justice.’7 Wilson himself 
took his global image seriously, and was concerned with the USA’s 
international prestige.8 That his appeal, especially in Europe, had an edge on 
that of the other leaders was evidenced by the ‘unprecedented enthusiasm’ 
that greeted Wilson on his arrival for the Paris Peace Conference at the end 
of the war.9  
 
The immediate context in which Wilson’s discourse of ‘self-determination’ 
emerged contrasted with the setting that shaped Lenin’s initial articulation. 
When the two men began using the language of ‘self-determination’, their 
basic positions differed. Lenin had started to speak of the concept at a time 
when he did not hold a political position to determine actual self-
determination claims. Wilson, by contrast, was in a place of such authority 
when he made his key statements on the concept. Thus, Lenin’s discourse 
focused mainly on the theoretical coherence and ideological ‘correctness’ of 
the concept of self-determination, whereas Wilson’s concentrated on war-
related, practical and diplomatic concerns. During the war, however, both 
were eager to win over international audiences to their respective ideologies 
                                                                                                                        
p.161.  
7 Creel 1920a, pp.288, 237.  
8 Notter 1937, pp.285, 294.  
9 See Viscount Cecil: A Great Experiment: An Autobiography, Jonathan Cape, London, 
1941, p.59; also Arthur S. Link: The Higher Realism of Woodrow Wilson and Other 
Essays, Vanderbilt University Press, Nashville, TN, 1971, p.125 and ‘From the diary of 
Dr. Cary T. Grayson’, 14 December 1918, PWW 1986, Vol.53, p.383, and House’s 
diary from the same day, pp.389–391. Wilson’s visit was the first time a US President 
had travelled outside the USA while in office. 
 94 
94 
and policies – and both referred to ‘self-determination’ in seeking to achieve 
this.  
 
Furthermore, Lenin first vigorously argued for the concept while fighting for 
power in a small, obscure party. In a fragile political setting and within a 
Marxist community deeply committed to ideological dispute, Lenin might 
have feared a loss of influence if he failed to persuade his comrades. By 
contrast, Wilson employed his discourse on ‘self-determination’ at the 
height of his power, as President of the USA, when his country enjoyed 
global esteem. Objections to his statements would not immediately threaten 
his presidency, and were probably something he felt he could afford to 
ignore. 
 
Personality might have further enhanced the contrasts in how ‘self-
determination’ first appeared in the two men’s utterances and writings. 
While both seem to have handled criticism very badly, 10  they acted 
differently on feedback, advice and opposing views. In stark distinction to 
the intense polemics with which Lenin engaged his opponents, there is no 
record of Wilson striving to convince others of his views on self-
determination.11 On the contrary, he seemed unaffected by criticism and 
counterarguments from those around him. His contemporaries 
straightforwardly characterised him as uninterested in and even ‘intolerant 
of the views of others’, and as ‘intensely prejudiced in his likes and 
dislikes.’12 Co-workers noted that Wilson resisted advice,13 and ‘shunned the 
                                                
10 For Lenin, see e.g. Figes 1996, p.391, for Wilson, see below. 
11 When Wilson on a rare occasion replied to questions on ‘self-determination’, from the 
San Francisco Labor Council, 17 September 1919, he was defensively trying to ease 
concerns over the practical implications of the idea, rather than positively arguing for it. 
Records from the meeting, WWPL, accessed 7 March 2011 
wwl2.dataformat.com/Document.aspx?doc=29523. 
12 Cited in Louis Siebold: ‘The Extraordinary Career of Woodrow Wilson who left the 
Quiet of University Life for the Turmoil of Politics and became the Leader of the 
World’s greatest Nation during the World’s most Stirring Times,’ Post-Dispatch, 18 
June 1920, WWPL, accessed 20 March 2011, 
wwl2.dataformat.com/Document.aspx?doc=32168. British diplomat Cecil claims that 
Wilson was ready to meet other people’s views ‘as soon as he realized what they were’, 
but implies that he was not always interested in finding out, Cecil 1941, pp.68–69. See 
also Siebold 1920; House’s diary from 22 November, 1915, House 1926, Vol.I, p.128. 
13 Lansing 1921, p.38. See also Cecil 1941, p.64; George Curry: ‘Woodrow Wilson, Jan 
Smuts, and the Versailles Settlement’, American Historical Review, 66(4), 1961, 
pp.968–986, especially pp.977–979 for how Wilson allegedly ignored his advisors when 
drafting the Covenant; and Robert W. Tucker: Woodrow Wilson and the Great War: 
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sight or study of unpleasant truths that diverted him from his foregone 
conclusions.’ 14  Wilson, they said, had a ‘one-track mind’, 15  and was 
‘dogmatic and yet [without] a very clear idea of what was really needed.’16  
 
On issues of ‘self-determination’, Wilson’s apparent disregard of the 
opinions and advice of his Secretary of State Robert Lansing was 
particularly striking. For instance, Wilson included in his Fourteen Points 
speech of January 1918 an explicit reply to the December 1917 Bolshevik 
statement that had, with reference to ‘self-determination’, challenged the 
Allies to clarify their war aims.17 Wilson chose to answer the Bolsheviks in 
the Fourteen Points in defiance of Lansing’s emphatic warnings that the 
Bolsheviks did not represent the Russian people and that they spoke solely 
to ‘the proletariat [,] the ignorant and mentally deficient’.18 Their idea of 
‘self-determination’, Lansing urged, would cause ‘international anarchy’ 
and was best left unaddressed.19  
 
It is possible that Wilson ignored Lansing in this specific instance because 
he did not share this undivided hostility towards the Bolsheviks. In the 
summer of 1918, Wilson confessed to being uncertain of how to deal with 
them: ‘I have been sweating blood over the question what is right and 
feasible to do in Russia. It goes to pieces like quicksilver under my touch.’20 
                                                                                                                        
Reconsidering America’s Neutrality 1914–1917, University of Virginia Press, 
Charlottesville, VA, 2007, p.21. 
14 David Lloyd George: Memoirs of the Peace Conference, Vol. I, Yale University Press, 
New Haven, CT, 1939, p.140. See also John Maynard Keynes: The Economic 
Consequences of the Peace, Labour Research Department, London 1920, p.38 and 
Llewellyn Woodward: ‘A British View of Mr. Wilson’s Foreign Policy’, pp.141–176 in 
Edward H. Buehrig (ed.): Wilson’s Foreign Policy in Perspective, Indiana University 
Press, Bloomington, IN, 1957, at p.142. 
15 Wilson initially applied the phrase to himself (House 1926, Vol. I, diary notes from 10 
July 1915, p.129). For studies of Wilson’s personality see Sigmund Freud and William 
C. Bullit: Woodrow Wilson: A Psychological Study, Transaction, London, 1966 and 
Alexander L. George and Juliette L. George: Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A 
Personality Study, Dover, New York, 1964. 
16 Cecil 1941, p.68. 
17 Woodrow Wilson: ‘Address to a Joint Session of Congress on the Conditions of Peace’ 
(‘Fourteen Points’), 8 January 1918, APP, accessed 21 February 2011 
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=65405. See also A. J. P. Taylor: The 
Origins of the Second World War, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1991, p.567; Manela 2007, 
p.42; Mayer 1959 pp.342, 353–355. The Bolsheviks, however, remained suspicious; see 
House 1928, Vol. III, p.356. 
18 ‘From Robert Lansing’, Washington 2 January 1918 in PWW 1984, Vol.45, p.429. 
19 Ibid., p.427. 
20 Wilson to House on 8 July, 1918, House 1928, Vol. III, p.398, see also pp.324–325. 
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While Wilson had sided with other Americans in viewing the February 1917 
Russian Revolution favourably, the Bolshevik takeover that autumn had 
induced scepticism.21 Believing that the Bolsheviks had been right to react 
against the pre-war practice of secret diplomacy and annexations, Wilson 
nonetheless struggled with their call for radical change.22 Although echoing 
some of their criticisms of empire, he deplored disorder.  
 
At the same time, Wilson was aware of the Bolsheviks’ ideological allure, 
especially in parts of a war-weary Europe. By the time of the Fourteen 
Points speech, the US side also acknowledged the importance of keeping 
Russia fighting as an Ally in the war, and was apprehensive about the 
negotiations between the Bolsheviks and the Central Powers that had started 
in December 1917. Given such divided sympathies, Wilson’s decision to 
respond to the Bolsheviks in his Fourteen Points speech seemed partly an 
attempt to involve them in dialogue and indirectly persuade them to stay 
engaged in the war on the Allied side.23 Moreover, he appeared to use the 
speech to compete with the global attraction of socialist ideas, in order to 
draw the world – and the Western left especially – away from the Bolshevik 
vision and towards his own country’s ideology and politics.24 However, the 
Fourteen Points address contained no mention of ‘self-determination’.  
 
This is not to say that Wilson necessarily avoided the language of ‘self-
determination’ in the Fourteen Points speech because of Lansing’s 
opposition. As will be explained, he explicitly internationalised the concept 
only a month later, again ignoring Lansing’s insistent protestations. Deeply 
opposing the concept of ‘self-determination’, Lansing always objected 
                                                
21 For summaries of US discussions of the Bolsheviks see Mayer 1959, e.g. p.166 and 
MacMillan 2001, e.g. p.79.  
22 See e.g. ‘To Robert Lansing, with Enclosure’, 20 January 1918, PWW 1984, Vol.46, 
p.45 and ‘Bowman Memorandum on Conference with President Wilson’, 10 December 
1918, House 1928, Vol.IV, p.291. See also David Stevenson: The First World War and 
International Politics, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1991, p.194; Georg Schild: Between 
Ideology and Realpolitik: Woodrow Wilson and the Russian Revolution, 1917–1921, 
Greenwood Press, Westport, CT, 1995. For a scholarly view from the time, see Simon 
Litman: ‘Revolutionary Russia’, American Political Science Review, 12(2), 1918, 
pp.181–191. 
23 See also Killen 1982. 
24 Throntveit 2011b, p.459, mentions that Wilson also hoped to encourage a popular 
uprising in Germany. See also Charles Seymour: ‘Woodrow Wilson and Self-
determination in the Tyrol’, Virginia Quarterly Review, 38(4), 1962, pp.567–587, at 
pp.570–571. 
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strongly to Wilson citing it: in fact, Lansing’s critique has remained a key 
reference for scholarship on self-determination.25 A lawyer by training, 
Lansing held that the lack of a clear beneficiary of ‘self-determination’ 
made the concept both dangerous and meaningless,26 and could be ‘utterly 
destructive of the political fabric of society and result in constant turmoil 
and change’.27 Already in 1918, in a much-quoted passage with points he 
also put across to Wilson, Lansing formulated his position in terms that 
would reappear at later international moments:  
 
The more I think about the President’s declaration as to the right of 
‘self-determination’, the more convinced I am of the danger of 
putting such ideas into the minds of certain races. It is bound to be 
the basis of impossible demands on the Peace Congress and create 
trouble in many lands. What effect will it have on the Irish, the 
Indians, the Egyptians, and the nationalists among the Boers? Will it 
not breed discontent, disorder, and rebellion? […] The phrase is 
simply loaded with dynamite. It will raise hopes which can never be 
realized. It will, I fear, cost thousands of lives. In the end it is bound 
to be discredited, to be called the dream of an idealist who failed to 
realize the danger until too late to check those who attempt to put the 
principle in force. What a calamity that the phrase was ever uttered! 
What misery it will cause!28 
 
Wilson, however, seems to have shown scant interest in Lansing’s 
arguments, to the latter’s great distress.29 Rather than attempting to convert 
Lansing to his own views, Wilson turned elsewhere for input. On matters of 
foreign policy, as on most other issues, he relied more upon his ‘second 
personality’30 and closest advisor ‘Colonel’31 Edward House.32 But even 
                                                
25 For a few of many explicit references, see Cassese 1995, p.316, Pomerance 1982, p.74; 
Musgrave 1997, p.31; Moynihan 1993, pp.81–84. 
26 Lansing 1921, notes from 20 December 1918, p.86.  
27 ‘From Robert Lansing’, Washington, 2 January 1918, PWW 1984, Vol.45, p.428. 
28 Cited in Lansing 1921, pp.86–87. See also Lansing: ‘Notes on Sovereignty in a State’, 
American Journal of International Law, 1(105), 1907, pp.105–128, at p.128. 
29 Lansing’s diary notes from 20 November 1921, quoted in Arthur S. Link: Wilson: The 
New Freedom, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1967, p.67.  
30 Wilson cited in House 1926 Vol. I, p.118, further explaining: ‘If anyone thinks he is 
reflecting my opinion by whatever action he takes, they are welcome to the conclusion’. 
31 The ‘Colonel’ title was honorary. 
32 See Charles Seymour: ‘The Role of Colonel House in Wilson’s Diplomacy’, pp.11–33 
in Buehrig (ed.) 1957, at p.20; Lansing 1921, p.38. Wilson’s wife implies that the 
President relied on her as much as on House, whom she did not like: Edith Bolling Galt 
Wilson: Memoirs of Mrs Woodrow Wilson, Putnam, London, 1939, pp.179, 282–283, 
300. See also Tucker 2007 p.31–38; Springfield Republican: ‘A Picture of Chaos and 
Black Night’, 29 May 1919, WWPL, accessed 21 February 2011, 
wwl2.dataformat.com/Document.aspx?doc=32059; House 1926, Vol.II, p.113, citing 
Atlantic City Review, 26 December 1915; House’s diary notes 14 December 1918, in 
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House sometimes felt left in the dark on Wilson’s policies and decisions.33  
 
On specific issues of self-determination, it was from other sources that 
Wilson said he would seek advice. During the First World War, the concept 
was widely seen as one concerning the territorial settlements expected to 
result from the conflict’s conclusion. All parties using the language of ‘self-
determination’ at the time of the war, including Lenin, did so with reference 
to its projected territorial implications. And whereas Wilson seemed to have 
resisted counsel on other fronts, on the issue of territorial settlements, he 
sought out the opinions of ‘experts’.34 As one of his advisors at the 1919 
Paris Peace Conference put it: Wilson sought application of ‘general 
principles of justice’, ‘not by diplomats and politicians each eager to serve 
his own interests, but by dispassionate scientists – geographers, ethnologists, 
economists – who had made studies of the problems involved.’35 En route to 
the Peace Conference in late 1918, Wilson said to the experts accompanying 
him: ‘Tell me what is right and I will fight for it. Give me a guaranteed 
position.’36  
 
Four months before the Fourteen Points speech, and five months before 
Wilson would internationalise ‘self-determination’, his faith in expert 
opinion on issues of territorial war settlements had materialised in the 
establishment of a US ‘Commission of the Inquiry’.37 Led by presidential 
advisors and composed of academic experts, this Commission had been 
instructed to recommend concrete territorial arrangements in preparation for 
future peace negotiations. Shortly before delivering the Fourteen Points 
speech, Wilson had received a memorandum with the Commission’s 
                                                                                                                        
PWW 1986, Vol.53, p.390. 
33 See e.g. George and George 1964, pp.188, 191. According to Tucker 2007, p.22, 
Wilson’s unwillingness to discuss his policies or take advice often rendered his 
decisions ‘obscure’. 
34 See below for the Fourteen Points. For one expression of Wilson’s attitude to experts, 
see DHM 1928 Vol.II, Document 18: ‘The Council of Ten, January 30, 1919: 
Secretary’s Notes of a Conversation Held at M. Pinchon’s Room at the Quai d’Orsay, 
Paris, on Thursday, January 20, 1919, at 11 AM’, p.198. See also Seymour 1962, p.575. 
35 Baker 1922, Vol.I, p.112. 
36 Ibid., p.113, as noted by Isaiah Bowman. 
37 The Inquiry was set up in September 1917. See Liliana Riga and James Kennedy: 
‘Mitteleuropa as Middle America?: “The Inquiry” and the Mapping of East Central 
Europe in 1919’, Ab Imperio, 4, 2006, pp.271–300. 
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recommendations.38 The many territorial provisions of the Fourteen Points 
address came to draw on these proposals.39  
 
Wilson’s Fourteen Points speech was not only his most detailed 
pronouncement on the war’s territorial settlements and the most famous 
statement anyone made during the First World War: it would also be seen as 
expressing the US President’s concept of ‘self-determination’, albeit without 
actually using this language.40 The speech came to represent both Wilson’s 
close affiliation with ‘self-determination’, and his overall wartime vision. 
During the war as well as later, Wilson would be seen as embodying the 
concept of ‘self-determination’, and its international value and meaning 
would be closely tied to his wider policies and discourse.  
 
The diplomatic setting of the Fourteen Points speech has already been 
indicated, and others have analysed it in depth.41 Suffice it to say that 
whereas Wilson had made no major international reference to ‘self-
determination’ before the speech, other warring parties had employed such 
language. Wilson gave the speech seven days after receiving an English 
version of the Bolsheviks’ challenge to clarify the Allies’ war aims with 
reference to ‘self-determination’.  
 
Most of the fourteen points outlined in Wilson’s speech would propose 
territorial settlements for Europe based on criteria that would later be 
associated with his concept of self-determination: an independent Poland 
should be ‘inhabited by indisputably Polish populations’ (XIII); and Italy’s 
borders readjusted ‘along clearly recognizable lines of nationality’ (IX). The 
peoples of Austria-Hungary (X) and the Ottoman Empire (XII) should be 
allowed the ‘opportunity of autonomous development’; and Balkan relations 
should be established ‘along historically established lines of allegiance and 
                                                
38 DHM 1928 Vol.II, p.110; Baker 1922, Vol.III, p.23; also House 1928, Vol.III, p.328; 
Mamatey 1957, p.179; Martin 1958, p.145; Mayer 1959, p.339. 
39 According to Baker (1922, Vol.I, p.110), six of the fourteen points came directly from 
the memorandum. See also Throntveit 2011a, p.463.  
40 See also Throntveit 2011b, especially p.450. 
41 See in particular Stevenson 1991, p.183–198; Mamatey 1957, pp.153–233; Temperley 
1920, Vol. I, pp.166–203 as well as ‘National Self-determination During the Great 
War’, pp.28–52 in Derek Heater: National Self-determination: Woodrow Wilson and his 
Legacy, Macmillan Press, New York, 1994.  
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nationality’. In addition, the ‘political and economic independence and 
territorial integrity of the several Balkan states’ should be guaranteed (XI).42  
 
Furthermore, Wilson’s Fourteen Points demanded settlement of colonial 
claims to be ‘based upon a strict observance of the principle that in 
determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the 
populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of 
the government whose title is to be determined’ (V). He called for 
‘evacuation of all Russian territory’ (VI), restoration of Belgium (VII), and 
righting of the ‘wrong done to France by Prussia’ in Alsace-Lorraine (VIII). 
In the address, Wilson demanded an end to the practice of secret treaties (I), 
guarantees of freedom of the seas and free trade (II and III), arms reduction 
(IV); as well as the establishment of a ‘general association of nations’ to 
safeguard ‘political independence and territorial integrity to great and small 
states alike’.  
 
Given the close association with ‘self-determination’, with this speech 
Wilson implied a new way of framing the concept internationally, without 
openly citing it. For instance, by mentioning nationally defined 
characteristics as a guide for determining state boundaries, Wilson provided 
some ground for the many later international agents as well as scholarly 
works that would discuss self-determination as a concept defined in national 
terms. Moreover, his points on the restoration of independence to Belgium 
and France presaged what would in later international history be expressed 
as a concept of self-determination that could re-establish state sovereignty 
after occupation and annexation, as in the 1990s cases of Baltic 
independence. Meanwhile, Wilson’s reference to Russia seemed spurred by 
the Bolshevik-induced concerns he grappled with at the time, and the 
mention of ‘colonial claims’ appears a reaction to the Bolsheviks’ anti-
imperialist language of ‘self-determination’. 
 
Crucially, Wilson sought legitimation for his Fourteen Points by invoking 
the ideals of peace, order, and freedom from different kinds of interference 
than what Lenin’s language of ‘self-determination’ had referred to. Lenin’s 
                                                
42 Wilson 1918: ‘Fourteen Points’. 
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discourse of ‘self-determination’ had primarily denounced domination, 
dependence and inequality – as well as interference with peoples in the 
forms of capitalist and imperialist oppression and exploitation. Wilson, by 
contrast, equated the freedom of ‘free nations’ – ‘states’ in today’s 
terminology43 – with their peace and unencumbered trade.44 He presented 
instability and other forms of disruptive interference as the main threats to 
state freedom. These standards would prevail throughout his wartime 
messages, including those directly referring to ‘self-determination’, as will 
be shown. While he rarely mentioned ‘self-determination’ or ‘freedom’ 
directly,45 peace and unencumbered action for states were the dominant 
ideals in his discourse.46 Given the context of war, Wilson’s reliance on 
freedom as peace as the main legitimising standard was perhaps 
unsurprising. Nevertheless, it represented a noteworthy change from the 
idea of freedom Lenin had previously attached to the language of ‘self-
determination’.  
 
Wilson’s wartime statements indicated a special concern for interference 
with states on the economic field, often underlining the importance of free 
trade.47 Restricting interstate trade, he warned, would threaten state freedom 
                                                
43 This is clear e.g. from Wilson’s ‘Address delivered at the First Annual Assemblage of 
the League to Enforce Peace’, 27 May 1916, APP, accessed 8 February at 
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=65391; and the Fourteen Points, which is 
also concerned with states; also House’s diary notes from 15 August 1918, from a 
discussion with Wilson on representation at the future League of Nations, House 1928, 
Vol.IV, p.49; Oppenheim 1919, p.33; Inis L. Claude, Jr.: Swords into Ploughshares: 
The Problems and Progress of International Organization, Random House, New York, 
1984, p.52–53. 
44  See e.g. points II and III, as well as point VI (on Russia) and VII (on Belgium). 
45 However, his 1915 State of the Union address contained many mentions of freedom and 
liberty: 7 December 1915, WWPL, accessed 10 March 2012, 
wwl2.dataformat.com/Document.aspx?doc=30447. For rare mentions from after the US 
war entry, see Wilson’s ‘Speech at the Opening of the Third Liberty Loan Campaign, 
delivered in the Fifth Regiment Armory, Baltimore’ (‘Force to the Utmost’), 6 April 
1918 APP, accessed 2 March 2011, 
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=65406; and ‘Address of the President of 
the United States Delivered at a Joint Session of the Two Houses of Congress’, 
Washington 11 February, 1918, (‘Four Principles’), WWPL, accessed 22 February 
2011, wwl2.dataformat.com/Document.aspx?doc=30724, as well as his reported 
reference in the 1918 Bowman memorandum, op.cit. 
46 See also Wilson’s speech at Coliseum, Indianapolis, Indiana, 4 September 1919, in Ray 
Stannard Baker and William E. Dodd (eds), War and Peace: Presidential Messages, 
Addresses, and Public Papers (1917–1924), Vol. I, Harpers, New York, 1927, pp.610–
621. 
47 E.g. Wilson: Address to the Senate of the United States: ‘A World League for Peace’ 
(‘Peace without Victory’) January 22, 1917 APP, accessed 25 February 2011, 
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=65396; Wilson 1915: ‘State of the Union’. 
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as non-interference.48 Economic liberalism, as he saw it, was vital to peace 
as much as to freedom. In April 1918, he cautioned that a consequence of a 
German victory in the First World War would be to have ‘trade […] follow 
the flag’, with no freedom of the seas.49 To him, protectionism interfered 
illegitimately with trade, to the detriment of state freedom and international 
peace. 50  Accordingly, in detailing actual post-war settlements, Wilson 
sought to ensure unobstructed trade for certain countries by insisting on 
their having access to the sea.51  
 
Those of Wilson’s wartime statements that actually contained the language 
of ‘self-determination’ were based on these same standards of legitimation. 
Before the US entry into the war, his main reference to the concept had been 
to use it, in 1915, to request Congress to expand US defences for the sake of 
the country’s independent naval trade 52  – an understanding of self-
determination that had not been internationalised. It was only in the ‘Four 
Principles’ speech of 11 February 1918 that Wilson made his first major 
international reference to ‘self-determination’.53 At that time, the USA had 
been involved in the war for almost a year. Russia was still formally on the 
Allied side, whilst also negotiating with the Central Powers. In a context of 
growing pressure, Wilson’s reference to ‘self-determination’ in the Four 
Principles speech was also his most important international articulation of 
the concept.  
 
Like Lenin’s wartime writings, Wilson’s Four Principles incorporated the 
language of ‘self-determination’ into an analysis of the causes and nature of 
the war. Wilson noted: ‘This war had its roots in the disregard of the rights 
of small nations and of nationalities which lacked the union and the force to 
make good their claim to determine their own allegiances and their own 
                                                                                                                        
See also Stevenson 1991, p.66. 
48 In Woodrow Wilson: The State: Elements of Historical and Practical Politics, D. C. 
Heath, London 1919 (original 1889), p.309, he expressed that interference should be 
allowed only ‘where common action (and) uniform law are indispensable’. 
49 Wilson 1918: ‘Force to the Utmost’ 
50 See also Buehrig (ed.) 1957, p.42; Lloyd E. Ambrosius: ‘Democracy, Peace and World 
Order’, pp.225–249 in Cooper (ed.) 2008, at p.240. 
51  Wilson 1917: ‘Peace without Victory’. He added such access to the territorial 
settlements for Poland and Serbia in the ‘Fourteen Points’, PWW, 1984, Vol.45, p.478. 
52 Wilson 1915: ‘State of the Union’. 
53 Wilson 1918: ‘Four Principles’. 
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forms of political life.’54 Disparaging the ‘forever discredited’ game ‘of the 
balance of power’, Wilson posited that, to secure peace, ‘every territorial 
settlement involved in this war must be made in the interest and for the 
benefit of the populations concerned.’ He then proposed ‘self-
determination’ as a remedy against instability, to help ensure a peaceful 
post-war order: 
 
National aspirations must be respected; peoples may now be 
dominated and governed only by their own consent. ‘Self-
determination’ is not a mere phrase. It is an imperative principle of 
action, which statesmen will henceforth ignore at their peril.55 
 
With this formulation of ‘self-determination’, Wilson revealed that he, like 
Lenin, legitimised the concept as a means to a greater end – although their 
ends surely differed. For Lenin, self-determination was legitimate as long as 
it encouraged progress towards freedom as equality in internationalist 
socialism. Seeking the revolutionary overthrow of capitalism, he supported 
peoples’ use of force, as well as infringements of law and order if needed 
for achieving this aim. By contrast, Wilson’s legitimising standard for self-
determination was freedom as peaceful order and non-interference. 
Rejecting violence and revolutionary change, he saw peace as the natural 
and ideal state of affairs.56  
 
The distinction Wilson made in the Four Principles between ‘peoples’ and 
‘statesmen’ is worth noting. Not only did he invoke it on several occasions, 
it also expressed a tension in his discourse. On the one hand, Wilson 
sometimes stated that it was governments and not people that had caused the 
First World War,57 and that whereas the USA was at war with Germany, it 
had ‘had no quarrel with the German people’.58 Calling for nations’ freedom 
from ‘autocratic rulers’, Wilson seemed to condemn Germany’s autocracy 
                                                
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid. 
56 See e.g. Notter 1937, pp.20, 80, 228; Manela 2007, p.43. 
57 E.g. in a Washington Post interview, 5 November 1916, quoted in Notter 1937, p.568, 
see also p.480. 
58 Wilson: ‘Address to a Joint Session of Congress Requesting a Declaration of War 
against Germany’, 2 April, 1917, APP, accessed 21 February 2011, 
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=65366.  
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as an illegitimate restriction of the freedom of the people under its control.59 
However, his views had little room for ideas of ‘bottom–up’ popular 
sovereignty. Rather than advocating that people should decide for 
themselves, he focused on learned leaders of state who would intuitively 
interpret the general will.60  In fact, Wilson saw ‘the people’ as being 
disposed to dubious decision-making that could endanger the peace he 
valued above all else.61 Reportedly, in 1917, he had described himself as ‘a 
democrat like Jefferson, with aristocratic tastes’.62 Intellectually, he had 
said, he deemed himself democratic, which was unfortunate, because ‘his 
mind led him where his taste rebelled.’63 Apparently, Wilson considered his 
own reasoned support for democracy to be ‘bad taste’. 
 
In essence, Wilson formulated his concept of ‘self-determination’ in the 
Four Principles as a warning to statesmen that ignoring it would imperil 
their positions. He proposed the concept as a way to remove the reasons for 
disaffection before popular dissent could spin out of leaders’ control.64 It 
was for such statesmen that self-determination ought to be an ‘imperative 
principle of action’: disregarding it would make their own rule unstable, and 
threaten their state’s peace. The ‘implementers’ of self-determination should 
not be those subjected to governance based on the concept.65 And self-
determination should certainly not materialise in popular demands for 
equality or separate statehood.66  
 
                                                
59 Wilson 1918: ‘Four Principles’, see also his message to the All-Russian Congress of 
Soviets, 11 March 1918, Baker 1922, Vol.I, p.45; and House, Vol.III, p.433. For the 
Bolsheviks’ reply to this address, written by Lenin, see ‘Draft Resolution on Lenin’s 
Message’, March 15, 1918, accessed 20 December 2012, 
www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1918/mar/13.htm#bk2. See also William Langer: 
‘Peace and the New World Order’ p.67–68 in Arthur Dudden (ed.): Woodrow Wilson 
and the World Today, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, PA, 1957. 
60 See e.g. Stephen Wertheim: ‘The Wilsonian Chimera: Why Debating Wilson’s Vision 
hasn’t saved American Foreign Relations’, White House Studies, 10(4), 2011b, pp.343–
359, pp.349, 351. 
61 Especially certain kinds of people, as I will show. See also House 1928, Vol.IV, p.28, 
note 1. 
62 House 1928, Vol.III, pp.181–182, diary notes from 10 September 1917. 
63 Ibid. 
64 See Wilson 1917: ‘Peace without Victory’; also Edward M. House: ‘The Versailles 
Peace in Retrospect’, pp.425–444 in Edward Mandell House and Charles Seymour 
(eds.): What Really Happened at Paris: The Story of the Peace Conference 1918–1919 
by American Delegates, Hodder & Stoughton, London, 1921, p.429. 
65 See also Steigerwald 1989, p.484. 
66 See also Throntveit 2011b, p.446; and the Bowman memorandum, DHM 1928, Vol.I, 
p.43. 
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Scholars have tended to overlook how Wilson used the concept of ‘self-
determination’ to appeal to statesmen over the heads of the people, rather 
than the other way around. His concept of democracy clearly contrasted 
with today’s understandings,67 and depictions of Wilson’s idea of self-
determination in terms of ‘popular sovereignty’68 and ‘self-government’69 
must be questioned. True, Wilson did occasionally address specific popular 
audiences – for instance, the Western left to attract them away from the 
Bolsheviks, and enemy peoples to encourage their dissent. 70  But such 
narrow appeals did not chime with his overall discourse of ‘self-
determination’, and appear more like chance tactical moves dictated by 
specific, immediate wartime concerns. 
 
These ideas described here as Wilson’s concept of ‘self-determination’ 
actually tended to occur in his discourse in a different guise: as the ‘consent 
of the governed’. 71  At times, Wilson used the language of ‘self-
determination’ and ‘consent of the governed’ indistinguishably,72 but mostly 
he employed the latter. In 1917, for instance, Wilson had stated that lasting 
peace depended on ‘the principle that governments derive all their just 
powers from the consent of the governed.’ 73  His ambiguous and 
occasionally interchangeable use of the two phrases caused confusion on 
their real meaning(s), and allowed people to interpret ‘self-determination’ as 
they saw fit. 74  However, all his mentions of ‘self-determination’ and 
‘consent of the governed’ signalled sustained commitment to the same 
legitimising standards of peace, stable order and non-interference. 
 
Although Wilson himself never elaborated on his choice of words, to those 
                                                
67 See especially Wilson 1919 The State; also Wertheim 2011b, p.349. 
68 Manela 2007, p.42. 
69 Throntveit 2011b, p.451. 
70 See e.g. Carleton 1962, p.563. 
71 E.g. Wilson 1917: ‘Peace without Victory’; and on 26 May 1917 when Wilson 
addressed the new Russian Government, House 1928, Vol.III, p.135. The claim of 
Manela 2007, p.22, that Wilson replaced ‘self-determination’ with ‘consent of the 
governed’ only after February 1918 thus does not correspond to Wilson’s actual uses of 
the two phrases. 
72 E.g. Wilson: ‘The Pueblo Speech’, 25 September 1919, Voices of Democracy, The US 
Oratory Project, accessed 15 December 2012, voicesofdemocracy.umd.edu/wilson-the-
pueblo-speech-speech-text/. See also the reference to ‘consent’ in the Four Principles 
quote above. 
73 Wilson 1917: ‘Peace without Victory’, emphasis added. See also ‘Force to the Utmost’. 
74 See also Throntveit 2011b, p.478. 
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around him, his favoured notion of ‘consent of the governed’ looked like a 
milder or weaker version of ‘self-determination’. 75  A quick semantic 
comparison between the two phrases would seem to point to ‘consent’ 
setting up a feebler connection between people and sovereignty than 
‘determination’. ‘Consent of the governed’ would appear to open only for 
passively acceding to an established political authority – not actively 
determining a political framework, or disassociating from it by creating a 
new political unit. The phrase implicates a type of political representation, 
rather than political ownership. And without denoting any standard of 
equality, ‘consent of the governed’ suggests placing people passively at the 
bottom of a political status hierarchy – as governed. This notion does not 
seem to conceptualise peoples as governing, law-making, or a source of 
political legitimacy.  
 
Significantly, Wilson presented this concept of what can be called ‘self-
determination as the consent of the governed’ at a time when Lenin had 
already articulated ‘self-determination’ with reference to freedom as 
equality and new state creation. Wilson had responded to Lenin’s radical 
discourse by undermining the differences between ‘self-determination’ and 
‘consent of the governed’ and by shifting self-determination’s meaning in a 
less radical direction. Whether or not this was the result of a conscious plan 
on Wilson’s part, it occurred at the peak of the ideological wartime rivalry, 
when the USA sought to undermine the Bolsheviks’ authority. It is likely 
that Wilson in this context hoped to co-opt the socialists’ globally appealing 
language of ‘self-determination’, strip it of their radical idea of freedom, and 
link it to his own liberal-conservative worldview. 
 
When Wilson internationalised this concept of ‘self-determination’, peoples 
around the world listened to his messages and directly drew upon his 
language in their appeals for political freedom.76 Wilson’s words obviously 
                                                
75 Lansing 1921, p.85; Ray Stannard Baker: ‘The Versailles Treaty and After’, Current 
History, 88(534), 1989 (originally published 1924), pp.20–23, p.21; DHM 1928, Vol.II, 
Document 7: ‘Wilson’s Second Draft or First Paris Draft, 10 January 1919 with 
comments and suggestions by Hunter Miller: Covenant’, p.87. 
76 E.g. the Provisional Government of Lithuania: ‘Lithuanian Delegation to Woodrow 
Wilson, 23 Jan. 1919’, WWPL, accessed 25 February 2011, 
wwl2.dataformat.com/Document.aspx?doc=30992; Manela 2007, p.196. 
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mattered, and could affect how the war developed and the extent to which 
popular demands were met. His international wartime pronouncements took 
shape in awareness of the possible impact of his discourse. As mentioned, in 
referring to ‘self-determination’ in the first place, Wilson was probably 
influenced by US apprehensions of the Bolsheviks’ ideological appeal, and 
the possibilities of a Russian withdrawal from the war. In downplaying 
‘self-determination’ in favour of ‘consent of the governed’, it is likely that 
Wilson had in mind his country’s relations with other parties in the war.  
 
Take the US relationship with Austria-Hungary. Until at least spring 1918, 
the US side had hoped to conclude a separate peace with that multi-national 
empire, which a clear reference to ‘self-determination’ would risk 
jeopardising.77 On the other hand, advocating ‘self-determination’ to that 
enemy territory might have incited rebellion among Austria-Hungary’s 
diverse populations,78 a development urged on by the British and by the US 
Commission of the Inquiry.79 The latter had directly recommended a policy 
of first ‘stirring up of nationalist discontent, and then […] refusing to accept 
the extreme logic of this discontent, which would be the dismemberment of 
Austria-Hungary.’80 In this light, ‘consent of the governed’ appears to have 
been advocated as a middle-ground compromise between silence and ‘self-
determination’. 
 
Also America’s relationship with its Allies called for softening Wilson’s 
discourse of ‘self-determination’. At the time when the US President 
publicly used this language in 1918, Lenin had internationally associated 
‘self-determination’ with colonial liberation and anti-imperialism. 
Meanwhile the Allies ruled vast territories and hoped to expand even 
                                                
77 See Lansing’s ‘Memorandum on the Policy of the United States in Relation to 
Nationalities Included within the Austro-Hungarian Empire’, June 1918, quoted in 
Mamatey 1957, p.267. See also pp.56–57, 107. Mamatey claims this policy changed 
when Lansing on 29 May 1918 expressed America’s ‘earnest sympathy’ with the 
‘nationalistic aspirations for freedom’ of the Czecho-Slovaks and Jugo-Slavs [sic], 
p.261. See also Dragan Zivojinovic: America, Italy and the Birth of Yugoslavia, 
Columbia University Press, New York, 1973. 
78 See also Pomerance 1982, p.12. On 29 May 1918, US officials said that they had 
followed with great interest ‘the Congress of Oppressed Races of Austria-Hungary’ held 
in Rome that April. Charles G. Fenwick: ‘Jugoslavic National Unity’, American 
Political Science Review, 12(4), 1918b, pp.718–721, at p.718. 
79 Cablegram from Balfour to House, 27 February 1918, House 1928, Vol.III, p.386. 
80 PWW 1984, Vol.45, pp.459, 463. 
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further. Britain and France had no plans of granting independence to their 
‘subject peoples’, and already viewed with suspicion Wilson’s principles 
and proposals. 81  In this setting, overly clear US promotion of ‘self-
determination’ might have upset US–Allied relations. Consequently, in the 
autumn of 1918, an official US, Wilson-approved82 commentary to the 
Fourteen Points urged Britain and France not to worry that ‘self-
determination’ would affect their colonial possessions.83 Soon after, the 
Allies hesitantly agreed to make peace based on the Fourteen Points ‘and the 
principles of settlement enunciated in [Wilson’s] subsequent address’.84 
Although these principles included self-determination,85 the Allies certainly 
did not approve of any version of the concept that would open for colonial 
independence.86 
 
By the time of the Paris Peace Conference, then, Wilson’s appropriation of 
‘self-determination’ seemed to have made the concept compatible with 
colonialism.87 Having legitimised his discourse with reference to values of 
order, peace and non-interference with states, Wilson accepted colonial rule, 
too, as long as it did not challenge these standards. At the Paris Peace 
Conference, colonialism was also perpetuated in practice, with actual 
territorial settlements moulded according to the national interests of 
powerful states. The conference created few states that had not existed 
                                                
81 Churchill 1929 insisted none of the Allies felt committed to Wilson’s programme 
‘except in general sympathy’, p.105; Georges Clemenceau (in Grandeur and Misery of 
Victory, Harrap, London, 1930) seemed annoyed and described the Fourteen Points as a 
‘purely American idea’, p.156. For a similar perspective, see Ansprenger 1989, p.31. 
82 House initiated the commentary in preparation for the Peace Conference – where it came 
to be used in negotiations with the Allies. It was finalised on 29 October 1918 after 
drafting primarily by Walter Lippman, who had also been Secretary of the Inquiry, 
House 1928 Vol.IV, pp.156–158 and Churchill 1929, p.106. See also Riga and Kennedy 
2006. 
83 House 1928 Vol.III: ‘Official American Commentary on the Fourteen Points’, October 
1918, pp.198, 201. See also Churchill 1929, p.106; Seymour 1962, pp.567–558, 571. 
84 With reservations regarding ‘freedom of the seas’, and abstaining from demanding 
German compensation, André Tardieu: The Truth about the Treaty, Bobbs-Merrill, 
Indianapolis, IN, 1921, p.71. The Allies’ statement came in reply to ‘President Wilson’s 
consent to propose an armistice to the Allies’, Department of State, Washington, DC, 23 
October 1918, in Scott 1921, pp.434–436. 
85 France did indeed cite ‘self-determination’ in its ‘plan of procedure’ for the Paris Peace 
Conference, Tardieu 1921, p.88. 
86 Clemenceau later denied that the Allies ever aimed at any ‘liberation program’: Mayer 
1959, p.184; also De Groot 2001, pp.197, 193. For an unconvinced British attitude to 
Wilson’s principles, see TNA: FO 608/41, 503, Peace Conference (British Delegation) 
Files 97/1/22 to 98/1/2 (To P.P.18113), 1919, from Herron on 30 April 1919, Geneva. 
87 See the discussions documented in DHM 1928, Vol.I–II.  
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before the war had ended,88 and left large, dissatisfied minorities outside 
what they saw as their ‘mother’ countries.89 Some of these were granted 
minority rights within existing states, at the expense of a state of their own.90 
 
Even Wilson seemed oddly uncommitted to ‘self-determination’ at Paris. He 
certainly did not act on the concept as its proponents had hoped, and was 
especially sceptical to boundary changes.91 During the war, populations 
worldwide had seen Wilson as the personified promoter of self-
determination,92 and the ‘icon of their aspirations’.93 It was to him they had 
directed their pleas for freedom with letters, visits and petitions.94 However, 
he was to provide little assistance. 95  Having presented his ‘scientific’ 
positions in advance, new claims left him cold.96 Wilson had legitimised 
‘self-determination’ as the servant of peace, international order and non-
interference in the affairs of states. To him, it was not in itself an imperative 
principle of action. At the Paris Peace Conference, he rather chose to work 
for a League of Nations as his preferred path to peace. 
 
Perhaps by the time of the Paris Peace Conference, Wilson regretted that his 
                                                
88 See e.g. Hannum 1996 pp.28, 30. Against this, it has been claimed that: ‘Never before 
had so many nation-states been created at one time in the name of the right of self-
determination.’ Paul Gordon Lauren: The Evolution of International Human Rights: 
Visions Seen, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, PA, 2011, p.99. 
89 See in particular Mamatey 1957; Temperley 1921, Vol.V, pp.112–132, as well as Vol. I–
VI, 1920–1921; and ‘The Application of Self-determination in the Peace Treaties of 
1919’ pp.57–84 in Cobban 1969; and Seymour 1962. 
90 Liliana Riga and James Kennedy: ‘Tolerant Majorities, Loyal Minorities, and “Ethnic 
Reversals”: Constructing Minority Rights at Versailles 1919’, Nations and Nationalism, 
15(3), 2009, pp.461–482, especially pp.463–464. For a perspective on the war’s end in 
terms of international power relations, see Paul M. Kennedy: ‘The First World War and 
the International Power System’, International Security, 9(1), 1984, pp.7–40. 
91 See Lloyd E. Ambrosius: Wilsonianism: Woodrow Wilson and His Legacy in American 
Foreign Relations, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2002, p.131. 
92  See e.g. Ivo J. Lederer: Yugoslavia at the Paris Peace Conference: A Study in 
Frontiermaking, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT, 1963, p.25. 
93 Manela 2007, p.4. 
94 William Allen White: Woodrow Wilson: The Man, His Times and His Task, Houghton 
Mifflin, Boston, 3rd edition, 1925, p.388. 
95 See also Manela 2007 concerning the Koreans, pp.123–127; Egyptians, p.153; India, 
p.166. 
96 For one example, see the case of Indian and Turkish representatives described in 
Grayson’s diary entrance from the Peace Conference, 17 May 1919, WWPL, accessed 
21 February 2011, wwl2.dataformat.com/Document.aspx?doc=30940. See also the 
records from February 6, 1919 cited in House 1928, Vol.IV, p.322, and DHM 1928, 
Vol.I, pp.158, 165, on India and self-government. The claim in Seymour 1962, p.569 
that Wilson had strong ‘emotional sympathy for the weaker nationalities struggling for 
freedom’ thus seems questionable. Also House later expressed annoyance with smaller 
entities’ claims to self-determination, see House 1921, p.431. 
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wartime language of ‘self-determination’ had been interpreted globally as a 
promise of full freedom. Shortly before the conference, Wilson reportedly 
said to his propaganda chief, who had distributed his speeches 
internationally:  
 
I am wondering if you have not unconsciously spun a net for me 
from which there is no escape. It is to America that the whole world 
turns to-day, not only with its wrongs, but with its hopes and 
grievances. The hungry expects us to feed them, the roofless look to 
us for shelter, the sick of heart and body depend upon us for cure. 
[…] What I seem to see – with all my heart I hope that I am wrong – 
is a tragedy of disappointment.97 
 
Wilson’s clearest expression of disquiet at having ever referred to ‘self-
determination’ has been misattributed to a ‘speech’ he is said to have given 
to the US Senate on 19 August 1919,98 or a ‘written statement’ supposedly 
sent Congress ‘in late 1919’. 99  The actual statement in question was 
recorded at a meeting with Irish representatives in Paris on 11 June 1919, 
and was submitted to the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on 30 
August 1919.100 While it is not clear whether the conversation was taken 
down verbatim or paraphrased, the record had the Irish representatives 
saying that Wilson had spoken for countless of peoples when he had ‘uttered 
those words declaring that all nations had a right to self-determination’. In 
response, Wilson purportedly bemoaned the unforeseen consequences of his 
discourse: ‘When I gave utterance to those words, I said them without the 
knowledge that nationalities existed, which are coming to us day after 
                                                
97 Creel 1920b, p.163. See also Baker 1922, Vol.I, p.7. 
98 Tim Potier: Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia: A Legal 
Appraisal, Lower Law International, The Hague, 2001, p.23; Cassese 1995, p.22, n.33, 
referring to Temperley 1921, Vol.IV. Temperley 1921, Vol.IV, p.429, does not in fact 
suggest that Wilson made a speech that day, but Temperley (1920 Vol.III, p.66) claims 
that a ‘discussion between President Wilson and the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee’ took place on 19 August 1919. Cassese’s reference seems to have conflated 
the two events. 
99 Joan Hoff: A Faustian Foreign Policy from Woodrow Wilson to George W. Bush: 
Dreams of Perfectibility, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007, p.49. 
100 US Senate: ‘Interview between President Wilson and Messrs. Edward F. Dunne and 
Frank P. Walsh, at the President’s House, 11 Place des Etats Unis, Paris, Wednesday, 
June 11, 1919’ submitted by Walsh to Hearings before the Committee on Foreign 
Relations, US Senate, 66th Congress, First Session: ‘On the Treaty of Peace with 
Germany, signed at Versailles on June 28, 1919, and submitted to the Senate on July 10, 
1919, by the President of the United States’, Government Printing Office, Washington, 
DC, 1919, Document 106, from Saturday 30 August 1919, p.838. 
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day.’101 
 
Such concern for the real-life potency of his language sits ill with views of 
Wilson as the true champion of ‘self-determination’. A firm belief in the 
concept would logically have implied seeking to spread and realise it. Alarm 
at its potential impact would seem to indicate weak commitment. Might 
Wilson’s infrequent and ambiguous references to ‘self-determination’, and 
his apparent disinterest in the concept at Paris, be explained by lack of 
devotion, even remorse? However, he never explicitly stated in public that 
his language of ‘self-determination’ had been misunderstood, or that that he 
should not have used it.102 
 
What seems more likely is that Wilson came to realise that his words had 
been received differently than he intended: his understanding of ‘self-
determination’ was not really what he had internationalised. When Wilson 
had spoken of ‘self-determination’ to an international audience, Lenin’s 
radical concept of freedom as equality for all peoples – including colonies – 
was generally associated with that language. Wilson responded to Lenin’s 
discourse by addressing statesmen with the language of ‘self-determination’, 
and by legitimising the concept with reference to standards of peace, order 
and non-interference. He had hoped that political leaders would act on self-
determination to prevent disorder and ensure lasting stability. Certainly he 
had not sought to encourage peoples to undertake their own liberation in 
unpredictable or potentially disruptive ways. Instead of boosting his 
cherished values, however, Wilson’s internationalisation of ‘self-
determination’ came to spark aspirations of freedom far beyond his 
intentions. 
 
This perspective would make sense of an apparent paradox from the 
meeting with the Irish representatives in Paris. Later in that meeting Wilson 
reportedly expressed a remorse in seeming contradiction to his statement 
above, apparently still on the topic of ‘self-determination’: ‘I wish that you 
would bear in mind that I came here with very high hopes of carrying out 
                                                
101 Ibid. 
102 Throntveit 2011b, p.478. See also US Senate 1919, p.838; Baker 1922, Vol.II, p.107: 
Baker 1989, p.21. 
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the principles as they were laid down. I did not succeed in getting all I came 
after.’ 103 While the first statement, cited above, had Wilson worried that he 
did too much by mentioning self-determination at all – with the second, he 
expressed that he had done too little by not implementing the principle as he 
had hoped.104 Perhaps it was not the language of ‘self-determination’ as 
such, that he regretted, but rather the realisation that it now appeared to be 
peoples and not their leaders who were acting on it.  
 
Wilson revealed his complex attitude to the language of ‘self-determination’ 
also in another non-public utterance. His desire to create a League of 
Nations is well known, with French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau 
describing it as Wilson’s ‘motor’.105 And Wilson’s first draft of a League 
Covenant, of 7 September 1918, did cite ‘self-determination’ – although as a 
principle conditional on world peace:  
 
The Contracting Powers unite in guaranteeing to each other political 
independence and territorial integrity; but it is understood between 
them that such territorial readjustments, if any, as may in the future 
become necessary by reason of changes in present racial conditions 
and aspirations or present social and political relationships, pursuant 
to the principle of self-determination, and also such territorial 
readjustments as may in the judgement of three fourths of the 
Delegates be demanded by the welfare and manifest interest of the 
peoples concerned, may be effected, if agreeable to those peoples; 
and that territorial changes may in equity involve material 
compensation. The Contracting Powers accept without reservation 
the principle that the peace of the world is superior in importance to 
every question of political jurisdiction or boundary. 106 
 
It was Wilson’s advisor House who had planted the language of ‘self-
determination’ in this draft article of the Covenant, and the above paragraph 
was virtually copied from one House had produced.107 For a long time, 
                                                
103 US Senate 1919, p.838. 
104 See also Baker 1922, Vol.II, p.107: Baker 1989, p.21. 
105 Clemenceau 1930, p.161. See also Ambrosius 2008, p.229, and Stevenson 1991, p.245. 
106 DHM 1928, Vol.II, Document 3: ‘Wilson’s First Draft: Covenant’, pp.12–13, emphasis 
added. Three months later, Wilson reportedly argued that territorial adjustments should 
be considered only ‘in time as passion subsided’: House 1928, Vol.IV, p.292. See also 
Temperley 1920 Vol.III, p.56: ‘Revision of the Text of the Covenant of the League’; 
PWW 1986, Vol.53, p.655, note 1; DHM 1928, Vol.I, p.15. 
107 Wilson had formulated a generally worded request for such a draft after the British 
‘Philimore report’. House’s draft was sent to Wilson on 16 July 1918. House 1928, 
Vol.IV, pp.22, 27, 34 and DHM 1928, Vol.II, Document 2: ‘Suggestion for a Covenant 
of a League of Nations’, p.10, and DHM 1928, Vol.I pp.12, 14–15. The second 
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Wilson kept secret the drafts that cited ‘self-determination’. 108  When 
Lansing and Wilson’s advisor David Hunter Miller found out about the 
concept’s inclusion, they objected strongly: ‘self-determination’ would only 
bring destabilisation.109 Foreshadowing many later efforts to hush calls for 
self-determination as statehood by offering ‘internal’ or human rights 
instead, Hunter Miller then suggested replacing ‘self-determination’ in the 
Covenant with certain minority rights provisions.110  
 
Reacting to such protestations, Wilson then softened the draft Covenant’s 
reference to ‘self-determination’ by introducing a provision allowing states 
to veto any future territorial adjustments.111 When in later drafts, ‘self-
determination’ was dropped altogether, there is no evidence that Wilson 
objected.112 He certainly did not fight for including the language of ‘self-
determination’ in the Covenant which he deemed so vital for the post-war 
order.113 During the drafting process, ‘self-determination’ was first replaced 
with ‘consent of the governed’, 114  before this too was removed. 115 
Eventually, the relevant Article (X) of the final Covenant simply stated: 
 
The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as 
against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing 
political independence of all Members of the League. In case of any 
such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression 
the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation 
                                                                                                                        
emphasis was Wilson’s only substantial addition to House’s draft – other amendments 
were minor. Wilson presented the draft to his Paris commissioners with only slight 
amendments. PWW 1986, Vol.53, pp.655–656. Cooper 2009, p.651, note 28, 
erroneously suggests that Wilson wrote House’s draft.  
108 According to DHM 1928, Vol.I p.14, only Wilson and House had copies. See also John 
Milton Cooper: Breaking the Heart of the World: Woodrow Wilson and the Fight for the 
League, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2001, p.30.  
109 Lansing 1921, p.85. DHM 1928, Vol.II, p.70 and DHM 1928, Vol.I, p.52 – Hunter 
Miller produced a paper with his objections, p.45. 
110 On 10 January 1919 DHM 1928, Vol.II, p.70.  
111 In his draft of 20 January 1919, ibid., Document 9, p.99. See also Riga and Kennedy 
2006 and 2009; Throntveit 2011b, pp.445–446. 
112 See the records in DHM 1928, Vol.II, especially Document 7, with Hunter Miller’s 
comments to the article, p.70; as well as Document 8, p.94; Document 12: ‘Cecil-Miller 
Draft, January 27, 1919’, p.134; and Document 14: ‘Wilson’s Fourth Draft or Third 
Paris Draft, February 2, 1919’, p.146. House regretted the removal of the ‘elasticity’ of 
the original formulation, House 1928, Vol.IV, p.35. 
113  Neither did he refer to the concept when explaining the article above to 
contemporaries, according to the Bowman memorandum of December 1918: House 
1928, Vol.IV, p.292. 
114 On the suggestion of Hunter Miller, DHM 1928, Vol.II, p.87. See also Document 11, 
p.119, with the same suggestion made by Lord Eustace Percy. 
115 DHM 1928, Vol.I, p.71. 
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shall be fulfilled.116  
 
Wilson had thus had the opportunity to codify ‘self-determination’ in the 
League Covenant, but had chosen not to.117 In consequence, even after 
Wilson’s internationalisation of ‘self-determination’ and his broadening of 
the concept’s appeal, it remained a non-legal term. While Wilson did 
enhance the political power of the language of ‘self-determination’, he did 
not make it part of international law, and he left it without any formalised 
implementation options. 
 
Looking back, it seems that even Wilson’s most empathic use of the 
language of ‘self-determination’, in the Four Principles speech had some 
reservations. In that address, as part of a verbal attack on Germany and 
Chancellor Georg van Hertling, Wilson had asked:  
 
Is Count von Hertling not aware that he is speaking in the court of 
mankind, that all the awakened nations of the world now sit in 
judgment on what every public man, of whatever nation, may say on 
the issues of a conflict which has spread to every region of the 
world? 
 
It was this ‘court’, Wilson had said, which had spoken out against 
annexations and indemnities, and had decided that: ‘“Self-determination” is 
not a mere phrase. It is an imperative principle of action, which statesmen 
will henceforth ignore at their peril.’118 So even in what was his strongest 
expression of ‘self-determination’ Wilson distanced himself somewhat from 
the concept by presenting it as a preference of the ‘court of mankind’ – that 
is, as an external actor’s concept. Moreover, he conveyed that the purpose of 
mentioning ‘self-determination’ at all had been to show that van Hertling 
was ignoring it, rather than to positively endorse the concept himself. And 
finally, the address came eight days after US diplomat William Bullit had 
advised Wilson to use the language of ‘self-determination’ against the 
Central Powers – and four days after Wilson had received a memorandum 
                                                
116 League of Nations: Covenant (Including Amendments adopted to December, 1924), 
Avalon Project, accessed 8 February 2011, 
avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/leagcov.asp. 
117 See also Throntveit 2011b, pp.445–446. 
118 Wilson 1918: ‘Four Principles’. 
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on the striking German workers demanding ‘self-determination’. 119  On 
closer inspection, then, his Four Principles reference to ‘self-determination’ 
appears both reactive and rather disengaged.  
 
Wilson’s second and arguably also final key public mention of ‘self-
determination’120 was remarkably similar to that of the Four Principles. Two 
months after that address, Wilson cited ‘self-determination’ in his ‘Force to 
the Utmost’ speech to a US regiment armoury in Baltimore. At that point, 
his statements were being spread worldwide, and a global audience eagerly 
awaited his words. In ‘Force to the Utmost’, Wilson attacked what he called 
Germany’s ‘programme’. Within that ‘programme’, he claimed, ‘our ideals, 
the ideals of justice and humanity and liberty, the principle of the free self-
determination of nations, upon which all the modern world insists, can play 
no part’. 121  Neither on this occasion did Wilson actively promote the 
language of ‘self-determination’ as integral to his own ‘programme’: he 
employed it reactively to undercut a wartime opponent. 
 
Perhaps the most important tensions in Wilson’s discourse of ‘self-
determination’ surfaced when he linked it to a notion of equality. Like Lenin 
before him, Wilson drew upon some ideal of equality when talking about 
self-determination.122 But unlike Lenin, Wilson seemed to value equality 
only as part of a vision of orderly peace. For instance, in the Fourteen 
Points, Wilson presented his aim as being a peace based on peoples’ ‘right 
to live on equal terms of liberty and safety’.123 In the same speech, he 
espoused ‘equality of trade conditions’ for peaceful states, a message 
repeated in the Four Principles.124 And in ‘Force to the Utmost’, Wilson 
declared himself ready for ‘a peace in which the strong and the weak shall 
                                                
119 Cited in correspondence from Gordon Auchincloss, PWW 1984, Vol.46, pp.227, 266. 
120 Wilson did cite ‘self-determination’ on later occasions, including in the 1919 ‘Pueblo 
Speech’, but then only in passing, and when arguing for the League – not ‘self-
determination’. Mentions beyond these were even less consequential: see his September 
1919 session with the San Francisco Labor Council and his conversation with Grayson 
on 8 December 1918; Grayson’s ‘Peace Conference Diary Entry’, WWPL, accessed 7 
March 2011, wwl2.dataformat.com/Document.aspx?doc=27740. 
121 Wilson 1918: ‘Force to the Utmost’. 
122 Wilson 1918: ‘Four principles’; ‘Force to the utmost’. See also 1917: ‘Peace without 
Victory’. 
123 Wilson 1918: ‘Fourteen Points’. 
124 Wilson 1918: ‘Four Principles’. 
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fare alike.’125  
 
But Wilson incorporated the value of ‘equality’ in his ‘self-determination’ 
discourse with only certain agents in mind, and with a narrower range of 
application than Lenin.126 To Lenin, the ideal of equality pertained broadly 
to nations and peoples, also those without political power at a given time. 
Wilson, on the other hand, using the vocabulary of his times, mostly 
referred to the equality of ‘nations’, which today would denote states. 
Furthermore, Wilson praised states’ equality only as a means to peace,127 
and understood it as their equal right to be free from interference in their 
political and commercial affairs.128  
 
Also in occasionally referring to ‘peoples’ and ‘nations’ more broadly, 
Wilson would disqualify for equal self-determination any group he did not 
find fit. Although he has been said to have had ‘a passionate faith […] in the 
higher nature of the people!’,129 he did not extend this faith to all peoples. 
Favouring established, stable order, Wilson would consider for self-
determination only those groupings that could handle the concept 
responsibly, maturely and in an orderly way.130 Instead of proposing the 
equal spread of self-determination to all sorts of people, Wilson called for 
controlled arrangements benefiting international stability. Importantly, this 
                                                
125 Wilson 1918: ‘Force to the Utmost’. 
126 Also in his domestic politics, the commitment to equality seemed dubious: see e.g. 
Wilson ‘An Address at New Rochelle, New York,’ 27 February 1905, when he 
criticised labour unions’ drive for equality, claiming that ‘they drag the highest man to 
the level of the lowest’, in PWW 1974, Vol.16, p.15. Wilson also opposed equal rights 
for non-whites, Manela 2007, pp.26–29. The impact of racial thinking on Wilson’s 
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directly calling him ‘racist’, Gary Gerstle: ‘Race and Nation in the Thought and Politics 
of Woodrow Wilson’, pp.93–124 in Cooper 2008, p.115. See also Siba N’Zatioula 
Grovogui: Sovereigns, Quasi sovereigns, and Africans: Race and Self-determination in 
International Law, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, MN, 1996, pp.120–121. 
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at the time; for an overview see Richard Bellamy: ‘The advent of the Masses and the 
Making of the Modern Theory of Democracy’, pp.70–103 in Cambridge 2003. 
127 Wilson 1916: ‘Address’; 1918: ‘Fourteen Points’. See also House’s diary of 15 August 
1918, House 1928, Vol. III, p.49; Killen 1982, p.67. 
128 See e.g. Wilson 1917: ‘Peace without Victory’. 
129 Baker 1922, Vol.I, p.103. See also Link 1957, p.14 and Edith Benham’s diary notes, 10 
January 1919, in PWW 1986, Vol.53, p.707–709. See also Wilson 1919: The State e.g. 
p.27. 
130 Wilson outlined these elements of his political thinking in his 1919 (originally 1889) 
The State, as well as in ‘The Modern Democratic State,’ an essay he wrote in 1885, 
reproduced in PWW 1968, Vol.5, see pp.90 and 92 in particular.  
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shows that although Wilson was more occupied than Lenin with the internal 
characteristics of a possible self-determination ‘unit’, both men understood 
the concept in primarily civic rather than ethnic terms.  
 
Even with regard to his expressed formal ideal of equality between states, 
Wilson’s statements were ambiguous. Most noticeably, he presented some 
states as ‘more equal than others’, and the USA as the best of all. 
Apparently, Wilson believed that the USA was outstanding in ‘serving 
humanity’131 – and that he himself had a special role in this task.132 In strong, 
normative terms, Wilson declared that the power of the USA ‘spr[ang] out 
of freedom and [was] for the service of freedom’.133 Only the USA, he said, 
could ‘redeem the world’. 134  He saw the USA was the war’s sole 
‘disinterested’ party, 135  a perspective he also asserted in 1917 when 
declaring the war aim of a ‘Peace without Victory’.136 During the war, 
Wilson saw his and his country’s unique moral purpose manifested by his 
standing up for a better peace against the old order of secret treaties, 
annexations, and closed diplomacy. 137  Wilson thus championed US 
exceptionalism, and not true equality between states.  
 
Moreover, with his wartime statements Wilson expressed the intention of 
universalising these true and better ‘American values’ – rather than allowing 
other peoples to develop on their own, equally valid terms. While he 
maintained, in the Four Principles, that he did ‘not mean that the peace of 
the world depends upon the acceptance of any particular set of 
suggestions’,138 a year earlier, he had insisted on such a set of suggestions. 
Wilson had called for a new world order based on ‘consent of the 
governed’, freedom of the seas, and arms reduction, before concluding: 
 
These are American principles, American policies. We could stand 
for no others. And they are also the principles and policies of 
                                                
131 Baker 1922, Vol.I, pp.17, 22. 
132 For psychological analysis, see Freud and Bullit 1966, pp.197, 226. 
133 Wilson 1918: ‘Four Principles’. 
134 Wilson 1918: ‘Force to the Utmost’. 
135 According to Bowman’s notes, quoted in DHM 1928, Vol.I, p.41. 
136 Wilson 1917: ‘Peace without Victory’. 
137 Baker 1922, Vol.I, pp.27–29, 100. See also Notter 1937, pp.114–119. 
138 Wilson 1918: ‘Four Principles’.  
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forward looking men and women everywhere, of every modern 
nation, of every enlightened community. They are the principles of 
mankind and must prevail.139  
 
Whilst espousing such missionary aims, however, Wilson was also heedful 
of his domestic audience in presenting his foreign policy and the US war 
effort as being in the country’s interest. 140  Throughout the war, he 
emphasised that US self-interest would be best served through a peace that 
guaranteed the country non-interference, especially when it came to its free 
trade.141 In 1918, he announced that if the war were lost, the Americans’ 
‘own great Nation’s place and mission in the world would be lost with it.’142 
His stated convictions might well here have been genuine, but he must also 
have kept in mind a Republican US Congress wary of entanglement in the 
complex affairs of the world.143 
 
Wilson’s ‘Self-determination’ in Practice 
A similarly tension-ridden ideal of ‘equality’ surfaced on the field of 
Wilson’s actual self-determination policies. Due to the concept’s close 
association with its perceived originator, these policies, too, would become 
part of the international image of ‘self-determination’. 144  Besides 
disregarding actual peoples who invoked the concept, Wilson wrote off 
Africans in Germany’s colonies as ‘barbarians’ unfit for self-
determination.145 In Europe, he expressed similar attitudes concerning the 
Irish and Albanians. The next chapter examines the Albanian case, which 
offered an international opportunity to implement Wilson’s vision of self-
determination. As for the Irish, their representatives asked Wilson for 
support at a meeting at the White House in early 1918, but he remained 
                                                
139 Wilson 1917: ‘Peace without Victory’. 
140 See Ambrosius 2002, p.122. 
141 Before the US war entry, in Wilson’s 1915: ‘State of the Union’; after, in 1917: ‘Peace 
without Victory’. 
142 Wilson 1918: ‘Force to the Utmost’. 
143 See references to Republican criticism in Creel 1920b; Wilson 1939, p.187; Manela 
2007, p.56. 
144 See also the recollections of American Peace Conference delegates in House and 
Seymour (eds.), 1921. 
145 As expressed in South African Prime Minister Jan Smuts’ proposal, finalised on 16 
December 1918, which Wilson excitedly received on 26 December, DHM 1928, Vol.I, 
pp.34, 28; see PWW 1986, Vol.53, p.515, note 1. See also Hunter Miller’s ‘Summary 
Observations’ on Smuts’ Plan to the American Commissioners, 13 January 1919 in 
DHM 1928, Vol.I, pp.35–36, and J. C. Smuts: The League of Nations. A Practical 
Suggestion, Hodder & Stoughton, London, 1918.  
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unmoved.146 Later he allegedly confessed that the Irish had made him ‘very 
angry’, and ‘that he had wanted to tell them (the Irish) to go to hell’.147 
Wilson seems to have dismissed as irrelevant Irish non-consent to the rule 
of Britain – a country that happened to be an important US ally.148  
 
Wilson’s language of equality was thus tempered by his conflicting view 
that only the sufficiently enlightened counted in politics.149 He saw equality 
as a standard applicable primarily to ‘free states’, who proved their maturity 
by peacefully adhering to the law.150 Agents who conducted themselves 
unlawfully, by contrast, threatened to imperil stable order, and hence did not 
deserve equal recognition.151 In 1917, Wilson stated that equality had to be 
‘gained’ in a peaceful and gradual manner.152 He saw such a conditional 
approach to equality as necessary for the sake of peace – the only standard 
he recognised as meriting unreserved endorsement. At the end of the First 
World War, a similar reasoning materialised when diplomatic recognition of 
newly independent states was made conditional on their adoption of specific 
minority rights treaties.153  
 
Disinclined to policies of unconditional equality and statehood for the 
‘unqualified’, Wilson in late 1918 found in the mandate system a worldwide 
guarantee for what he saw as moral and orderly governance.154 The system 
                                                
146 ‘An Address and a Reply’, 10 January 1918, in PWW 1984, Vol.45, pp.559–561. See 
also Wilson’s replies to the San Francisco Labor Council in September 1919, op.cit. 
147 DHM 1928, Vol.I, p.294. See also Joseph P. Tumulty: Woodrow Wilson as I Know 
Him, The Echo Library, Fairford, 2006, p.264.  
148 See also Ambrosius 2002, p.119–122. 
149 For his political outlook on these issues, see his The State (1919); as well as Throntveit 
2011b, especially p.470; Notter 1937, pp.69–71; Steigerwald 1989, p.473. 
150 See his first draft Covenant in House 1928, Vol.IV, p.27–28. See also Notter 1937, 
p.61; House’s letter to Lord Robert Cecil of 25 June 1918, House 1928, Vol.IV, p.18.  
151 See Link 1971, especially ‘Woodrow Wilson and his Presbyterian Inheritance’, pp.3–
20. With the same reasoning, Wilson suggested that ‘self-determination’ should not (at 
least not immediately) apply to German-speaking Austria, Grayson’s notes of 8 
December, 1918, op cit., and PWW 1986, Vol.53, pp.336–340, especially p.339. 
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colonial power. 
152 Wilson 1917: ‘Peace without Victory’. The British expressed the same attitude, e.g. 
regarding prospects for Egyptian self-rule in Minute High Commissioner, Egypt, 11 
May 1922, TNA: FO 141/790, no 14549/1. See also Ambrosius 2002, p.127.  
153 Concretely, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Turkey and 
Yugoslavia. For a criticism of this practice, see Riga and Kennedy 2009. See also Jan 
Herman Burgers: ‘The Road to San Francisco: The Revival of Human Rights Idea in the 
Twentieth Century’, Human Rights Quarterly, 14, 1992, 447–477, at pp.449–450. 
154 See Wilson’s reasoning as recorded in DHM 1928, Vol.II, Document 18: ‘The Council 
of Ten, January 30, 1919’, pp.196–197. 
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would effectively become the chief policy materialisation of his concept of 
self-determination. Its final codification in the League of Nations Covenant 
meant that the mandate system would give the League sovereignty and 
‘right of ultimate disposal’ over peoples formerly under Russian, Ottoman 
and Habsburg rule, with a specific League member acting as mandatory for 
each mandate.155 In the words of the Covenant, such peoples should be 
governed as mandates for ‘not [being] able to stand by themselves under the 
strenuous conditions of the modern world’.156 
 
Wilson’s promotion of the mandate system had been inspired by South 
African Prime Minister Jan Smuts’ ‘Practical Suggestion’ for a League of 
Nations. 157  This ‘Smuts plan’ categorised peoples according to their 
(in)ability for self-rule, finding some altogether lacking, and others in need 
of ‘much nursing’ to achieve it.158 With reference to ‘self-determination’, 
Smuts had claimed that the ‘genius of Western civilization’ had a special 
responsibility for the post-war world.159 When reading Smuts’ proposal, 
Wilson had reportedly been ‘[d]eeply impressed with the idea that it was the 
moral duty of the great and enlightened nations to aid the less fortunate and 
especially to guard the nationalities freed from autocratic rule until they 
were capable of self-government and self-protection.’ 160  He had then 
incorporated the system into his own drafts of the League of Nations 
Covenant.161  
 
The President’s collaborators sanctioned the incorporation of the mandate 
system in the Covenant. The system was spoken of as offering guardianship 
                                                
155 Smuts 1918, p.12. The official US commentary to the Fourteen Points had outlined a 
similar system, proposing that colonial powers should act ‘as trustee(s) for the natives 
and for the interests of the society of nations’, House 1928, Vol.III, p.202. 
156 Wilson had himself included this formulation in several of his Covenant drafts; see e.g. 
DHM 1928, Vol.II, Document 14, p.151–152. 
157 The proposal was much discussed among the Allies in late 1918: see Smuts 1918; 
Curry 1961, especially p.975; N. Gordon Levin: Woodrow Wilson and World Politics: 
America’s response to War and Revolution, Oxford University Press, 1968, p.186; 
Thomas J. Knock: To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World 
Order, Oxford University Press, New York, 1992, p.202. For Smuts’ later influence on 
the establishment of the UN, see Mazower 2009. 
158 Smuts 1918, p.11; DHM 1928, Vol.II, Document 5: ‘The Smuts Plan: The League of 
Nations. A Practical Suggestion’, p.26.  
159 As cited in DHM 1928, Vol.II, pp.26–27. 
160 Lansing 1921, pp.142–143. 
161 In the first instance applied to the former German colonies, DHM 1928, Vol.II, p.40. 
Churchill 1929 remarked: ‘This was carrying a sound principle too far’, p.150. 
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of the uncivilized, within which the enlightened, ‘advanced nations’162 
would protect the immature peoples, and the world as a whole, against the 
destabilising potential of such peoples.163 However, although the mandate 
system was legitimised with reference to peace for all, it seemed to serve 
primarily one side of the equation. In the final Covenant, scant influence 
was left to the mandated peoples,164 while all League members could exploit 
the mandates’ resources in line with the ‘open door’ principle.165 Lansing 
later explained that allied countries’ support for the system was driven by 
hopes of dividing Germany’s colonies between them without reducing their 
indemnities.166 
 
Internationally, the mandate system became directly associated with 
Wilson’s concept of ‘self-determination’. At the 1919 Paris Peace 
Conference, non-self-governing peoples destined for the system queried 
Western powers about its implications,167 and asked Wilson what, if any, 
differences there were between the mandate system and ‘self-
determination’. 168  Wilson merely responded enigmatically: ‘In every 
instance the mandate should fit the case as the glove fits the hand’.169 Later, 
he said that the system would benefit the mandated peoples, helping them 
develop gradually towards ‘full membership in the family of nations’, for 
the sake of peace.170 Wilson seemed to view its role along the lines of how 
he saw his own and the USA’s standing in the world: Embodying and 
executing peoples’ interests and will, regardless of their expressed 
                                                
162 League of Nations Covenant, Article XXII. 
163 See Churchill 1929 p.139; Lloyd George on 30 January 1919, quoted in DHM 1928, 
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165 Wilson praised this in conversation with Bowman in December 1918, House 1928, 
Vol.IV, p.293. The US commentary to the Fourteen Points had claimed this would be in 
the mandates’ interest, House 1928, Vol.IV, p.201. 
166 Lansing 1921, p.140. 
167 E.g. at the Council of Ten meeting on 30 January; see questions from Australia, DHM 
1928, Vol.II, Document 18: ‘The Council of Ten, January 30, 1919’, p.202; and at the 
plenary session on 14 February 1919 – see questions from the Turkish, DHM 1928, 
Vol.II, p.194. See also pp.23, 561.  
168 DHM 1928, Vol.II, pp.196–197. 
169 Ibid., p.198. 
170 As noted by Grayson 1919. See also the second principle in Wilson 1918: ‘Four 
Principles’. Using a similar line of reasoning on the domestic front, Wilson argued that 
segregation would be best for the ‘Negroes’ too, Gerstle 2008, p.109. 
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viewpoints. 171  Since the mandate system would provide for peoples’ 
peaceful development, it would actually help realise their true freedom. 
 
Presenting mandated peoples as too immature for peaceful political agency, 
the mandate system that Wilson advocated barred such peoples from any 
role in their own political, economic or legal affairs. Although a small group 
of mandates could appeal to the League on certain limited issues, no 
mandate could dispute the mandatory form of governance. Only the League 
and the mandatory in charge could decide on possible, eventual self-rule 
after mandates had organically ‘grown up’ through indefinite subjugation. 
Mandated peoples were permitted to consent to the system, but there was no 
mechanism for registering either their consent, interests or will. Plebiscites – 
discussed for some post-war settlements – were not at issue regarding 
mandates.172 Protecting a stable international order and the mandatories’ 
freedom of unhindered action seem to have been the guiding principles. The 
system thus codified and institutionalised some of the most conservative 
elements of Wilson’s concept of ‘self-determination’, although without 
drawing on this exact language. 
 
Conclusions 
Wilson introduced ‘self-determination’ into the language of high-level 
international affairs during the First World War. His global appeal ensured 
both a worldwide audience and a high moral status for the concept. After 
Wilson’s 1918 references to ‘self-determination’, the concept became not 
only inherent to international discourse, but also hard to argue against.173 
Wilson connected ‘self-determination’ to vague but positive ideals of peace, 
freedom, and equality, making the concept seem like a legitimising standard 
of its own. Despite having excluded the concept from the League of Nations 
                                                
171 See e.g. Wilson in DHM 1928, Vol.II, Document 15: ‘Plenary Session of the Peace 
Conference, January 25, 1919’, p.155. See also Notter 1937, p.75 and Pomerance 1982, 
p.6. 
172 Plebiscites were discussed with regard to e.g. Alsace-Lorraine, Fiume (Rijeka), Istria, 
and Poland: see House 1928, Vol.IV, diary notes from 31 May, 1919, p.487; Baker 
1922, Vol.III, Document 65, ‘Memorandum of Mr. Lloyd George, entitled, “Some 
Considerations for the Peace Conference before they finally draft their terms”’, 25 
March 1919, p.483; PWW 1984, Vol.45, ‘From Frank William Taussig’, 3 January 
1918, p.’441; PWW 1988, Vol.’59, ‘Hankey’s notes of a meeting of the Council of 
Four’, 13 May, 1919, p.86. See also Temperley 1924, Vol.VI, pp.556–559. 
173 See e.g. Füredi 1994, p.10.  
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Covenant, his discourse hence paved the way for its appearance in the 
1920–1921 League of Nations’ Aaland Islands case, and its codification in 
international law with the 1945 UN Charter. With later international 
references to ‘self-determination’, the concept would be presented as being 
Wilson’s, and it was the ideas he had associated with it that would prevail 
when it subsequently appeared.174 
 
Wilson’s strong association with the language of ‘self-determination’ would 
ensure that even parts of his discourse and policies that had not mentioned it 
directly would become globally affiliated with the concept. This was 
reinforced by the ambiguity and tensions in his actual ‘self-determination’ 
references, which allowed for a range of interpretations. However, Wilson’s 
ambiguities all pointed towards turning self-determination from a radical 
into a liberal-conservative concept. In scrapping ‘self-determination’ in the 
League Covenant and implementing the concept through the mandate 
system, Wilson subordinated it to ideas of predictable order. His preference 
for stability and mature, ‘deserving’ political agents implanted these 
features in the international imagination as relevant to ‘self-determination’. 
And when he cited ‘self-determination’ and ‘consent of the governed’ 
interchangeably, he suggested that the concept might not require creating 
new states. With this approach, Wilson also indirectly prepared the ground 
for the late 20th-century scholarly notion of ‘internal self-determination’, 
which held that the concept could be realised within established states, for 
the sake of international security. 
 
With its selection of legitimating standards, Wilson’s language effectively 
co-opted Lenin’s ‘self-determination’ discourse and painted the concept in 
new colours. Lenin had championed self-determination as an idea of 
freedom as equality opening for full political independence for different 
                                                
174 For an acknowledgement from a time not covered by this thesis, see the statement 
delivered by Carl Gershman, Counsellor of the US Mission to the United Nations, 9 
October 1981: ‘Self-determination and the Soviet Empire’, World Affairs; 1981/82, 
144(3), pp.229–236, at pp.230–231. For interesting perspectives on Wilson’s legacy in 
terms of US foreign policy, see Anne-Marie Slaughter: ‘Afterword: Making Democracy 
Safe for the World’, pp.327–335 in John Milton Cooper (ed.): Reconsidering Woodrow 
Wilson: Progressivism, Internationalism, War, and Peace, Johns Hopkins University 
Press, Baltimore, MD, 2008, and the whole of Part IV, pp.253-325 in the same book; 
Wertheim 2011b. 
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kinds of groups. In concrete cases of self-determination, Lenin would ask 
the people to decide, leaving all options open, including their right to 
independent statehood. He would approve of their use of violence if this 
would aid the achievement of his goal of freedom as equality. 
 
Reacting to this radical vision, Wilson’s concept of self-determination 
prioritised stability and organic order. For Wilson, peace was the ultimate 
goal, condition, and legitimising standard of self-determination. In contrast 
to Lenin’s orientation, moreover, Wilson’s hazy standard of equality 
recognised the political agency of only what he considered to be mature 
bodies politic. His concept of ‘self-determination as consent of the 
governed’ allowed state leaders to act without popular consultation, even 
contrary to the peoples’ will – as long as peace and non-interference were 
maintained. Concerned with statesmen embodying a general will, Wilson 
presented self-determination as a tool that leaders could use to prevent 
destabilising resistance from emerging. By linking ‘self-determination’ to an 
idea of freedom as peaceful non-interference, primarily in the actions of 
states, Wilson narrowed down the type of freedom the concept would be 
internationally associated with. 
 
Despite the huge differences between them, both Lenin’s and Wilson’s 
concepts of ‘self-determination’ contained a conditionality ‘let-out clause’175 
that accorded with their respective ideologies. For Lenin, implementation of 
the concept hinged on his ultimate aim of internationalist socialism. It 
should be up to socialists – and himself in particular – to decide when it 
might be realised. In terms fundamentally contrasting yet strikingly similar, 
Wilson would permit self-determination only when it served international 
peace and the non-interference of the agents that he approved of. It would 
have to be the enlightened, qualified leaders of the world – his own person 
especially – that should determine when the proper criteria had been met.  
 
Today, Wilson is seen as the ‘father’ of ‘self-determination’. 176  And 
undoubtedly, he was critical to the concept’s internationalisation. Wilson’s 
                                                
175 I am grateful to John Breuilly for this formulation. 
176 See e.g. Castellino 2000, p.13; Gershman 1981. 
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ideas, arguments and legitimating standards would recur in all later 
international appearances of the concept. However, the widespread view 
that his influence on ‘self-determination’ totally overshadowed that of Lenin 
might be due to the predominance of liberal-conservative ideas in 
subsequent international affairs. Lenin and Wilson alike expanded the 
political imagination of international affairs with their uses of ‘self-
determination’, leaving all later significant international appearances to echo 
their discourse and ideas. While Wilson’s visions figured most prominently 
in these subsequent appearances, both Lenin’s and Wilson’s concepts of 
self-determination contributed to shaping international conceptualisations of 
freedom.
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3. ‘SELF-DETERMINATION’ FROM IGNORANCE TO 
INTERNATIONAL CODIFICATION 
 
By the end of the First World War, the language of ‘self-determination’ had 
become a central part of international political discourse, but had not yet 
been codified in law. This chapter examines selected international 
understandings of self-determination from the time around the conclusion of 
the war and up to the legal formalisation of the concept in the 1945 UN 
Charter. The pre-1945 cases of Albania and the Aaland Islands exemplify 
how self-determination was conceived of internationally after Wilson’s 
internationalisation of the concept, but before its legal codification. And the 
formalisation of the language of ‘self-determination’ in the UN Charter 
shows how the concept came to be adopted in international law. In 
investigating these events, the chapter identifies the ideas of freedom used 
to internationally legitimise arguments and ideas of self-determination. 
 
Already towards the end of the First World War, peoples around the world 
had started to use the language of ‘self-determination’ to pursue their 
aspirations for political freedom. The cases of Albania and of the Aaland 
Islands were both of this kind. Not only are they distinct from each other, 
the two cases may seem odd in light of today’s common view that a case of 
‘self-determination’ usually involves decolonisation. Despite their 
particularities, however, both concerned radical calls for freedom as the 
formation of new states – Albania wanted independence, and the Aaland 
Islands sought unification with Sweden. Both, moreover, appeared on the 
international agenda at the end of the First World War due to the interests of 
great powers. The ways the two were handled and argued reflect the 
internationally prevalent understandings of the concept of self-determination 
and ideas of freedom at the time.  
 
The Aaland Islands case was significant also for contributing to the UN 
Charter’s incorporation of the language of ‘self-determination’. When 
discussing the Aaland Islands in 1920 and 1921, the League of Nations 
addressed the meaning of ‘self-determination’ and acknowledged the 
international standing of the concept, although concluding that it did not 
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apply to the Aaland Islands specifically. By transporting the concept of 
‘self-determination’ into the discourse of the most important international 
institution of the time, the case elevated its status in international affairs and 
paved the way for its legal codification. Later, in 1945, the UN Charter 
would make the language of ‘self-determination’ part of international law.1 
Together with its close association with ideas of freedom, the legal authority 
the concept gained with its inclusion in the Charter lies at the heart of its 
international importance.  
 
Exploring these understandings of self-determination between 1918 and 
1945 makes it clear that Lenin and Wilson had set the terms for the 
appearances of the concept in international affairs. In each of the three 
instances covered in this chapter, the legitimating standards of freedom 
employed by these two men continued to shape international ‘self-
determination’ discourse. No new standard of legitimation was used to 
argue internationally about self-determination: the radical and liberal-
conservative ideas of freedom with which Lenin and Wilson had imbued the 
concept would keep competing to define it. Measured by the League of 
Nations’ and the UN Charter’s authoritative articulations of ‘self-
determination’, the liberal-conservative idea emerged from this period as 
internationally dominant.  
 
With this chapter, the thesis shifts away from individual political leaders 
and their use of the language of ‘self-determination’, to utterances in the 
international institutional forums of the League of Nations and the UN. 
Moreover, unlike the preceding analyses of the political statements of Lenin 
and Wilson, the following chapters concentrate on discourse in primarily 
legal settings. Indeed, the major post-First World War international 
references to ‘self-determination’ came from state delegates debating legal 
language on behalf of their countries, or from documents of international 
law.  
 
As in previous chapters, however, the focus remains on how ‘self-
determination’ was referred to in the international public domain at key 
                                                
1 See e.g. Cassese 1995, pp.43, 65. 
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moments, and how agents sought legitimation for this language with ideas 
of freedom. My concern is not with whether official statements disclosed the 
sincerely held opinions of representatives, or whether they effectively 
served state interests. As explained in the introduction, study of international 
‘self-determination’ language presented in public can reveal the legitimating 
standards of international discourse regardless of whether behind-the-scenes 
rhetoric might have more accurately reflected the ‘real’ intentions of 
individual agents.  
 
Albania and the Aaland Islands 
The case of Albania towards the end of the First World War was not 
subjected to the same lengthy League of Nations treatment as the Aaland 
Islands case would be, and it lacked authoritative international mentions of 
‘self-determination’. Nevertheless, the international handling of the 
Albanian question offers insights into how the political meaning of self-
determination was understood internationally in the immediate aftermath of 
Wilson’s utterances. 2  It also provides a background to the later 
independence claims of largely Albanian-populated Kosovo,3 to be dealt 
with in the final chapter of the thesis.  
 
Albania had become independent in 1912, but due to the First World War, 
the status of Albanians, like that of many other peoples, had become 
unclear. During the war, Albania had been neutral, but had come under the 
occupation of several forces, including those of Italy and Serbia.4 In 1917, 
the Italians had declared Albania ‘independent’, but under the ‘protection’ 
of an Italian administration.5 As explained in the previous chapter, from late 
1918 Woodrow Wilson came to champion the mandate system as a 
realisation of his concept of self-determination. Interestingly, for a period 
                                                
2 See also ‘The Clemenceau–Lloyd George Proposals as submitted to the President on the 
10th September’, TNA: FO 608/41: 329, 331, 333. 
3 Kosovo has not held a complete census since 1981 (results from a 2011 census are still 
incomplete) but estimates put its population at 92% Albanians, 5.7% Serbs and 2.3 % 
other minorities, according to Kosovo’s Statistical Office, accessed 10 January 2011 at 
www.ks-gov.net/ESK/eng/.  
4 See e.g. Lederer 1963, p.57. 
5  For a wide-ranging analysis of Albanian history over the last hundred years, see 
Alexandra DeRenzy Channer: Defeat and Resurrection: A Political History of the Pan-
Albanian National Revolutionary Movement 1912–2010, PhD diss., University of 
Pennsylvania, 2012. 
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around the same time, Albania was the only country in Europe (except 
Eurasian Armenia) that the USA and its allies favoured placing under the 
mandate system.  
 
The source of the idea of turning Albania into a mandate was the ‘Treaty of 
London’, which Britain and France had secretly entered into with Italy in 
1915, in order to secure Italy as an ally in the First World War.6 While not 
specifying Albania’s mandate prospects in precisely the same terms that 
were later outlined in the influential 1918 Smuts plan, the Treaty of London 
had given Italy full sovereignty over parts of Albania and mandatory powers 
over others. The treaty had also divided the remaining Albanian territories 
between Serbia, Montenegro and Greece, and promised Albanian-populated 
Kosovo to Serbia, which had occupied Kosovo in 1912.  
 
In discussing territorial settlements resulting from the First World War, 
Britain and France favoured making Albania an Italian mandate, even 
though they had recognised Albania as an independent state in 1912. 
Besides being interested in staying on good terms with the Italians, Britain 
felt, soon after the war, that ‘the internal security’ of Albania could ‘only be 
maintained by placing it under the protection of a Great Power’.7 The British 
seem to have reached this conclusion partly due to the fact that most 
Albanians were Muslim, a point that might become a source of instability.8 
According to the British, Muslim ‘Orientals’’ lacked political capacities, 
and were entitled to fewer rights than ‘Europeans’. 9  Such reasoning 
corresponded with Wilson’s ideal of enlightened statesmen establishing 
stable forms of governance suited to the peoples’ capacity levels, for the 
sake of international peace and non-interference. 
 
                                                
6 Treaty of London, 26 April 1915, accessed 20 May 2012, WWI Document Archive, 
http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/The_Treaty_of_London_(1915); see Temperley 1921, 
Vol. IV, pp.278–319. 
7 See the British Foreign Office’s confidential report ‘South Eastern Europe and the 
Balkans’ 13, 1919, TNA: FO 925/30210, p.11. 
8 As expressed by the British Intelligence Bureau in its secret ‘Memorandum on the 
Formula of ‘the Self-determination of Peoples’ and the Moslem World’, TNA: FO 
608/203, pp.14–15. The document was reportedly authored by Arnold Toynbee on 10 
January 1918: see William H. McNeill: Arnold J. Toynbee: A Life, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 1989. 
9 British Intelligence Bureau 1918, pp.1, 33. 
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Moreover, there were fears that Muslim self-determination could inspire a 
Muslim–Bolshevik alliance. In early 1918, a British memorandum had 
warned that Muslims and Bolsheviks believed themselves ‘to be face to face 
with the same enemy – namely, “Capitalism”, or in other words the 
European Middle Class’. Since an alliance between these forces could spark 
revolutionary disturbance, vigilance towards Muslims everywhere was 
warranted: ‘Scratch the Tartar and you find the Bolshevik!’10 Regardless of 
whether such sentiments were backed by actual realities, fears of the spread 
of Bolshevik ideology and radical self-determination were prevalent also 
among Britain’s allies, including the United States. 
 
Also the US administration initially rejected Albanian independence and 
supported its becoming a mandate of either Italy or Serbia.11 Without giving 
any reasons, the US Commission of the Inquiry had in 1918 pronounced: 
‘an independent Albania is almost certainly an undesirable political entity.’12 
Throughout 1918 and 1919, the USA continued to reject Albanian self-rule 
as a matter of unquestioned policy.13 And although Wilson had established 
his name globally in part by denouncing precisely such secret treaties as the 
Treaty of London,14 he endorsed the London Treaty’s call for an Albanian 
mandate.15  
 
During the spring of 1919, another reason materialised for the Western 
powers to let Albania fall under an Italian mandate in the name of peace and 
order. A conflict then arose at the Paris Peace Conference over the city of 
Fiume (today Rijeka in Croatia) with surrounding territory.16 The area had a 
                                                
10 Ibid., p.17. 
11 Lansing 1921, referring to meetings on 21 September 1918, pp.172–173. See also 
‘Official American Commentary’, in House 1928 Vol.IV, pp.206, 209. 
12 PWW 1984, Vol.45, p.470. 
13 An early 1919 British memorandum indicating a difference within US opinion on 
Albania makes clear that none of the options favoured by the US side included Albanian 
self-rule. See 10 January 1919 transmission from H. Nicholson, written 9 January 1919, 
‘Record of Conversation with Members of United States Delegation regarding Bulgaria, 
Macedonia, Greeko-Bulgarian Frontier, Thrace, Dobrudja, Albania, Italian Treaty, 
Greece, Serbia, Constantinople and Asiatic Turkey’, 578 in TNA: FO 608/ 30, Peace 
Conference (British Delegation) 76/2/8 to 79/1/1 1919, 575. 
14 See e.g. the first of Wilson’s 1918 Fourteen Points. 
15 As noted by the British Foreign Office, ‘British Delegation, Paris, October 3, 1919, 
Draft telegram No 1410, Cypher’, TNA: FO 608/41, 49. He had become aware of the 
treaty in June 1917: Seymour 1962, p.570. 
16 See e.g. Mayer 1967, pp.673–716 and Stevenson 1991, pp.283–289. For a contemporary 
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majority Yugoslav (Croat) population, and the Treaty of London – viewed 
as the maximalist Italian position – had not granted it to Italy. Wilson 
refuted Italy’s claims to Fiume. Generally sympathetic to Serb and Yugoslav 
demands for ‘self-determination’,17 the USA supported the case against 
Italy. When this triggered a dramatic Italian walkout from the Paris 
conference, a crisis ensued amongst the allies. In response, Britain and 
France proposed giving Albania as a mandate to Italy in exchange for it 
‘giving up’ Fiume. Wilson, however, soon seemed tired of the whole issue, 
and confined himself to remarking quietly that the mandate solution might 
mean giving the Italians too much for something that had not really been 
theirs to begin with.18 
 
The allied powers’ well-documented preoccupation with the Italian–
Yugoslav crisis did not entail much recorded interest in the Albanians’ own 
view of their self-determination or mandate prospects.19 On asking Wilson 
directly if he could prevent the dismemberment of their country, the 
Albanians appear to have received no answer.20 Wilson’s advisor Baker in 
turn commented on their appeal that everyone turned to the President in 
their own egoistic interest.21 The United States’ allies, likewise, dismissed a 
request of the Albanian President for separate representation at the Paris 
Peace Conference.22 Rather than allowing self-determination as statehood to 
any kind of people, they seem to have acted in line with Wilson’s preference 
for an orderly peace with friendly, enlightened statesmen in charge of 
mature, ‘free nations’.  
                                                                                                                        
view on the issues involved in the dispute, see Robert-William Seton-Watson: The 
Balkans, Italy and the Adriatic, Nisbet & Co., London, 1916. His Absolutism in Croatia, 
Richard Clay & Sns, Suffolk, 1912 deals with the Yugoslav question from the 
perspective of the predicted end to Hungarian rule in Croatia. 
17 Lederer, 1963, pp.25, 35.  
18 ‘Substance of telegram from Wilson to Mr. Polk’, 22 September (received 2 October) 
1919, TNA: FO 608/41: 335 – see also TNA: FO 925/30210, p.3 and p.11; and PWW 
1988, Vol.59, ‘Manteaux’s Notes of a Meeting of the Council of Four’, 28 May 1919, 
p.565. 
19 Records on the crisis abound, with correspondence warning of further war, as well as 
socialist revolution in Italy if it was not resolved. See e.g. TNA: FO 608/41 in particular 
telegram from Sir R. Rodd, Rome, No. 607, sent 23 September, received 24 September 
1919, No. 90: 8. 
20 Baker 1922, Vol.I, p.8. 
21 Ibid. 
22 ‘From the President of the Albanian Government’, 23 January 1919, TNA: 110/1/2, 25 
January 1919, in FO 608/47, Peace Conference British Delegation Files 109/1/2 to 
110/2/1 1919: 267 and TNA: ‘Cypher telegram from Mr Balfour to Lord Curzon, D. 
1205, 16 February 1919’ 9-110/1/2/2210/19, in FO 608/47: 272. 
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From a different side of the political spectrum, a radical call for Albanian 
‘self-determination’ had appeared in 1917, when Moscow’s Moslem 
Executive Committee had backed Albanian independence. The British 
nervously registered that an appeal from that Committee had warned that the 
Allies’ position on the Albanian question ‘roused suspicion and doubt 
among the many Moslems of Russia, particularly in consequence of those 
bitter experiences of centuries past, during which Moslems all the world 
over […had] learnt the meaning of what is called European justice.’23 This, 
however, was an exceptional instance of support for the Albanian cause – 
and without discernable results. With few other backers in sight, Albanian 
representatives in the spring of 1919 even turned to the USA to be their 
mandatory power, hoping that this would protect them better than being 
under Italy.24 After this request fell on barren ground, Albania seemed set for 
a future as a mandate under Italy. 
 
Meanwhile in 1919, different ideas of the practical meaning of self-
determination were manifested on the ground. Whereas the Italian-supported 
leadership in Albania was without popular backing,25 the British mission 
there reported that a ‘Kossovo [sic] Committee’ had formed after Wilson’s 
Fourteen Points speech, to fight for true Albanian independence.26 Yugoslav 
representatives were then keen users of the language of ‘self-determination’ 
when addressing Western states.27 But while the Yugoslavs did argue for 
Albanian statehood against the idea of an Italian mandate, they also had 
their own ambitions for dominating the Albanian lands, and for weakening 
their Italian rival.28  
                                                
23 Reproduced in British Intelligence Bureau 1918, pp.14–15. 
24 ‘Albanians Want Us to Act as Mandatory’, New York Times, 8 March 1919, p.1; 
‘American Mandatory Asked by Albanians’, Los Angeles Times, 1 May 1919, p.12. A 
similar option was discussed for Armenia, but rejected. See PWW 1988, Vol.59, 
‘Hankey’s and Mantoux’s Notes of a Meeting of the Council of Four”, May 21 1919, 
p.345. 
25 As recorded by Phillips, Head of the British Military Mission to Albania, 10 July 1919, 
to the D. M. I. TNA: FO 608/30, Confidential Report no. 22, p.13. 
26 Ibid., p.20. 
27 See FRUS, 1921, Vol.II, Europe, p.948, ‘Yugoslavia’, letter from the Montenegrin 
Prime and Foreign Ministers to the US Secretary of State, 15 April 1921; see also 
Reuters interview with Serb leader Pasic 28 October 1918, cited in Lederer 1963, p.41; 
the sympathies of King Nicholas of Montenegro in 1918–1919, p.71; the Yugoslav 
programme of 1919, p.94. 
28 See TNA: letter from Ante Trumbic to George D. Herron, No 4176, sent 13 March, 
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Also the 1918 incorporation of Kosovo into the ‘first Yugoslavia’, the 
Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes had disclosed tensions in that 
state’s commitment to self-determination: Kosovo’s Albanian majority 
population represented a problem for Serb nationalist aspirations.29 Already 
in 1919, observers warned that Serbs were expelling and massacring 
Albanians from Kosovo and Northern Albania in attempts to make the 
territory’s demography ‘fit’ with Serb objectives of dominance based on 
their view of ‘self-determination’.30 The ensuing situation for Albanians 
under Yugoslav rule indicated little, if any, concern for their self-
determination, as the League of Nations continued to receive reports of 
discrimination and atrocities.31  
 
In the summer of 1919, the head of the British military mission to Albania 
indicated some sympathy with the Albanians’ capability for self-rule when 
                                                                                                                        
received 14 April 1919, and letter from Mr Lazarovich Hrbeljanovich, 19 February 1919 
with enclosure: ‘A Copy of a Resolution Passed at a Mass Meeting of Serb Croat and 
Slovenes at New York’, 17 February, 1919, FO 608/41: 495, 438, and 441 respectively; 
and ‘Confidential Report from G. F. Phillips, Brig-Gen, Head of British Military 
Mission, Albania, Scutari’ (Shkoder), 29 June 1919, no. 20, FO 608/30: 20; Lederer 
1963, pp.96, 285. 
29 See MacMillan 2001, p.361; population statistics for Kosovo prior to 1919 in TNA: FO 
608/47, 43–53. 
30 See letter from Edith Durham to the British Foreign Office, TNA: FO 608/47, pp.4–6, 
and reports from other British observers, pp.9, 119.  
31  At the LNA: especially Box 1657, Section 41, including File 32213, ‘Albanian 
Minorities in Yugoslavia’, 1923; File 58664, Dossier 11379, from the German Consul in 
Geneva, April 8, 1927, ‘Albanian Minorities in Yugoslavia’: ‘Towards a Petition 
Addressed by a former Albanian Minister, Hassan Bey Prishtina to the Presidency of the 
League Council Demanding Protection for the Albanians in Yugoslavia’, 15 Mars 1927; 
File, 12416, Dossier 11379. On discrimination of Albanians in Serbia and Greece see 
e.g. Telegram from Ilias Vrioni, President of the Council of Ministers of Albania, 
Durazzo (Durrës), undated, received in Geneva 5 March 1921; File, 12479, Dossier 
11379, 29 April 1921: ‘Precis of Attached Correspondence from M Frasheri, President 
of the Albanian delegation, Paris, to the Secretary-General, League of Nations’ and the 
letter: ‘From Midhat Frasheri, President of the Albanian Delegation to the Peace 
Conference’, 3 March 1921, with an Attached memorandum of 26 April 1921; File, 
39302, Dossier 11379, 26 September 1924: Letter signed Bajram Tzuri, Hassan 
Prishtina, B. Pejami to the President of the Council of the League, 25 Sept 1924; File, 
12394, Dossier 11379, from the ‘Colony of Cossova in Central Albania’, 4 April 1921: 
‘Protection of Albanian minorities in Jugo-Slavia’; File, 38248, Dossier 11379, 
‘Massacre d'Albanais à Kossovo’; telegrams in File, 39301, Dossier 11379, e.g. ‘M 
Azcarate, from E.C 29 Sept 1924’; File, 23109, Dossier 11379: 11 September 1922, 
petition from Albanians; File, 33547, Dossier 11379: 23 January 1924, on discussions 
with M Taditch [sic]; File, 41214, Dossier 11379: 15 December 1924, on the heated 
language in the Serbian press; File, 41229, Dossier 11379: ‘Albanian minorities in 
Yougoslavia’, ‘Letter from EC to Cadogan’, Geneva, 26 March1925, on discrimination; 
File, 31166, Dossier 11379: 21 September 1923, from EC to Rosting, on the Yugoslav 
reply. For a contemporary perspective on the emerging Yugoslav state, see Fenwick 
1918b, especially p.721. 
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he claimed to have discovered the real leader of the ‘Kossovo Committee’. 
‘[O]ne Hassan Bey Pristina’, this British official stated, ‘[had] been a 
revolutionist against the Turks and the Serbians all his life. Well educated, 
very highly born with great influence, he [had] in the background, been 
working with the one object to regain Albania its lost territory.’32 Despite 
such sporadic expressions of approval, however, the allies did not actually 
drop the mandate idea until Albanians themselves in 1920 had overthrown 
the Provisional Government and driven out Italian forces from strategic 
areas. Perhaps realising that independence was now the solution most likely 
to keep the peace, Wilson then called for recognition of Albania’s 1913 
borders, with no mandate. On 17 December 1920, the League of Nations 
recognised Albania as a full member state.33 Meanwhile, the Albanian 
population in Kosovo remained under Serbian rule. 
 
While the Albanian question exemplifies one version of the practical fate of 
the concept of ‘self-determination’ after Wilson had internationalised it, the 
Aaland Islands case brought its first formal mention at the international 
institutional level. With the League of Nations’ 1920 and 1921 handling of 
the Aaland Islands case, the international profile of ‘self-determination’ 
discourse was raised and institutionally affirmed. Moreover, not only were 
the League of Nations’ references to ‘self-determination’ an important 
precursor to the concept’s later incorporation in the UN Charter: they also 
foreshadowed arguments and ideas that would be repeated at later 
international moments, including during the 2008–2010 ICJ case on 
Kosovo. 
 
The case of the Aaland Islands surfaced internationally around the same 
time as that of Albania, and similarly concerned a population demanding to 
determine its own political fate. However, due to the different great-power 
interests involved, the two cases were treated differently. Albanian petitions 
and demands for self-determination had initially been ignored, then 
overshadowed by Italy’s priorities, and, in the case of Kosovo, set aside for 
the sake of the Yugoslavs. Nevertheless, the Albanians managed to regain 
                                                
32 Phillips, TNA: FO 608/47, 10. 
33 For this sequence of events, see Temperley 1921, Vol. IV, pp.342–344; Lederer 1963 
p.291. 
 135 
13
5 
their state, although the Albanians in Kosovo stayed under Serbian rule. By 
contrast, the Aaland Islanders’ desire to unite with Sweden received 
considerable international attention, including a lengthy League of Nations 
treatment addressing ‘self-determination’ – but did not end with statehood. 
 
Unlike the Albanian question, the Aaland Islands34 case concerned several 
powerful states directly, threatening to cause international destabilisation by 
upsetting relations between them. Geographically situated between Sweden 
and Finland, the archipelago of the Aaland Islands was at the end of the First 
World War under Finnish sovereignty despite the express wish of its 
Swedish-speaking population to break away.35 Because of their strategic 
importance, the islands had from the 1853–1856 Crimean War onwards 
experienced repeated invasions and attempts at demilitarisation and 
remilitarisation. Britain, France, Russia, Germany and Finland had all been 
involved, and thus held a stake in the fate of the Aaland Islands.  
 
In 1917, the islanders had petitioned the Swedish monarch to take up their 
case for unification with Sweden.36 Sweden had then attempted to have the 
matter addressed at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference. At this stage, however, 
the issue had been temporarily shelved, together with other disputes relating 
to former Russian territories.37 Shortly after, the case was put firmly on the 
international agenda: in June 1920, Britain requested the Council of the 
League of Nations to internationalise the Aaland Islands question by 
discussing its proper handling.38  
                                                
34 The Islands are variously referred to in English as Aaland, Aland, or, sometimes, Åland. 
‘Aaland’, however, is the standard. 
35 For background to the case, see e.g. Markku Suksi: ‘The Åland Islands as a Continued 
Asymmetrical Feature of Finnish Governance – With some Convoluted Tendencies of 
Resymmetrisation’, pp.133–153 in Ferran Requejo and Klaus-Jürgen Nagel (eds): 
Federalism Beyond Federations: Asymmetry and Processes of Re-symmetrization in 
Europe, Ashgate, 2011, and Norman J. Padelford and K. Gösta A. Andersson: ‘The 
Aaland Islands Question’, American Journal of International Law, 33, 1939, pp.465–
487; Barros 1968; Markku Suksi: ‘The Aaland Islands in Finland’, in Local Self-
Government, Territorial Integrity and Protection of Minorities, Proceedings of the 
UniDem Seminar in Lausanne, 16, Council of Europe, 1996, pp.20–50; Rudolf 
Bernhardt (ed.): Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Vol I: Aaland Islands to 
Dumbarton Oaks Conference (1944), Elsevier Science, London 1992. 
36 See Padelford and Andersson 1939 p.470, Suksi 2011, p.135 
37 See e.g. LNA: Series 468, Section 11, Box R 544, file 2137: FO, London, 28 November 
1919: ‘To Harold Nicholson, Paris’. 
38 LNA: Series 468, Box R 545, Section 11, file 5020: Letter from Earl Curzon of 
Kedleston to the League of Nations Secretary-General, 19 June 1920. See also LNA: 
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Britain’s letter to the League of Nations Council cited Article XI of the 
League Covenant, whereby every League Member had a ‘friendly right’ to 
bring to the League ‘any circumstance whatever affecting international 
relations which threaten[ed] to disturb international peace or the good 
understanding between nations upon which peace depends’.39 In the view of 
the British, the Aaland Islands question was affecting international affairs by 
threatening to disturb the good interstate relations necessary for world 
stability. The British letter further noted that both Finland and Sweden were 
implicated in the case and had been informed of Britain’s move.40 
 
Also several other appeals to the League of Nations responding to the 
British action argued with reference to peace and international stability: and 
some used the language of ‘self-determination’. 41 Swedish submissions 
presented the Aaland Islanders’ right to self-determination as a matter of 
international importance, holding that they should be allowed to unify with 
Sweden as an expression of that right.42 Representatives of the Aaland 
Islands presented their case in similar terms, calling upon the League to let 
them part from Finland and join Sweden instead. Besides pointing to the 
will of the population as expressed in petitions and votes, they warned the 
League that the islanders would face assimilation if forced to stay under 
Finnish rule. Under such circumstances, it was implied, the Islands might 
not remain peaceful.43  
                                                                                                                        
Records of the First Assembly, 1920, Section Économique, Société des Nations, Plenary 
meetings (meetings held 15 November to 18 of December 1920), Geneva 1920 and 
LNA: Box R 544 File 2660: ‘Note from the Foreign Office’, FO, London, 2 January 
1920; as well as Charles Noble Gregory: ‘The Neutralization of the Aaland Islands’, 
American Journal of International Law, 17(65) 1923, pp.63–76, at p.63. 
39 ‘Letter from Earl Curzon’ 1920; League of Nations Covenant. 
40 ‘Letter from Earl Curzon’ 1920. 
41 See the records at LNA: Box R 545 File 5355: 8 July, 1920: The ‘Aaland Islands 
question’, Note by the Secretary-General, and Box R 544 File 5350: 7 July 1920: ‘The 
Åland Islands’, Handbooks Prepared under the Direction of the Historical Selection of 
the Foreign Office, no 48, H. M. Stationery Office, London, 1920 and The New Europe, 
15(192), 17 June 1920 (eds R. W. Seton-Watson and A. F. Whyte). See also Philip 
Marshall Brown: ‘The Aaland Islands Question’, American Journal of International 
Law, 15(2), 1921, pp.269–270. 
42 ‘The Aaland Islands question. Letter dated 10 July 1920, from M. Branting’, LNA: Box 
R 545 File 5396: 10 July 1920, circulated for information of the Council. 
43 LNA: Representatives of the Aaland Islands Johannes Erikson and August Karlsson: 
‘Letter, dated 6th June [July?] 1920, from the accredited representatives of the 
Landsting of the Aland Islands’, Box R 545 File 5303; from Johannes Eriksson to the 
Council of the League, Stockholm, 24 July 1920, Box R 545 File 5706. 
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On the other side of the dispute, Finland opposed any internationalising of 
the Aaland Islands case via the League’s involvement. In the Finnish view, 
the issue was a strictly domestic one; it was of the essence that outside 
actors should refrain from interfering with Finland’s internal affairs. 
Moreover, the separation of the Aaland Islands from Finland had to be 
prevented on the grounds that the ‘wishes of a minority’ should not trump 
‘the economic and military security of a nation’.44 Effectively, Finland was 
arguing that internationalising the Aaland Islands case, and allowing 
secession, would set a dangerous precedent. Such a precedent would 
threaten the stability not only of other League members, but of the world 
order as a whole. With this argumentation, Finland put forward what was to 
become a common case against radically legitimised self-determination in 
the ensuing ten decades. As will be shown, almost one century later, Serbia 
would present the same reasoning at the ICJ, against Kosovo’s self-
determination and independence.  
 
In July 1920, the League of Nations acted on Britain’s letter by setting up a 
Committee of Jurists to advise the Council of the League on the legal status 
of the Aaland Islands dispute. 45  While this in itself represented an 
internationalisation of sorts, the jurists’ examination was meant to clarify 
whether the case required further international action. Composed of three 
international jurists, the Committee was to consider two questions: if the 
Aaland Islands’ demand of a plebiscite on whether to separate from Finland 
and join Sweden was an international matter within the League’s mandate; 
and whether the League should issue advice on the validity of the post-
Crimean War agreement on the Islands’ demilitarisation.46 Since the League 
would raise the issue of ‘self-determination’ only in its answer to the first 
point, that is the question to be analysed here. 
 
                                                
44 LNA: ‘Brief review of the question of the Aaland Islands’ from the Finnish delegation, 
London, 7 July 1920, Box R 545 File 5319, No 609. 
45 See LNA: file 5717 in Series 468, Section 11, Box R 545 on the appointment of advisory 
committee of jurists on the Aaland Islands question. 
46 League of Nations Official Journal, October 1920, special supplement no. 3: ‘Report of 
the International Committee of Jurists Entrusted by the Council of the League of 
Nations with the Task of Giving an Advisory Opinion upon the Legal Aspects of the 
Aaland Islands Question’ (dated 5 September 1920) (hereafter: ‘Jurists 1920’), p.3. 
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Upon completing its investigation into the Aaland Islands case, the 
Committee of Jurists submitted an advisory report to the Council of the 
League in September 1920. The report opened by reformulating the first 
question as follows: ‘[C]an the inhabitants of the Aaland Islands, as at 
present situated, and taking as a basis the principle that peoples must have 
the right of self-determination, request to be united to Sweden?’ By 
rephrasing the original question, the League’s Committee of Jurists had 
placed the international meaning of ‘self-determination’ at the heart of the 
case. Under the headline ‘The principle of self-determination and the rights 
of peoples’, the report noted: ‘Although the principle of self-determination 
of peoples plays an important part in modern political thought, especially 
since the Great War […] there is no mention of it in the Covenant of the 
League of Nations.’ Consequently, the Jurists held, self-determination did 
not constitute a positive rule of international law.  
 
Mirroring parts of Finland’s position, the Committee of Jurists further 
maintained that national groups did not have a right to separation ‘by the 
simple expression of a wish’. Decisions about separatist claims, they stated, 
belonged to the domestic jurisdiction of states. Interfering in a state’s affairs 
by shifting decision-making power on an issue of self-determination from 
that state’s internal, sovereign domain onto the League of Nations would 
‘endanger the interests of the international community’. 47  With these 
reflections, the League’s Committee of Jurists seemed to say that the 
concept of self-determination had no role to play in international affairs. 
 
At the same time, the Committee stated that under two types of 
circumstances, ‘self-determination’ claims might come within the scope of 
the League’s mandate as matters of international concern, after all. The first 
situation would involve a state’s ‘manifest and continued abuse of sovereign 
power, to the detriment of a section of the population of [that] State’. 
According to the League Jurists, the Aaland Islands case did not fall into 
that category. The second scenario in which ‘the principle of self-
determination of peoples [might] be called into play’ as a matter of 
international concern was if a state’s legal status was not ‘normal in respect 
                                                
47 Ibid., p.5. 
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to territorial sovereignty’ – but ‘obscure and uncertain from a legal point of 
view’.48 In the view of the League’s Jurists this did apply to the Aaland 
Islands case, because Finland’s status under international law had not been 
settled after it had gained independence.49 Based on this reasoning, they 
concluded that the Aaland Islands case was an international matter, beyond 
the domestic jurisdiction of Finland. Therefore, it would have to be decided 
within the remit of the Council of the League.50 
 
Significantly, the Committee of Jurists also cited ‘self-determination’ when 
deliberating on the legal status of Finland and the Aaland Islands. Finland’s 
legally unclear status, they explained, had been 
 
caused by and originated in the separatist movement among the 
[Aaland Islands’] inhabitants, who quoted the principle of ‘national 
self-determination’ in the context of Finland’s recent independence 
from the Russian empire and subsequent civil war.51 
 
It was this, as the Jurists saw it, that had made the boundaries of Finnish 
sovereignty unclear, and turned the Islanders’ demand for ‘self-
determination’ into an international issue. Put differently, according to the 
Jurists, the Aaland Islanders’ call for self-determination had not in itself 
been of direct international concern. But since their ‘self-determination’ 
demands had contributed to unsettling Finland’s legal status, their self-
determination had, indirectly, become an international matter. The Jurists 
hence indicated that peoples could internationalise their ‘self-determination’ 
claims by casting the states in which they were situated into legal 
uncertainty. The undefined status of such states could then transfer a 
people’s demands from the domestic to the international plane. Exactly how 
the existence or degree of legal uncertainty should be determined in such 
cases was, however, a point on which the Jurists remained silent.  
 
With these analyses, the League’s Committee of Jurists presented two 
seemingly contradictory perspectives on the role of self-determination in 
                                                
48 Ibid., p.6. 
49 Ibid., pp.9, 14. 
50 Ibid., p.14. 
51 Along with the military events accompanying Finland’s separation from Russia: ibid., 
p.14. 
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international affairs. On the one hand, their report ruled out self-
determination as having any legal import, and denied the relevance of the 
concept to separatist conflicts. In mentioning instances of state abuse as one 
exception to this rule of inadmissibility, the Committee had found self-
determination inapplicable to the Aaland Islands case. On the other hand, 
their report stated that self-determination was in fact relevant to the Aaland 
Islands, due to the unclear legal status of Finland. And they had recognised 
the international force of ‘self-determination’ discourse by implying that the 
Islanders’ calls for ‘self-determination’ had compromised Finland’s legal 
status in the first place. 
 
This was not the only self-determination-related ambiguity in the report; 
another regarded the relationship between ‘self-determination’ and 
statehood. In one respect, the report had indicated that the two notions were 
situated on different conceptual planes. The Jurists had posited statehood as 
an international concept, and self-determination as belonging to a state’s 
domestic sphere. Containing self-determination issues within a state’s 
internal domain had even been presented as vital to the very notion of 
statehood: moving self-determination issues from states to international 
institutions would interfere with state sovereignty and ‘be contrary to the 
very idea embodied in the term “State”’. 52  Further, the Jurists had 
disassociated ‘self-determination’ from statehood by arguing that such 
claims should not be allowed to break up existing states or create new ones. 
Demands for self-determination should not lead to political independence: 
the peace should be preserved by internal compromise solutions guided by 
‘geographical, economic and other similar considerations’.53 
 
These points suggested that the League’s Jurists interpreted ‘self-
determination’ as a fundamental threat to the idea of statehood. The concept 
of self-determination, they indicated, would have to be pacified because it 
challenged not only actual, existing individual states, but the very 
international order of states. For the sake of stability and the right of 
established states to non-interference, self-determination should as a rule not 
                                                
52 Jurists 1920, p.5. 
53 Jurists 1920, p.6. 
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be discussed outside the realm of sovereign states – nor should it result in 
radical, new statehood. 
 
On the other hand, the League of Nations Jurists coupled ‘self-
determination’ and ‘statehood’ by acknowledging that calls for ‘self-
determination’ were always about creating a new state. Whether such claims 
sought separate independence or, as in the case of the Aaland Islands, 
unification with an existing state, the Jurists presented creating a new state 
as the clear aim. Notably, they did not offer their preferred recourse of 
minority rights as a realisation of self-determination; rather, they expected 
claimants to give up ‘self-determination’ in terms of statehood, and gain 
minority rights instead. Hence the Jurists did not support any ‘internal’ 
version of self-determination, of the sort to be mooted in the 2008–2010 ICJ 
Kosovo case. Unlike the claim of this later ‘internal’ notion that self-
determination could be realised without involving statehood – but rather 
through human rights and possibly territorial autonomy – the Jurists implied 
that realising the concept in practice could only mean new state creation. 
 
By aligning ‘self-determination’ with political independence in this manner, 
the League’s Committee of Jurists not only recognised the concept’s radical, 
secessionist potential, but also elucidated the paradoxical side of its 
radicalism. After all, also the radical and seemingly subversive 
manifestations of ‘self-determination’ in international discourse have been 
oriented towards the established option of statehood, thereby boosting the 
conventional idea that states in their current format (albeit not necessarily 
with their present boundaries) are worth preserving as the proper 
foundations of international order.  
 
Based on the Jurists’ finding that the Aaland Islands were an international 
rather than internal Finnish matter, the League of Nations on 20 September 
1920 declared itself competent to deal with the case. It also appointed a new 
Committee, of International Rapporteurs, to visit the islands, examine the 
situation, and recommend further action. Following their investigations, 
these Rapporteurs presented their conclusions to the League Council on 16 
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April 1921 in the form of a second report.54  
 
The Rapporteurs agreed with the Jurists that the Aaland Islands were of 
international concern. However, in the view of the Rapporteurs, the chief 
reason for this was neither ‘self-determination’ nor Finland’s uncertain legal 
status, but the fact that the case threatened to destabilise relations between 
Sweden and Finland. The League Rapporteurs further differed from the 
Jurists in offering their own reformulation of the first question posed in the 
case, leaving ‘self-determination’ unmentioned. In the words of the 
Rapporteurs, the first question was about ‘Finland’s right of sovereignty 
with regard to the Aaland Islands’. 55  Raising the concept of self-
determination only cautiously, the Rapporteurs merely referred to Woodrow 
Wilson’s principle of a ‘right of people to dispose freely of their own 
destinies’, 56  and the ‘principle of free determination (or self-
determination)’.57 This, they held, was ‘a principle of justice and liberty, 
expressed by a vague and general formula which has given rise to the most 
varied interpretations and differences of opinion.’58  
 
Yet, on the issue of the international meaning of ‘self-determination’, the 
two League reports converged. Both assumed that realising self-
determination meant creating a new state, and that this was not a right 
enshrined in law.59 And both reports invoked peace, stability, and an idea of 
freedom as non-interference with existing states, in arguing that state 
dissolution with reference to ‘self-determination’ should generally be 
avoided. 60  They similarly recommended orderly solutions within state 
boundaries, such as protection of language, property, and political rights – 
instead of self-determination.61 As the Rapporteurs summed it up in words 
                                                
54 See LNA: Records of the Second Assembly, 1921, Section Économique, Societé des 
Nations, Plenary Meetings and Committees, Geneva 1921, p.84–89. 
55 LNA: League of Nations Commission of Rapporteurs: ‘Report presented to the Council 
of the League of Nations by the Commission of Rapporteurs’, League of Nations 
Council Document B7 21/68/106, 1921 (hereafter: ‘Rapporteurs 1921’), p.2. 
56 Ibid., p.1 
57 Ibid., p.3. 
58 Ibid., p.3. 
59 For the Rapporteurs, see ibid., pp.3, 10. 
60 See ibid., p.11 
61 In the end, this was also how the League came to approach the Aaland Islands case in 
practice. Soon after the Rapporteurs had recommended that the League should monitor 
the guarantees it had stipulated for the Aaland Islanders within Finland, this proposal 
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resembling both the Jurists’ and those of Lansing quoted in the previous 
chapter:  
 
To concede to minorities, either of language or religion, or to any 
other fractions of a population the right of withdrawing from the 
community to which they belong, because it is their wish or their 
good pleasure, would be to destroy order and stability within states 
and to inaugurate anarchy in international life; it would be to uphold 
a theory incompatible with the very idea of the State as a territorial 
and political unity.62 
 
In addition, the reports concurred that since the Aaland Islanders did not 
suffer oppression, ‘self-determination’ was generally inapplicable to their 
case. It was implied that the Aaland Islanders did not need to be granted 
political freedom as self-determination because – since they were not 
interfered with – they were already free. The concept of ‘self-determination’ 
expressed in the two League reports presumed that freedom can be taken 
away only by interference – not by domination, dependence, or inequality.  
 
The reports, in effect, jointly proposed that self-determination should be 
realised only in exceptional cases, when a state had interfered with a group’s 
freedom in such a manner that granting self-determination would be the 
solution most likely to serve international stability. The Jurists had taken an 
indirect approach; in such cases, they had said, ‘self-determination’ 
demands would threaten to obstruct interstate relations and thus become 
international concerns. More directly, the Rapporteurs had indicated that 
self-determination might even be granted in such instances. They concluded 
their report by stating that if Finland did not comply with their 
recommendations to enhance the internal rights of the Aaland Islanders, that 
would open for ‘another possible solution, and it is exactly the one which 
we wish to eliminate.’63  
 
These conclusions brought to the fore what had been a fundamental feature 
of the international language of ‘self-determination’ ever since Lenin’s time: 
its legitimation with reference to an idea of freedom negatively defined 
                                                                                                                        
was implemented. 
62  Ibid., p.4 
63 Rapporteurs 1921, p.13. 
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against and from certain ills. Lenin’s 1903–1917 writings had identified 
these ills as domination, inequality, as well as specific forms of capitalist 
and imperialist interference with a people. Subsequently, Wilson had 
legitimised his ‘self-determination’ discourse by invoking an idea of 
freedom from the forms of interference with state action that he despised, 
especially war and obstructions with trade. The League of Nations reports 
perpetuated the link between ‘self-determination’ and a negative idea of 
freedom, while also, like Lenin, proposing that it could function as a 
remedy. With its two reports, the League implied that self-determination 
might be legitimate only as a form of remedial freedom from interference, 
and only under the condition that it would serve the (non-interfered-with) 
freedom of established states.  
 
The League of Nations Aaland Islands case hence recognised the language 
of ‘self-determination’ and its connection to political freedom at 
international institutional level. The case provided what was by then the 
highest-level and most authoritative international assessment of the concept. 
It represented the first attempt by a key international institution to crystallise 
the meaning of the concept, and reaffirmed its political import.  
 
Nonetheless, the case did not bring new ideas into how ‘self-determination’ 
was referred to or legitimised internationally. Both League reports vaguely 
echoed Lenin’s conceptualisation of self-determination as a negative idea of 
freedom, the realisation of which would entail the establishment of a new 
state – although they legitimised it with reference to a narrower idea than 
that endorsed by Lenin. The reports made no mention of domination, 
dependence or inequality, but focused on freedom as peace and non-
interference, above all with established states. Self-determination, they held, 
might be tolerable as an exceptional remedy against interference, in the 
interest of international order. As such, they expressed an understanding 
closer to that of Wilson. Finally, regardless of the importance of the Aaland 
Islands case, it still left ‘self-determination’ outside of international law. 
 
The UN Charter 
‘Self-determination’ did appear in international discourse between the 
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Aaland Islands case and the formulation of the UN Charter in 1945. 
Especially through Wilson’s use, the concept had reached global audiences, 
who made their own uses of it between the two world wars. The most 
important of these were the 1930s references to ‘self-determination’ by the 
Nazi regime in Germany. Aware of the international moral and political 
appeal of this language at the time, the Germans attempted to use the 
concept as a standard to legitimise their increasingly aggressive policies. 
This acknowledged concept of freedom, they implied, would be violated as 
long as people’s natural development was interfered with through foreign 
rule. In practice, the Nazi regime called for self-determination for Germans 
living outside the boundaries of Germany as part of its annexation plans.64 
 
Although the Nazi discourse of ‘self-determination’ was noted, at times 
sympathetically, by Western states, it led to no expansion of the ideas 
already played out with this language internationally, and no changes in the 
international status of the concept.65 It did not result in any international 
discussion on the meaning of the concept, nor was the language of ‘self-
determination’ incorporated into the international treaties of the time.66 
Strikingly, the Nazi discourse of ‘self-determination’ did not result in 
discrediting the concept, either. Instead, Nazi argumentation and the Second 
World War as a whole seemed to cast minority rights in a questionable light. 
Partly as a consequence, the beginnings of the international history of 
individual human rights emerged after the war.67 Around the same time, also 
the language of ‘self-determination’ reappeared on the international scene. 
 
It was only when the UN Charter included the language of ‘self-
determination’ that the status and significance of the concept in international 
affairs really changed. From that point on, ‘self-determination’ was part of 
                                                
64 Abulof 2010, pp.46–49 provides a useful summary. 
65 See e.g. FRUS: 1938, Vol.I, General, ‘Annexation of Austria by Germany’, Telegram 
from the Ambassador in Germany to the Secretary of State, Berlin 13 March 1938, 
p.435; 1939, Vol.I, ‘Events leading to war in Europe’, Chargé in Germany to the 
Secretary of State, Berlin 3 April 1939, p.109. William L. Shirer’s bestselling The Rise 
and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany, Secker and Warburg, London, 
1960 does not address ‘self-determination’. For rights discourse and the development of 
human rights 1933–1950, see Mazower 2004. 
66 See e.g. the Munich Pact of 29 September 1939, accessed at the Avalon Project, 30 
December 2012: avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/munich1.asp#art2. 
67 See Mazower 2004; Mayall 2003, p.117; see also Moyn 2011. 
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international law. The importance of the Charter is unrivalled in giving self-
determination international legal weight, adding to its already established 
political and moral authority. At the later moments when the concept again 
assumed significance in high-level international affairs, the Charter would 
serve as its supreme textual reference point.  
 
‘Self-determination’ is cited in Article 1, paragraph 2 of the UN Charter as 
one of the organisation’s ‘purposes’. This is the core reference to ‘self-
determination’ in the Charter. The concept is also mentioned in the UN 
Charter’s Article 55 on international economic and social cooperation, but 
Article 55 merely copies the wording of 1(2) and presents economic and 
social cooperation as a means to ensure ‘self-determination’ – which 1(2) 
had already established as a UN purpose.68 The greater significance of 1(2) 
is evident also from the fact that this Article was to be cited as the essential 
‘self-determination’ reference in subsequent international discussions, to 
which next chapters will turn. The remainder of this chapter focuses on 
Article 1(2), seeing Article 55 as a reiteration of the former, and thus not 
warranting separate analysis. 
 
The first proper draft of the UN Charter was formulated at the Dumbarton 
Oaks Conference in 1944 and did not mention ‘self-determination’.69 Also 
the 1941 Atlantic Charter had ignored the language of ‘self-determination’ 
when listing the principles that should guide a better post-war world.70 ‘Self-
determination’ was only introduced into the draft UN Charter at the 1945 
San Francisco Conference.71 At Dumbarton Oaks, merely representatives of 
                                                
68 Charter of the United Nations, 1945, Article 1(2) and 55. 
69  Formally, the Washington Conversations on International Peace and Security 
Organization. For useful overviews of the conference and other post-war planning 
documents from the time, see United Nations Documents 1941–1945, Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, London, 1946, and Harley Notter (ed.): Postwar Foreign Policy 
Preparation 1939–1945, Greenwood Press, Westport, CT, 1975 (orignally 1949).  
70 Despite scholarly claims to the contrary, e.g. Cassese 1995, p.37. The Atlantic Charter, 
14 August 1941, Avalon Project, accessed 15 February 2013: 
avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/atlantic.asp. ‘Self-determination’ does not seem to have been 
discussed at the Yalta conference 4–11 February 1945 either. For insiders’ accounts see 
Edward R. Stettinius: Roosevelt and the Russians: The Yalta Conference, Jonathan 
Cape, London, 1950; Clyde Eagleton: ‘The Charter Adopted at San Francisco’, 
American Political Science Review, 39(5), 1945a, pp.934–942. 
71 Officially, United Nations Conference on International Organisation (UNCIO). For the 
formal set-up of the conference, see UNCIO, Vol.XV, United Nations Information 
Organizations, London, New York, 1945; for proposals and amendments based on the 
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the ‘Big Four’ – the USA, UK, USSR, and China (in 1945 becoming the 
‘Big Five’ with the inclusion of France) – had discussed the planned world 
organisation. At the San Francisco Conference, held between 25 April and 
26 June 1945, national delegates from 50 Second World War allies would 
pick up on these talks. 
 
Soon after the San Francisco Conference got underway, the four countries 
that had participated at Dumbarton Oaks jointly submitted 27 amendments 
to their proposal of 1944. One of these amendments incorporated ‘self-
determination’ in the Charter as one of the purposes of the new world 
organisation. According to this four-state amendment (with additions to the 
Dumbarton Oaks proposal shown in italics), the UN should aim ‘[t]o 
develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle 
of equal rights and self-determination of peoples and to take other 
appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace.’72 Although several 
other state representatives proposed amendments as well,73 the four-power 
‘package’ with the 27 amendments became the basis on which discussions 
on the Charter proceeded.74 Meanwhile, most other states withdrew their 
amendments.75 
 
It is not clear why the four states that had excluded ‘self-determination’ 
from the Dumbarton Oaks draft decided, only a few months later, to 
incorporate the concept in the Charter after all. What is clear, though, is that 
                                                                                                                        
Dumbarton Oaks drafts, see UNCIO, Vol.III: Dumbarton Oaks Proposals Comments 
and Proposed Amendments. See also FRUS, 1945, Vol.I, General, Foreign Relations: 
‘The United Nations Conference on International Organization, San Francisco, 
California, April 25–June 26 1945’ (hereafter cited as FRUS SF); Leland M. Goodrich 
and Edvard Hambro: The Charter of the United Nations: Commentary and Documents, 
Stevens, London, 1949. 
72 See UN: Dumbarton Oaks to San Francisco, United Nations Information Organisation, 
London 1945, 5 May 1945, Doc 2; G/29, p.622. The four powers submission included 
27 proposed amendments. See also ARMSNY, UNCIO collection: S-0981, Box 14, File 
3, Progress reports – summary reports for 1–15 May 1945, ‘Summary report for May 8’. 
73 ARMSNY UNCIO: S-1006, Box 1, File 7, Working Papers, Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, 
comments and amendments (15 April–15 May, 1945).  
74 See ARMSNY UNCIO: S-0981, summary report for 8 May; also Mary Ann Glendon: 
‘The Forgotten Crucible: The Latin American Influence on the Universal Human Rights 
Idea’, Harvard Human Rights Journal, 16, 2003, pp.27–40: ‘It was only after Churchill, 
Roosevelt and Stalin had settled everything that was most important to them that they 
announced a meeting where the rest of the Allies could have a say’ (p.27). 
75 ARMSNY UNCIO: S-1006, Box 1, File 8, Working Papers, Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, 
comments and amendments (1 May–15 June, 1945). 
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the initiative for its inclusion came from the Soviet Union.76 In early May 
1945, the USSR had made the language of ‘self-determination’ part of the 
four-state package of amendments, suggesting it for the Charter’s first 
article as a purpose of the UN. The Soviet Union had also proposed a 
reference to ‘self-determination’ in the section of the Charter dealing with 
trusteeship – a colonial arrangement similar to the mandate system.77 
 
When soon after, discussions on the Charter commenced at San Francisco, 
Soviet delegates were the most vocal defenders of ‘self-determination’.78 
Subsequently at the conference, and on later occasions, Soviet 
representatives laid claim to the language of ‘self-determination’ and took 
credit for having placed it in the UN Charter. 79  However, it is not 
immediately obvious why the USSR wanted to have the Charter mention 
‘self-determination’. The initiative was not explained, and at San Francisco, 
Soviet representatives mentioned the concept very rarely, without arguing 
for it in any detail, and without presenting it as being very important.80 At 
one point, Soviet Ambassador Andrei Gromyko even stated that the USSR 
was willing to drop the ‘self-determination’ reference altogether ‘in the 
interest of agreement’ between the great powers.81 The Soviet Union’s 
longest elaboration of its stance on the UN and the Charter at the closing 
plenary session of the San Francisco Conference contained no reference to 
                                                
76 FRUS SF: ‘Minutes of the First Four-Power Consultative meeting on Charter Proposals, 
held at San Francisco, May 2, 1945, 9pm’, informal notes, p.551.  
77 Ibid., pp.551, 569; also Huntington Gilchrist: ‘Colonial Questions at the San Francisco 
Conference’, American Political Science Review, 39(5), 1945, pp.982–992; Humphrey 
1986; Claude 1984, p.351; Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr: ‘The Degrees of Self-determination in 
the United Nations Era’, American Journal of International Law, 88(2), 1994, pp.304–
310. For an insightful discussion on the concept of trusteeship, see William Bain: 
Between Anarchy and Society: Trusteeship and the Obligations of Power, Routledge, 
London, 2006. 
78 See ARMSNY UNCIO: S-1018, Box 2, File 5, Working Papers, Commissions and 
Technical Committees, summary reports Committee I/1, ‘Report of second meeting of 
the drafting committee, Committee I/1/A’, 9.30am, 16 May.  
79 E.g. on 11 June, 1945, see Mr A. A. Arutiunian (USSR), pp.56–57 in ‘Verbatim minutes 
of second meeting of Commission II’ (with Smuts as president of the Commission), 11 
June 1945, UNCIO, Vol. VII, Commission II General Assembly, 1945, p.56. 
80  See also Rupert Emerson: ‘Colonialism, Political Development, and the UN’, 
International Organization, 19(3), 1965, pp.484–503, p.487; Paul Gordon Lauren: ‘First 
Principles of Racial Equality: History and the Politics and Diplomacy of Human Rights 
Provisions in the United Nations Charter’, Human Rights Quarterly, 1, 1983, pp.1–25, 
at p.4. See also Bowring 2011. 
81 FRUS SF, ‘Minutes of the Thirteenth Five-Power Informal Consultative Meeting on 
Proposed Amendment, held at San Francisco, June 2, 1945, 5:30pm’, ‘Trusteeship 
Questions’, p.1113. 
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‘self-determination’.82 
 
Moreover, when the USSR did mention ‘self-determination’ at San 
Francisco, the narrow reference was to the concept as an aim of the specific, 
colonial ‘trusteeship’ system. This was also the agenda item under which 
‘self-determination’ was generally discussed during the conference. Soviet 
delegates did not invoke self-determination as a broader idea of freedom and 
equality for groups other than trusteeships, or stress that it should include 
the option of statehood.83 The Soviet linkage of ‘self-determination’ with 
trusteeship at San Francisco had been foreshadowed by Lenin’s anti-
imperialist discourse, and would predicate the anti-colonialism of 1950–
1960 UN debates. 84  Nevertheless, the connection between ‘self-
determination’ and independence for colonies was not to be fully formalised 
until the UNGA passed the Decolonisation Declaration in 1960.  
 
Remarkably, also the other three states – the USA, Britain and China – that 
had joined the USSR in sponsoring the amendment containing ‘self-
determination’ seemed disinterested in the concept at San Francisco. Britain 
had at first argued in favour of the Soviet move to refer to ‘self-
determination’ in the Charter, but had then opposed it, along with the 
French, apparently since such a reference might threaten these countries’ 
colonial possessions.85 Nevertheless, the UK soon came to accept having the 
language of ‘self-determination’ in the Charter, on the pragmatic grounds 
that rewriting Article 1(2) might take too much work.86 Also the Chinese 
tried on at least one occasion to modify the Charter’s wording of ‘self-
determination’, but generally appeared unengaged.87 Apparently both China 
                                                
82 Ambassador Gromyko at the closing plenary session on 26 June 1945 as recorded in 
Andrew Cordier Papers, Columbia Archives Rare Books and Manuscript Collection, ID: 
4078451 (hereafter: ACP), UNCIO, pp.5–7. 
83 See e.g. ‘Summary of fourth meeting of Committee II/4’, 14 May 1945, UNCIO, Vol.X 
Commission II General Assembly, UN Information Organizations, New York 1945, 
p.441. 
84  See also Füredi 1994, p.52. 
85 FRUS SF, informal minutes of 2 May 1945, p.551. FRUS SF, ‘Minutes of the Sixtieth 
Meeting of the United States Delegation, Held at San Francisco, Friday, June 1, 1945, 
9am’, informal notes, ‘Trusteeship’, p.1055. See also Lauren 2011, p.155. 
86 ARMSNY UNCIO: S-1018, ‘Report of second meeting’ 16 May. Besides the USSR and 
the Ukrainian SSR representatives, Egypt argued for including self-determination: 
ARMSNY, UNCIO: S-0981, Box 14, File 3, ‘Summary report for May 14’.  
87 See ARMSNY UNCIO: S-1018, ‘Report of second meeting’ 16 May. 
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and the UK accepted the Charter’s ‘self-determination’ reference as a matter 
of mere convenience. 
 
The USA would seemingly have preferred to leave the concept of ‘self-
determination’ unaddressed at San Francisco – but once the suggestion to 
include it in the Charter had been made, found it hard to oppose.88 Initial US 
drafts prepared for the conference had avoided the language of ‘self-
determination’,89 despite pleas from civil society representatives to have the 
Charter include it.90 Even the US co-sponsoring of the four-state amendment 
of Article 1(2) at San Francisco reflected less than total commitment. In 
fact, US delegates instantly contradicted their own co-sponsorship of the 
amended Article, and argued that the Charter should drop the language of 
‘self-determination’. The wording on the concept, they claimed, lacked 
sufficient clarity.91  
 
Regardless of some lingering concerns,92 the Americans then again reversed 
their position, and endorsed the Charter’s reference to ‘self-determination’.93 
On the very day this happened, President Franklin D. Roosevelt had 
explained to his San Francisco delegation that the USA should support ‘self-
determination’: The USA, he had said, needed to ‘take the leadership and 
indicate to the Oriental peoples that we do not back the imperial role of the 
handful of non-Asiatics.’94 This change of heart on ‘self-determination’ 
                                                
88 Ibid. See also Ruth B. Russell: A History of the United Nations Charter: The Role of the 
United States 1940–1945, Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, 1958, p.810. 
89 See Louis B. Sohn: ‘How American International Lawyers Prepared for the San 
Francisco Bill of Rights’, American Journal of International Law, 89, 1995, pp.540–
554. 
90 Notably from the future first president of the UN General Assembly, Belgian socialist 
Paul-Henri Spaak, cited in FRUS SF, ‘Interest of the United States in the Reaction of 
Non-participating Governments to the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals’ from US 
Ambassador to Belgium, Charles Sawyer, to Secretary of State 25 November 1944, 
p.940. See also Lauren 2011, pp.167, 171–172. For pressure groups’ reactions to 
Dumbarton Oaks, see also Burgers 1992, pp.474–475.  
91 This exchange is summarised even more briefly in ARMSNY UNCIO: S-1018, ‘Report 
of second meeting’ 16 May, p.2.  
92 See records from the Four-Power Consultation on May 2 in FRUS SF, p.546: ‘Review 
of amendments to Dumbarton Oaks Proposals as suggested by the Soviet Delegation’, 
and Russell 1958, p.810. 
93 ARMSNY UNCIO: S-1018, Box 2, File 5, Working Papers, Commissions and Technical 
Committees, Committee I/1/A (drafting subcommittee reports), ‘Report of Third 
meeting of Committee I/1/A (Drafting subcommittee)’, 18 May, 1945, ‘Consideration of 
outstanding points for Chapter I: Purposes’, p.3–4. 
94 FRUS SF, ‘Minutes of the Forty-fifth Meeting of the United States Delegation, Held at 
San Francisco, Friday, May 18, 1945, 9am’, informal notes, p.794. 
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might, however, be explained by more than such sentiments. Ever since 
Wilson’s time, Americans had seen the concept of self-determination as 
theirs, and as a value linked broadly to freedom and peace.95 In the words of 
one US delegate to the San Francisco Conference, his country simply could 
not ‘place itself in a position of denying the principle of “self-
determination”’.96 The next chapter will show how similar ambivalence 
continued to characterise US ‘self-determination’ discourse during UN 
debates between 1950 and 1960.  
 
The four co-sponsors’ lack of enthusiasm for self-determination at San 
Francisco suggests that the inclusion of the concept in the Charter did not 
result from an elaborate, determined plan on the part of any one of them. To 
begin with, the USSR might have planted the language of ‘self-
determination’ in the four-power package of amendments by ‘default’, as an 
unquestioned part of Soviet foreign policy doctrine established by Lenin 
decades earlier. ‘Self-determination’ then became only one of 27 proposed 
changes to the Charter, of which the four co-sponsors found several others 
more pressing.97 Although the other three sponsors acquiesced – even if they 
had wanted to oppose inclusion of the term, they might have found it tricky 
to do so. Already in 1918, Wilson had internationally cemented the moral 
and political appeal of ‘self-determination’ discourse. And in 1920–1921, 
the League of Nations had further strengthened the concept, affirming its 
international institutional importance. By the time of San Francisco, ‘self-
determination’ had become known worldwide as a value of in its own 
right.98  
 
In contrast to the four powers’ passivity on self-determination at San 
Francisco, other conference representatives did argue about the concept 
                                                
95  See also Russell 1958, p.75. 
96  FRUS SF, ‘Minutes of the Sixtieth Meeting’, 1 June, p.1055. 
97 ARMSNY UNCIO: S-0981, Summary report for 8 May. In the course of the conference, 
the four sponsoring governments jointly submitted 29 amendments to the Dumbarton 
Oaks proposal. See e.g. Mr Koo (China) in ACP, UNCIO: Plenary session, Doc.1209 
(English), P/19, June 27, 1945 p.3; also William T. R. Fox, ‘Collective Enforcement of 
Peace and Security’, American Political Science Review, 39(5), 1945, pp.970–981. 
98 See Council on African Affairs: ‘The San Francisco Conference and the Colonial Issue’, 
Memorandum Prepared for Consideration in Relation to the Establishment of the 
Charter of a World Organization at the San Francisco Conference of the United 
Nations, April, New York, 1945, p.4. 
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when discussions on the Charter commenced in early May 1945. All these 
arguments sought legitimation with reference to similar ideals of peace and 
international order, suggesting that these were the dominating standards of 
the day. For instance, those who opposed having ‘self-determination’ 
included in the Charter usually claimed that the concept should be excluded 
because its codification would threaten world stability. According to one 
version of this argument, which never gained much hold, Hitler’s earlier use 
of ‘self-determination’ proved that the concept was suited only to induce 
war-mongering abuse.99  
 
An argument more prevalent at San Francisco against an unqualified 
mention of ‘self-determination’ in the Charter claimed that such a mention 
could incite disorder by breaking up existing states, hence fundamentally 
interfering with their sovereignty. This line of reasoning arose in the 
relevant drafting committee on the initiative of Colombia. 100  ‘[S]elf-
determination’, Colombia had maintained, ‘was acceptable within the text 
[of the Charter] only if it meant the right to self-government of a people, and 
not if it meant the right to secede.’101 If ‘self-determination’ were to be 
included in the Charter, it would be necessary to make this clear. Although 
the drafting committee agreed that ‘self-determination’ did not have to 
imply secession, it did not incorporate Colombia’s proposed specification 
into the Charter text. The drafting committee merely chose to affirm, 
internally, that self-determination ‘corresponded closely to the will and 
desires of peoples everywhere and should be clearly enunciated in the 
Charter’.102 
 
In the same drafting committee discussion, several other states ‘strongly 
argued’ for including the language of ‘self-determination’ in the Charter, 
                                                
99 Iran cited in ‘Advance progress Report, Fifth Meeting of Commission I, Committee I, 14 
May’, ARMSNY UNCIO: S-1018, Box 2, File 3 (-4), Working Papers, Commissions 
and Technical Committees, summary reports Committee I/1. See also ARMSNY 
UNCIO: S-0981, Box 14, File 3: Summary report for 14 May. 
100 At San Francisco, it was Committee I/1/A that concentrated on Article 1(2). 
101 ARMSNY UNCIO: S-1018, Box 2, File 3 (-4), Summary report of sixth meeting of 
Committee I/1, 15 May, 1945; and Committee I/1, progress report, sixth meeting, 15 
May, 1945; also ARMSNY UNCIO: S-0981, Box 14, File 4, progress reports – 
summary reports for 15–20 May 1945, daily record of progress of commissions and 
committees, 15 May. 
102 ARMSNY UNCIO: S-0981, daily record, 15 May. 
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claiming that it would contribute to international peace. Syria, for instance, 
held ‘that this principle correspond[ed] closely to the will of the people 
everywhere; […] it served Belgium, Norway, Greece and Syria in their 
struggle for liberation.’ Yugoslavia wrongly cited ‘self-determination’ as 
‘one of Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points’, and espoused it as ‘the 
cornerstone’ of its own constitution.’103 Contrary to the overall position of 
the drafting committee, such viewpoints assumed that realising ‘self-
determination’ would have to involve the creation of new states. 
 
Belgium presented the most adamant case against mentioning ‘self-
determination’ in the Charter, depicting the concept as ‘dangerous and 
unacceptable’.104 Codifying it as the basis of interstate relations by including 
it in Article 1(2), Belgium insisted, ‘would open the door to inadmissible 
interventions’ in the internal affairs of states.105 Nonetheless, even this 
strongest critic of ‘self-determination’ could not sustain an all-out rejection. 
After initially having opposed the concept entirely, 106  Belgium then 
proposed instead to leave it in the Charter, but make its implementation 
conditional on the maintenance of ‘international order’.107 Without any 
explanation, however, the drafting committee rejected Belgium’s attempt to 
attach conditions to self-determination, and left the concept in the Charter in 
the original version of the four-state amendment.108 
 
Both Belgium’s tempering of its resistance to the language of ‘self-
determination’, and the fate of the Belgian and Colombian proposals, 
reaffirmed the international appeal of the concept. At the time of San 
Francisco, the language of ‘self-determination’ appeared to be widely 
accepted as being of some moral and political value. It seemed unacceptable 
to disallow it completely, and hard to argue against. The arguments 
exhibited at San Francisco just before the language of ‘self-determination’ 
                                                
103 ARMSNY UNCIO: S-1018, Summary report of sixth meeting, 15 May, 1945; and 
Committee I/1, progress report, sixth meeting, 15 May, 1945; also UNCIO: S-0981, 
daily record, 15 May. 
104 ARMSNY UNCIO: S-1018, ‘Report of second meeting’, 16 May.  
105 Belgian amendment to 1(2), UNCIO, Vol. IV Commission I, General Provisions, UN 
Information Organizations, London, New York 1945, Doc 374, p.300 
106 ARMSNY UNCIO: S-0981, summary report for 14 May; and ARMSNY UNCIO: S-
1018, ‘Advance progress Report’, 14 May. 
107 ARMSNY UNCIO: S-1018, ‘Report of second meeting’ 16 May.  
108 Ibid. 
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was included in the Charter also showed that the prevalent legitimising 
standards of the time lay close to Wilson’s ideals of non-interference and 
peace. As in 1918, it seems, an international environment scarred by a world 
war had helped to affiliate the concept with a liberal-conservative idea of 
freedom.109 
 
The idea of freedom underpinning the Charter’s reference to ‘self-
determination’ shone through also on a few other occasions at San 
Francisco. The word ‘freedom’ itself was barely mentioned at the 
conference, nor did it figure in the Charter. When Iran’s representative 
towards the end of the conference lamented the absence of the word 
‘liberty’ in the Charter, the US chairman of that meeting simply closed the 
issue without any explanation.110 A rare record of an explicit linking of 
freedom and ‘self-determination’ at San Francisco was dated two days 
before the concept was voted into Article 1(2). During a drafting committee 
meeting on that day, a British delegate had equated ‘self-determination’ 
with independence, but warned that these notions should not be ‘confus[ed]’ 
with true freedom. ‘[I]ndependence’, he had said, was not the same as 
freedom, and ‘would come, if at all, by natural development’.111 ‘Self-
determination’ as independence, Britain wanted to make clear, was not to be 
achieved instantaneously, but through slow, ‘natural’ steps.112  
 
This British intervention seemed intent on inserting a condition of 
‘maturity’ into realising self-determination as independence, especially if 
                                                
109 For references to peace as the objective of the conference and of the UN, see ACP 
UNCIO: Plenary sessions, e.g. ‘Verbatim minutes of the first plenary session’, 27 April, 
1945 Doc 15, P/3, and ‘Verbatim Minutes of the closing plenary session, Opera House, 
June 26, 1945’, of 27 June 1945, Doc.1209 (English), p.19. For Soviet references see 
Gromyko, p.8. 
110 Chairman Stettenius stated that the coordination committee would sort out the issue – 
but the committee never addressed it; see Adle, Iran, on 23 June, 1945, UNCIO, Vol.V 
Delegation Chairmen Steering Committee Executive Committee, United Nations 
Information Organizations, London, New York 1945, p.310. Also Uruguay called for 
the inclusion of ‘freedom’ in the Charter on 14 May: ARMSNY UNCIO: S-0981, 
summary report for 14 May. 
111 ‘Summary of fourth meeting of Committee II/4’, 14 May 1945, UNCIO 1945, Vol. X, 
p.440. 
112 On the issue of independence, Philippine delegate Carlos P. Romulo: I Walked with 
Heroes, Holt Rinehart and Winston, New York, 1961, claimed he fought and won the 
battle for including ‘independence’ in the Charter’s Article 76(b) as an aim for non-self-
governing territories, pp.259, 261–262. See also Gilchrist 1945, p.987. 
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applied to colonies.113 That position was similar to Wilson’s discourse of 
‘self-determination’ from almost three decades earlier, and was to be 
repeated in the 1950–1960 UN debates examined in the next chapter. Also 
towards the end of the San Francisco Conference, the UK expressed alarm 
at the prospect of making self-determination in the form of statehood an 
unconditional ‘goal for all territories’.114 Moreover, with its attempt to 
disassociate ‘independence’ from ‘freedom’, Britain indirectly rejected the 
idea that conditions of dependence could make peoples unfree, implicitly 
saying that it was only interference that could take freedom away.  
 
While the San Francisco Conference participants seemed to associate the 
same ideas of freedom with the language of ‘self-determination’, on the 
whole they did not operate with any joint definition of the concept. Oddly, 
at the very same meeting on 16 May 1945 in which the drafting committee 
adopted the four-power proposal’s precise wording on ‘self-
determination’,115 the committee also called for more discussion on what the 
concept really meant.116 However, no such detailed discussion was recorded 
at the conference.117 Perhaps it did not actually take place because delegates 
had warned against it. According to a UK representative, discussing self-
determination would only trigger disagreement, a point on which a USSR 
                                                
113 See also William Roger Louis: ‘Public Enemy Number One: The British Empire in the 
Dock at the United Nations, 1957–71’, pp.186–213 in Lynn (ed.) 2006b, at p.187. 
114 UNCIO 1945, Vol. X, ‘Summary report of fifteenth meeting of Committee II/4’, 18 
June 1945, p.562. 
115 ARMSNY UNCIO: S-1018, ‘Report of second meeting’ 16 May; also S-1018, Box 2, 
File 7, Working Papers, Commissions and Technical Committees, Committee I/1/A, 
misc: ‘Text of Chapter I, as agreed upon by the drafting committee’, 16 May 1945 and 
Report of the Third meeting of Committee I/1/A (Drafting subcommittee), 18 May, 
1945, 3.05pm. 
116 ARMSNY UNCIO: S-0981, Box 14, File 4, Office of the Executive Secretary, 
summary report for 17 May 1945 stated that ‘The questions of the equality of states, 
self-determination and the sanctity of treaties have been raised in I/1; I/1/A considers 
that these topics should be considered elsewhere, but no specific recommendation on 
this subject has been made.’ See also Subcommittee I/1/A's report from the same day, 
and ARMSNY UNCIO: S-1018, ‘Report of second meeting’ 16 May. 
117 Eagleton 1945a blamed such oversights on ‘the fact that the Conference was dominated 
by individuals inexperienced in international organization and more interested in 
political security than in legal order or constitutional form’, p.937. See also Clyde 
Eagleton: ‘International Law and the Charter of the United Nations’, American Journal 
of International Law, 39(745), 1945b, p.751–754. For similar contemporary criticism of 
the final Charter, see George A. Finch: ‘Editorial Comment: The United Nations 
Charter’, American Journal of International Law, 39, 1945, p.541–546. For a defence, 
see Mintauts Chakste: ‘Justice and Law in the Charter of the United Nations’, American 
Journal of International Law, 42, 1948, pp.590–598. 
 156 
15
6 
delegate agreed.118 In the conference’s last recorded use of the language of 
‘self-determination’, its meaning still seemed to be unclear.119 
 
The conference’s only two brief attempts at defining the concept of ‘self-
determination’ did not really make it any more clear-cut. These efforts did, 
however, highlight the ideas of freedom which the concept was associated 
with at the time. Two different drafting committees issued these 
clarifications after the 16 May vote on including ‘self-determination’ in 
Article 1(2), and before the final version of the Charter had been 
approved.120 Dated 1 June121 and 14 June,122 the second of these texts was 
both a specification of the first, and was issued from a higher level of the 
conference drafting hierarchy.  
 
According to the 1 June text, the two principles in Article 1(2) – ‘equal 
rights’ and ‘self-determination’ – were ‘two component elements or one 
norm’. Free expression of peoples’ will, the text held, was essential to 
prevent abuse of this norm. ‘[T]he principle as a whole’, it continued, 
‘extends as a general basic conception to a possible amalgamation of 
nationalities if they so freely choose.’ The text concluded that ‘what is 
intended by paragraph 2 is to proclaim the equal rights of peoples as such, 
consequently their right to self-determination. Equality of rights, therefore, 
extends in the Charter to states, nations, and peoples.’123  
                                                
118 Jebb, UK, ‘Summary report of twenty-second meeting of Coordination Committee’, 15 
June, UNCIO Vol. XVII Documents of the Coordination Committee, UN Information 
Organizations, London, New York 1945, p.143. 
119 Ibid., pp.142–143. 
120 The Charter was approved by the Coordination Committee on 1 and 2 June, ARMSNY 
UNCIO: S-1019, Box I, File 6, Charter, Commission I/Committee 1, records from 5 
June 1945: To Coordination Committee (via Commission I), ‘Approval of Chapter I by 
Committee I/1’. The Committee had the ultimate authority to approve drafts of the 
Charter; see ACP UNCIO: ‘Conference Procedure on Drafting Final Charter’, 11 May 
1945, Steering Committee, Restricted, Doc 243 (English), ST/8. For the adoption of the 
text at the Conference, see e.g. ARMSNY UNCIO: S-1018, Box 2, File 7, A, misc: 
‘Text of Chapter I, as agreed upon by the Drafting Committee’, Doc. 384, I/1/A/5 (2), 
18 May 1945; also ACP UNCIO: ‘Tentative Drafts of the Coordination Committee and 
the Advisory Committee of Jurists, Subject to Final Approval of the Coordination 
Committee’, 21 June 1945, Coordination Committee, Document 1140 Co/179, p.2. 
121  UNCIO 1945, Vol. IV, ‘Report of Rapporteur of Subcommittee I/1/A, Farid 
Zeineddine, Syria, to Committee I/1, 1 June, 1945’, pp.703–704. 
122  ARMSNY UNCIO: S-1018, Box 2, File 1, Working Papers, Commissions and 
Technical Committees, summary reports Committee I, general, ‘Report submitted to 
Commission I on behalf of Committee I, working on Preamble, purposes and 
principles’, 14 June 1945, p.13.  
123 UNCIO 1945, Vol. IV, Report of Rapporteur, 1 June 1945, pp.703–704. 
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The subsequent 14 June text would be the final and most authoritative 
explication of ‘self-determination’ at the conference. ‘The principle of equal 
rights of peoples and that of self-determination’, that text went, ‘are two 
complementary parts of one standard of conduct. [R]espect for that principle 
is a basis for the development of friendly relations and is one of the 
measures to strengthen universal peace.’ Ending with a warning similar to 
that of 1 June, the 14 June clarification stressed that genuine expression of 
peoples’ will was essential to prevent the concept from being misused.124  
 
Despite the rather imprecise language of the two texts, the more 
authoritative 14 June document involved three interesting changes in 
emphasis from that of 1 June. First, the 14 June text specified international 
peace as superior to and the aim of self-determination. Then, it limited the 1 
June text’s broader reference to equality. And, with reference to ‘friendly 
relations’, the later text affirmed that self-determination was meant for 
states, not for ‘states, nations, and peoples’, as in the 1 June text. Just like 
Wilson, the San Francisco drafters seem to have seen states as the primary 
agents and ‘recipients’ of self-determination, and to have favoured the 
concept as a means of achieving international stability. Indeed, also the 
four-power draft which would become Article 1(2) had proclaimed ‘self-
determination’ in the context of orderly interstate relations. The purpose of 
the UN, according to that draft, was to ‘develop friendly relations among 
nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples and to take other appropriate measures to 
strengthen universal peace’ (emphases added).  
 
In essence, the 14 June text held self-determination to be synonymous with 
‘sovereign equality’, meaning the equal right of states to non-interference 
when engaging in international affairs.125 At the time of San Francisco as 
                                                
124 ARMSNY UNCIO, ‘Report’, 14 June 1945. See also ‘Verbatim Minutes of the First 
Plenary Session’ 27 April 1945, ACP, UNCIO, Plenary sessions, Doc 15, P/3, for 
Stettenius, see pp.5–7; also Hans Kelsen: The Law of the United Nations, Praeger, New 
York, 1950, pp.51–53. 
125 See R. Higgins: ‘Postmodern tribalism and the right to secession, comments’, in 
Brölman et al. (eds), 1993, pp.29–35, at p.29; Robert A. Klein: Sovereign Equality 
among States: The History of an Idea, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1974. 
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well as today, ‘sovereign equality’ denoted protection of the sovereign 
jurisdiction of states, especially when entering into international agreements 
and organisations.126 The notion of sovereign equality did not encompass 
peoples or groups other than already well-established bodies politic.127 
Unsurprisingly, established states have generally seen the consolidation of 
sovereign equality as an international value.128  
 
Despite the mention of ‘equal rights’ together with ‘self-determination’ in 
Article 1(2), therefore, the discourse shaping the drafting of the UN Charter 
did not seem particularly appreciative of equality as an ideal. It was not 
equality that underpinned the drafters’ decision to base the UN’s workings 
on the exclusive veto powers of five permanent members of the Security 
Council.129 And it was not the radical idea of freedom as equality of status 
that provided the foundations for understanding self-determination as 
sovereign equality. Instead, the language of the drafters of Article 1(2) 
suggested framing the concept as a path to peace, non-interference and 
‘absence of coercion’130 for established states.131  
 
Conclusions 
Following the international realisation of one version of self-determination 
in the case of Albania, the League of Nations’ Aaland Islands case and then 
the UN Charter formalised the significance of the concept in international 
affairs. The Charter also codified the language of ‘self-determination’ in 
                                                
126 See Kelsen 1950, pp.51–53; the UNCIO volumes and ACP UNCIO records, as well as 
William T. R. Fox: ‘The Super-Powers at San Francisco’, Review of Politics, 8(1) 1946, 
pp.115–127, at p.118 and Alan James: ‘The Equality of States: Contemporary 
Manifestations of an Ancient Doctrine’, Review of International Studies, 18(4), 1992, 
pp.377–391, especially pp.384–385. 
127 See Hans Kelsen: ‘The Preamble of the Charter – a critical analysis’, Journal of 
Politics, 8(2), 1946, pp.134–159, especially pp.149–151. See also Cassese 1995, p.42; 
Martti Koskenniemi: ‘Legal Cosmopolitanism: Tom Franck’s Messianic World’, 
International Law and Politics, 35, 2002–2003, pp.471–486, at p.475. 
128 See Hurd 1999. 
129 And for a perspective on racial equality at the conference, see Lauren 1983. 
130 President F.D. Roosevelt defining ‘self-determination’ in a letter to Churchill on 
planning for the post-war international order, FRUS 1944, Vol. III, ’The British 
Commonwealth and Europe’, ‘President Roosevelt to the British Prime Minister 
(Churchill)’, 27 May 1944, p.692. 
131 Kelsen 1946, p.152; M. S. Rajan: ‘United States Attitude toward Domestic Jurisdiction 
in the United Nations’, International Organization, 13(1), 1959, pp.19–37, at pp.19, 35; 
M. Glen Johnson: ‘The Contributions of Eleanor and Franklin Roosevelt to the 
Development of International Protection for Human Rights’, Human Rights Quarterly, 
9, 1987, pp.19–48, at p.24. 
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international law. Neither of these cases, however, changed the dynamics of 
legitimation or the ideas of freedom that Wilson and Lenin had attached to 
the concept internationally. In the cases of Albania and the Aaland Islands, 
radical articulations of ‘self-determination’ served to spark discourse and 
solutions with liberal-conservative affinities – as when Wilson had reacted 
to Lenin’s language. And even after the adoption of the Charter in 1945, the 
concept would remain within the conceptual confines drawn up by those 
two men. Sometimes with explicit reference, 132  the three instances 
investigated in this chapter reaffirmed particularly Wilson’s liberal-
conservative notion of self-determination as a means of ensuring peace, 
stability and non-interference with approved state agents – while largely 
pushing aside the radical idea of freedom as equality of status.133 The cases 
repeated the vision associated with Wilson’s language of ‘self-
determination’, but did not change it.  
 
Of the events examined in this chapter, the formulation of the UN Charter 
was clearly the most important. Leaving the precise meaning of ‘self-
determination’ unclear, the Charter, as the world’s supreme legal document, 
asserted the concept as a purpose of the UN and vested it with legal 
authority. When the language of ‘self-determination’ later gained 
international importance, especially in the UN debates to be discussed in the 
next chapter, and in the ICJ Kosovo case, the Charter was cited as the key 
textual source. Regardless of what precise legal status the Charter might 
have accorded to the concept, that document made ‘self-determination’ an 
authoritative international standard. The Charter also took a step towards 
making ‘self-determination’ legally operational. In light of the concept’s 
lingering associations with the prospect of statehood, this might be seen to 
in itself have radical implications. Indeed it is for such reasons that scholars 
                                                
132 See above, as well as Czechoslovak representative Mazaryk at the closing plenary 
session at San Francisco, 26 June 1945, as cited in ACP UNCIO, p.17. 
133 For related contemporary expressions of these ideals, see Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science, 243, Essential Human Rights, January 1946, 
including Edward R. Stettinius, Jr.: ‘Human rights in the United Nations Charter’, pp.1–
3; H. V. Evatt: ‘Economic Rights in the United Nations Charter’, pp.4–5; Charles de 
Visscher: ‘Human Rights in Roman Law Countries’, pp.53–59 and Henri Bonnet: 
‘Human Rights are Basic to Success of United Nations’, pp.6–7, all proposing that the 
inclusion of human rights in the Charter would be a way to safeguard peace, and Karl 
Loewenstein: ‘Freedom is Unsafe Without Self-government’, pp.47–49, indicating self-
government – but not secession – as a similar remedy. 
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have posited that ‘self-determination’ amounts to an ‘international law of 
freedom’.134  
 
Most of these ideas and conceptualisations were merely implied when the 
League and the UN Charter used the language of ‘self-determination’. It 
was not until the 1950–1960 UN debates on the ICHRs and the 
Decolonisation Declaration that the international meaning and value of 
‘self-determination’ would be debated, head on. These are the issues to 
which this thesis now turns. 
                                                
134 For example Miéville 2005, p.268. 
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4. ‘SELF-DETERMINATION’ DEFINED? 
 
Five years after the UN Charter had legally codified an undefined variant of 
the concept of ‘self-determination’, the UN began debating its meaning – 
and this was to prove a lengthy process. First, commencing in 1950, the 
Third Committee of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) discussed 
incorporating the term in the International Covenants on Human Rights 
(ICHRs).1 Then, at its 1960 plenary session, the UNGA plenary deliberated 
upon the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries 
and Peoples (the ‘Decolonisation Declaration’), which it would pass later 
that year. 2 Together, these two UN debates – in effect constituting a single, 
decade-lasting discussion – were uniquely engaged with the international 
significance of the language of ‘self-determination’ and its relation to 
political freedom.  
 
Apart from the early 20th-century emergence of the discourse of ‘self-
determination’ in international affairs, no other moment has been more 
important to the concept. Although the full details of the international 
context of the 1950–1960 UN discussions are beyond the scope of this 
chapter, I could note that ‘self-determination’ again became significant 
during global change and intense ideological competition. Arguments at the 
UN reflected Cold War tensions as well as the ongoing dismantling and de-
legitimation of colonialism. Speakers seemed keen to protect their 
countries’ international prestige and geopolitical interests; the often-heated 
                                                
1 Initially, the UN had envisaged a single human rights covenant, but decided in 1954 to 
formulate two, adopted by the UNGA in 1966 as the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) – in this thesis referred to jointly as ‘ICHR’ or ‘ICHRs’. 
These ICHRs entered into force in 1976. Over the years, primarily the UNGA Third 
Committee discussed ‘self-determination’ in this setting, and above all between 1950 
and 1955; the concept was however cited also in other UN texts and organs, like the UN 
Human Rights Commission (HRC) and the UNGA plenary, including with regard to 
UNGA Resolution 545(VI), 5 February 1952 and UNGA Resolution 637(VII), 16 
December 1952. Because discussion of ‘self-determination’ at the Third Committee’s 
ICHR debate was the most important, as well as uniquely detailed, in the following I 
concentrate on this debate as the key part of the UN’s handling of the concept in the 
1950s. See the UN’s public records from the Third Committee, HRC and UNGA 
(especially 1950–1955), as well as UNOGA records cited below. See also UN official 
John P. Humphrey: Human Rights and the United Nations: A Great Adventure, 
Transnational Publishers, New York, 1984, p.205. 
2 UNGA Resolution 1514, 14 December 1960. 
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rhetoric signalled that the stakes involved were high. 3  In these 
circumstances, the language of self-determination was legitimised with 
reference to the ideas of freedom then deemed suitable for steering the 
world towards a better international order. 
 
The 1950–1960 decade of UN debate ended with the UNGA passing three 
documents of international law: the 1960 Decolonisation Declaration and 
the two 1966 ICHRs. All three texts contained exactly the same wording on 
‘self-determination’: ‘All peoples have the right of self-determination. By 
virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely 
pursue their economic, social and cultural development.’4 Even more than 
this formulation itself, the debates preceding its inclusion in the three 
documents disclosed international understandings of the concept of self-
determination and affiliated ideas of freedom. 
 
Legally, the force of the three documents was less than that of the UN 
Charter – nevertheless, the 1960 Decolonisation Declaration in particular 
was important. It formalised the legal and policy connection between ‘self-
determination’ and colonial independence, and provided the closest thing 
‘self-determination’ would ever get to an authoritative definition. Moreover, 
the 1960 Declaration served to make the concept politically implementable. 
From the adoption of that Declaration, independence for colonies has been 
the conventional association with the language of ‘self-determination’ in 
scholarship, politics and law. Granting colonies statehood has become the 
only form of realising self-determination widely accepted even in non-
consensual cases. Although the final text of the two 1966 Covenants would 
not be equally significant to ‘self-determination’ in international affairs, the 
discussion preceding these ICHRs is also necessary to understanding the 
concept. 
 
Like the previous chapter, this one focuses on ‘self-determination’ discourse 
presented by states and institutions, not by individuals in personal 
                                                
3 Benjamin Rivlin: ‘Self-determination and Colonial Areas’, International Conciliation, 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 501, January 1955, e.g. remarks on the 
rising temperature of the ICHR debates, pp.204, 218. See below for further detail. 
4 UNGA Resolution 1514, 2, ICCPR and ICESCR 1(1). 
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capacities. It should be noted that, during the UN debates, Middle Eastern, 
Latin American, Asian, and African delegates seemed less bound by their 
capitals than their Western5 and socialist6 counterparts.7 Nevertheless, the 
statements issued by all delegates were necessarily official country 
positions, and not private views. And as before, my focus is on international 
discourse on self-determination and the ideas of freedom publicly used to 
legitimise such discourse. Thus, the backgrounds or motivations of the 
various individuals who happened to present arguments are not pertinent to 
the study. 
 
This chapter starts with explaining the 1950 onset of the UN debates 
addressing ‘self-determination’ and ends with a closer look at how the 1960 
Declaration framed self-determination as colonial independence. In-between 
these two points, I examine the rhetorical strategies that debate participants 
employed in arguing about self-determination at the UN. Overall, Western 
delegates made the case against incorporating ‘self-determination’ in the 
three UN texts in greater detail and with more varied arguments than did 
those states that argued for including the concept. Since Western arguments 
sceptical to self-determination were central to the international discourse on 
the concept at this moment, my analysis will pay greater attention to them. 
Throughout, I explore how states invoked the radical and liberal-
conservative ideas of freedom in arguing about self-determination 
internationally.  
 
This chapter does not seek to pigeonhole the conceptual promoters of the 
                                                
5 It is established terminology to use the terms ‘the West’ and ‘Western’ with reference to 
Western European, North American, and British Commonwealth country 
representations in UN debates: see e.g. Burke 2010, pp.9–12 and Cassese 1995 pp.46–
47 (although the latter’s ‘West’ sometimes includes North Americans and sometimes 
not, see e.g. p.49). Nordic countries usually echoed the discourse of the ‘West’. 
6 This term here denotes the members of the Warsaw Pact as they participated in the UN 
debates. 
7 Internal correspondence indicates both that Western governments kept their UN delegates 
on a tight leash – and Western frustration of a lack of similar coordination on the part of 
others. See e.g. FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol.III, UN Affairs, UN Planning Staff, Bureau of 
UN Affairs, Washington, A/MS files, lot 54 D291 (V), ‘UNA/P master file’, undated 
(but referring to a new US policy of 6 April 1954), p.132. See also Burke 2010 pp.10–
11 and Moyn 2010, e.g. p.96, referring to French and US delegates speaking on behalf 
of their governments. Whether these dynamics reflected countries’ positions on the role 
of the UN in the Cold War is a question beyond the scope of this chapter. 
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two ideas of freedom according to their Cold War affiliations8 – nor is it 
possible to categorise them in this way. Cold War interests clearly produced 
conflicting arguments on self-determination policy. But the standards that 
states used to legitimise these arguments were not determined in the same 
way. After all, participants were operating in the same international forums 
and formats, seeking to win over the same audiences to their arguments and 
ideas. In line with the logic of legitimation explained in the introduction to 
this thesis, it should thus come as no surprise that the discourses of different 
states on ‘self-determination’ in the UN debates relied upon similar 
legitimating standards. And again, the liberal-conservative idea of freedom 
came to dominate. 
 
Debating ‘Self-determination’ at the UN  
The decade of UN discourse on ‘self-determination’ was instigated by the 
post-Second World War efforts to adopt an international human rights bill. 
Already at the 1945 San Francisco Conference, the participants had 
determined that the UN Economic and Social Council should establish a 
Commission on Human Rights (HRC), within the framework of keeping the 
peace and avoiding a new war.9 At its very first meeting in January 1947, 
this HRC had decided to draft a human rights covenant with these ends in 
mind.10 Discussing a preliminary draft in 1948, the HRC had not mentioned 
‘self-determination’.11 But it had emphasised, in terms resembling those of 
Wilson several decades earlier, that ‘human rights should be protected by a 
regime of law’, so as to stop mankind from threatening the peace by 
                                                
8 For a perspective from the time on Cold War ‘bloc’ thinking at the UN, see Alexander 
Dallin: ‘The Soviet View of the United Nations’, International Organization, 16(1), 
1962, pp.20–36. 
9 See e.g. Dean Gildersleeve, USA, in ARMSNY UNCIO: ‘Report of Third Meeting of 
Committee I/1/A, 18 May 1945: Consideration of Outstanding Points for Chapter I: 
Purposes’, S-1018, Box 2, File 5. 
10 Initially referred to as an ‘International Bill of Human Rights’, UNDocE/259, 11 
February 1947, ‘Economic and Social Council, Human Rights Commission: Report of 
the Commission on Human Rights to the Economic and Social Council’, United Nations 
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) 4th session 1947, Plenary General Series, 
UNDocs E/33/Rev.2, 33/Rev.3, E/251-274/Add.5, UNE 251-2744, p.2. Unless 
otherwise stated, all UNDocs cited here have been accessed at the UN Library, New 
York. 
11 See the following records: ECOSOC 6th session 1948 6:4; ECOSOC 7th session 1948 
Plenary General Series; ECOSOC, HRC, 1948–1949; these and any ensuing ECOSOC 
records are official records accessed at the UN Library, New York. 
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‘rebel[ling] against tyranny and oppression’.12 One of the human rights that 
had then been put forward had been ‘the right to a government which 
conforms to the will of the people.’13 
 
At the HRC’s May–June 1949 session, the USSR, as in 1945, made the first 
move on ‘self-determination’, by proposing the inclusion of the following 
article in the human rights covenant:  
 
Every people and every nation shall have the right to national self-
determination. States which have responsibilities for the 
administration of non-self-governing territories [NSGTs] shall 
promote the fulfilment of this right, guided by the aims and 
principles of the United Nations in relation to the peoples of such 
territories.14  
 
Subsequent discussions and drafts, however, seemed to ignore both this 
specific proposal and the language of ‘self-determination’.15 Initially, the 
USSR and its allies protested that the other proposed drafts were ignoring 
the ‘right of peoples and nations to national self-determination’.16 But when 
these objections were met with silence, their focus shifted elsewhere.17  
 
‘Self-determination’ did not become a topic of extended discussion at the 
UN until 9 November 1950, following a joint initiative of Saudi Arabia and 
Afghanistan at the UNGA’s Third Committee. The Third Committee had 
just become the main organ drafting the ICHRs, and would remain so until 
it presented the covenants to the UNGA plenary in 1966.18 The Saudi–
                                                
12 ECOSOC 7th session, op.cit., UNDocE/800, 28 June 1948: Report of the HRC 3rd 
session, annex A, p.10.  
13 Ibid., p.12. 
14 ECOSOC, 9th session, 1949 UNE 1363-1406: UNDocE/1371 and UNDocE/CN.4/350: 
Report of HRC 5th session to ECOSOC, 9 May–20 June, 1949, p.47. 
15 See records from ECOSOC 11th session, 1950, UNE 1678–1687. 
16 Official records from the UNGA 5th session, 1950/51, Third Committee, UNA C.3 L.41-
153, A/C.3/L.77, 2 November 1950. See also the intervention of Panyushkin (USSR) in 
the minutes from the 289th meeting of the Third Committee, 19 October 1950, in UN 
R1/1, UNGA Official Records 5, 1950, 3rd–4th Committees, p.114. Also representatives 
of Poland as well as Ukrainian and Byelorussian SSRs criticised the absence of ‘self-
determination’ in the ICHR draft: see pp.113, 117, 125, and 129. 
17 ‘Self-determination’ was not included when, shortly after, the USSR presented a list 
over rights for the covenant: UN R1/1 1950, Third Committee 297th meeting, 30 
October, pp.175–176. See also ‘Daily Report of 17 November 1950’, ARMSNY: S-
0923, Box 12, File 8, Daily General Assembly Reports to the Secretary-General, 27 
Sept–17 November 1950. 
18 For records on discussions of ‘self-determination’ in the ICHRs, see Marc J. Bossuyt: 
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Afghan proposal called upon the UNGA to request the HRC to study how 
the right to self-determination might be ensured, and to prepare 
recommendations to the Assembly.19 Whereas the Soviet Union had never 
explained why it in 1949 had wanted to have ‘self-determination’ included 
in a human rights covenant, Saudi and Afghan representatives did expand on 
their proposal. Saudi Arabia’s delegate, Jamil Murad Baroody, stated that 
colonies and colonial powers should be ‘partners’ with ‘equal rights’ – and, 
speaking on behalf of Afghanistan, Abdul Rahman Pazhwak denounced 
violations of the ‘basic’ ‘right of nations to self-determination’: 
 
It was being violated in the name of civilization, of freedom from 
want and ignorance, and of democracy; but those were poor excuses. 
Men who governed their own fate were guided by other motives than 
those who governed the fate of others; and poverty was preferable to 
slavery.20 
 
Clearly, then, the Saudi–Afghan call for higher-level UN recognition of 
‘self-determination’ was legitimised with reference to equality and freedom 
from dependence. A status of equal independence, the argument went, was 
more valuable even than economic prosperity. People’s freedom as 
independence should be valued and promoted, regardless of the economic 
consequences. Later, its drafters pointed out to the Third Committee that 
their ‘self-determination’ proposal had not been intended to limit the 
concept to colonial peoples only – in their view, it encompassed a broader 
idea of freedom.21 This 1950 move hence expressed a radical idea of ‘self-
determination’, though one seemingly unaligned with Lenin’s specific 
socialist ideology. After this initiative, Baroody and Pazhwak reportedly 
                                                                                                                        
Guide to the ‘Travaux Préparatoires’ of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1987; Matthew Craven: The International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Perspective on its Development, 
Clarendon, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995; Sarah Joseph, Jenny Schultz and 
Melissa Castan: The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Cases, 
Materials, and Commentary, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004. For these 
discussions in the context of human rights history, see Moyn 2010, Burke 2010 and 
Kristen Sellars: The Rise and Rise of Human Rights, Sutton, London, 2002. 
19 UNDocA/C.3/L.88, 3 November 1950, Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia: ‘Amendment to 
the Joint Draft Resolution Submitted by Brazil, Turkey and the United States of 
America (UNDocA/C.3/L.76)’ and UNDocA/C.3/L.88/Rev.1 of 7 November. 
20 UN R1/1 1950, Third Committee 309th meeting, 9 November, p.240.  
21 Pazhwak, 4 November 1955, UN R1/1, UNGA Official Records 10, 1955, 3rd 
committee, p.141. 
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assumed ‘unofficial leadership’ of the Third Committee.22  
 
Interestingly, given Lenin’s earlier advocacy, Soviet reactions to the Saudi–
Afghan draft encapsulated a narrower understanding. While commending 
the draft text, the USSR used the language of ‘self-determination’ only with 
reference to the prospects for ‘self-government’ – rather than full statehood 
– of colonies ruled by Western states.23 ‘Self-determination’, the Soviet 
representatives argued, should be granted to ‘abolish all restrictions’ 
specifically for populations oppressed by Western colonialism.24 With this 
stance, Soviet delegates indicated that they understood self-determination 
primarily as a weapon against colonial Cold War opponents, and as 
legitimate if it enhanced peoples’ freedom from imperialist interference. In 
so doing, they were repeating only one strand of Lenin’s ideas of ‘self-
determination’, ignoring parts of his broader conceptualisation. 
Nevertheless, the USSR would continue to support the concept in whichever 
guise it occurred throughout the decade of UN debates.25 
 
It was the Saudi–Afghan initiative, rather than the Soviet one, that served to 
spark off the years of UN discussion. By contrasting self-determination with 
dependence and inequality, it had indicated not only a radical policy of self-
determination – but also a radical way of understanding freedom in 
international affairs.26 This immediately triggered strong reactions at the 
UN, including personal acrimony of some Western states against the authors 
of the draft.27 British delegates spoke against the Saudi–Afghan proposal, 
stressing that ‘self-determination was [...] of necessity a slow and gradual 
process’. The French said that the concept should be excluded from the 
                                                
22 UN official Humphrey 1984, p.172. 
23 by presenting ‘self-determination’ as based on UN Charter Article 73(b) on the 
administration NSGTs. For the ensuing debate, see UN R1/1 1950 Third Committee, 
309th meeting, 9 November, p.240.  
24 Morozov, USSR, UN R1/1 1950/51, 317th Plenary Meeting, 4 December 1950, p.553. 
25 For a contemporary analysis of immediate post-war Soviet approaches to international 
law, see W. W. Kulski: ‘The Soviet Interpretation of International Law’, American 
Journal of International Law, 49(4), 1955, pp.518–534. 
26  Interestingly, Berlin 1959, p.30, disagrees that demands for colonial liberation can be 
demands for ‘negative’ freedom – he claims they have the ‘positive’ concept of liberty 
at heart. 
27 Especially against Baroody: see ‘From the UK UN delegation to ER Warner’, UN Dept, 
Foreign Office, November 1952, TNA: CO 936/102: 15 January–7 December 1953, 
Doc.26. 
 168 
16
8 
ICHR and that the Third Committee should discuss it no further. 28 
Belgium’s delegates repeated the country’s 1945 case: ‘Self-determination’ 
would result in ‘anarchy, as the populations were not yet sufficiently 
advanced to decide their own fate’.29 And with characteristic ambivalence, 
the USA stated that while it ‘supported the principle of self-determination’, 
it would have to be excluded from the present discussion.30  
 
These early developments launched the assumptions, arguments and 
legitimising standards that would play out as the UN debated self-
determination for the next ten years. Significantly, while states’ arguments 
and rhetoric could differ greatly, their basic assumptions and their 
legitimising standards were often not in conflict. For instance, a key 
assumption shared by participants in the debate was that the language of 
‘self-determination’ primarily connoted political independence. True, a very 
few UN delegates did present self-determination as realisable through 
democratic representation and individual rights within existing states.31 And 
the fact that the UN discussed including the concept in a human rights bill 
also hinted at such an ‘internal’ perspective. But ‘internal self-
determination’ was never explicitly advocated during the UN discussions. 
As these debates unfolded, the language of ‘self-determination’ generally 
stayed linked to statehood. 
 
Moreover, state participants in the UN debates also commonly assumed that 
the key question raised by ‘self-determination’ was whether or not to grant 
statehood to ‘dependent territories’ – in the main, to colonies.32 Although 
Western states repeatedly tried to prevent colonialism from becoming the 
subject of any international discussion at the UN, in this they were 
                                                
28 UN R1/1 1950, Third Committee, 309th meeting, 9 November 1950, p.240. 
29 Ibid., and 310th meeting, 10 November 1950, p.241. 
30 Eleanor Roosevelt, ibid., p.243. For a brief and somewhat rosy perspective on the role of 
Eleanor and Franklin D. Roosevelt in the emergence of human rights, see Johnson 1987, 
especially pp.27–28. 
31 E.g. Gilson, Belgium, 643rd meeting, 25 October, 1955; Hoare, UK, 652nd meeting, 4 
November, 1955; Houk, Canada, 674th meeting, 28 November 1955, all in UN R1/1 
1955, Third Committee, pp.94, 143, 249, respectively. 
32 Including NSGT and Trust Territories. Although without unambiguous formal 
definition, ‘dependent territory’ was applied in the UN setting as a synonym of 
‘colony’, including NSGTs and Trust Territories. See e.g. M.I. Finley: ‘Colonies – an 
Attempt at a Typology’, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, Conference of the 
Society, 19 September 1975, pp.167–188, at p.170. 
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unsuccessful. For the most part, UN delegates seemed to take it for granted 
that self-determination chiefly concerned establishing new states from 
former colonies. Most also came to admit that colonies would, some day, 
become independent – although they disagreed strongly on the 
circumstances, tempo and authority under which this might happen.33 
 
Another joint assumption was that the language of ‘self-determination’, in 
general terms, held a certain positive moral value and a level of international 
authority. Over the decade of discussion at the UN, few states directly 
opposed it as such.34 Instead, delegates explained the international weight of 
the concept of self-determination as being founded in the UN Charter’s 
Article I, as well as in Wilson’s advocacy.35 Socialist representatives also 
referred to Lenin;36 others mentioned the French and American revolutions 
and the independence of specific states as proof of the practical import of 
the concept.37 These references to earlier authoritative mentions of ‘self-
determination’ at the UN debates both reflected, and might have helped 
create, the debates’ near-consensus on the concept’s international meaning. 
 
                                                
33 Cooper 2005 (especially pp.213–241) traces the colonial powers’ acceptance of this to 
the realisation that they were not interested in granting equal citizens’ rights to colonial 
peoples. See also Frederick Cooper: Decolonization and African Society: The Labor 
Question in French and British Africa, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996. 
34 Rivlin 1955 claimed that ‘self-determination’ was ‘espoused by every member nation’ in 
a manner ‘akin to the unanimity of all political candidates in opposing sin’ (p.204); also 
Füredi 1994, p.270; Crawford 2002, p.296, for the 1940s and pp.340–341 for 
subsequent international history. 
35 For references to Wilson, see e.g. Tsaldaris, Greece, Third Committee, 572nd meeting, 3 
November 1954, UN R1/1, UNGA Official Records 9, 1954, Third Committee, p.150, 
as well as Asha, United Arab Republic, 929th UNGA Plenary Meeting, 30 November 
1960, British Library microfiche SPR Mic. E 14, UNGA Official Records 4th 
emergency & 15th sessions, Plenary Documents, A/4355–A/4682, A/INF; A/L, 1960, 
Box No. 1 (hereinafter: ‘BL’), p.1047, and Rossides, Cyprus, 945th Plenary Meeting, 13 
December 1960, BL, p.1254. For the Charter, see e.g. Dag Hammarskjold, ‘Statement 
by the Secretary-General’, Third Committee, 633rd meeting, 11 October 1955, UN R1/1 
1955, p.45, as well as Jochamowitz, Peru, 363rd meeting, 10 December 1951, and 
Ullrich, Czechoslovakia, 366th meeting, 11 December 1951, both at the Third 
Committee cited in UN R1/1, UNGA Official Records 6, 52, 2nd and 3rd Joint and 3rd 
Committees, pp.100, 118, respectively; Fekini, Libya, 929th Plenary Meeting, 30 
November 1960, BL p.1033. 
36 E.g. Zorin, USSR, 925th Plenary Meeting, 28 November 1960, BL, p.981. 
37 For the American Revolution see e.g. Thors, Iceland, 936th Plenary Meeting, 5 
December 1960, BL, p.1147, and for the French and American Revolutions, as well as 
Wilson, see Begum Jehan-Murshid, Pakistan, Third Committee, 827th meeting, 3 
December 1957, UN R1/1, UNGA Official Records 12, 1957, 2nd–3rd Committees, 
p.320. See also Robert Waelder: ‘Protest and Revolution against Western Societies’, 
pp.3–27, in Morton A. Kaplan (ed.): The Revolution in World Politics, Wiley, New 
York, 1962, claiming that the US references to the American Revolution were part of 
the US rhetorical strategy in the decolonisation debate, at p.23. 
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The year 1955 added two new sources to this list of textual self-
determination authorities that participants cited during the UN debates. That 
year, the Third Committee’s drafters of the ICHRs voted the precise 
language of ‘self-determination’ into the draft covenants, advancing the 
international formalisation of the concept.38 Moreover, in 1955 also the 
African–Asian Bandung Conference asserted the concept, in its (non-
binding) final communiqué, with language mirroring that employed during 
the preceding five years of Third Committee discussion.39 Bandung was 
especially critical in certifying the importance of ‘self-determination’ to the 
non-aligned movement.40 Without Bandung, the African–Asian-sponsored 
draft that was to result in the 1960 UNGA Decolonisation Declaration might 
not have materialised.41 In 1955, both the draft ICHRs article on ‘self-
determination’ and the Bandung communiqué strengthened the general 
sense at the UN that the concept was of high international standing. 
 
In fact, participants in the UN debates converged on more than these basic 
assumptions on what ‘self-determination’ meant and what its textual 
authorities were – they also relied on strikingly similar standards of 
legitimation in arguing about the concept. Western states were the most 
vocal espousers of the liberal-conservative standards that would dominate 
the decade. Although amending their precise lines of reasoning, as will be 
shown, they uniformly sought legitimation with reference to peace and non-
interference. When they presented their various arguments against UN 
codification of ‘self-determination’, the heart of their case remained that 
codifying the concept would mean risking instability through interfering 
                                                
38 UNDocA/C.3/SR.676, 29 November 1955; see the chronology recorded in ‘Proceedings 
of the Third Committee’, UNOGA: SOA 317/1/03 A, ‘Article Relating to the Right of 
Peoples to Self-determination’. 
39 ‘Final Communiqué of the Asian–African Conference of Bandung’, 24 April 1955. See 
also Roland Burke: ‘“The Compelling Dialogue of Freedom”: Human Rights at the 
Bandung Conference’, Human Rights Quarterly, 28, 2006, pp.947–965; and Burke 
2010, especially p.26. 
40 For the atmosphere and key themes of Bandung, see Richard Wright: The Color 
Curtain: A Report on the Bandung Conference, Banner Books, New York [1956] 1994. 
For a human rights perspective, see Burke 2006. See also the memoir of Philippine 
representative Carlos P. Romulo: The Meaning of Bandung, University of North 
Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, NC, 1956; also Naoko Shimazu: ‘“Diplomacy as Theatre” 
Recasting the Bandung Conference of 1955 as Cultural History’, Asia Research Institute 
Working Group Series, no 164, October 2011. 
41  See e.g. Crawford 2002, p.317.  
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with the affairs of established states.42 Britain and the Commonwealth 
countries, as well as Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, 
Spain and the USA, were especially prominent on this side of the discussion 
– although the US position was often ambiguous.43  
 
Also most African, Asian and Middle Eastern states cited such standards 
when they sought to legitimise their arguments against the West and for UN 
formalisation of the language of ‘self-determination’. They often disagreed 
with the West on facts and policy, as well as on which agents counted 
politically – taking account of non-state peoples and not only existing states 
in their international outlooks. Their discourse, however, implicitly relied 
upon similar ideas of freedom. Indeed, the Saudi–Afghan draft had been a 
rare exception in the UN debates, and the form of radical ideas it expressed 
would not again be formulated as clearly. Instead, some non-Westerners 
defended self-determination both as a matter of radical equality and as a 
means to secure peace,44 while most relied on standards even closer to those 
espoused by the West. Typically, African, Asian and Middle Eastern 
delegates argued for self-determination as freedom from oppression, 
exploitation and other forms of interference, and by emphasising above all 
that its codification would serve world peace.45 Placing peace at the top of 
their value hierarchy, they argued that it was violations of self-determination 
through illegitimate interference with subjugated peoples that would cause 
                                                
42  See e.g. the British UN Delegation summing up views expressed in British–French–
Belgian talks on ‘self-determination’ on 27–28 May; the concept was seen as 
ineffective, unenforcable, political, disruptive, a threat to contractual obligations, and a 
‘serious menace to peace’: TNA: FO371/101434, ‘Draft Brief on “Self-determination”’, 
14 June 1952. 
43 For an example of this ambivalence, see Roosevelt at the Third Committee, Daily 
Report of 18 November 1952, attachment at ARMSNY: S-0923, Box 12, File 9, General 
Assembly, Daily General Assembly Reports to the Secretary-General, 15 Nov 1952–4 
March 1953. See also Roosevelt, US, Third Committee 364th meeting, 10 December 
1951, UN R1/1, 1951–1952, p.104. For a scholarly discussion on this ambivalence, see 
Annette Baker Fox: ‘International Organization for Colonial Development’, World 
Politics, 3(3), 1951, pp.340–368, especially pp.340–341. 
44 See e.g. from the 1960 UNGA Plenary Session, BL: Bhutto, Pakistan 878th meeting, 29 
September, pp.236, 233; Sukarno, President of the Republic of Indonesia, 880th 
meeting, 30 September, p.286. See also e.g. Sékou Touré, President of Guinea, 896th 
meeting, 10 October, pp.564, 573; Souvanlasy, Laos, 904th meeting, 13 October, p.709; 
Okala, Cameroun, 866th meeting, 21 September, p.29. 
45 E.g. Tamba, Liberia, Third Committee 366th meeting, 11 December 1951, UN R1/1, 
UNGA Official Records 6, 1951–52, 2nd and 3rd Joint and 3rd Committees, UN, New 
York, p.115; Cheng China, Third Committee 569th meeting, 2 November 1954, UN 
R1/1 1954, p.135; also Emerson 1965, especially p.486. 
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instability, ‘bloodshed and war’.46 
 
The arguments of socialist states, in support of including ‘self-
determination’ in the ICHRs and the Decolonisation Declaration, generally 
employed similar legitimating standards.47 The socialist demand that peoples 
should be freed from colonialism because it was oppressive and interfering 
defended an idea of freedom as non-interference of the sort that Lenin had 
first associated with ‘self-determination’. However, the rest of Lenin’s 
radical discourse was absent from socialist argumentation in the decade of 
UN debates. Significantly, despite occasional mentions of ‘equality’, the 
‘self-determination’ discourse of socialist states actually presented ‘peace’ 
as more important.48 Obviously, socialists confronted the West on factual 
and policy questions, such as whether colonialism was truly oppressive, and 
whether advancing self-determination would aid peace and non-
interference. But during the 1950–1960 debates, they never explicitly 
contested the legitimising standards that underpinned the West’s language 
of ‘self-determination’.49 
 
It is imaginable that non-Western states’ appeals to peace and non-
interference in the UN debates were tactical moves aimed at increasing the 
chances of gaining legitimacy for their arguments and ideas – while their 
‘real’ end was equality. For the purposes of this thesis, however, the key 
point is that the very choice of drawing on such liberal-conservative ideals 
proves the high international status of these ideals at the time. Seeking 
legitimation in the same international forums and formats, states 
                                                
46 Raadi, Iran, Third Committee 399th meeting, 23 January 1952, UN R1/1 1951–52, 
p.316. See also Baroody, Saudi Arabia, Third Committee 398th meeting, 22 January 
1952, ibid., p.310. 
47 For socialist perspectives on the 1960 session as a whole, see V. Solodovnikov: ‘At the 
15th Session of the UN General Assembly in 1960’, International Affairs, 52(4), 
2006, pp.188–196; Starushenko 1963, pp.152–154. 
48 E.g. Khrushchev’s submission of the draft decolonisation declaration, 23 September 
1960, UNDocA/4502; also Fomin, USSR, Third Committee, 565th meeting, 27 October 
1954, referring to both equality and non-interference, but citing peace as the uppermost 
aim, UN R1/1 1954, p.109; from the 1960 UNGA plenary, BL: Gheorghiu-Dej, 
Romania, 872nd meeting 27 September, p.140; socialist interventions at the 902nd 
meeting on 12 October, especially p.671; Budo, Albania, 933rd meeting, 2 December, 
p.1085. 
49 It is beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss the possible role played by internal 
Soviet discussions on foreign policy, including the emphasis on ‘peace’ and ‘peaceful 
co-existence’. 
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participating in the 1950–1960 UN debates had to refer to the standards they 
expected to be convincing there. Irrespective of whether their choice of 
legitimising standards materialised from ‘true’ convictions or short-term 
tactics, their decision to use them shows that they expected such standards 
to be internationally convincing. 
 
UN delegates’ common ground on the meaning, authority and legitimising 
standards of the language of ‘self-determination’ contrasted with the points 
on which they disagreed. Most importantly, states disagreed on whether the 
concept should be codified in the ICHRs and the Decolonisation 
Declaration, further integrating it into international law. Western states 
presented their case against including ‘self-determination’ in these texts 
with both argumentative flexibility and conceptual consistency. While the 
widely acknowledged value of self-determination sometimes required 
Western delegates to support the concept in the abstract, they continued to 
resist its formalisation in law. And, while employing various rhetorical 
strategies, they made their case with constant reference to the standards of 
non-interference and peace.  
 
One broad line the West presented against codifying ‘self-determination’ in 
the three UN texts was that including such language would be improper for 
various ‘technical’ reasons. For instance, Western delegates insisted that, at 
any specific time, no UN forum was technically qualified to discuss self-
determination.50 Revealingly, in 1955, internal UK and US correspondence 
described this evasive, ‘technical’ position as an attempt to push the 
language of ‘self-determination’ off the UN agenda altogether, in the 
interests of the status quo.51 In 1960, the same tactic seemed aimed at 
avoiding discussion of self-determination in the UNGA plenary due to the 
public international interest in that particular Assembly session.52 
                                                
50 For early versions, see the Third Committee 297th meeting, 10 November, UN R1/1 
1950, p.243. For 1960, see e.g. the 898th UNGA Plenary Meeting, 10 October, p.614, 
and the 902nd, 12 October, BL pp.671, 674. 
51 Minutes from a meeting at the Foreign Office between UK and US representatives on 30 
March 1955, Foreign Office Minutes, 1 April 1955 (Mr Warner), quoting US UN 
delegate Lord, TNA: FO371, 117561. See also Inis L. Claude, Jr.: ‘Domestic 
Jurisdiction and Colonialism’, pp.121–135 in Martin Kilson (ed.) New States in the 
Modern World, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1975, pp.122, 134. 
52 See especially the discussion at the 898th meeting, 10 October, BL, from p.614. 
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A different set of ‘technical’ objections had surfaced at the UN’s discussions 
on including ‘self-determination’ in the ICHRs in the early 1950s. Some 
delegates had then claimed that incorporating the concept in the covenants 
would prevent states from ratifying them – a view expressed by UN officials 
as well.53 Moreover, several Western countries had maintained that since the 
ICHRs concerned individual rights, and self-determination regarded groups, 
the latter concept did not belong in the covenants – and was in any case less 
important than the human rights of individuals.54 Against such ‘technical’ 
protestations, other delegates had argued that the UN should proclaim ‘self-
determination’ in the covenants, as a condition and as a ‘source’ for all other 
rights.55 
 
Western delegates also objected to incorporating ‘self-determination’ in the 
UN texts because, they held, the concept, technically speaking, was not 
(already) a legal right. Its legal status was unclear; although the UN Charter 
had mentioned ‘self-determination’, it had endorsed only the concept’s 
moral and political – rather than legal – force, and had not defined its 
meaning: ‘Self-determination’ was merely a ‘principle’, 56  ‘feeling’, 57 
                                                
53 Humphrey 1984, p.129; Bossuyt 1987, e.g. p.23; on France see Sellars 2002, p.80.  
54 These points were repeated throughout the ICHR debates – e.g. by Cassin, France, Third 
Committee, 309th meeting, 9 November 1950, UN R1/1, 1950, p.244; Keith Officer, 
Australia, 317th UNGA Plenary Meeting, 4 December, 1950, UN R1/1 1950–51, ‘Draft 
First International Covenant on Human Rights and Measures of Implementation: Report 
of the Third Committee’ (UNDocA/1559 and Corr.1), p.555. And from the Third 
Committee’s 1954 records at UN R1/1 1954: Elliot, UK, 562nd meeting, 22 October, 
p.96; Hood, Australia, 564th meeting, 27 October; Beaufort, Netherlands, 567th 
meeting, 29 October, pp.103–105; Montgomery, Canada, 569th meeting, 2 November, 
p.133. See also Alston 1984, pp.616–617. Not solely technical, this also exhibited a 
liberal concern with shielding individuals from state interference. See also Lord, USA, 
568th Third Committee meeting, 1 November 1954, UN R1/1 1954, p.124. 
Interestingly, in 1954, a US attempt to include an article on the right to private property 
in the ICHRs was defeated. ECOSOC, 17th session, 1954, UNE 2567–2576, HRC 
Report of the Tenth Session 23 February–16 April 1954 in ECOSOC official records, 
18th session, supplement 8, p.7. See also from the 1960 UNGA plenary meetings, BL: 
Macmillan, UK, 877th, 29 September, p.225, and Ormsby-Gore, UK, 925th meeting, 28 
November, p.985. 
55 Matthew, India, Third Committee, 569th meeting, 1 November 1954, UN R1/1 1954, 
p.131. See also Tomasic, Yugoslavia, Third Committee, 568th meeting, 1 November 
1954, ibid., p.126; and Baroody, Third Committee, 309th meeting, 9 November 1950, 
UN R1/1 1950, p.240 and at the Third Committee, 10 November 1954, UN R1/1 1954, 
p.193. 
56 De Lacharriere, France, 317th plenary meeting, 4 December 1950, UN R1/1 1950–51, 
p.558. 
57 Roosevelt, USA, at the Third Committee, 10 December 1951 op.cit., p.104. 
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‘force’,58 or ‘drive’.59 To include such a vague, ‘impractible’ notion in the 
ICHRs and the Decolonisation Declaration would only open the doors to 
destabilising arbitrariness and abuse. 60  Responding to this stance, non-
Western delegates pointed out that also ‘freedom’ and ‘democracy’ had 
been cited with unclear or dubious intentions in the past, and that had never 
provided any reason for abandoning such concepts.61  
 
As a final ‘technically’ phrased point, Western states argued that 
internationally codifying ‘self-determination’ would inappropriately 
interfere with the freedom of states. UN codification, they claimed, would 
curb the freedom of all states by imposing legal duties on them, and would 
rob colonial powers specifically of their rightful control over colonies.62 
Parties in the UN debates generally viewed self-determination as related to 
colonial independence, and Western states saw colonies as belonging to the 
domestic sphere of the colonial powers. From this viewpoint, if the UN 
adopted the concept in the three texts under discussion, that would open up 
for international interference with the freedom of colonial states. In reply, 
one delegate summarised the opposition to this Western argument by stating 
that such reasoning ‘should not be used as a disguise for the continued 
domination of dependent peoples and the denial to them of the right of self-
                                                
58 Hoare, UK, Third Committee, 642st meeting, 24 October 1955, UN R1/1 1955, pp.90–
91. 
59 US President Eisenhower, 868th plenary meeting, 22 September 1960, BL, pp.45–46. 
See also Humphrey 1984, p.163. 
60 See e.g. Eisenhower, 868th plenary meeting, 22 September 1960, BL, as well as 
Dehousse, Belgium, Third Committee 371st meeting, 20 December 1951, UN R1/1 
1950, p.144, referring to the Nazi regime – as did, for instance, Corley Smith, UK, 
Third Committee 401st meeting, 24 January 1952, UN R1/1 1951–52 p.329. By 
contrast, in the 1960 debate a reference to the Nazi regime condemned colonialism 
rather than ‘self-determination’: De Freitas-Valle, Brazil, 934th meeting, 3 December 
1960, BL p.1126. 
61 Baroody, Saudi Arabia, Third Committee, 648th meeting, 31 October 1955, UN R1/1 
1955, p.121. He repeated the same argument on 25 November 1955, UN R1/1 1955 
p.240. 
62 See Berard, France, 945th plenary meeting, 13 December 1960, BL p.1259. Coulson, 
UK, 317th plenary meeting, 4 December 1950 UN R1/1 1950–1951, p.554. For internal 
records, see the whole of FO371/101439 at TNA, e.g. Howard to the Registry, 5 
December 1952, warning that including ‘self-determination’ in the covenant would 
‘promote interference by the U.N.’ in colonial matters. See also TNA: Foreign Office 
minutes, 12 July 1955 of a meeting with the Minister of State on 8 July, FO371/117561, 
outlining that the British ‘adhered to the principle but could not admit the United 
Nations or other outside interference with its implementation in our dependent overseas 
territories.’ For the USA, see former US Ambassador to the UN James J. Wadsworth: 
The Glass House: The United Nations in Action, Praeger, New York, 1966, p.123. See 
also Moyn 2010, p.96; Claude 1984, pp.367–370. For further secondary analysis, see 
e.g. Claude 1984 (orignally 1964), pp.367–369.  
 176 
17
6 
determination.’63 
 
Oddly, Western states continued their ‘technical’ attempts to block UN 
discussion and codification of the concept of ‘self-determination’ even after 
the battle had been lost. Already in 1952, the UN had formally voted that the 
ICHRs should proclaim self-determination as a right for ‘all peoples’.64 
Rather than acceding to this defeat, however, sceptical delegates stepped up 
their efforts to get the UN to dismiss the language of ‘self-determination’.65 
A similar dynamic was seen in 1955, when the UN voted the specific text of 
the article on ‘self-determination’ into the ICHRs.66 Prior to the 1955 vote, 
the UK delegation had voiced horror at the prospects of the UN accepting 
the ‘dangerous doctrine that self-determination is a [legal] “right”’. 67 
Sharing this fear,68 Western UN officials had tried to postpone the vote 
indefinitely.69  
 
Extraordinarily, just before the 1955 vote occurred, UN Secretary-General 
Dag Hammarskjold himself appeared before the Third Committee to urge 
caution on ‘self-determination’ for the sake of world order.70 Already a year 
                                                
63 Omar, Somalia, 13 December, 1960, BL pp.1259, 1248–1249 
64 UNGA Resolution 545, 1952. 
65  E.g. ‘Speech made by Gladwyn Jebb to the Council’ on 30 July 1952, TNA: 
FO371/101434; also FO371/101433, ‘Letter from A. A. Dudley to S. Hoare, Foreign 
Office’, undated (but refers to a New York Times article from 24 April 1952); and 
‘Howard, Foreign Office, to EM West, Colonial Office, 27 June 1952’, CO 936/100 ‘5 
January 1952–25 August 1952’, Annex B. For the USA, see from ‘Roosevelt, Acting 
Chairman of the US delegation to the UNGA to the Secretary of State, Paris, February 
7, 1952’, FRUS 1951, Vol.II ‘The United Nations; the Western Hemisphere’, p.785, 
referring to a meeting with the French Ambassador. 
66 See accounts in UN Interoffice memoranda of 15 and 29 November 1955, from John P. 
Humphrey, Director, UN Division of Human Rights to Philippe de Seynes, Under-
Secretary for Economic and Social Affairs. ‘Proceedings of the Working Party of the 
Third Committee’, and ‘Proceedings of the Third Committee’, both UNOGA: SOA 
317/1/03 A. 
67 ‘Memorandum on Self-Determination’, UK delegation, New York, 28 September 1955, 
TNA: FO371/117561. 
68 On the increasing discomfort of Humphrey and his deputy director Egon Schwelb 1950–
1955, see e.g. UNOGA: SOA 317/1/01A, ‘Draft ICHR and Question of Implementation 
May 1950–Dec 1951’; SOA 317/1/01B, 06.1952–03.1953; SOA 317/1/01C, April 
1953–Nov 1955; and SOA 317/1/01D, 1955, especially inter-office memorandum, 11 
February 1954 from Schwelb to Humphrey, then Acting Assistant Secretary-General, 
Department of Social Affairs: ‘The Fate of the Draft Covenants on Human Rights’, and 
correspondence from Humphrey to Arthur W. Rogers, UN Association in Canada, 22 
November 1955. 
69 See the notes by Mehdi Vakil to the Secretary-General, ‘An Informal Discussion with 
the Chairman of the Third Committee’, 18 October, 1955, UNOGA: SOA 317/1/03 A. 
70 On 11 October 1955, UN R1/1 1955, p.45. See the development of the statement in: 
‘From Humphrey to de Seynes, 13 September 1955 Draft Statement by the Secretary-
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earlier, Hammarskjold had expressed deep concern over self-determination. 
In a report on the UN’s work, he had called for ‘a balance between vision 
and restraint, recognizing the fundamental right to self-determination as 
well as the fact that the exercise of self-determination maybe [sic] self-
defeating if not wisely and carefully prepared.’71 Despite the Secretary-
General’s interventions against UN codification, the 1955 vote did in the 
end incorporate ‘self-determination’ into the draft ICHRs. 
 
These two UN votes on the language of ‘self-determination’ showed 
increasing international appreciation of the concept as anti-colonial 
sympathies spread worldwide. 72  Ever since the Second World War, 
preserving colonialism in its then-current form had appeared increasingly 
untenable; by the 1950s, the system had begun to be seen as a threat to 
world peace.73 Independence for the colonies was now seen as the way 
forward. 74  Given the association of ‘self-determination’ with colonial 
freedom, this development enhanced the international appeal of the concept 
even further. As the decade progressed, and more and more African and 
Asian states gained admission to the UN, the pro-‘self-determination’ 
sentiment of the debates grew stronger still.75 
                                                                                                                        
General to the 3rd Committee’, attachment SOA 317/1/03A. 
71 UN Secretary-General: ‘Annual Report on the Work of the Organization’ 1 July 1953–
30 June 1954, UN, New York, 1954, pp.xii-xui. 
72 See e.g. Rupert Emerson: From Empire to Nation: The Rise to Self-assertion of Asian 
and African Peoples, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1960; Jackson 1987, 
p.526. 
73 See e.g. Cooper 2005; Cooper 1996, p.173 and Ray Kiely: Rethinking Imperialism, 
Palgrave, London 2010 for strategies of legitimation during the dismantlement of 
colonialism; and Frederick Cooper: ‘Modernizing Bureaucrats, Backward Africans, and 
the Development Concept’, pp.64–92 in Frederick Cooper and Randall Packard (eds): 
International Development and the Social Sciences: Essays on the History and Politics 
of Knowledge, University of California Press, Berkeley, CA, 1997, on the turn to 
‘development’ discourse in this strategy. With a complementary perspective, Füredi 
1994 covers colonial powers’ attempts to de-legitimise colonial movements. See also 
Claude 1984, p.361. Crawford 2002 (e.g. pp.292–296) offers a broader analysis of 
colonialism’s loss of legitimacy in international discourse after the Second World War. 
74 Louis 2006a, p.192; Claude 1984, p.367.  
75 See e.g. Solodovnikov 2006, p.189; John Sankey: ‘Decolonisation: Cooperation and 
Confrontation at the United Nations’, pp.90–119 in Erik Jensen and Thomas Fisher 
(eds): The United Kingdom – The United Nations, Macmillan, London, 1990, p.100; 
Lauren 2011, p.203; David A. Kay: ‘The Politics of Decolonization: The New Nations 
and the United Nations Political Process’, International Organization, 21(4), 1967, 
pp.786–811, at p.789; Emerson 1965, p.484; Mark E. Ellis: ‘The New International 
Economic Order and General Assembly Resolutions: The Debate over the Legal Effects 
of General Assembly Resolutions Revisited’, California Western International Law 
Journal, 15, 1985, pp.647–704, at p.656; Edward McWhinney: The United Nations and 
a New World Order for a New Millennium, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 2000, 
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In this setting, the UN debates were developing into being about something 
more than just the narrow codification of ‘self-determination’ in three UN 
texts: the discussions concerned the political and ideological leadership of 
the Cold War world. Today’s attitudes to UNGA proceedings as generally 
neither important nor interesting contrast sharply with those of the 1950–
1960 period.76 Throughout the 1950s and especially during the culminating 
1960 plenary debate, UN delegates were keenly aware that the eyes of the 
world were on them, and that the very international moral prestige of their 
states was at issue.77 In a tense environment attuned to a global Cold War 
public, states’ arguments in the UN debates aimed to both legitimise their 
specific positions on self-determination, and to enhance their ethos 
worldwide. 
 
Under these circumstances, outright rejection of UN formalisation of ‘self-
determination’ in the three UN texts was an untenable strategy for Western 
sceptics of the concept: UN majorities plainly could not be won over to this 
position.78 With UN rhetoric and affinities turning increasingly anti-colonial, 
any argument that implied an all-out rejection of self-determination was 
unlikely to win support. And so Western arguments began to proclaim 
general, principled support for the concept of ‘self-determination’, while 
opposing its proposed formalisation into the UN texts. For instance, during 
the 1950s discussions, Western representatives argued that the concept, 
although valuable, should not feature in the ICHRs since these covenants 
presented ‘self-determination’ in an unnecessarily ‘narrow or rigid’ form, 
failing to acknowledge it as ‘universal’.79 While also this Western line 
                                                                                                                        
pp.9, 34–35. On the contributions of Latin American countries to this changed dynamic 
on the issue of human rights, see Glendon 2003; Wilson 1988, p.67. 
76 For a recent vocal criticism of the UN and the UNGA, see John Bolton (former US 
Ambassador to the UN): ‘The Key to Changing the United Nations System’, Foreign 
and Defence Policy, 28 October 2010. 
77 See e.g. Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament, Strobe Talbott (transl. and ed.), 
Andre Deutsch, London, 1974 (hereafter: ‘Khrushchev 1974’), p.482; Carlos P. Romulo 
with Beth Day Romulo: Forty Years: A Third World Soldier at the UN, Greenwood 
Press, New York, 1986, pp.158–159. 
78 See Gauntlett, UK Colonial Office, 10 July 1958, in TNA: CO 936/400, 1957–1959, part 
B, IRD 123/355/01. 
79 E.g. Roosevelt, USA, 18 November 1952, op.cit., pp.2, 1; Roosevelt, USA, Third 
Committee 364th meeting 10 December 1951, op.cit., pp.104–105. For another US 
iteration of the position, see ‘Speech delivered by Mrs Walter Elliot, CBE, on 
November 29th 1957 in the Third Committee’, TNA: FO 371/ 129971. See also records 
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opposed UN formalisation of ‘self-determination’, it did so in the name of 
defending a true, ‘universal’ version of the concept.80  
 
Western states’ advocacy of such ‘universal self-determination’, however, 
was ridden with contradictions. Essentially, they employed this language 
with less than ‘universal’ ends in mind. At first glance, claiming that the 
concept was ‘universal’ would seem intended to broaden and strengthen it – 
and scholars have also taken this claim at face value. 81  But whereas 
championing a ‘universal’ principle of self-determination would have 
entailed urging others to embrace it, Western states underscored its broad 
scope as a deterrent. For instance, in 1955, the UK cautioned that if the UN 
texts incorporated ‘self-determination’, that would incite minorities all over 
the world to seek secession.82 Later internal UK correspondence described 
as a ‘weapon’ such use of the language of ‘universal self-determination’ in 
the UN debates, to make other states wary of formalising it.83 Apparently, 
Western delegates stressed the ‘universality’ and broad appeal of self-
determination precisely in order to prevent UN codification.84 
 
Likewise, had Western states really seen self-determination as ‘universal’, it 
should have applied universally, also to the colonialism of the West. But 
                                                                                                                        
from 13 November 1952, in ARMSNY: S-0923, Box 12, File 1, Daily UNGA Reports 
21 October–14 November, 1952, p.3; also Elliot, UK, Third Committee, 576th meeting, 
8 November 1954, UN R1/1 1954, p.173; Quentin-Baxter, UK, Third Committee, 649th 
meeting, 1 November 1955, UN R1/1 1955, p.124; Hoare, UK, 652nd meeting, 4 
November 1955, UN R1/1 1955 p.142. See also to the Foreign Office from the UK UN 
delegation, 10 December 1952, TNA: FO371/101439, and FO371/107143, from the UK 
delegation at the UN to the Foreign Office, 29 December 1952, ‘Notes on Third 
Committee’ presenting this as the UK’s main argument.  
80 In 1955, the HRC as a whole echoed this rhetoric, stating ‘it was generally agreed [that 
self-determination] was a universal principle, applicable to all nations and to all peoples 
in all parts of the world’ HRC, Report of the 11th Session, 5–29 April 1955, ECOSOC 
official records, 20th session, supplement no. 6, UNE 2727–2737, p.21. 
81 Antonio Cassese: ‘Political Self-determination – Old Concepts and New Developments’, 
pp.137–165 in A. Cassese (ed.): UN Law/Fundamental Rights: Two Topics in 
International Law, Sijthoff & Noordhoff, Alpen aan den Rijn, 1979, at p.140; Burke 
2010, pp.20, 36, 50–55. 
82 Hoare, UK, Third Committee, 642st meeting, 24 October 1955, UN R1/1 1955, pp.90–
91. See also the British UN delegation ‘Notes on Third Committee’, 29 December 1952, 
op.cit.: ‘(we) did our best to break through the anti-colonial front by hammering the 
theme of universality and indicating the danger to sovereign states of recognising an 
unqualified “right of self-determination” for all minorities and undefined groups.’ 
83 From the Colonial Office (JE Marnham) to the Foreign Office (GR Gauntlett), 5 
September 1957, TNA: FO371/129971. 
84 Rivlin (1955, p.206) pointed out that both the calls for universality and the attacks 
against Soviet domination in fact were efforts to ‘brake the drive for’ self-
determination. 
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Western states used the language of ‘universal self-determination’ to shift 
attention away from their own colonialism.85 A meeting of colonial powers 
confessed as much in late 1952: 
 
[T]he best way of trying to reduce the anticipated anti-colonial 
majority would be to concentrate upon the universality of the 
principle of self-determination […] and to attempt to steer the 
discussion away from colonies whenever the purely colonial 
application of the principle was unduly emphasised.86  
 
Sitting ill with their pretentions of ‘universality’, the arguments of Western 
delegates in fact focused exclusively on presenting their Cold War enemy as 
the target for freedom and ‘self-determination’.87 Consensus had emerged in 
the UN debates that ‘imperialism’ curtailed peoples’ freedom, 88  and 
warranted self-determination. 89  With the language of ‘universal self-
determination’, Western states seemed to be trying to not only steer the anti-
colonial sympathies away from themselves – but to stir up these sympathies 
against Soviet ‘imperialism’. 90 While Lenin in 1917 had taken aim at 
Western countries when attacking imperialism with the language of ‘self-
determination’, in the 1950-1960 UN debates, these countries themselves 
now employed such discourse. Rather than mirroring Lenin’s call for 
allowing the creation of new states on the basis of self-determination, 
however, the West now demanded Eastern bloc states’ ‘internal’ freedom 
from Soviet interference.91 
                                                
85 See e.g. Crawford 2002, pp.292–341; Cooper 2005; Sellars 2002, p.87; Kay 1967, 
p.808. 
86 ‘To the Foreign Office’, 10 December 1952, TNA: FO371/101439; see also Gauntlett, 
Colonial Office, 10 July 1958, op.cit. 
87 Roosevelt, 10 December 1951, op.cit., p.105. 
88 Particularly in the 1960 debate. Space does not allow for an analysis of ‘imperialism’ or 
related concepts; for illuminating detail see Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper: 
Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference, Princeton University 
Press, Princeton, NJ, 2010. See also Kiely 2010. For a brief conceptual history, see 
Jordheim and Neumann 2011. For examples from the UN debates, see BL: Shehu, 
Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the People’s Republic of Albania, 871st 
plenary meeting, 26 September 1960, p.132 and Pazhwak, Afghanistan 935th plenary 
meeting, 5 December 1960, p.1137. 
89 In similar terms, Latin American countries denounced ‘neo-colonialism’ – meaning 
economic interference also after formal independence; see e.g. Benites Vinueza, 
Ecuador, 933rd plenary meeting, 2 December, 1960, p.1100, BL. African states too 
condemned neo-colonialism at the 1960 session – although Young 2006, p.46, has 
contended that the term was not introduced before 1961.  
90 See e.g. Roosevelt, 18 November 1952, op.cit., pp.3-4. 
91 See e.g. Ormsby-Gore, UK, 925th plenary meeting, 28 November 1960, BL, p.982. For 
the US, see ‘Telegram from the Department of State to Mission at the United Nations, 
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By the time of the 1960 UNGA debate, such ways of employing the 
language of ‘self-determination’ and freedom to accuse Cold War enemies 
of imperialism seems to have become a broader trend. 92  The general 
agreement at the UN that imperialism truly restricted freedom then gave rise 
to a rhetorical Cold War battle on who the real imperialists were. Apart 
from the West’s attacks against the USSR, 93  socialists condemned 
‘American imperialism’,94 and Arab states reviled Israel’s ‘embodiment’ of 
‘imperialism and colonialism’. 95  Despite irreconcilable factual 
disagreements, such language showed conceptual agreement that imperialist 
interference with states – rather than peoples’ dependence or inequality – 
was what threatened freedom, and thus merited self-determination.96 All the 
various arguments on what forms of interference deserved denunciation 
sought restitution of the same idea of freedom. 
 
With their language of anti-imperialism and ‘universal self-determination’, 
the Western states might also have hoped to discredit the USSR’s 
representation of the cause for colonial freedom.97 Western fears of the Cold 
                                                                                                                        
Washington, October 6, 1960’, FRUS 1958–1960, Vol.II, UN and General International 
Matters: ‘Department believes it important secure as much support as possible in 
general debate and in committee for proposition that USSR remains major colonial 
while other former colonial empires have been largely liquidated. Inasmuch as there 
will be clear majority in UNGA for any statement condemning colonialism, best course 
we can follow is to seek turn declaration against Soviets themselves by portraying them 
in true colonialist colors.’ See also Wadsworth, USA, at the 869th plenary meeting, 23 
September 1960, BL, p.93, and subsequent UNGA plenary sessions; Burke 2010, p.47, 
and interview with Khrushchev in the USA on 9 October 1960 in N. S. Khrushchov 
[sic]: Disarmament and Colonial Freedom: Speeches and Interviews at United Nations 
General Assembly Sept–Oct 1960, Lawrence and Wishart, London 1961, pp.140–141, 
149. Allegations of Soviet interference were a key part of US Cold War rhetorical 
strategy: see Norman A Graebner: ‘Myth and Reality: America’s Rhetorical Cold War’, 
pp.20–37 and J. Michael Hogan: ‘The Science of Cold War Strategy: Propaganda and 
Public Opinion in the Eisenhower Administration’s “War of Words”’, pp.134–168, both 
in Martin J. Medhurst and H. W. Brands (eds): Critical Reflections on the Cold War: 
Linking Rhetoric and History, Texas A&M University Press, College Station, TX, 2000. 
92 Louis Henkin: ‘The United Nations and Human Rights’, International Organization, 
19(3), 1965, pp.504–517, at p.511, contends that participants also in the ICHR debates 
were keen to ‘embarrass’ each other. 
93 Gershman 1981 shows that the trend continued beyond this ‘moment’. 
94 Shehu, Albania, 871st plenary meeting, 26 September 1960, BL, p.114.  
95 Shukairy, Saudi Arabia, 899th plenary meeting, 11 October 1960, BL, p.626 
96 See also Zorin, USSR, 939th plenary meeting, 7 December 1960, BL, p.1188. 
97 See e.g. Lynn Boyd Hinds and Theodore Otto Windt, Jr: The Cold War as Rhetoric: The 
Beginnings, 1945–1950, Praeger, New York, 1991, p.19, and Theodore Otto Windt, Jr: 
Presidents and Protesters: Political Rhetoric in the 1960s, University of Alabama Press, 
Tuscaloosa, AL, 1990, p.4; Harold Karan Jacobson: ‘The United Nations and 
Colonialism: A Tentative Appraisal’, International Organization, 16(1), 1962, pp.37–
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War spread of communism, and of the formation of an anti-colonial–
socialist alliance are well documented.98 In addition, the Americans in 
particular were competing with the USSR for the role as the main sponsor of 
anti-colonialism at the UN.99 Already in 1952, an internal US memorandum 
had cautioned that the USA was appearing to ‘perpetuate the old-style 
colonial system’, ‘allow[ing] the Soviets to take credit for championing the 
cause of dependent peoples’ and the concept of self-determination.100 
 
As the decade proceeded, the USA increasingly seemed to find itself in 
something of a bind in the UN debates. On the one hand, US economic and 
political interests dictated a close bond to Europe’s colonial powers and a 
sceptical attitude towards the language of ‘self-determination’. On the other 
hand, the USA was striving to be on the right side of the UNGA majority, 
which it saw as expressing ‘world public opinion’ and as a political as well 
as ‘moral force’.101 In light of the broad UN backing of the language of 
‘self-determination’, the USA was keen to appear as its owner and 
originator.102 The country’s history, self-image and popular support for ‘self-
                                                                                                                        
56, at p.39. Further on general US–USSR rhetorical strategies during the Cold War, see 
Martin J. Medhurst, Robert L. Ivie, Philip Wander and Robert L. Scott (eds): Cold War 
Rhetoric: Strategy, Metaphor, and Ideology, Michigan State University Press, East 
Lansing, MI, 1997. 
98  See e.g. Young 2006, p.171; Steven Metz: ‘American Attitudes toward Decolonization 
in Africa’, Political Science Quarterly, 99(3), 1984, pp.515–533, especially pp.518, 
522; Odd Arne Westad: The Global Cold War, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
2005; also Fox 1951, p.353; Dallin 1962; Jacobson 1962, p.41. 
99  See e.g. US Ambassador Wadsworth 1966, p.110, and internal US correspondence 
referred to below. Also the UNSG’s special advisor Andrew Cordier (US) expressed 
frustration over the Soviet role, in particular that of Khrushchev in the 1960 session, as 
well as general distress over the unfolding 1960 UNGA proceedings. See his letters at 
ACP Box 55, UN Files, Outgoing Correspondence, Chronological, 1959–1960. For 
American analysis from the time, see Vernon McKay: ‘Too Slow or Too Fast? Political 
Change in African Trust Territories’, Foreign Affairs, 35(2), 1957, pp.295–310; 
Jacobson 1962, pp.37–56. See also Metz 1984, pp.515–533, and Robert J. McMahon: 
‘“By Helping Others, We Help Ourselves”: The Cold War Rhetoric of American 
Foreign Policy’, pp.233–246 in Medhurst and Brands (eds) 2000, especially p.235 on 
‘peace’ and ‘freedom’ in US rhetoric. 
100 ‘Memorandum Prepared in the Bureau of United Nations Affairs’, 21 May, 1952, 
op.cit., p.39; also the same volume’s UN Planning Staff, Bureau of UN Affairs, 
Washington, Undated, A/MS files, p.127, and ‘UNA/P master file’, undated, 1954, 
p.130. For analysis, see e.g. Good 1959. 
101 FRUS 1952–1954, ‘Memorandum by the American UN Planning Staff to the Planning 
Adviser, Bureau of UN Affairs, William Sanders’, Attachment: ‘Principal Stresses and 
Strains Facing the US in the UN’, Washington, DC, 27 July 1953, p.87. 
102 See e.g. ‘Draft Report Prepared by Lincoln Bloomfield’, Washington, DC, 9 February 
1956, FRUS, 1955–1957, Vol. XI, United Nations and General International Matters, 
p.52–57; Good 1959, p.265. 
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determination’103 too made it difficult to oppose inclusion of the concept in 
the UN texts.104 ‘Self-determination’, as the US position emerged, might be 
defended as a means to world peace and realisation of US interests.105  
 
As a result of such diverging pressures, US discourse at the UN debates 
stayed ambivalent on issues of colonialism and self-determination.106 During 
the decade, US representatives both praised European colonial rule107 and 
made claims such as that the USA ‘constantly sought’ to realise self-
determination ‘behind the scenes in attempting to convince metropolitan 
powers’.108 Such double signals annoyed the British ally,109 who felt that the 
Americans had given up on empire too quickly, and only supported self-
determination at the UN out of fear of Soviet influence in the colonial 
world.110 In 1955, the US State Department admitted that ‘[t]he question of 
self-determination [...] has caused us very considerable difficulties’ at the 
UN due to ‘attempts to steer a middle-of-the-road course between the 
                                                
103 ‘Minutes of Twenty-ninth Meeting of the United States Delegation to the General 
Assembly, Paris, December 10, 1951’, FRUS, 1951, Vol. II, ‘The United Nations; the 
Western Hemisphere’, p.776. See Fox 1951 for analysis from the same year. 
104 See also interview with Andrew Cordier, 30 October, 1963, describing the USA as 
taking a moderate position due to concern for its NATO allies: Oral History Research 
Office, Columbia University, Dag Hammarskjold Oral History Project ‘Recollections of 
Dag Hammarskjold and the United Nations, by Andrew W. Cordier’, p.76. 
105 ‘Action Program for Improvement in U.S. Participation in the United Nations General 
Assembly’, in ‘Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for International 
Organization Affairs (Wilcox) to the Representative at the United Nations (Lodge)’, 
Washington, DC, 7 May 1956, FRUS 1955–1957, pp.67–70. 
106 See W. R. Louis (with Ronald Robinson): ‘The Imperialism of Decolonization’, 
pp.451–502 in Louis 2006a, for the post-Second World War emergence of this 
ambivalence. For contemporaneous views, see e.g. Charles Wolf, Jr.: United States and 
the Third World: Problems and Analysis, Little, Brown, Boston, MA; 1967; Wolfers 
(ed.) 1959, especially Good 1959; Lincoln P. Bloomfield: The United Nations and U. S. 
Foreign Policy: A New Look at the National Interest, Little, Brown, Boston, MA; 1967; 
Claude 1984 (originally 1964), p.362. 
107 See e.g. Wadsworth 1966, pp.110–112. 
108  ‘Speech by the Honourable Mrs Oswald B. Lord, United States Alternate 
Representative, in Committee III, on Self-determination’ 28 November 1957, TNA FO 
371/129971. See also Nigel J. Ashton: ‘Anglo–American Revival and Empire during the 
Macmillan Years, 1957–63’, pp.164–185 in Lynn (ed.) 2006. 
109 For British irritation over the US ambivalence see e.g. Hoare to Attlee, 23 February 
1955, TNA: FO371/117561, claiming that the USA feigned concern for self-
determination ‘for home consumption’ while eager to keep their allies, concluding that 
‘their present effort seems peculiarly silly’; also FO 371/117566, records from 24 and 
25 October 1955, and FO371/129971 from the Colonial Office to the Foreign Office, 5 
September 1957, describing the ‘mental processes’ of the US State Department on self-
determination as ‘rather wooden’. However, it was evidently also important to the UK 
to ‘ensure the full co-operation of the Americans’, to bring others over to voting with 
the UK, especially Latin American countries: Foreign Office, 9 July 1959, to the UK 
mission at the UN, TNA: CO 936/400. 
110 See e.g. Louis (with Robinson) 2006a, p.475, for references to the era of Churchill and 
Eden. 
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colonial and anti-colonial states’. 111  This US ambivalence on self-
determination would remain until the 1960 vote on the Decolonisation 
Declaration, and even thereafter.112  
 
Needless to say, the increasingly anti-colonial environment at the UN put 
also other Western states in a tricky position in the debates on self-
determination, especially those that still had colonies. Aware of the 
sympathies of the UN majority, some of these manoeuvred into a position 
where they could present self-determination as a positive principle – while 
stressing that it could only be granted by colonial powers, not through 
incorporating it in international law. The colonial powers alone, these 
Western representatives said, could decide to grant self-determination to 
their colonies when they determined that the colonial peoples in question 
had reached sufficient ‘maturity’.113 But until the colonial states had decided 
to end colonialism, no other agent should interfere with Western decision-
makers, or with their colonies.114 
 
In hence presenting maturity as a condition for self-determination and 
statehood, Western states revealed that they considered their ‘dependent 
territories’ to be incapable of independence, not unlike children.115 By 
implication, as long as colonial peoples lacked the skills and experience 
required for a self-sufficient existence, they would be dependent on and 
subordinated to ‘parental’ colonial administration. For the duration of their 
                                                
111‘Action Program’, FRUS 1955–1957, pp.67–70. See also McKay 1957, p.308. 
112 Metz 1984, p.516 claims to have observed a ‘watershed’ of change in US anti-
colonialism, but nothing of the sort is reflected in US positions as expressed in the UN 
debates. 
113 Dehousse, Belgium, Third Committee 361st meeting, 7 December 1951, UN R1/1 
1950/51, p.83. The racism inherent to this outlook was expressed also with regard to 
non-Western delegates in the UN debates, e.g. FRUS, UN Planning Staff, ‘UNA/P 
master file’, 1954, p.132. For scholarly outlooks from the time, see Fox 1951, pp.340–
368; John Fletcher Cooke: ‘Some Reflections on the International Trusteeship System, 
with Particular Reference to its Impact in the Governments and Peoples of the Trust 
Territories’, International Organization 13(3), 1959, pp.422–430 and ‘Trusteeship and 
Non-self-governing Territories’, International Organization, 16(1), 1962, pp.137–182; 
Bloomfield 1967, p.203. 
114 See also Cooper 1996 and Cooper 1997.  
115 See in particular BL: Couve de Murville, France, 864th plenary meeting, 20 September 
1960, p.8, and most other statements that day; also Christiansen, Denmark, 945th 
plenary meeting, 13 December, 1960, p.1262. Cordier expressed the same attitude to the 
recently independent countries at the 1960 session, in an interview from 30 October 
1963, Hammarskjold Oral History Project, p.75. See William Bain: ‘The Political 
Theory of Trusteeship and the Twilight of International Equality’, International 
Relations, 17(1), 2003, pp.59–77. 
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‘immaturity’, the colonies would need educational training. Only once the 
colonies had ‘reached adulthood’ through colonial rule, could they, under 
suitable conditions, become independent. 116  With these perspectives, 
Western states debating at the UN perpetuated a reasoning akin to Wilson’s 
concept of ‘self-determination’, and one that had briefly appeared at the San 
Francisco Conference as well. 
 
From this standpoint, the West was in effect arguing that only after colonial 
peoples had become sufficiently mature would it be safe to let them take 
care of themselves. It was seen as less important to consult colonial peoples 
than to look after their interests; and the West held that it would be in 
colonies’ interest that their colonisers protected them against self-
determination until they were ready.117 Terminating colonial governance too 
hastily might induce irresponsible and destabilising conduct – and that 
would benefit neither the colonies nor the world. As put by the USA, the 
‘unrestricted application’ of self-determination ‘could result in chaos’ and 
might ‘endanger international peace and security’.118 Indeed, ‘the right of 
self-determination, if not exercised wisely, [could] endanger peace and 
destroy freedom.’119 
 
The Western view of the ‘childlike’ nature of colonial dependence portrayed 
the continuation of colonialism as an altruistic move, for the good of the 
global order as a whole.120 In the 1960 UNGA debate, colonial powers 
echoed the language of Smuts’ 1918 proposal, claiming to have assumed a 
singular responsibility in educating their ‘dependencies’ for the sake of 
world peace.121 For this reason, they held, they should be seen as the ones 
who deserved applause once ‘their’ former colonies had reached ‘self-
                                                
116 See also Wadsworth 1966, pp.152–153. 
117 E.g. Shanahan, New Zealand, 932nd plenary meeting, 2 December 1960, BL, p.1073. 
See also Belgium Third Committee, 310th meeting, 10 November 1950, UN R1/1 1950, 
p.241 
118 Roosevelt, 18 November 1952, op.cit., pp.3, 6. 
119 Ibid. 
120 See also Cooper, 1996, p.27. 
121 De Lequerica, Spain, 886th plenary meeting, 4 October 1960, pp.391–392, 396, BL; 
also Plimsoll, Australia, 933rd plenary meeting, 2 December 1960, pp.1090–1091; 
Christiansen, Denmark, 945th plenary meeting, 13 December, 1960, p.1262. See also 
Claude 1984, p.370. 
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determination’.122 When the opening of the 1960 UNGA session admitted 16 
African states and Cyprus as new UN members,123 there was no lack of 
Western representatives who lauded their own ‘crowning achievement’ of 
letting their dependent peoples go.124 Such self-praise was probably also 
articulated to score points in the tense Cold War setting, and to set a positive 
historical record for Western colonialism, the legitimacy and moral standing 
of which was plainly on the wane.125  
 
At the same UNGA session, many newly independent states made use of 
similar rhetoric, complimenting their former colonisers. In a particularly 
telling example, Dahomey (today Benin) ‘congratulated’ France ‘for having 
realized in time that we had reached the age of political maturity and for 
having prepared us by easy stages to come of age without strife.’126 Also the 
UN delegates of other new states justified the achievement of independence 
by emphasising their responsible, and above all, peaceful management.127  
 
This maturity-oriented discourse projected the view that dependence and 
self-determination was a question of different stages. Those who drew on 
such language implicitly argued that colonies, at their current, dependent 
stage, were situated at the low end of an evolutionary line that might some 
day, after training and preparation, ripen naturally into a stage of self-
determination and statehood.128 From this point of view, the subordination of 
                                                
122 E.g. Ormsby-Gore, UK, 925th meeting, 28 November 1960, BL, p.986. See former 
head of the African division of the UK Colonial Office, Andrew Cohen: British Policy 
in Changing Africa, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1959, e.g. pp.35–36, claiming 
that also nationalism and the colonial demand for independence resulted from the 
education provided by the West; also pp.90, 106. 
123 At its 864th plenary meeting on 20 September, 1960. 
124 Couve de Murville, France, 864th plenary meeting, 20 September, 1960, BL, p.8. See 
also Wigny Belgium, 869th plenary meeting, 23 September, 1960, BL, p.85. 
125 See Louis 2006b; also Ormsby-Gore, UK, 925th meeting, 28 November 1960, BL, 
p.982. For various examples of related discourse from the time, see the records of the 
Movement for Colonial Freedom at the School of African and Oriental Studies 
Archives, e.g. MCF, COM-10-15, Files 11, 15 and T5, 1960; and MCF, Box 26, AFF 
49, AAF, UT (1), 1961; AFF 50, AAF, UT (2), 1961; AFF 51, AAF, UT (3), 1959–1961; 
AFF 52, AAF, UT (4), 1960–1963. 
126 At the 866th plenary meeting, 21 September 1960, BL, p.33; also delegates from Upper 
Volta and Congo (Brazzaville), pp.33-35. 
127 Ibid.; Barnes, Liberia and Rakotomalala, Madagascar, at the 893rd plenary meeting, 7 
October 1960, BL, pp.531–532. 
128 Martino, Italy, 937th plenary meeting, 6 December 1960, BL, p.1165–1166. See also 
Wadsworth, USA, 937th plenary meeting, 6 December 1960, BL p.1157. On British 
attitudes, see e.g. Philip Murphy: Party Politics and Decolonization: The Conservative 
Party and British Colonial Policy in Tropical Africa, 1964, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
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colonial people was due to their inadequate development – and not, for 
instance, the colonial powers’ interests in perpetuating the inequalities of the 
system. Moreover, according to this model, colonial peoples could reach the 
stage of self-determination only gradually and under circumstances 
determined by their more advanced superiors, the colonial powers. 129 
Without such slow, path-dependent guidance, the flawed capabilities of the 
colonial peoples could threaten world peace.130 Moving them responsibly 
from the stage of dependence to the level of self-determination would thus 
serve the cause of world stability. 
 
Crucially, from this perspective, the colonies of the Western states did not 
lack freedom. According to the logic of Western discourse, only 
interference, especially of Soviet ‘imperialist’ kind, could take away 
freedom. In the UN debates, Western countries eschewed any suggestion 
that they were interfering with their colonies.131 When socialist delegates 
alleged that Western colonialism exploited and oppressed colonial peoples – 
thereby interfering and in a sense depriving them of freedom according to 
the West’s own standards – Western delegates responded vehemently.132 
These colonial powers did not insist that the colonial relationship was one of 
equality,133 but they presented its unequal nature as being of no consequence 
to the question of colonial freedom. Throughout the decade, the Western 
states framed the unequal, dependent status of the colonies in terms of 
colonial peoples’ lack of capacities rather than their lack of freedom.  
 
Western delegates actually maintained that colonialism advanced the 
freedom of colonial people as their peaceful non-interference, irrespective 
                                                                                                                        
1995, and Partha Sarathi Gupta: Imperialism and the British Labour Movement, 1914–
1964, Macmillan, London, 1975. For a US policy perspective from the time, see Max F. 
Millikan and Donald L. M. Blackmer (eds): The Emerging Nations: Their Growth and 
United States Policy, Little, Brown, Boston, MA, 1961. 
129 Thors, Iceland, 936th plenary meeting, 5 December 1960, BL, p.1147. 
130 See e.g. ibid., p.1149; Benites Vinueza, Ecuador, 933rd plenary meeting, 2 December 
1960, BL, p.1102. 
131 See e.g. De Lequerica, Spain, 886th plenary meeting, 4 October 1960, BL, p.392 
132 For one illustration, see the exchange started by Zorin, USSR, 939th plenary meeting, 7 
December 1960, BL, p.1187.  
133 For odd references to equality, however, see BL: Nash, Prime Minister of New 
Zealand, 886th plenary meeting, 4 October 1960, p.398, and Garin, Portugal, 892nd 
plenary meeting, 7 October 1960, p.505. 
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of the subordinate status to which it assigned them.134 In the UN debates, 
Western states seemed to appreciate peace as a higher form of freedom, as 
the opposite of violent interference with an existing, stable order. And since 
colonialism, in this Western view, did provide for peace, it served not only 
international stability, but the freedom of colonial peoples as well.135 At the 
end of the 1960 debate, France explicitly defended colonialism based on its 
promotion of freedom as non-interference. True freedom as advanced by 
colonialism, France claimed, 
 
is not the freedom of a minority to impose its laws nor of a majority 
to silence any voice raised in disagreement[, but] liberation from 
hunger, from fear and from ignorance. It is the freedom of self-
expression, of action, freedom to construct without constraint, 
without anxiety or any hindrance other than respect for the freedom 
of others.136  
 
Interestingly, few of the arguments in favour of including ‘self-
determination’ in the three UN texts challenged the Western claim that 
specific conditions should be attached to realising the concept as 
independence. Several non-Western delegates, for instance, made the case 
that colonial peoples were not immature: ‘neither poor nor without 
civilization’, they were sophisticated peoples with long histories and 
traditions.137 Such points did not dispute the principle that implementing 
self-determination required a proper level of ‘maturity’, or that lack of such 
would have justly assigned colonies to a subordinate, dependent status.138 
They merely contested the West’s description of colonial capability levels 
and claimed that colonial peoples were already mature enough for 
                                                
134 See BL: Ormsby-Gore, UK, 947th plenary meeting, 14 December 1960, p.1275 and 
Garin, Portugal, 947th plenary meeting, 14 December 1960, p.1280.  
135 See e.g. Ormsby-Gore, UK, 902nd plenary meeting, 12 October 1960, BL p.674; 
Wadsworth, USA, 869th plenary meeting, 23 September, BL, p.93. For a rare claim that 
colonies actually also had political representation, see the British UN delegation’s 
‘Draft Brief on “Self-determination”’, 14 June 1952, TNA: FO371/101434. 
136 Bernard, France, 945th plenary meeting, 13 December 1960, BL, p.1258. For a similar 
defence of colonialism based on its championing of freedom, see Burns 1957, pp.5, 15, 
23, 73. 
137 BL: Wirjopranoto, Indonesia, 936th meeting, 5 December, p.1150; also Aw, Mali, 
931st meeting, 1 December, p.1065; Roa, Cuba, 937th meeting, 6 December, p.1169; 
Ismail, Guinea, 902nd meeting 12 October, p.680, as well as Kadar, Hungary, 883rd 
meeting, 3 October, p.333.  
138 Even the UN debates’ harshest critic of the West, Soviet leader Khrushchev, reasoned 
in 1960 that ‘one must mature in order to realize the heights to which human society can 
attain’: Khrushchev, USSR, 902nd plenary meeting, 12 October 1960, BL, p.688. 
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statehood. Instead of challenging Western decision-makers’ authority on 
self-determination, such arguments merely asked the West to recognise that 
the conditions for implementing the concept had already been fulfilled. 
 
In the 1960 UNGA debate, however, the ‘self-determination’ discourse of 
some non-Western delegates had a more radical tinge. Several states then 
indirectly rejected the paternalism that shone through the West’s language 
of self-determination by comparing colonies to slaves rather than to 
children.139 Likening the status of the colonies to that of slaves meant 
conceptualising colonialism as a relationship of inequality, with the lower-
ranking agent dependent on the superior one for all decision-making and 
rules. In this understanding, colonial dependence unjustly deprived colonial 
peoples of power over their own affairs, and assigned them by law to open-
ended reliance on the arbitrary will of their colonial masters. Significantly, 
from this perspective, colonial dependence was a matter of status and not a 
stage; it reflected institutionalised inequality and not simply a degree of 
underdevelopment.  
 
Such language presented ‘dependent’ peoples as ipso facto unfree, precisely 
because of their status of inequality and dependence on the will of their 
colonial masters.140 Not in charge of their own, self-determined body politic, 
colonial populations were subordinated to their rulers; neither were they 
equal to other, independent peoples. In contrast to the outlook espoused by 
the West, in this view, deprivation of freedom did not necessitate 
interference. Most of the radically-sounding arguments in the UN debates 
                                                
139 E.g., at 1960 plenaries, BL: Mazurov, BSSR, 893rd meeting, 7 October, p.531; 
Ghana’s President Nkrumah, 869th meeting, 23 September, p.61; Guinea's Ismaël 
Touré, 902nd meeting 12 October, p.680. See also Tamba, Liberia, Third Committee 
366th meeting, 11 December 1951, UN R1/1 1951–52, p.115; also Bain 2003. Western 
states, especially European colonial powers responded angrily to such suggestions, see 
e.g. Garin, Portugal, 892nd plenary meeting, 7 October 1960, BL p.508. See also 
records from 5 January 1952 to 25 August 1952, TNA: CO 936/100, claiming that the 
reference to ‘slavery’ with regard to dependent peoples obscured the fact that people 
were more unfree in communist countries. Later the same year, Britain complained 
(‘From W. A Morris to A. A. Dudley, 21 May 1952’ TNA: FO371/101434) of ‘reference 
to the enslavement of peoples, so manifestly offensive as to be clearly unacceptable to a 
number of countries’. 
140 For a few examples from the 1960 UNGA plenary, BL: Gromyko, USSR, 864th 
meeting, 20 September, p.13; Touré, Guinea, 865th meeting, 20 September, p.23; 
Castro, Cuba, 871st meeting 26 September, p.135; Sosa Rodriguez, Venezuela, 939th 
meeting, 7 December, p.1199. 
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held that colonialism also involved oppression and economic exploitation of 
the kind Lenin had condemned, but did not present this as the heart of the 
matter: Colonialism would have dispossessed peoples of their freedom even 
in the absence of such interference. For no matter what colonial powers 
actually did, they could legally and at any time arbitrarily use their powers 
over colonial peoples. These peoples were made unfree by having no way of 
predicting or affecting the powers or laws that prevailed over them.141 
 
On this reasoning, colonialism’s alleged benefits to colonial peoples were 
immaterial to the question of their freedom. 142  Regardless of whether 
colonialism might bear positive results, it was its dependent and unequal 
nature, not its methods or outcomes, that would inevitably curtail colonies’ 
freedom. As a delegate from Ceylon put it in an illustrative quote from the 
1960 session: 
 
However good a colonial government may be and however much it 
may do to improve the lot of the dependent peoples, there is no 
justification for the continuance of a system of colonial domination. 
Good government can never be a substitute for self-government.143  
 
Discourse of this kind portrayed the radical demand for self-determination 
as freedom and equality as legitimate irrespective of a colony’s level of 
development. Even if capacities might be flawed or potentially destabilising, 
as one UN delegate firmly stated in 1954, ‘it was preferable to have people 
err by themselves rather than to have others err for them’.144 Maturity, from 
this perspective, was not a precondition for statehood. Self-determination 
was not a matter of gradually reaching a proper stage of development – it 
meant freedom as a legally and actually guaranteed status of equality. And 
this would have to involve the option of realising independent statehood 
                                                
141 From the 1960 UNGA plenary, BL: Touré, Guinea, 912th meeting, 8 November, p.827, 
and 902nd meeting 12 October p.680; Rifa’I, Jordan, 930th meeting, 1 December, 
p.1056. 
142 The question of whom colonial development had benefited was also raised during the 
1960 plenary, as laconically noted by Cooper, Liberia, ‘One feeds the cow not for the 
good of the cow itself but for the milk it produces’: 902nd plenary meeting, 12 October 
1960, BL, p.682. 
143 Claude Corea, Ceylon, 901st plenary meeting, 12 October 1960, BL, p.665. See also 
Ba, Mali, 901st plenary meeting, 12 October 1960, BL, p.654. 
144 De Barros, Brazil, Third Committee, 565th meeting, 27 October 1954, UN R1/1 1954, 
p.111. Recall also Pazhwak’s words, ‘poverty was preferable to slavery’ above, op.cit. 
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without conditions.145 
 
Moreover, unlike the Western preoccupation with ideals of peace and stable 
order, this contrasting ‘self-determination’ discourse did not present peace 
as a higher type of freedom, or as inevitably more important than freedom 
as equality. ‘Peace’, in the words of a 1960 UN delegate exemplifying this 
perspective, ‘is not simply a good thing in itself’.146 At the 1960 UNGA 
session, various socialist and non-Western countries openly proclaimed that 
liberation might legitimately be achieved by violent means, if commanded 
by the aim of freedom. Some praised the bloody, ‘merciless wars’ of 
colonial liberation,147 and others said that colonial emancipation ‘has always 
been the result of pressure’. 148  As one representative summed it up, 
‘dominated peoples are entitled to overthrow this domination, even by the 
force of arms’.149  
 
While such utterances reflected certain aspects of Lenin’s language of ‘self-
determination’, they entailed a central difference. To be sure, Lenin too had 
endorsed the use of violence to achieve self-determination, and had bound 
the concept up with the prospect of achieving statehood, including for 
colonial peoples. But he had also insisted that self-determination should 
ultimately not lead to statehood; to him, the end goal was freedom as 
equality in internationalist socialism. By contrast, the radical discourse of 
the 1950–1960 UN debates, assumed statehood itself to be the chief aim of 
self-determination. 
 
 
                                                
145 For the rhetoric of equality within the imperial system and demands for equal 
citizenship rights, including from organised labour, see Cooper 2005, pp.202, 205, 214–
218, 227. See also Burns 1957, p.75, portraying a call for equality as the core of the 
demand for colonial independence – and then arguing against this demand, since it 
threatens world peace, p.86. For a few debate interventions on these themes, see 
Baroody, Third Committee 362nd meeting, 8 December 1951, UN R1/1 1951–1952, 
p.95; and BL: Boucetta, Morocco, 945th plenary meeting, 13 December 1960, pp.1249–
1253; and Senegal’s Prime Minister Mamacou Dia, 940th plenary meeting, 8 December 
1960, pp.1201–1202. 
146 Mamacou Dia, 940th plenary meeting, 8 December 1960 BL, pp.1201–1202. 
147 Boucetta, Morocco, 945th plenary meeting, 13 December 1960, BL, p.1252. 
148 Aw, Mali, 874th meeting, 28 September 1960, BL, p.679. 
149  Shukairy, Saudi Arabia, 927th meeting 29 November 1960, BL p.1012; also 
Khrushchev’s statement of 13 October 1960, quoted in Khrushchev 1961, p.184. 
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A Definition of ‘Self-determination’? 
Of the three UN texts resulting from the 1950–1960 UN debates, the focus 
here is on the 1960 Decolonisation Declaration. Not only did the UNGA 
pass it before adopting the two ICHRs in 1966, the Decolonisation 
Declaration also, crucially, formalised the link between ‘self-determination’ 
and colonial independence. Consequently, scholars have described the 
Declaration as ‘almost an amendment of the Charter’. 150  The ICHRs, 
meanwhile, simply repeated the exact wording of the 1960 Declaration, 
while situating ‘self-determination’ in a human rights framework.151  
 
The Decolonisation Declaration was debated at the UNGA’s plenary 
meetings between September and December 1960, 152 a time when the 
Assembly’s international standing was at its peak.153 At the opening of that 
UNGA session, the UN admitted 17 new states as members, accentuating 
the importance of the moment. During the ensuing plenary meetings, UN 
delegates cited ‘self-determination’ both when discussing the proposed 
drafts of the Decolonisation Declaration, and in addressing the admission of 
the new UN members. Of the then 99 UN countries, 79 participated in the 
debate, including heads of state and foreign ministers.154 Even more than the 
                                                
150 Emerson 1965, p.493. See also Samuel A. Bleicher: ‘The Legal Significance of Re-
citation of General Assembly Resolutions’, American Journal of International Law, 63, 
pp.444–478, 1969, at p.444; Louis 2006a, p.186. 
151 For brief discussions, see Christian Tomuschat: ‘Democratic Pluralism: The Right to 
Political Opposition’, pp.27–47 in Allan Rosas and Jan Helgesen (eds): The Strength of 
Diversity: Human Rights and Pluralist Democracy, Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1992, 
p.40; Crawford 2000b, p.94–95; Burke 2010, p.37; Craven 1995, p.24.  
152 For insider accounts, see e.g. James J. Wadsworth: The Price of Peace, Praeger, New 
York, 1962, pp.11–12; Wadsworth 1966, pp.106–109; Khrushchev 1974, pp.462, 468, 
471, 479–482; and Khrushchov 1961. For a full audio recording of the 14 December 
1960 meeting at which the Decolonisation Declaration was adopted, see UN 
Audiovisual Library of International Law, accessed 23 July 2012, 
untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/ha/dicc/dicc_audio.html. 
153 For the UNGA’s international authority, especially around 1960, see e.g. Miguel 
Marin-Bosch: ‘How Nations Vote in the General Assembly of the United Nations’, 
International Organization, 41(4), 1987, pp.705–724, at p.705; Kay 1967, p.786; 
Emerson 1965, p.496; Alston 1984, p.608. See also Erik Voeten: ‘Clashes in the 
Assembly’, International Organization, 54(2), 2000, pp.185–215; Divac Öberg 2006; 
N. G. Onuf: ‘Professor Falk on the Quasi-legislative Competence of the General 
Assembly’, American Journal of International Law, 6, pp.349–355; Bleicher 1969; 
Obed Asamoah: ‘The Legal Effects of Resolutions of the General Assembly’, Columbia 
Journal of Transnational Law, 3, 1963, pp.210–230, at p.214; Ellis 1985. 
154 See ARMSNY: ‘Statements Regarding the Secretary-General and the Secretariat Made 
in the General Debate at the Fifteenth Session of the General Assembly’, General 
Assembly Matters Files of the Secretary-General: U Thant (especially Statements 
01/09//1960-01/10/1960), S-0856, Box 5, file 8, Acc Dag/1/5.2.1.3, ‘Statements 
01/09//1960-01/10/1960’. For media reporting, see in particular New York Times 
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1950s ICHR discussions, the 1960 UNGA debate played out in a truly 
international setting. Participants described the discussions as a ‘landmark 
of decisive importance in the history of mankind’.155  
 
As in 1945 and 1949, it was the USSR that placed the language of ‘self-
determination’ on the international agenda in 1960. On 23 September 1960, 
three days after the opening meeting of the UNGA session, the Soviet Union 
submitted a draft of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to 
Colonial Countries and Peoples.156 This 14-page proposal called for ‘the 
final and complete liberation of peoples languishing in colonial bondage’, 
with reference to the UN Charter’s principle of ‘self-determination’.157 
Sharpening the already contentious UN rhetoric of the time, the draft 
described colonial peoples as living under a ‘shameful colonial regime’, ‘in 
conditions of colonial oppression and exploitation’.158 Detailing the horrors, 
underdevelopment and instability caused by colonialism, the Soviet draft 
lauded the brave national liberation struggles of peoples around the world.159  
 
While ‘radically’ confronting Western colonial policy, the Soviet draft had 
conceptual similarities to Western discourse in the UN debates. Like the 
West, the Soviet draft sought to legitimise its position on self-determination 
by citing peace as the key value. Instead of promoting self-determination as 
a matter of equality, the draft highlighted ‘the great objective of securing a 
strong and lasting peace on earth’.160 However, in denunciating interference, 
the emphasis differed. Western discourse chiefly acclaimed freedom as 
peace and non-interference with established states. The USSR draft 
denounced interference in the forms of oppression and exploitation of 
colonial, non-state peoples. Thus it repeated the parts of Lenin’s ‘self-
determination’ discourse that had advocated colonial liberation as a matter 
of freedom from interference. 
 
                                                                                                                        
coverage from 20 September to 15 December, 1960. See also Solodovnikov 2006, 
p.188. 
155 Sosa Rodriguez, Venezuela, 939th plenary meeting, 7 December 1960, BL, p.1198. 
156 For Khrushchev’s account of the submission, see Khrushchev 1974, pp.481–482. 
157 UNDocA/4502, BL version, pp.1, 2, 13.  
158 Ibid., p.1; UNDocA/4501, BL version, unpaginated. 
159 UNDocA/4502, p.1. 
160 Ibid., p.14. 
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When the UNGA started to debate this draft in October 1960, the majority 
in the Assembly immediately backed both UN action on colonial 
independence and the substance of the USSR text.161 Socialist and most 
African and Asian delegates pressed for UN endorsement of self-
determination as statehood for colonies – some while reviling European 
colonialism for ‘crimes’, ‘oppression,’ 162  and being ‘obnoxious’. 163  The 
debate gave rise to what might have been the fieriest public exchanges of 
the entire Cold War.164 Tellingly, the meetings included the famous ‘shoe-
banging’ episode, in which Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev was said to 
have taken off one shoe and banged it in protest at the Philippines’ 
allegation that the Soviet Union had ‘swallowed up’ the peoples of Eastern 
Europe.165 
 
Probably realising that the UN was about to formalise ‘self-determination’ 
as a principle of colonial freedom, Western states shifted their 
argumentation. Although colonialism had greatly benefited colonial peoples, 
they now said, it might have reached its end point.166 The colonial powers 
had succeeded in bringing most colonies to maturity,167 and could grant 
them self-determination ‘in progressive steps’168 so as ‘to avoid giving rise 
                                                
161 See the minutes starting from the 898th meeting on 10 October 1960 and the sessions 
immediately following it, BL p.614. 
162 Ba, Mali, 901st plenary meeting, 12 October 1960, BL, p.654. 
163 Cooper, Liberia, 902nd plenary meeting, 12 October 1960, BL, p.681. 
164 For the most heated exchanges from the decade of UN debates, see the whole 902nd 
plenary meeting on 12 October 1960, BL pp.671–690.  
165 Lorenzo Sumulong, BL, p.682. Khrushchev (1974) explained that when Western 
delegates at the UNGA session started ‘banging on their desks and making noise’, the 
Soviet delegates ‘began to pay them back in kind’, p.471. Official UN transcripts did 
not record this episode, but it was reported in i.a. the New York Times the following day 
(13 October 1960) and vividly recounted at ACP 1959–1960, e.g. letters to A. J. 
Brumbaugh, Florida, 16 October 1960; to Dr V. F. Schwalm, Indiana, 21 October 1960; 
to Dr R. V. Bollinger, Dean of Students, Manchester College, Indiana, 16 October 1960. 
See also Wadsworth 1966, p.107. 
166 For appraisals of colonialism, see BL: Plimsoll, Australia, 933rd plenary meeting, 2 
December 1960, pp.1090–1091; Christiansen, Denmark, 945th plenary meeting, 13 
December 1960, p.1262; for admissions that the time of colonialism might have passed, 
see Wadsworth, USA, 869th meeting, 23 September, p.93; Ormsby-Gore, UK, 925th 
meeting, 28 November, p.983; Segni, Italy, 874th meeting 28 September, p.199. See 
also ‘Paper Prepared by the Assistant Legal Adviser for United Nations Affairs’ 
(Meeker), New York, 4 October 1960, from ‘US Policy and the 15th General 
Assembly’, FRUS 1958–1959, Vol.II, p.389 See also McKay 1957, p.309; Cooper 
1996, p.27. 
167 Ormsby-Gore, UK, 925th plenary meeting, 28 November 1960, BL, p.986. 
168 Wadsworth, USA, 937th plenary meeting, 6 December 1960, BL, p.1157. 
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to disorder and chaos.’169 As one UK delegate put it, viewed ‘objectively’, 
colonialism might be ‘dying [only] in the sense that the Phoenix dies, dying 
at the moment of its greatest glory, when it gives birth to new nations’.170  
 
The Soviet draft may have triggered the discussion on self-determination at 
the 1960 UNGA plenary, yet it was not that text that would eventually be 
adopted as the final Decolonisation Declaration. On 28 November 1960, a 
large group of African and Asian states presented their own, identically 
titled, alternative draft Declaration to the UNGA.171 This move, its sponsors 
explained, was an attempt to prevent colonial independence from becoming 
subjected to automatic Cold War bloc voting.172 Except for some Western 
scepticism, this new draft immediately gained wider Assembly support. And 
two weeks later, on 14 December 1960, the UNGA adopted it as the 
Decolonisation Declaration 173  – with 89 states voting in favour, none 
against, 174  while Australia, Belgium, the Dominican Republic, France, 
Portugal, Spain, Britain, the Union of South Africa and the USA 
abstained.175  
 
The US abstention on the 14 December vote revealed the persisting 
ambivalence on ‘self-determination’. The US delegation had actually been 
involved in the preceding weeks’ 176  drafting of the African–Asian 
                                                
169 Martino, Italy, 937th plenary meeting, 6 December 1960, BL, p.1165–1166. 
170 Ormsby-Gore, UK, 925th plenary meeting, 28 November 1960, BL, p.983. 
171 UNDocA/L.323, on behalf of Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Chad, Ethiopia, 
Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, 
Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Togo, Tunisia and Turkey. In the end, 43 
African and Asian states were listed as sponsors of the draft. Besides this draft and the 
Soviet one, Honduras presented its own draft declaration, which did not gain support: 
UNDocA/L.324/REV.2, 7 December 1960. Honduras later described this as a 
‘supplement’ to the African–Asian draft, which it also voted for: Milla Bermudez, 
Honduras 937th plenary meeting, 6 December 1960, BL, p.1157. 
172 Nong Kimny, Cambodia, 926th plenary meeting, 28 November 1960, BL, p.989, and 
UNDocA/L.323. See also Kay 1967, p.790. 
173 With the minor change of removing quotation marks in referring to the work of the 
UN; see UNDocA/L.323 and UNGA Resolution 1514. See also Humphrey 1984; 
Romulo with Romulo 1986, pp.158–159. 
174 The USSR voted in favour of the resolution, but later described its own draft as having 
‘far more scope and substance, clarity and consistency’; see the submission of a letter 
by the USSR delegation (V. Zorin) from 30 December 1960, with a statement of 
Khrushchev from 27 December 1960, 4 January 1961, ARMSNY: S-0856, Box 5, File 
8, ‘Record 10631, Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries 
and Peoples, TR410, Jan 1960–Dec 1963’, p.5. 
175 947th plenary meeting, 14 December 1960, BL, p.1274. 
176 Palar, Indonesia, claimed the drafting had taken four weeks: 947th plenary meeting, 14 
December 1960, BL, p.1279. Indonesia had chaired the African–Asian working group 
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proposal.177 Exactly what their influence was on the text is unclear, but the 
Americans had commented on it already on 9 November. Apparently, the 
USA had worked with the UK to exclude from the draft any specific target 
dates for colonial independence, and to shift the focus from Western 
colonialism onto Soviet interference.178 When the African–Asian sponsors 
submitted the text to the UNGA, the US State Department internally 
described it as ‘a considerable improvement over previous drafts.’179 Only 
six days before the vote, the US Secretary of State and the US UN 
delegation had favoured it.180 Although President Dwight D. Eisenhower had 
been wary and had considered threatening to withdraw aid to countries 
planning on a positive vote, also he nonetheless concluded that a ‘yes’ 
stance on the Declaration might be proper.181 The following day, however, 
British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan seems to have convinced 
Eisenhower to abstain instead, apparently for the sake of Anglo-American 
harmony.182  
 
By eventually abstaining, the USA placed itself in the company of the 
European colonial powers, and against the UN majority. 183  This 
                                                                                                                        
drafting the declaration, see from Sukardjo Wirjopranoto, Permanent Representative of 
Indonesia to the UN, to Mongi Slim, President of the General Assembly, ARMSNY: 
699/0101, 6 December 1961, TR 412/1, ‘Special Committee of Seventeen Members on 
the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial 
Countries and Peoples (GA Res 1514 (XV)’, Jan 1960–Dec 1963, S-0443-0088, 10636. 
Kay 1967, p.790 claims the African–Asian group started informal discussions already 
on 10 October 1960, while the USA claimed it started around 1 November: Telegram 
from the Department of State to the Mission at the UN, Washington, November 1, 1960, 
FRUS 1958–1960, Vol.II, pp.431–432. 
177 On 1 November 1960, the State Department instructed the US delegation at the UN 
that the dangerously anti-colonial atmosphere created by the USSR submission of its 
colonial independence draft could be handled by submitting a ‘counter-resolution’. It 
suggested consultations with four countries, of which two (Turkey and Tunisia) were to 
be among the original co-sponsors of the 28 November draft, Telegram from the State 
Department, op.cit.  
178 Telegram from the State Department to the US UN Mission, 25 November 1960, FRUS 
1958–1960, Vol.II, p.447, referring to conversations with the UK delegation; and 
Telegram from the State Department to the UN Mission, Washington, 4 November1960, 
p.433; also Telegram from the State Department to the UN Mission, 30 November 
1960, p.450; Telegram from the American UN Mission (by Wadsworth) to the State 
Department, 14 December 1960, at 1 am, New York, p.458 
179 State Department to the UN Mission, 30 November 1960, ibid., p.450. 
180 Memorandum from the Secretary of State (Christian A. Herter) to the President’s Staff 
Secretary (A. Goodpaster), Washington, 8 December, ibid., p.454 
181 ‘Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the President and the Secretary 
of State’, Washington, 8 December 1960, ibid., p.456. 
182 Ibid., editorial note. 
183 Khrushchev was particularly pleased with this development: see Khrushchev 1974, 
p.482; also Solodovnikov 2006, p.191. 
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corresponded badly with US ambitions for a role as the promoter of freedom 
at the UN, or with its Cold War image concerns.184 Even the US delegation 
expressed unease. When the UNGA passed the Declaration, one US delegate 
showed her personal dissent with the official position of her country by 
standing up and applauding.185 Explaining the US vote to the plenary, 
Ambassador James J. Wadsworth proclaimed America’s ‘support of 
freedom’ and the Declaration’s ‘underlying principles’, before praising the 
Western colonial powers and condemning Soviet imperialism. He then 
added, ‘I am sure that the devotion of the United States to the principles of 
human freedom and political advancement will be judged by what the 
United States has done, is doing and will continue to do in the cause of 
freedom.’186 In a telegram to the State Department, Wadsworth admitted he 
was ‘shocked and disheartened’ by Washington’s ‘last minute reversal’, and 
warned that UNGA delegations had reacted strongly, emotionally and 
negatively towards the US abstention.187  
 
Remarkably, the USA again reversed its position in 1961, when it pleaded 
strong support for the Decolonisation Declaration and voted in favour of 
implementing it.188 At the UNGA that year, newly instated US President 
John F. Kennedy proclaimed that the ‘continuing tide of self-determination, 
which runs so strong, has our sympathy and our support’.189 It seems that, 
                                                
184 See Wadsworth 1966, p.181; Telegram from the State Department to the UN Mission, 
30 November 1960, FRUS 1958–1960, Vol.II, p.450. 
185 New York Times, 15 December, 1960. See also Kay, 1967, p.793. In his memoirs, 
Wadsworth expressed relief at finally being able to tell the truth about his work at the 
UN: Wadsworth 1962, p.8. 
186 Wadsworth, US, 947th plenary meeting, 14 December, 1960, BL, pp.1281–1284. 
187 Telegram from the US Mission at the UN (Wadsworth) to the State Department, New 
York, December 15, 1960, FRUS 1958–1960, Vol.II, pp.458, 460. For Wadsworth’s 
position on ‘self-determination’ specifically, see his 1966 memoirs, pp.141–153. 
188 Also Australia, Belgium, and the Dominican Republic voted in favour of implementing 
the Declaration. 
189 ‘The Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of 
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples’, from Permanent US Representative 
to the UN to the president of the GA, 25 November 1961, ARMSNY: S-0443-0088, 
10631, TR410, ‘Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and 
Peoples, Jan 1960–Dec 1963’, UNDocA/4985, p.12. Metz 1984, p.527 claims that the 
USA went from seeing colonial independence as a threat to seeing it as an opportunity. 
See also Louis (with Robinson) 2006. For criticism of the implementing committee, see 
e.g. Seymour M. Finger: ‘A New Approach to Colonial Problems at the United Nations’, 
International Organization, 26(1), 1972, pp.143–153, at p.143. Perhaps by then, the 
USA had concluded that it might continue to exert influence even in the African and 
Asian states that had recently become independent: see Louis (with Robinson) 2006, 
pp.467, 491; Kiely 2010, p.108. 
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despite its abstention on the 1960 vote, the USA was not ready to abandon 
its claim to stand as the world’s foremost promoter of freedom and self-
determination at the UN. 
 
That the European colonial powers too chose to abstain rather than vote 
against the Decolonisation Declaration is likely to have reflected more than 
a desire to avoid upsetting the world’s affinities on self-determination.190 
These states probably also appreciated that the language and legitimising 
standards of the final document were more closely aligned with their ideals 
than the Soviet proposal had been. The final text presented colonialism as 
merely being out of date, rather than outright morally condemnable,191 and 
elevated peace as its supreme objective.192 Significantly, the document also 
decried ‘[a]ny attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national 
unity and the territorial integrity of a country’.193 While these dispositions 
chimed well with those of Western states, the formal sponsors of the 
document must have prized the values of peace and non-interference as 
well, with many seeking to bolster their states’ recent independence beyond 
formal UN membership.194 
 
With this approach to ‘self-determination’, the 1960 Decolonisation 
Declaration cemented the concept’s international association with 
independent statehood, but also limited its realisable scope to colonies.195 
The document did not proclaim ‘self-determination’ as a more broadly 
applicable idea of freedom from inequality, dependence or domination, nor 
                                                
190 In arguing against the Declaration earlier in the UNGA session, they had foreshadowed 
that they would vote against it. See also Kay 1967, pp.808–809. 
191 See also Nong Kimny, Cambodia, 926th plenary meeting, 28 November 1960, BL, 
p.989. For an analytical argument against colonialism, see Ypi 2013. 
192 As did its sponsors: see BL: e.g. Vakil, Iran, 926th plenary meeting, 28 November 
1960, p.992; Obeid, Sudan, 935th plenary meeting, 5 December 1960, p.1133; and 
Jawad, Iraq, 937th plenary meeting, 6 December, p.1173; socialist delegates appraised 
the draft in similar terms: Nosek, Czechoslovakia, 926th plenary meeting, 28 
November, 1960, p.996; and Zorin, USSR, 939th plenary meeting, 7 December 1960, 
p.1188. On peace as the key overall ‘legitimizing concept’ for decolonisation, see 
Claude 1984, p.351; also Cassese 1979, p.141. 
193 UNDocA/L. 323. 
194 See Burke 2010, p.25, referring to attitudes expressed at Bandung; for a critical 
approach, see Jackson 1993. 
195 See Hannum 1996, p.49; Cassese 1979, p.147; Evan M. Brewer: ‘To Break Free from 
Tyranny and Oppression: Proposing a Model for Remedial Right to Secession in the 
Wake of the Kosovo Advisory Opinion’, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 45, 
2012, pp.245–292, at p.252. 
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did it infuse the concept with new international standards. With language 
strengthening established notions of peace, statehood, and non-
interference,196 as well as specifically existing borders,197 the Declaration 
invoked ideas that Wilson had first internationally articulated with the 
discourse of ‘self-determination’.198 
 
Conclusions 
The 1950–1960 UN debates revealed deep international disagreement on 
issues of colonial policy, and on whether the UN should adopt the three 
‘self-determination’ texts under discussion. The debates reflected Cold War 
geo-ideological interests and states’ concerns with their global standing and 
appeal. Legally and in policy terms, the main text resulting from this 1950–
1960 ‘moment’, the Decolonisation Declaration of 14 December 1960, was 
ground-breaking. It laid out the content of ‘self-determination’ as being 
colonial independence, and made the concept a realisable part of politics 
and law.  
 
In conceptual terms, however, the moment added little new. States’ 
discourse on ‘self-determination’ did not go beyond the conceptual frames 
set by Wilson and Lenin decades earlier. Again, international arguments on 
self-determination played out liberal-conservative and radical ideas of 
freedom. And again, a radical formulation of ‘self-determination’ sparked 
liberal-conservative attempts to take over the concept. During the ensuing 
debates, the international discourse reflected mainly the liberal-conservative 
standards of peace, order and non-interference: these would also be codified 
in the final Decolonisation Declaration. Previous chapters have shown that 
earlier international moments bolstered the liberal-conservative idea of 
freedom associated with ‘self-determination’, even though the radical one 
remained. This was also the case in the UN debates of the 1950s and 1960. 
                                                
196 See Robert H. Jackson: Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations and the 
Third World, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993, p.523. 
197 Colonies already had a separate legal status: see e.g. Benyamin Neuberger: ‘National 
Self-determination: Dilemmas of a Concept’, Nations and Nationalism, 1(3), 1995, 
pp.297–325, at p.315; also Koskenniemi 1994, p.256; Karen Knop: ‘Statehood: 
Territory, People, Government’, pp.95–116 in Koskenniemi and Crawford (eds), 2011, 
at p.100; Franck 1993, p.6. For a different perspective, see Kwaw Nyameke Blay: ‘Self-
determination Versus Territorial Integrity in Decolonization Revisited’, Indian Journal 
of International Law, 25, 1985, pp.386–410. 
198 See also Emerson 1965, p.495; Claude 1984 [1964], pp.351, 367. 
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The boundaries drawn up at this moment for the international meaning of 
self-determination remained intact until the 1990s break-up of the Soviet 
Union and socialist Yugoslavia. It was only from that point on that the 
question of the radical potential of self-determination, beyond the colonial 
context, started to be revived. Emerging from these circumstances, the 
2008–2010 ICJ proceedings on Kosovo then came to re-examine the 
concept at considerable length. 
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5. SELF-DETERMINATION TODAY: THE INTERNATIONAL 
COURT OF JUSTICE PROCEEDINGS ON KOSOVO 
 
Between 2008 and 2010, UN debate again brought the language of ‘self-
determination’ to the centre of international affairs. The occasion was the 
proceedings of the UN’s principal court, the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ), on Kosovo’s declaration of independence.1 On 17 February 2008, 
Kosovo had declared independence; in response, Serbia had requested the 
ICJ for an advisory opinion on the legality of the declaration.2 During the 
ensuing proceedings, dozens of states argued about the issue, including, for 
the first time in an ICJ case, all five members of the UN Security Council 
(UNSC).3 The ICJ statute allows any state to initiate proceedings of this 
kind, and the fact that the case occurred was not in itself remarkable.4 What 
made it extraordinary were the large number of states participating, and the 
prominent use of the language of ‘self-determination’. 
 
Unlike the 1950–1960 UN debates, the ICJ Kosovo case did not deal with 
whether ‘self-determination’ should be codified in documents of 
international law. Nor were the participants in the proceedings – state 
agents, the Court, and the judges on the ICJ panel – formally required to 
discuss ‘self-determination’. The question Serbia had put to the ICJ had 
been: ‘Is the unilateral declaration of independence by the Provisional 
Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo in accordance with international 
law?’ 5  In the final ICJ advisory opinion, which concluded that the 
declaration had not violated international law, the Court included only a 
                                                
1 See the ICJ website, www.icj-cij.org, accessed 26 January 2013. Unless otherwise stated, 
all ICJ materials cited in this chapter have been retrieved from its website. 
2 Serbia formally requested the UNGA to ask the ICJ to render an opinion; see UNGA 
Resolution 63/3, 8 October 2008. In the UNGA, 77 states voted for referring the 
question to the ICJ, while 74 abstained and 6 voted against. 
3 By April 2009, the ICJ had received written arguments from 37 states (including 
Kosovo), and 15 additional written comments by July. In December 2009, the Court 
heard the oral arguments of 29 states. Hereafter, countries’ written submissions are 
referred to by state name: written comments, as ‘comments’, and oral contributions as 
‘oral’. The Court referred to Kosovo as ‘the authors of the declaration of independence’ 
rather than as a ‘state’, and its submissions were, uniquely, called ‘contributions’. For 
the sake of simplicity, however, in the following I refer to Kosovo as a ‘state’ or 
‘country’, and its contributions as ‘submissions’. As of September 2013, Kosovo has 
been recognised as an independent state by 104 UN members, including the UK, where 
this thesis is submitted, as well as by my native Norway. 
4 For the rules of the court, see the ICJ Statute. 
5 UNGA Resolution 63/3 2008. 
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brief mention of ‘self-determination’.6  
 
Most states arguing before the ICJ nevertheless raised the question of 
whether, and how, the concept of ‘self-determination’ might apply to 
Kosovo. While few asserted unambiguously that it did, in explaining their 
positions to the world’s highest court, states revealed how they 
conceptualised self-determination, and, indirectly, the ideas of freedom 
invoked by the concept. Consequently, the final ICJ opinion did mention 
‘self-determination’, and some of the judges in the case chose to express 
their views on the concept in statements issued separately to the opinion of 
the Court.7 In subsequent comments, scholars have described the case as 
being one of ‘self-determination’. 8  By exposing the perspectives of 
significant states and institutions, the Kosovo proceedings provided unique 
insights into current international understandings of self-determination.9 In 
effect, the ICJ case was the furthest-reaching international debate on the 
concept since the 1950–1960 UN discussions. 
 
Followed closely around the world,10 the ICJ Kosovo proceedings involved 
                                                
6 ‘Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 
Respect of Kosovo’, ICJ, (‘Final Opinion’ hereafter), 22 July 2010. 
7 Three of the four judges voting against the Court’s opinion issued ‘dissenting opinions’, 
while four of the ten voting in its favour issued ‘separate opinions’. Two judges issued 
‘declarations’. Although these texts were without legal force, they are notable in 
conveying the reasoning of some of the most esteemed and influential minds of 
international law. 
8 E.g. Kaiyan H. Kaikobad: ‘Another Frozen Conflict: Kosovo's Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence and International Law’, pp.55–85 in Summers (ed.) 2011, p.55. 
9 See also Richard Caplan: ‘The ICJ’s Advisory Opinion on Kosovo’, PeaceBrief 55, 
United States Institute of Peace, 17 September 2010, p.3. 
10 For a few of the many scholarly and media comments on, and reactions to the case, 
besides the references below, see Björn Arp: ‘The ICJ Advisory Opinion on the 
Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 
Respect of Kosovo and the International Protection of Minorities’, German Law 
Journal, 11(8), 2010, pp.847–866, at p.847; Thomas Burri: ‘The Kosovo Opinion and 
Secession: The Sounds of Silence and Missing Links’, German Law Journal, 11(8), 
2010, pp.881–890, especially pp.881–882; Dan Bilefski: ‘World Court Rules Kosovo 
Declaration was Legal’, New York Times, 22 July 2010; Vuk Jeremic (Serbian Foreign 
Minister): ‘Kosovo’s Disastrous Precedent; Serbia Will Never Recognize this Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence; We Seek Peaceful Compromise’, Wall Street Journal, 27 
July, 2010; Hashim Thaci (Kosovo’s Prime Minister): ‘To Kosovans, Blair is a True 
Hero’, The Guardian, 2 September 2010; ‘Kosovo Independence Move Not Illegal, says 
UN Court’, BBC World News, 22 July 2010; China Daily: ‘ICJ Ruling Not to Change 
Russia’s Stance on Kosovo’, 23 July 2010; Taipei Times: ‘ICJ’s Kosovo Decision is 
Vague and Very Limited’, 28 July 2010; Tehran Times: ‘Will Ruling on Kosovo Entice 
other Regions?’, 24 July 2010; Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFERL): ‘Tartarstan 
Nationalist Leader Encouraged by Court Ruling on Kosovo’, 26 July 2010; RFERL: 
‘Karabakh Armenians Buoyed by Kosovo “Precedent”’, 27 July 2010; RFERL: 
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high stakes for more countries than only Kosovo and Serbia. As will be 
shown, Kosovo had really first emerged as an international issue in the 
context of the 1998–1999 Kosovo war, which had arisen from the early 
1990s breakup of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (hereafter: 
‘Yugoslavia’). Shortly after the end of the Cold War, these developments 
had raised fundamental questions on the standards guiding the conduct of 
international affairs, including territorial integrity, non-interference, and 
human rights.11 While there is no space here to investigate the post-Cold 
War evolution of such international norms, it should be noted that states’ 
positions on them were reflected by their roles in the Yugoslav wars, 
including that in Kosovo.12 The fact that, in the ICJ Kosovo case, arguments 
and ideas of states were markedly aligned to those expressed in the 1990s 
indicated the case was seen as an arena for defending also these earlier 
political and legal positions.  
 
Furthermore, after Kosovo had declared independence in 2008, Western 
states in particular had publicly defended and recognised its statehood, and 
                                                                                                                        
‘Transdniester Hails Court Ruling on Kosovo’, 28 July 2010; Joshua Keating: ‘So 
Kosovo is Legal. What Happens Now?’ Foreign Policy Blog, 22 July 2010; 
International Crisis Group: ‘Kosovo and Serbia after the ICJ Opinion’, Europe Report 
no 206, 26 August 2010. 
11 For a succinct summary see Marc Weller: ‘The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo’, 
International Affairs, 75(2), 1999, pp.211–251, at pp.213–218. See also Martti 
Koskenniemi: ‘“The Lady Doth Protest Too Much”: Kosovo, and the Turn to Ethics in 
International Law’, Modern Law Review, 65(2), 2002, pp.159–175; Christopher Coker: 
Humane Warfare, Routledge, London 2001. 
12 Literature abounds, much of it highly polemic and concentrated on the 1999 NATO 
intervention against Serbia; see e.g. Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O’Hanlon: Winning 
Ugly. NATO’s War to Save Kosovo, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, DC, 2000; 
Alex Bellamy: Kosovo and International Society, Palgrave, London 2002; Ted Galen 
Carpenter (ed.): NATO’s Empty Victory, Cato Institute, Washington, DC, 2000; Philip 
Hammond and Edward S. Herman (eds): Degraded Capability: The Media and the 
Kosovo Crisis, Pluto Press, London 2000; Michael Ignatiaff: Virtual War: Kosovo and 
Beyond, Holt, New York, 2000; Noam Chomsky: The New Military Humanism: Lessons 
from Kosovo, Pluto Press, London, 1999; James Gow: The Serbian Project and its 
Adversaries: A Strategy of War Crimes, Queen’s University Press, Kingston, 2003, 
dealing with the war in Bosnia as well as in Kosovo. For useful contemporary 
perspectives, see Slavoj Zizek: ‘Against the Double Blackmail’, Lacan Dot Com, 1999, 
accessed 30 January 2011 at www.lacan.com/kosovo.htm; Julie A. Mertus: Kosovo: 
How Myths and Truths Started a War, University of California Press, Berkeley, CA, 
1999; Antonio Cassese: ‘Ex iniuria ius oritur: Are We Moving Towards International 
Legitimation of Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures in the World Community?’, 
European Journal of International Law, 10, 1999, pp.23-30; for summaries of the 
diplomacy of the Kosovo war, see Richard Caplan: ‘International Diplomacy and the 
Crisis in Kosovo’, International Affairs, 74(4), 1998, pp.745–761 and Weller 1999. For 
the documents concluding the war, see the ‘Military Technical Agreement’ (‘Kumanovo 
Agreement’) between NATO’s KFOR and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia plus 
Serbia, 9 June 1999, and UNSC Resolution 1244, 10 June 1999. 
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continued to play a key role in its international administration,13 as had 
other, non-Western, states. On the opposing ‘side’ at the ICJ,14 states with 
close economic and political ties to Serbia, and those worried about 
secessionist claims from within their own borders, had made vocal public 
cases against Kosovo’s statehood. 15  Although this chapter concentrates 
narrowly on the discourse used in the ICJ case rather than the intricacies of 
the larger international context, this picture does go some way in explaining 
the intensity of state involvement in the proceedings. The ICJ case became a 
scene for political as much as legal deliberations.16 While only ‘advisory’, 
the Court proceedings gave rise to a battle about the legitimacy of countries’ 
wider standards and policies, on which participants may have expected the 
final opinion to provide an authoritative verdict.  
 
As in all other ICJ cases, participants in the Kosovo proceedings were state 
delegates and the judges of the Court. State delegations were composed of 
national diplomats as well as legal experts, some of whom held different 
citizenship than the state they represented at the ICJ. As to the Court’s 
fifteen judges, these had each been elected separately by the UNGA and the 
UNSC for a period of nine years.17 In the Kosovo proceedings, all fifteen 
participated up until the concluding vote, before which one judge resigned, 
leaving only fourteen to vote on the final advisory opinion. As in all ICJ 
cases, the judges were to ‘represent the main forms of civilization and the 
                                                
13 I return to Kosovo’s international statebuilding project below. Notably, these same 
countries had also been at the fore of the 1999 NATO intervention against Serbia over 
Kosovo, especially the USA and most of the EU. See e.g. Stephen Tierney: ‘The Long 
Intervention in Kosovo: A Self-determination Imperative?’, pp.249–278 in Summers 
(ed.) 2011. For Kosovo’s recognition, see e.g. Gary Wilson: ‘Self-determination, 
Recognition and the Problem of Kosovo’, Netherlands International Law Review, 2009, 
pp.455–481; Grace Bolton and Gezim Visoka: ‘Recognizing Kosovo's Independence: 
Remedial Secession or Earned Sovereignty?’, South East European Studies at Oxford, 
Occasional Paper 11/10, October 2010. 
14 Re ‘sides’ of the case: this refers to the countries that argued that the declaration was 
legal, and those arguing that it was not. 
15 For instance, Cyprus, Russia and Spain.  
16 The wider issue, as noted in the introduction to this thesis, that it in any event makes no 
sense to distinguish between the discourse of international politics and international 
law, is far beyond the scope of this chapter, and has been lucidly dealt with especially 
by Koskenniemi, 2011a (e.g. p.225); also 2011b, pp.57, 60–61; 1999, p.115; 2005. For 
references to the Kosovo case on the same theme, see Christopher J. Borgen: ‘The 
Language of Law and the Practice of Politics: Great Powers and the Rhetoric of Self-
Determination in the Cases of Kosovo and South Ossetia’, Chicago Journal of 
International Law, 10, 2009, pp.1–33, as well as Veton Surroi: ‘The ICJ Advisory 
Opinion on Kosovo: The Beginning of a New Road’, ISS Opinion, September 2010, p.1. 
17  After being proposed by a Permanent Court of Arbitration; ICJ Statute, Article 4. 
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principal legal systems of the world’,18 and came from a broad array of 
states. The judges did not speak at the Court on behalf of their own 
governments: they were to consider the Kosovo case independently in light 
of the applicable international law. 
 
This chapter examines the language of ‘self-determination’ in the ICJ 
Kosovo case and the ideas of freedom contained therein. It starts by looking 
at the background to the ICJ Kosovo case from the perspective of ‘self-
determination’ in international discourse. Then it turns to the language of 
the proceedings themselves, as presented in the arguments of participating 
states, the separately issued statements of ICJ judges, and the Court’s final 
opinion. The states participating in the case, it is worth noting, were not 
clustered into neat geopolitical categories. Whereas many Western states 
argued for the legality of Kosovo’s declaration of independence and 
statehood, several non-Western countries did so as well. Opposing them, 
Russia, China, a few EU countries, and others, argued against. While both 
sides used the language of ‘self-determination’, Kosovo’s supporters 
elaborated most on it and are thus more extensively cited here. Throughout, 
my analysis enquires into how the discourse of ‘self-determination’ at the 
ICJ expressed ideas of freedom. 
 
Background 
Decades had passed between the UN debates that had unfolded between 
1950 and 1960, and the ICJ Kosovo case, and ‘self-determination’ had of 
course been referred to in this period. Yet, none of these intermediate 
appearances had brought the concept back into the focus of international 
affairs as it had been during the First World War, in the UN Charter, or in 
the 1950–1960 UN debates. Furthermore, these in-between references did 
not implicate any other ideas, meanings or standards of legitimation than 
those already introduced in earlier international discourse. And they 
involved no important international discussions where participants sought 
legitimation for their arguments and ideas on self-determination by invoking 
ideas of freedom. A full discussion of these cases would go beyond the 
confines of this chapter, as well as being less pertinent to my investigation. 
                                                
18 Ibid., 9. 
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A few examples do, however, warrant mention. ‘Self-determination’ had 
been referred to in international diplomacy during the breakup of 
Yugoslavia, during the independence of the Baltic States from the USSR, as 
well as during German reunification. But the language of ‘self-
determination’ never became central to the Yugoslav case, as I will show. 
And since Baltic independence and German unification were instances of 
consensual self-determination, they prompted no deeper international 
debate. Moreover, neither case brought any new international 
conceptualisations. German ‘self-determination’ realised a scenario 
resembling the Aaland Islanders’ demands from decades earlier; and the 
self-determination of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania ‘restored’ their already 
acknowledged statehoods from Soviet occupation.19  
 
There had also been references to ‘self-determination’ at the ICJ specifically 
before the Kosovo proceedings commenced, notably in the cases of East 
Timor (1995) and Palestine (2004).20 Since East Timor was formally a 
colony, the Court’s confirmation of its self-determination simply repeated 
the 1960 Decolonisation Declaration’s framing of the concept.21 In the 
Palestine ICJ proceedings, the Court, without elaboration, merely asserted 
that the Palestinians had a right to self-determination. 22  Neither case 
challenged or further illuminated the concept of self-determination in 
international affairs, or placed it at the forefront of international discourse. 
 
In fact, until the ICJ Kosovo proceedings started, it was far from given that 
this would be the case that would bring ‘self-determination’ back onto the 
international agenda, or that Kosovo would even be internationally 
addressed in such terms. Kosovo’s Albanian population had sought to break 
                                                
19 See e.g. the Declaration of European Community Foreign Ministers, Brussels, 27 August 
1991. See also Lauri Mälksoo: Illegal Annexation and State Continuity: The Case of the 
Incorporation of the Baltic States by the USSR, Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden, 2003; 
Malksoo 1999. 
20 ‘East Timor (Portugal v. Australia)’ and ‘Legal Consequences of the Construction of a 
Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory’, ICJ. ‘Self-determination’ was also at issue 
in other ICJ cases: see e.g. ‘Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of 
South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council 
Resolution 276, Advisory Opinion’, ICJ, 21 June 1971 
21 East Timor Judgment, ICJ, 30 June 1995, pp.105–106, and the Court’s reasoning, p.103. 
22 And that Israel was violating this by building the wall; see also the oral arguments 
presented on 23–25 February 2004, Palestine Advisory Opinion ICJ, 9 July 2004. 
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away from Serbia’s rule ever since the 1912 occupation – initially through 
unification with other Albanian-populated areas, and then through equal 
recognition as a republic within Yugoslavia.23 From the 1990s, Kosovo had 
demanded separate statehood, confirming this in a 1991 referendum. 
However, while international institutions, including the League of Nations 
and the UN, had been aware of the situation of Kosovo’s Albanians from the 
start, their demands had not been registered as ones of ‘self-
determination’.24 The incorporation of Kosovo in the Kingdom of Serbs, 
Croats and Slovenes, established in 1918, did not occur with reference to 
‘self-determination’ either.25 And when socialist Yugoslavia was created in 
1943, Kosovo was included as an entity subordinate to the republics of the 
federation, as an autonomous province of Serbia.26 
 
International institutions and states had also ignored Kosovo’s prospects for 
self-determination when the Yugoslav federation collapsed in the early 
1990s. 27 Despite the increased oppression of the Serbian state, as well as 
Kosovo’s 1991 referendum and appeals for international recognition, the 
case went nowhere. 28  Kosovo was not an international priority. Since 
                                                
23 See Channer 2012.  
24 For the UN, see below; for the League of Nations, see Chapter 3, as well as British 
records from 1919, including at TNA: FO608/47, letter from Edith Durham to the 
Foreign Office, 18 February 1919, transmitted on 26 February, 4–6, and other reports 
including, in the same file, 9 and 119, as well as in FO608/30, 76/2/8–79/1/1 1919, 
correspondence from British observers on the ground to the Foreign Office, June and 
July 1919; and, records from February to April 1919 in FO608/47.  
25 See ‘South Eastern Europe and the Balkans’, TNA: FO925/ 30210 P.13, p.2. 
26 The Kosovo Albanians’ call for ‘self-determination’ and the right to union with Albania 
at the 1943–1944 ‘Bujan Conference’ did not achieve this end either; see Reka 2003, 
pp.42–43. 
27 The scholarship on Yugoslavia, its breakup, and the history of Kosovo is vast. For 
various approaches, see e.g. Susan Woodward: Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution 
after the Cold War, Brookings Institution, Washington, 1995; Sabrina Ramet: 
Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia 1962–1991, Indiana University Press, 
Bloomington, IN, 1992; Noel Malcolm: Kosovo. A Short History, Macmillan, London, 
1998; Denisa Kostovicova: Kosovo: The Politics of Identity and Space, Routledge, 
London, 2005; Besnik Pula: ‘The Emergence of the Kosovo “Parallel State” 1988–
1992’, Nationalities Papers, 32(4), 2004, pp.797–826; Caplan 1998; Weller 2009; John 
Williams: Legitimacy in International Relations and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, St. 
Martin’s Press, London, 1998; Bogdan Denitch: Ethnic Nationalism: The Tragic Death 
of Yugoslavia, University of Minnesota Press, London, 1994. For a recent contribution, 
see Josip Glaurdic: The Hour of Europe: Western Powers and the Breakup of  
Yugoslavia, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT, 2011. 
28 See ‘Letter from Dr Rugova to Lord Carrington, Peace Conference on Yugoslavia, 22 
December 1991’, referring to the EC Declaration on Yugoslavia of 16 December 1991 
inviting Yugoslav republics to apply for recognition and indicating criteria for 
recognition in Krieger (ed.) 1999, p.118. For the declaration, see Danilo Turk: 
‘Recognition of states: A Comment’, European Journal of International Law, 4, 1993, 
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Kosovo’s Albanian population were non-violent in their resistance to Serbia, 
the outright war elsewhere in Yugoslavia overshadowed their predicament.29 
If Kosovo came up at all in international discussions of the early 1990s, its 
chances of statehood seemed to be ruled out.30 The most direct international 
initiative on Kosovo at that time was a one-sentence, non-public ‘Christmas 
warning’ from outgoing US President George Bush (Sr) to Serbian leader 
Slobodan Milosevic. On 24 December 1992, Bush had stated that the USA 
would use force against Serbia if it caused conflict in Kosovo.31 Not then 
leading to any international action, and not mentioning ‘self-determination’, 
the warning indicated that the only way Kosovo could become a subject of 
high-level international affairs was if the level of violence there came to 
threaten international security. 
 
The language of ‘self-determination’ did appear internationally with some 
indirect relevance to Kosovo when the European Community (EC) in 1991 
tasked the Badinter Commission with legally assessing the breakup of 
Yugoslavia, of which Kosovo was then still part.32 From November 1991 to 
July 1992, the Commission issued ten opinions on the feasibility of 
internationally recognising the former Yugoslav republics as independent 
states, as well as, in brief, the applicability of ‘self-determination’ to Serbs 
in Bosnia and Croatia. None of these opinions mentioned Kosovo explicitly, 
and they were not legally binding – although, in the 2008–2010 ICJ 
proceedings, participating states came to refer to the Badinter opinions as 
authoritative on the legal issues of the Kosovo case.33 
 
In its first opinion, the Badinter Commission held that Yugoslavia was ‘in 
                                                                                                                        
pp.66–71, Annex 2, at p.73. 
29 For the situation in Kosovo around this time, see e.g. Kostovicova 2005 and Pula 2004. 
30 See e.g. Krieger (ed.) 1999, p.120; Weller (ed.) 1999, p.48. 
31 Quoted in Barton Gellman: ‘Slaughter in Racak Changed Kosovo Policy’, Washington 
Post, 18 April 1999.  
32 Formally, the Arbitration Committee of the Peace Conference on Yugoslavia – usually 
known as the ‘Badinter Commission’, after its president, Robert Badinter, who was also 
the President of the French Supreme Court. Its opinions were issued on the request the 
Chairperson of the Yugoslav Peace Conference, Lord Carrington. 
33 See contributions from the side of Serbia: Cyprus p.31; Romania p.37; Russia p.16; 
Serbia p.179; oral p.79; Spain p.18; Venezuela oral p.6; and on the side of Kosovo: 
Austria oral p.2; Denmark oral pp.12–13; USA p.55; Kosovo pp.148–156; comment 
p.66. In the scholarship on the ICJ case, Peter Hilpold: ‘The Kosovo Case and 
International Law: Looking for Applicable Theories’, Chinese Journal of International 
Law, 8,(1), 2009, pp.47–61 also describes the Badinter opinions as authoritative. 
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the process of dissolution’,34 and in its eighth, that this process had been 
completed.35 This meant that the ex-Yugoslav countries had not seceded 
from Yugoslavia, but had rather succeeded it as separate states, and that they 
hence had not set any precedents for the world’s other independence-
seeking groups. The language of Opinions 1 and 8 signalled that the 
Badinter Commission did not see the independence of the former Yugoslav 
republics as a matter of self-determination. While Germany did refer to 
‘self-determination’ when it recognised Slovenia and Croatia as independent 
soon after the Commission’s first opinion, other states eschewed such 
language.36 It is likely that they did so for fear of being seen as admitting 
that the non-colonial meaning of ‘self-determination’ could be the creation 
of new states, as this might have created unwanted precedents for other 
secessionist demands. 
 
Also the third opinion of the Badinter Commission had some bearing on the 
later ICJ debate on Kosovo’s self-determination and statehood, although 
that opinion did not address such questions directly. According to Opinion 
3, the boundaries between Yugoslavia’s republics ‘and possibly other 
adjacent independent states may not be altered except by agreement freely 
arrived at’.37 It affirmed the principle of uti possidetis, which the ICJ in a 
different context in 1986 had defined as the preservation of the boundaries 
of former colonies at the time of their independence.38 Not spelling out how 
this principle applied to the non-colonial Yugoslav case, Opinion 3 also left 
unnamed the ‘possibly other adjacent independent states’– so it remained 
unsaid whether Kosovo might one day be among them. However, none of 
the Commission’s opinions openly raised the issue of the boundaries of 
Yugoslavia’s non-republic entities, such as Kosovo.39  
                                                
34 Reproduced in Alain Pellet: ‘The Opinions of the Badinter Arbitration Committee: A 
Second Breath for the Self-Determination of Peoples’, European Journal of 
International Law, 3, 1992, pp.178–185, at p.183. 
35 Reproduced in Turk 1993, p.88. 
36 For international considerations on recognition of the former Yugoslav republics, see 
Richard Caplan: Europe and the Recognition of New States in Yugoslavia, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2005. 
37 In Pellet 1992, p.185. 
38 The ‘Frontier Dispute, Judgment’, ICJ, 22 December, 1986 (Burkina Faso v Mali), p.17. 
39 For criticism of the opinions’ ambiguity on the issue of borders, see e.g. Peter Radan: 
The Breakup of Yugoslavia and International Law, Routledge, London, 2002, pp.217–
220; 222–223; Martyn Rady: ‘Self-determination and the Dissolution of Yugoslavia’, 
Ethnic and Racial Studies, 19 (2), 1996, pp.379–390, at p.386. See also Caplan 2005, 
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It was only the Badinter Commission’s Opinion 2 that explicitly used the 
language of ‘self-determination’, in evaluating the application of the 
concept to Serbs in Bosnia and Croatia.40 That Opinion claimed that the 
1966 ICHRs had ‘established that the principle of the right to self-
determination serves to safeguard human rights. By virtue of that right every 
individual may choose to belong to whatever ethnic, religious or language 
community he or she wishes.’ 41  Notwithstanding this odd proposition, 
Opinion 2 called for granting minority and other internal rights to the Serbs 
in Bosnia and Croatia, and for general recognition of the ‘identity’ of 
‘ethnic, religious or language communities’. While not directly rejecting the 
idea that such communities might also have independence, the Opinion 
seemingly embraced a ‘human rights’ idea of self-determination, which 
would allow the concept to be realised through individual rights guarantees 
instead of secession.42 However, also this opinion failed to bring up the 
particular case of Kosovo. 
 
Even the international handling of the 1998–1999 Kosovo war did not 
produce any definite guidelines on Kosovo’s self-determination. Having 
been left out of the international handling of the war in Bosnia, Kosovo 
started to receive international attention only when war in Kosovo itself 
threatened the stability of the wider region.43 From 1997, the Kosovo 
Liberation Army (KLA) had begun targeting Serbia’s policemen and 
military to achieve independence from the Serbian state,44 to which Serbia 
had responded with massive violence. Reacting to the escalation, the 
international community became involved over the course of 1998.  
                                                                                                                        
pp.69–71. 
40 In Pellet 1992, pp.183–184. 
41 Ibid., p.184. 
42 See also James Ker-Lindsay: ‘Not Such a “Sui Generis” Case After All: Assessing the 
ICJ Opinion on Kosovo’, Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and 
Ethnicity, 39(1), 2011, pp.1–11, at p.2. 
43 See Caplan 1998 for a summary of the early international involvement, as well as 
Krieger (ed.) 1999 and Weller (ed.) 1999 for original statements and resolutions from 
the relevant international organs like the OSCE, UN and NATO. Concerns for regional 
stability were exacerbated by the 1997 breakdown of the Albanian state, which greatly 
increased the inflow of weapons to Kosovo, and by the fact that neighbouring 
Macedonia and Montenegro, as well as Serbia ‘proper’, all contained sizable dissatisfied 
Albanian minority populations. For a journalistic account, see Judah 2002. 
44 Specifically, KLA members swore an oath to fight for the ‘liberation of all occupied 
Albanian territory and their unification’ (cited in Channer 2012, p.81). 
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With the worsening war, a conference in Rambouillet in early 1999 brought 
together key international actors as well as representatives from Kosovo and 
Serbia.45 The Accords resulting from the conference stated, inter alia, that 
Kosovo’s future status should be determined by consulting ‘the will of the 
people’ as well as other factors of the case.46 After US representatives 
assured the Kosovo delegation that this meant a referendum on 
independence after three years, Kosovo accepted the Accords, while Serbia 
rejected them.47 Although the formal meaning of the reference to the ‘will of 
the people’ was unclear, and the Accords had no direct legal force, also they 
would be briefly cited during the ICJ case, in support of independence for 
Kosovo.48  
 
Soon after the Rambouillet conference, NATO initiated a bombing 
campaign against Serbia – according to its Secretary-General, ‘not to 
conquer or preserve territory but to protect the values on which the alliance 
was founded’.49 Meanwhile, Kosovo’s self-determination demands remained 
off the table,50 and the territorial integrity of the ‘Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia’ (FRY) was affirmed.51 The international documents adopted 
when the Kosovo war ended in June 1999 did not refer to ‘self-
determination’.52 NATO had conducted the bombing campaign for the sake 
of the values of peace, regional stability and international security, and not 
to realise Kosovo’s self-determination as statehood. 53  By avoiding the 
                                                
45 Primarily the Contact Group, consisting of France, Germany, Italy, Russia, the UK, and 
the USA 
46 See Weller 1999, p.245. For the original documents, see Krieger (ed.) 1999 and Weller 
(ed.) 1999. 
47 Weller 1999, especially p.232; author’s interviews with participants at Rambouillet on 
conditions of anonymity, 2006. 
48 France 2009, p.29. 
49 Javier Solana: ‘NATO’s success in Kosovo’, Foreign Affairs, 78, 1999, pp.114–120, at 
p.114. 
50 See e.g. Part II, A, of the ICJ’s background dossier to the Kosovo case, 12 November 
1998 S/1998/1068, ‘Report of the Secretary-General Prepared Pursuant to Resolutions 
1160 (1998), 1199 (1998) and 1203 (1998) of the Security Council’, p.3. 
51 Weller 1999, pp.216. FRY was established in 1992, but internationally recognised only 
in 2000. In 2003 it morphed into the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, which 
dissolved with the independence of Montenegro in 2006. 
52 See especially UNSC Resolution 1244 (1999). For a contemporary view on Kosovo’s 
‘self-determination’, see International Crisis Group: Intermediate Sovereignty as a Basis 
for Resolving the Kosovo Crisis, Balkans Report N°46, Brussels, 9 November 1998.  
53 See also Thomas H. Lee: ‘International Law, International Relations Theory and 
Preemptive War: The Vitality of Sovereign Equality Today’, Law and Contemporary 
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language of ‘self-determination’ throughout the Kosovo war, international 
agents indicated that they regarded the concept as both unclear and possibly 
dangerously precedent-setting if invoked without colonial associations.  
  
Significantly, when the UN in 2008–2009, as a standard procedure in 
preparing for ICJ advisory cases, compiled a background dossier to the 
Kosovo proceedings, it included the Badinter Commission’s Opinions 1, 2, 
and 8, as well as the Rambouillet Accords.54 All materials contained in the 
dossier were ‘to throw light upon the question on which the advisory 
opinion of the Court [was] requested’.55 In this light, it seems striking that 
the UN decided to incorporate in the dossier all key international legal texts 
that referred to ‘self-determination’: the 1945 UN Charter and the 1960 
Decolonisation Declaration, as well as the 1966 ICHRs and the 1970 
Friendly Relations Declaration. 
 
Of these materials, the UN’s selection of the 1960 Decolonisation 
Declaration was particularly noteworthy. As explained in the previous 
chapter, that Declaration proclaimed independence for colonies, with 
reference to self-determination. International law had never defined Kosovo 
as a ‘colony’. ‘Self-determination’ appeared to be the only plausible link 
between the 1960 Declaration and the ICJ Kosovo case, and the explanation 
for the inclusion of that document in the dossier. While Kosovo itself had 
employed the language of ‘self-determination’ in calling for statehood 
before the ICJ case, neither the UN nor any other key international 
institution had discussed Kosovo in such terms.56 With its choice of material 
for the background dossier, and especially by reproducing the 
Decolonisation Declaration, the UN now signalled that the concept of self-
                                                                                                                        
Problems, 167, Autumn 2004, pp.147–167, especially p.155. 
54 The ICJ had ordered the dossier on 17 October 2008; the UN Office of the Legal 
Counsel compiled it on behalf of the UN Secretary-General, which submitted it to the 
ICJ on 30 January 2009: Final Opinion, p.5, Introductory Note to the dossier, 
misleadingly dated 10 October 2008; author’s correspondence with ICJ staff, 17 
September 2012. For Badinter and Rambouillet, see, respectively, III-C, ‘Regional 
Instruments in the Context of the Former Yugoslavia’, pp.5–14, and II-B, ‘Security 
Council Resolution 1244 (1999)’, pp.5–88.  
55 ICJ background dossier, Introductory Note, p.1 and ICJ Statute, 65(2). 
56 For Kosovo’s language, see below; for the international community’s language, see the 
dossier, Parts I (on the request for the ICJ opinion) and II (on the UN’s Kosovo 
involvement from 1998–1999 onwards, including on the UN interim administration 
Mission in Kosovo, UNMIK, and the UN-led process of determining Kosovo’s status). 
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determination was worth discussing with regard to Kosovo’s declaration of 
independence. 
 
State participants in the ICJ Kosovo proceedings had had access to this 
background dossier before submitting their own first arguments to the 
Court.57 The composition of the dossier, therefore, not only indicates a UN 
perspective on the law, questions and concepts involved in the question of 
the legality of Kosovo’s declaration of independence. It also reveals what 
the proceedings’ participants knew about the UN’s interpretations and 
expectations before they formalised their own opinions. The dossier, 
effectively, informed participants of where the UN anticipated the case 
would go before they submitted their own, earliest positions. Reading that 
dossier would have made them prone to conclude that the UN expected 
them to address ‘self-determination’, and to clarify how the concept applied 
to Kosovo.  
 
Since states and international institutions generally did not see Kosovo’s 
independence claim as a demand for decolonisation,58 to consider the case as 
a matter of ‘self-determination’ would have radical implications. The 
previous chapter showed how the 1960 Decolonisation Declaration 
authoritatively restricted the connection between ‘self-determination’ and 
political independence to colonies alone, and legitimised it with a liberal-
conservative idea of freedom. At the time of the Kosovo case, the language 
of ‘self-determination’ was not commonly associated with the radical idea 
of freedom as equality and statehood for non-colonial, non-state groups. 
Presenting the demand of the non-colonial Kosovo people for freedom in 
the form of equal statehood, as an issue of ‘self-determination’ thus 
reintroduced the concept’s association with the radical idea. 
 
Another document in the background dossier expressed a similarly radical 
understanding of Kosovo’s independence and the concept of ‘self-
                                                
57 Author’s Skype interview with legal counsel in the proceedings, on the condition of 
anonymity, 17 September 2012; Final Opinion, p.5. The dossier was also made 
available on the Court’s website. All original interviews referred to here were conducted 
by the author, on conditions of anonymity. 
58 However, in the ICJ case, Kosovo comment, p.81, and Switzerland, p.20, did argue that 
Kosovo was a NSGT.  
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determination’ in international affairs. This was a declaration adopted by 
Kosovo’s Assembly in 2005. 59  Its preamble cited the UN Charter’s 
affirmation of the right of peoples to self-determination, and pronounced 
‘the legitimate aspiration of Kosovo[’s] population to [live] in Freedom and 
peace with other people.’ The declaration then called for a referendum, and 
independence for Kosovo. In sum, the declaration issued a radical demand 
for freedom and self-determination as a matter of achieving a status equal to 
that of other independent states. 
 
Also Kosovo included in its first submission in the ICJ proceedings a central 
document that expressed the radical idea of freedom. This document 
contained the minutes of the 2008 meeting that had adopted Kosovo’s 
independence declaration. Within the text of the internationally-formulated60 
declaration of independence, ‘freedom’ appeared only in a promise to 
‘respect the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all […] citizens’ – 
whereas ‘self-determination’ had not been mentioned.61 But in the meeting 
at which independence had been declared, the idea of ‘freedom’ had 
emerged in a different guise: Kosovo’s President, Prime Minister and the 
Assembly Speaker had all used the language of ‘freedom’,62 and the Speaker 
had asserted: ‘There can be real peace and freedom only between equals.’63 
Moreover, while stressing Kosovo’s desire for and contribution to peace, the 
speakers had also cited the ‘sacrifice’ of the KLA, the guerrilla army which 
in the 1990s had taken up arms to end Serbian rule.64  
 
Since these 2008 minutes were relevant to the question of the ICJ case – the 
legality of Kosovo’s declaration of independence – it must be presumed that 
participants had studied them before entering the proceedings, together with 
the UN dossier. With this in mind, the wide use of the language of ‘self-
                                                
59 On 17 November 2005, ICJ background dossier, II-I, unpaginated 
60 Author’s interviews in Kosovo, 2010 and 2012; Susan Woodward: ‘Varieties of State-
building in the Balkans: A Case for Shifting Focus’ pp.47–54 in Martina Fischer and 
Beatrix Schmelzle (eds): Building Peace in the Absence of States: Challenging the 
Discourse on State Failure, Berghof Handbook Dialogue Series, Berlin, 2009, at p.50. 
61 ‘Kosovo Declaration of Independence’, 17 February 2008, Background dossier, II-H, 
unpaginated. 
62 ‘Extraordinary session of the Assembly of Kosovo, held on 17 February 2008’, Kosovo, 
Annex 2: Speaker Jakup Krasniqi, p.226/2; Prime Minister Thaci, p.228/4; President 
Fatmir Sejdiu, p.232/8. 
63 Ibid., p.226/2, Krasniqi. 
64 Ibid. 
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determination’ in the ICJ case becomes less surprising.65 A literal reading of 
the question to the Court (a reading which some participants disputed66) 
would entail addressing only Kosovo’s declaration of independence, not the 
independence itself or the applicability of self-determination. But the 
arguments of the proceedings centred almost exclusively on precisely such 
wider issues.67 When, in the end, the Court issued a narrow opinion that did 
not clarify the role of self-determination,68 it was criticised for having done 
so.69 The radical allusions of the UN dossier and the earlier articulations of 
Kosovo’s demands seem to have prompted anticipations that, in the ICJ 
case, the international meaning of ‘self-determination’ hung in the balance.70 
 
Debating ‘Self-determination’ at the ICJ  
Like those involved in the 1950–1960 UN debates, participants in the ICJ 
Kosovo case shared some assumptions on the international meaning of ‘self-
determination’ – although they disagreed on the concrete practical 
implications and legal relevance of the concept. A common assumption in 
the ICJ proceedings was that, in a non-colonial context, self-determination 
should first and foremost be implemented without leading to the creation of 
a new state. In non-colonial settings, the primary way to realise self-
                                                
65 Author’s interviews with participants on various legal teams. One senior legal counsel 
noted that his team never even considered not addressing ‘self-determination’. 
66 See e.g. Russia oral, p.40. See also Judges Trindade, p.13; Yusuf p.5; Simma, p.2, and 
Sepúlveda-Amor, p.7 – all of whom voted in favour of the final opinion. 
67 However, some – including the UK and the Netherlands – stressed the narrower 
argument that international law had nothing to say about declarations of independence. 
68 Final Opinion, p.43. 
69 See especially Judge Yusuf’s separate opinion, p.5. For scholarly criticism, see e.g. 
Burri 2010, p.882; Daphné Richemond-Barak: ‘The International Court of Justice on 
Kosovo: Missed Opportunity or Dispute “Settlement”?’, Hague Yearbook of 
International Law, 2011, unpaginated, accessed 10 June 2013, 
portal.idc.ac.il/FacultyPublication.Publication?PublicationID=1616&FacultyUserName
=YmFyYWsuZGFwaG5l; ‘Recent International Advisory Opinion’, Harvard Law 
Review, 124, 2010 pp.1098–1105; John R. Ablan: ‘Signal and Affirm: How the United 
Nations Should Articulate the Right to Remedial Secession’, Vanderbilt Journal of 
Transnational Law, 45, 2012, pp.211–244, at pp.212, 217. Serbia’s formulation of the 
question to the court has been criticised as well, e.g. in Theodore Christakis: ‘The ICJ 
Advisory Opinion on Kosovo: Has International Law Something to Say about 
Secession?’, Leiden Journal of International Law, 24(1), 2011, pp.73–86, at p.75; Hurst 
Hannum: ‘The Advisory Opinion on Kosovo: An Opportunity Lost, or a Poisoned 
Chalice Refused?’, Leiden Journal of International Law, 24(1), 2011, pp.155–161; 
Roland Tricot and Barrie Sander: ‘The Broader Consequences of the International Court 
of Justice’s Advisory Opinion on the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect 
of Kosovo’, Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 49, 2011, pp.321–363. For a 
defence of the Court’s narrow approach, see Marc Weller: ‘Modesty Can Be a Virtue: 
Judicial Economy in the ICJ Kosovo Opinion?’, Leiden Journal of International Law, 
24(1), 2011, pp.127–147. 
70 In the proceedings, Burundi oral, p.39 expressed this most directly.  
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determination had to be as ‘internal self-determination’. This shared 
assumption made the ICJ Kosovo case the most prominent exposition ever 
of international arguments and ideas on the role of ‘internal self-
determination’ in international affairs. 
 
‘Internal self-determination’, as explained in the introduction to this thesis, 
is not a notion originating from international law, but one that gained 
prominence in scholarship especially from the 1990s. The clearest legal 
expression of ‘internal self-determination’ might be the 2007 UNGA 
Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, but not even that 
Declaration employed that specific wording.71 Scholarship and law alike 
leave it unclear what ‘internal’ self-determination might add to the more 
familiar notions of ‘human rights’ and ‘democracy’, or what its usefulness 
might be in cases where peoples demand self-determination in terms of 
statehood. 
 
Given the uncertain substance and unconfirmed legal status of ‘internal self-
determination’ it is remarkable that states in the ICJ proceedings presented 
near-identical views on the general content of the idea. ‘Internal self-
determination’, they stated, meant a right to ‘participation’,72 representative 
government,73 respect for human rights,74 and equality before the law in an 
existing state.75 While some also mentioned territorial ‘autonomy’ as a way 
of realising ‘internal self-determination’,76 participants broadly expressed 
that the notion was concerned with individual rather than group rights. All 
maintained that if practical realities allowed ‘self-determination’ to be 
realised internally, that would be preferable, and come at the expense of the 
option of independence. However, while all agreed that ‘internal self-
determination’ should be prioritised before self-determination qua 
statehood, states diverged on the consequences of these assumptions for the 
                                                
71 UNGA resolution 61/295, 2007. Its article 46(1) is phrased in the same terms as the 
ICHRs. In the ICJ Kosovo proceedings, the 2007 Declaration was not included in the 
court’s background dossier, and only a few states referred to it explicitly: Malcolm 
Shaw for Serbia, p.67; Kosovo p.41, and James Crawford on behalf of the UK, p.53. 
72 Albania, p.19, and Bolivia oral p.11.  
73 E.g. Netherlands p.9. 
74 E.g. Romania p.23. 
75 E.g. Venezuela oral p.12. 
76 Germany p.33; Finland p.3; Bolivia oral p.11 and Belorussia oral p.29. Albania p.39 
also implied this as a possibility. 
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Kosovo case.  
 
To start with the arguments in favour of the Serbian case, opposing the 
legality of Kosovo’s declaration of independence. These held that, although 
Kosovo might have a right to ‘internal self-determination’, that would 
preclude it from gaining separate statehood. In Serbia’s words, ‘[a]n 
exercise of internal self-determination logically bars an exercise of external 
self-determination, as the former is, as a matter of fact, only applicable 
within the territory of the State concerned.’77 The only form of ‘self-
determination’ Kosovo might be allowed would thus prevent it from 
achieving full independence. The very few of Serbia’s supporters who 
conceded that a people might be granted self-determination as independence 
in exceptional non-colonial cases were at pains to stress that Kosovo was 
not such a case.78  
 
From this perspective, the reason for not letting ‘self-determination’ lead to 
statehood for Kosovo was that the principle of territorial integrity ruled out 
such outcomes, in the interest of international stability. As the supreme 
guarantor of world peace, territorial integrity always triumphed over self-
determination. 79  Allowing exceptions to this rule would threaten 
international peace and interfere with states’ freedom to decide over their 
own affairs. 80  In particular, accepting Kosovo’s self-determination as 
statehood in violation of the principle of territorial integrity would create an 
alarming precedent for other secession-seeking groups, endangering the 
very international order.81 At the end of the ICJ proceedings, one of the 
                                                
77 Serbia comment p.139. 
78 Especially Romania and Russia. Less directly, Belorussia and Burundi made similar 
cases. 
79 See e.g. Egypt 2009, p.20 (Egypt notably changed its position after the fall of President 
Mubarak, and recognised Kosovo in 2013). See also the arguments of Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil, China, Iran, Romania, Serbia, Spain, Venezuela, Vietnam, and Judge 
Koroma. Since the Kosovo war, scholars have seen the tension between territorial 
integrity and self-determination as central to the case of Kosovo; see e.g. Weller 1999, 
p.213 and Elizabeth Chadwick: ‘Post-World War 2 Exercises of Self-determination: 
“Peaceful”, “Friendly”, and “Other”’, pp.213–247 in Summers (ed.) 2011, p.221; Ablan 
2012, p.222; and Koskenniemi 2002, especially pp.163, 167. 
80 See the arguments of Azerbaijan, Bolivia, Brazil, China, Cyprus, Egypt, Iran, Libya, 
Romania, Russia, Serbia, Spain, Venezuela, Vietnam, as well as Vice President Tomka 
and Judge Koroma. 
81 See e.g. Cyprus comment 2009, pp.14–15. The same argument was made by, in 
particular, Bolivia, Iran, Serbia, Spain, as well as by Argentina, and by Judges Sotnikov 
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judges summed up these concerns with language that expressed a variant of 
Lansing’s arguments against Wilson from almost a hundred years earlier: 
 
International law does not confer a right on ethnic, linguistic or 
religious groups to break away from the territory of a State of which 
they form part, without that State’s consent, merely by expressing 
their wish to do so. To accept otherwise, to allow any ethnic, 
linguistic or religious group to declare independence and break away 
from the territory of the State of which it forms part, outside the 
context of decolonization, creates a very dangerous precedent. 
Indeed, it amounts to nothing less than announcing to any and all 
dissident groups around the world that they are free to circumvent 
international law simply by acting in a certain way and crafting a 
unilateral declaration of independence, using certain terms. The 
Court’s Opinion will serve as a guide and instruction manual for 
secessionist groups the world over, and the stability of international 
law will be severely undermined.82 
 
This passage brought out yet another point frequently raised by the pro-
Serbia side: that Kosovo’s claim to self-determination and independence 
was illegitimate because its population was a non-colonial group which no 
international authority had defined as a ‘people’.83 Many participants in the 
ICJ case held that only a colony would count as a ‘people’ entitled to 
statehood based on ‘self-determination’.84 And instead of being a colonised 
people, Kosovo’s Albanians were a minority whose rights extended no 
further than to human rights within Serbia. 85  Being internationally 
recognised as a political entity is typically the aim of a declaration of 
                                                                                                                        
and Koroma. The issue of precedent has been widely discussed in the scholarship, 
sometimes in highly alarmist terms, see e.g. Miodrag A. Jovanovic: ‘Is Kosovo and 
Metohija Indeed a “Unique Case”?’, pp.345–374 and Snezana Trifunovska: ‘The Impact 
of the “Kosovo Precedent” on Self-determination Struggles’, pp.375–393, both in 
Summers (ed.) 2011; Thomas Fleiner: ‘The Unilateral Secession of Kosovo as a 
Precedent in International Law’, pp.1–23 in Fastenrath et al. (eds), 2011; Ralph Wilde: 
‘Self-determination, Secession, and Dispute Settlement after the Kosovo Advisory 
Opinion’, Leiden Journal of International Law, 24(1), 2011, pp.149–154, at p.152; 
Marcelo G. Kohen and Katherine del Mar: ‘The Kosovo Advisory Opinion and UNSCR 
1244 (1999): A Declaration of “Independence from International Law”?’, Leiden 
Journal of International Law, 24(1), 2011, pp.109–126, at p.123 (both serving as legal 
counsels on Serbia’s legal team); Ker-Lindsay 2011, pp.3, 7. 
82 Judge Koroma, p.2. 
83 For example Argentina, Russia, Serbia, and Spain. 
84 Including Belorussia, Bolivia, Cyprus, Egypt, Romania, Slovenia, Venezuela, as well as 
Judge Koroma. Some cited the 1960 Decolonisation Declaration to this effect: e.g. 
Belorussia oral 2009, p.29; Bolivia comment 2009, p.3; oral p.11; China p.4. Serbia, 
p.190, claimed that the 1960 Declaration had ‘set the terms’ for international discourse 
on ‘self-determination’; see also p.216. Similar views were also presented by Kosovo, 
comment p.63, and UK p.89. 
85 See the arguments of Argentina, Azerbaijan, Belorussia, Cyprus, Egypt, Iran, Romania, 
Russia, Serbia, Slovenia and Venezuela. 
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independence. But with this argument, Serbia and its supporters demanded a 
kind of international recognition prior to such an act. 
 
Turning now to the arguments for Kosovo’s case – support for ‘internal self-
determination’ there formed part of a quite different line of reasoning. These 
arguments tended to maintain that since Serbia had interfered with Kosovo’s 
‘internal self-determination’ through oppression in the 1990s, Kosovo’s 
declaration of independence was legal and its statehood legitimate. 86 
Obviously, this argument contradicted Serbia’s position by accepting 
Kosovo as an independent state. But also this pro-Kosovo line placed 
‘internal self-determination’ at its fore. It was only because and after 
internal rights had been violated and ‘internal self-determination’ had 
become unviable, that statehood had emerged as justified for Kosovo.  
 
Interestingly, in making this case, Kosovo’s supporters rarely argued that 
independence had realised its ‘self-determination’, or that its statehood was 
legitimate as an expression of that concept. They assumed that self-
determination could (and should) be realised internally, without secession, 
and were hesitant to acknowledge that the concept could mean state creation 
for non-colonies.87 Only one country – Finland, to which I return briefly – 
portrayed Kosovo’s independence as legitimate primarily for expressing its 
‘self-determination’. All other participants were wary of such language, and 
some avoided it altogether.88 A few, Kosovo among them, pleaded to the 
Court to ignore ‘self-determination’ when issuing its final advisory 
opinion.89 One Kosovo-backer stated outright that Kosovo’s statehood was 
not based on self-determination, since only colonies could have 
independence on this ground.90 Participants not only appeared sceptical to 
basing Kosovo’s statehood on self-determination – they also seemed to 
doubt that non-colonial self-determination could ever mean independence. 
 
                                                
86 Including – to varying degrees – Albania, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, the 
Netherlands and Switzerland. 
87 See e.g. the submissions of Albania, Finland, Jordan, the Netherlands and Switzerland.  
88 Notably Austria, whose arguments narrowly maintained that international law does not 
address (and thus does not prohibit), declarations of independence: see Austria, p.22 and 
oral pp.6–7, 9, 11. 
89 See Kosovo’s submissions, as well as Albania, Austria, Denmark, Norway and the UK. 
90 Japan, pp.4–5. 
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Nearly all of Kosovo’s supporters relied upon an argument which was the 
opposite of providing general support to ‘self-determination’ as new state 
creation. It was, as they saw it, not any such broad concept of self-
determination, but rather a combination of extraordinary features that had 
given legitimacy to Kosovo’s independence. Its statehood was justified only 
as a sui generis case: a singular exception to the general rule of not allowing 
peoples independence.91 Almost half of the promoters of this sui generis 
argumentation in the ICJ proceedings did not mention ‘self-determination’ 
at all,92 while the rest of that group, including Kosovo itself, cited ‘self-
determination’ as a secondary point.93 This prevalent ‘flagship argument’94 
on the Kosovo side implicitly assumed that its case was not a matter of 
equality either, since its unique characteristics set it apart. 
 
In making the case that Kosovo’s independence was such a rare aberration, 
states at the ICJ emphasised Serbia’s brutality from 1989 – especially in the 
1998–1999 war – and also listed other features which they claimed had 
made the case unique. The violent breakup of Yugoslavia, Kosovo’s post-
1999 status under international administration, and the years of UN-led, 
ultimately failed, status negotiations, they said, had left Kosovo with no 
other option than to declare independence.95 Some added further supposedly 
sui generis elements: Kosovo’s special status within the Yugoslav 
federation,96 its whole post-1912 history,97 being under Serbian occupation,98 
the expressed desire of its people for independence,99 and post-independence 
commitments to minority rights.100 One state held that, when setting the 
terms for post-war Kosovo, UNSC Resolution 1244 of 1999 might have 
                                                
91 Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Kosovo, Latvia, the Maldives, the Netherlands, Poland, 
Slovenia and the UK all made such cases. Outside of the ICJ case, Kosovo’s post-
independence international administrators argued in such terms as well: see 
International Civilian Office (ICO) chief Pieter Feith: ‘Consolidating Kosovo’s 
European Future: Tracing Next Steps’, LSE, 13 May 2009 (audio). 
92 Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, France, Luxemburg and the USA. The UK avoided 
self-determination throughout its dozens of pages of written submissions, but mentioned 
it briefly at the very end of its oral statement. 
93 Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Latvia, Maldives, Poland, Slovenia, as well as Kosovo.  
94 Serbia, comment, p.209. 
95 Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Kosovo, Latvia, Maldives, the Netherlands, Poland, 
Slovenia and the UK all argued along these lines. 
96 E.g. Denmark oral, p.47; Ireland, p.10; Japan p.6; Poland pp.5, 16. 
97 Germany 2009, p.27. 
98 Kosovo oral p.16. 
99 Ireland 2009, p.11. See also Japan p.7. 
100 France 2009, p.29. See also Japan p.7, Latvia pp.1–2. 
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exceptionally opened for statehood by indirectly endorsing the Rambouillet 
Accords and their reference to ‘the will of the people’.101 
 
Clearly, none of these features in isolation would qualify as sui generis. 
Throughout history, innumerable groups have been oppressed and denied 
internal rights. Many have expressed a desire for self-determination and 
independence. Sometimes, internationally-led negotiations have failed. Also 
other cases than Kosovo have involved international administration, for 
instance East Timor and Bosnia, as well as mandates and trusteeships in 
earlier times. Moreover, occupation is nothing new in international history – 
the Baltic States provide other recent examples. Nor were the intuitively 
more exceptional features of the Kosovo case altogether distinctive. Its 
formal status within Yugoslavia, for instance, was like that of the 
federation’s other Serbian province, Vojvodina. Taken together, the 
characteristics of Kosovo’s case no doubt constitute ‘something’ unique. 
But then, no two cases will hold the exact same sum of characteristics. Each 
will always involve its own special combination of features, as pointed out 
by participants on both sides of the ICJ proceedings.102  
 
The argument that Kosovo’s independence was legitimate sui generis 
contrasted the warnings of Serbia’s supporters that it would set a dangerous 
precedent and open for destabilising challenges to the existing international 
order. While Kosovo’s promoters also emphasised peace and order, they 
held that in this very special instance it was independence that would truly 
serve the peace.103  Moreover, since the case of Kosovo could not be 
compared to any other, accepting its statehood would strengthen rather than 
undermine the general rule of non-disruptive solutions as the standard. 
Instead of creating precedence for other independence-seeking groups, 
approving Kosovo’s statehood on sui generis grounds would signal that this 
was generally not a favoured result. 104  By arguing that Kosovo’s 
independence was warranted only as a final resort in unique circumstances, 
                                                
101 France 2009, p.29. 
102 E.g. Cyprus comment, p.13 and Finland oral p.58. 
103 Arguing in these terms were e.g. Albania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, France, Germany, Ireland, Jordan, Kosovo, the Netherlands, Norway, Saudi 
Arabia, Slovenia, the UK, and the USA, as well as Judges Sepulveda-Amor and Yusuf.  
104 See especially Judge Cancado Trindade, p.16; also Lee 2004. 
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its supporters implied that, without exceptional features, status quo 
outcomes should apply.  
 
These lines of reasoning showed that the arguments on both sides of the ICJ 
debate used peace and stable order as their main legitimising standards. 
Given the general dynamic of legitimation regulating participants’ 
discourse, they had to argue with reference to the standards and ideals they 
believed to be the most powerful and convincing in the forums and formats 
where they expressed themselves. Evidently, before the world’s highest 
court, peace and international stability was the order of the day.105 Indeed, a 
few participants even modified their discourse towards aligning their 
legitimating standards closer to these liberal-conservative ideals. For 
instance, in its earliest submission, Albania had argued that Kosovo’s 
independence had realised its ‘self-determination’.106 By contrast, Albania’s 
final statement described statehood for Kosovo as a ‘peace and stability’ 
imperative.107  
 
Also Kosovo amended its discourse. The 2005 assembly declaration and the 
2008 minutes cited above had showed that, before the ICJ case had started, 
Kosovo had presented its claim to independence in terms of ‘self-
determination’, freedom as equality, and violent liberation. However, when 
seeking to legitimise its statehood in the international ICJ setting, Kosovo 
invoked different standards, which it expected to be appreciated and 
effective there. 108  Now Kosovo urged the Court not to address ‘self-
determination’,109 and argued that its independence should be approved as 
benefiting peace and regional stability.110 Echoing discourse from the 1960 
UN debate, Kosovo implicitly claimed to have deservedly reached the stage 
of independence, through Serbia’s past oppression and through its own 
                                                
105 Sources involved in the drafting of participants’ arguments have explained that each of 
the sides ‘coordinated’ their arguments before finalising their submissions (author’s 
interviews, September 2012). 
106 Albania, pp.39, 56; see also its comment, p.48. 
107 Albania oral p.18. See also Jordan, the Netherlands, Saudi Arabia and Switzerland; also 
Germany, p.43. 
108 First-hand sources have explained that those declaring Kosovo’s independence avoided 
mentioning ‘self-determination’ and ‘freedom’ at the ICJ to ease other states’ fears of 
setting a precedent for secession. Author’s interviews, September 2012. 
109 Kosovo comment p.86. See also Hilpold 2009, p.55. 
110 Kosovo oral, pp.9, 11; Kosovo p.190. 
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commitments to a peaceful future.111 Rather than being a precedent-creating 
case of secession, Kosovo claimed before the Court, its independence 
‘entailed special characteristics that [were] unlikely to be replicated in other 
cases.’112 
 
This widely cited argument – that Kosovo’s independence was lawful sui 
generis chiefly due to Serbia’s oppression and for the sake of international 
stability – sounded like a case for ‘remedial’ secession or ‘remedial’ self-
determination, a notion several ICJ participants also mentioned in the 
proceedings.113 ‘Remedial’ secession is a scholarly rather than legal term; it 
implies attaining self-determination in the form of independence as a last-
resort remedy against oppression. Especially in the 1990s, scholars of 
international law and political philosophy discussed whether remedial 
secession could be a way to legitimise self-determination as independence 
outside the framework of colonialism. 114  In 1991, philosopher Allen 
Buchanan’s Secession: the Morality of Political Divorce made an influential 
case, which legal scholars too have since endorsed.115 In this view, demands 
for separate statehood that seek legitimation with reference to harsh forms 
of interference are more justified than are nationally or ethnically articulated 
                                                
111 See in particular Hyseni’s part of the oral statement, pp.6–13; also p.35, and Kosovo 
pp.9–60.  
112 Kosovo comment, p.125. 
113 For explicit references, see e.g. UK and UK comment, Albania oral, as well as counter-
arguments made in the oral meetings by Azerbaijan, China, Romania, Serbia and Spain. 
For scholarly examples referring to Kosovo, see Mindia Vashakmadze and Matthias 
Lipphold: ‘“Nothing but a Road Towards Secession”? – The International Court of 
Justice’s Advisory Opinion on Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo’, Goettingen Journal of 
International Law, 2, 2010, pp.619–647, at p.635; Elena Cirkovic: ‘An Analysis of the 
Advisory Opinion on Kosovo’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence’, German Law 
Journal, 11(8), 2010, pp.895–912; Weller 2008b, p.88; Ablan 2012; Sienho Yee: ‘Notes 
on the International Court of Justice (Part 4): The Kosovo Advisory Opinion’, Chinese 
Journal of International Law, 9, 2010, pp.763–782, at p.777. While most scholars 
explain remedial secession with reference to self-determination, Klabbers 2006, p.198 
exceptionally suggests that the two are separate rights. 
114 Buchanan 1991; Crawford 2006; Michel Seymour: ‘Secession as a Remedial Right’, 
Inquiry, 50(4), 2007, pp.395–423 are generally all in favour of a right to remedial 
secession. Simon Caney: ‘Self-government and Secession: The Case of Nations’, 
Journal of Political Philosophy, 5(4), 1997, pp.351–372 and Tideman 2004 argue from 
a moral philosophy perspective that a right to secession should be more inclusive than a 
remedial right. Copp 1998 and Buchheit 1978, pp.220–223, also touch upon the 
concept, but without discussing it in detail. See also J. Oloka-Onyango, J.: ‘Heretical 
Reflections on the Right to Self-determination: Prospects and Problems for a 
Democratic Global Future in the New Millennium’, American University International 
Law Review, 15(1), 1999, pp.151-208. 
115 Notably Hannum 1993b, pp.60–62: see also Hendrix 2008; Cassese 1995, pp.359–360; 
Seymour 2007; Summers 2007, pp.343–344; Whelan 1994; Musgrave 1997, p.258. 
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demands. 116  Notably, in contending to have been subjected to special 
oppression, demands for remedial secession will always seek some sort of 
exceptional, sui generis status. 
 
In arguing that the independence of Kosovo was such a special, remedial 
case, several ICJ participants cited the 1970 UNGA Friendly Relations 
Declaration in support.117 Many Kosovo-advocates claimed that the ‘saving 
clause’ of that Declaration provided legal grounds for independence on an 
exceptional, remedial basis. That clause had proclaimed to guarantee the 
‘territorial integrity’ and ‘political unity’ of states ‘conducting themselves in 
compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of 
peoples [...] and thus possessed of a government representing the whole 
people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or 
colour’. To Kosovo’s supporters, this meant that states that did not conduct 
themselves in this manner, including Serbia, had no protection against 
secession. Those arguing against Kosovo in the ICJ case, however, cited the 
1970 Friendly Relations Declaration to the opposite effect. In their view, 
that Declaration defended the territorial integrity of states against secession, 
including attempts made with reference to ‘self-determination’.118  
 
However, irrespective of whether the Friendly Relations Declaration had 
provided legal support for ‘remedial’ secession or ‘remedial’ self-
determination, such a notion would be nothing new in international 
discourse. Some ‘remedial’ notion had been implied in the concept of ‘self-
determination’ ever since Lenin launched it as a remedy against colonial and 
capitalist oppression. And also in the Aaland Islands case, the League of 
Nations had expressed certain ‘remedial’ components of the concept.  
 
                                                
116 Buchanan 1991; see also Buchanan: ‘Theories of Secession’, Philosophy and Public 
Affairs, 26(1), 1997, pp.31–61; Buchanan 2006, p.92; and Buchanan: ‘What’s so 
Special about Nations?’ pp.283–310 in Couture et al. (eds) 1996, at pp.293–294, 
arguing that ‘national’ claims are raised at the expense of other allegiances, including 
religious, linguistic, and ideological ones. Moltchanova 2009, especially p.6, supports 
this, while Seymour 2007 argues against. 
117 UNGA Resolution 2625, 1970; Albania comment, p.33; oral pp.16, 19; Jordan oral 
p.34, the Netherlands pp.7–8; Poland p.24; Switzerland p.14; and Judge Trindade p.54. 
The Declaration was also quoted by Yusuf p.4 and the UK, pp.90–91. 
118 Belorussia oral p.30; Bolivia comment p.3; oral p.11; Brazil p.2; China p.4; oral p.35; 
Cyprus comment p.7; oral p.39; Serbia pp.214, 230; Spain p.17; Venezuela p.2; oral 
p.16. See also Judge Koroma p.7. 
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When Kosovo’s supporters sought to legitimise the case for its ‘remedial 
independence’, they again relied upon standards resembling those used by 
Serbia’s backers. Serbia had rejected statehood for Kosovo as a precedent-
setting threat to the territorial integrity of all states and hence to their 
freedom from interference. ‘Remedial’ arguments for Kosovo also 
emphasised non-interference – although they concentrated on the freedom 
from interference of a non-state group rather than that of existing states. The 
remedial model rested on the idea that a group could be granted self-
determination in the form of independence if its freedom had been interfered 
with in an unusually brutal manner and there was no other way out. In such 
a case, interference could justify remedying the group’s loss of freedom by 
granting it statehood.119 It would then serve established states and the 
international order as a whole to allow ‘self-determination’ to lead to 
independence, so as to prevent wider unrest. 
 
The one country that argued in a straightforward manner for Kosovo’s 
independence as a matter of ‘self-determination’, Finland, legitimised its 
case in terms of this kind.120 In the Finnish view, territorial integrity always 
had to ‘be weighed against countervailing values, among them the right of 
oppressed people to seek self-determination by way of independence.’121 
There was no reason to ‘limit the right to secession to decolonization’:122 
‘self-determination’ had always entailed an option of new state creation.123 
The League of Nations Aaland Islands case had specifically established that 
the ‘traditional law of self-determination’ allowed for independence when a 
‘[s]tate lack[ed] either the will or the power to enact and apply just and 
effective guarantees’ for a people.124 Essentially, Finland’s argument for 
‘self-determination’ as statehood for Kosovo was a defence of its remedial 
freedom from the interference exercised by Serbia.  
 
At the time when Kosovo’s ICJ backers in 2009 argued that its statehood 
was legitimate as an exceptional remedy against Serbian interference, 
                                                
119 See also Brewer 2012. 
120 Especially in Finland’s oral statement as delivered by Martti Koskenniemi. 
121 Finland oral, p.60. 
122 Ibid., p.62 
123 Ibid., pp.62, 64. 
124 Ibid., p.61. 
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Kosovo had been independent for more than a year. Their logic implied that 
Kosovo at that point, in 2009, was free, since the remedy of statehood 
should have re-established its freedom and ended interference. Interestingly, 
many of those who made this argument at the ICJ, including most Western 
countries, had already for ten years been involved in governing Kosovo 
through an international statebuilding project. 
 
‘International statebuilding’ is a scholarly term used to denote interventions 
ranging from military, ‘peacebuilding’ and development projects, to 
‘international territorial administrations’ like those in Kosovo, Bosnia and 
East Timor.125 Intended to address challenges to international security by 
‘building’ stable states throughout the world, international statebuilding 
commonly involves international decisionmakers taking over local powers, 
without local accountability.126 On the economic field, its programme is 
                                                
125  For various approaches to international statebuilding see Chandler (ed.) 2008; 
Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh (ed.): Rethinking the Liberal Peace: External Models and Local 
Alternatives, Routledge, London, 2011; Susanna Campbell, David Chandler and Meera 
Sabaratnam (eds): A Liberal Peace? The Problems and Practices of Peacebuilding, Zed 
Books, London, 2011; Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk (eds): The Dilemmas of 
Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations, Routledge, 
London, 2009; Dominik Zaum: The Sovereignty Paradox: The Norms and Politics of 
International Statebuilding, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007; Shahar Hameiri: 
‘Capacity and its Fallacies: International State Building as State Transformation’, 
Millennium, 38(1), 2009, pp.55–81; David Chandler: International Statebuilding: The 
Rise of Post-liberal Governance, Routledge, Oxford, 2010; Simon Chesterman: You, the 
People: The United Nations, Transitional Administration, and State-Building, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2004; for a briefer Kosovo-specific summary, see Rita 
Augestad Knudsen: ‘Privatization in Kosovo: “Liberal Peace” in Practice’, Journal of 
Intervention and Statebuilding, 7(3), 2013, pp.287-307. For ITAs, see Ralph Wilde, 
‘From Danzig to East Timor and Beyond: The Role of International Territorial 
Administration’, American Journal of International Law, 95(3), 2001, pp.583–605, 
especially p.585; Simon Chesterman, ‘East Timor in Transition: Self-Determination, 
Statebuilding, and the United Nations’, International Peacekeeping, 9(1), 2002, pp.45–
76, especially p.47. To add terminological confusion, the term ‘nation-building’ is 
sometimes also used, see e.g. Michael Ignatieff: Empire Lite: Nation-building in Bosnia, 
Kosovo and Afghanistan, Vintage, London 2003. 
126 The sizable literature on the lack of accountability in international statebuilding 
operations includes Aleksandar Morimov: Accountability of International Organizations 
in Post-Conflict Governance Missions, Boom Juridische Uitgevers, The Hague, 2005; 
Rebecca Everly: ‘The Regulation of International Territorial Administration in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and Kosovo’, Trinity College, 2006; Cameron 2006; Florian 
Hoffmann and Frédéric Mégret: ‘Fostering Human Rights Accountability: An 
Ombudsperson for the United Nations?’, Global Governance, 11(1), 2005, pp.43–64. 
See also the ‘Accountability of International Organisations’-Reports of the International 
Law Association, e.g. Second report, London Conference, 2000; the report of the New 
Delhi Conference, 2002; and the final report, Berlin Conference, 2004; for Kosovo, see 
Robert Muharremi: ‘The European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) 
from the Perspective of Kosovo Constitutional Law’, Zeitschrift für Ausländisches 
Öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, 70, 2010b, pp.357–379. 
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generally one of strong neoliberalism.127 Recent scholarship has been alert to 
the similarities between today’s international statebuilding and earlier 
arrangements such as trusteeship and colonialism.128 Current practice also 
bears similarities resembles the mandate system that Wilson saw as the 
materialisation of his concept of ‘self-determination’. 
 
In Kosovo, the UN had established an international statebuilding project 
immediately following the 1999 war.129 Led by the United Nations Interim 
Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), it had included the NATO 
force KFOR, the EU and the OSCE.130 In addition to having taken control 
over Kosovo’s administration, reconstruction, development and military 
security, the statebuilding project had formally vested its chief, the head of 
UNMIK, with all legislative, executive and judiciary powers. 131  The 
international project had thus both suspended Serbia’s sovereignty over 
Kosovo132 and barred Kosovo’s population from running its own affairs – 
although Kosovo did have, from 2001, a UNMIK-mandated local 
government with limited powers.  
 
This international statebuilding project had continued after Kosovo’s 2008 
declaration of independence. 133  Moreover, in 2008, two additional 
international offices with executive powers had installed themselves there.134 
                                                
127 See Susan Woodward: ‘Do the Root Causes of Civil War Matter? On using Knowledge 
to Improve Peacebuilding Interventions’, pp.42–56 in David Chandler (ed.): 
Statebuilding and Intervention: Policies, Practices and Paradigms, Routledge, London, 
2008, at p.59; Eric Herring: ‘Neoliberalism Versus Peacebuilding in Iraq’, pp.47–62 in 
Michael Pugh et al. (eds.): Whose Peace? Critical Perspectives on the Political 
Economy of Peacebuilding, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2008, at p.48; Michael 
Pugh: ‘The Political Economy of Peacebuilding: A Critical Theory Perspective’, 
International Journal of Peace Studies, 10(2), pp.23–42; Hameiri 2009. See also 
Memorandum of the Inquiry in PWW 1984, Vol.45, p.466. 
128 E.g. David Chandler: Empire in Denial: The Politics of State-building, Pluto Press, 
London, 2006; Bain 2006; Richard Caplan: ‘From Collapsing States to Neo-trusteeship: 
The Limits to Solving the Problem of “Precarious Statehood” in the 21st Century’, 
Third World Quarterly, 28(2), 2007, pp.231–244. 
129 UNSC resolution 1244, 10 June 1999. 
130 See UNMIK at www.unmikonline.org, accessed 20 January 2011. 
131 UNMIK Regulation 1999/1, 25 July 1999. 
132 UNMIK was established on the basis of the UN Charter’s Chapter VII (see UNSC 
Resolution 1244, 1999), which authorises any action the Security Council deems 
necessary ‘to maintain or restore international peace and security’ – including those 
conflicting with a country’s sovereignty. UN Charter Chapter VII, especially Article 39. 
133 UNSC member Russia had stated that it would not let UNMIK withdraw – seeing such 
withdrawal as acceding to Kosovo’s independence. 
134 The EU rule of law mission EULEX with executive powers over Kosovo’s rule of law, 
and the ICO, with wide-ranging powers resembling those of UNMIK as well as of the 
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The international project’s post-independence aims were to keep the peace, 
ensure rule of law, and enforce the 2007 ‘Ahtisaari Plan’.135 That plan, the 
result of two years of UN-led status negotiations, had been approved by 
Kosovo’s leadership, the UN Secretary-General and several countries 
including the USA and most EU members. 136  It had recommended 
conditional or ‘supervised’ independence for Kosovo with continued 
international administration; and it detailed unpopular, wide-ranging 
reforms including ethnically-based ‘decentralisation’. 137  Kosovo’s 2008 
declaration of independence as well as its constitution – both formulated by 
Western representatives138 – established this comprehensive plan as the 
country’s supreme legal document.139 
 
What this meant was that, even after its declaration of independence, 
Kosovo was bound to an international statebuilding project that held 
extensive powers over its governance and laws. Kosovo’s citizens were not 
the equals of the international officials who governed them, and had no 
decisive say in the applicable law of their country. Moreover, as 
‘independent’ Kosovo lacked full international recognition, and was not a 
UN member, it did not, as an entity, enjoy international equality with other 
states either. In essence, Kosovo was still ‘dependent’ in the sense referred 
to in the 1960 UN debate on decolonisation, and in a manner resembling 
how Wilson had conceptualised mandated peoples: it remained subordinated 
to an international administration that had been established in the name of 
                                                                                                                        
Office of the High Representative in Bosnia. The ICO closed down on 10 September 
2012, while EULEX, KFOR and UNMIK still retains powers. An extensive 
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe mission also remains, as part of 
UNMIK. 
135 ‘Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement’, 26 March 2007, known as 
the ‘Ahtisaari Plan’ after its chief architect, the UN-appointed special envoy and former 
President of Finland, Martti Ahtisaari. For the post-independence aims of, respectively, 
KFOR, EULEX and ICO, see www.aco.nato.int/kfor/about-us/mission.aspx; 
www.eulex-kosovo.eu/en/info/whatisEulex.php and www.ico-kos.org/?id=9, accessed 
19 May 2013. 
136  For a summary of immediate international reactions to the proposal, see B92: 
‘International Reactions to Status Proposal’, 2 February 2007. 
137 ‘Report of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Kosovo’s future status’, 26 
March 2007; see also Denisa Kostovicova: ‘Legitimacy and International 
Administration: The Ahtisaari Settlement for Kosovo from a Human Security 
Perspective’, International Peacekeeping, 15(5), 2008, pp.631-647. 
138 Author’s interviews in Kosovo, 2010 and 2012. 
139 See Declaration of Independence, 17 February 2008 and the Constitution of the 
Republic of Kosovo, ratified on 9 April and becoming effective on 15 June, 2008, 
Article 143. 
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helping it develop while protecting its peaceful freedom.140 Using language 
similar to that employed in the 1960 debate, participants in the ICJ 
proceedings compared Kosovo under international rule to a child placed in 
the hands of a guardian.141 
 
At no point in the ICJ proceedings was the fact that international 
statebuilding still dominated Kosovo, excluding its citizens from 
governance and law-making, presented as limiting Kosovo’s freedom or 
self-determination. 142  Its supporters certainly did not argue against its 
‘international statebuilding’: on the contrary, they were themselves the 
prime implementers of the international statebuilding project there. Rather, 
Kosovo’s backers seemed to assume that once the remedy of statehood had 
put an end to Serbia’s interference, Kosovo had become free, since only 
interference could restrict its freedom. And international statebuilding, as 
they saw it, was not something that ‘interfered’. 
 
Quite the reverse: some of Kosovo’s ICJ supporters implied that they saw 
continued international statebuilding as a condition for the legitimacy of its 
independence.143 At earlier moments, Wilson and delegates in the 1950–
1960 UN debates had presented ‘maturity’ as a condition for statehood, for 
the sake of peace. Kosovo’s ICJ backers, on their part, required perpetuated 
subordination to international statebuilding as an international stability 
guarantee. That ‘independence’ of this kind might not really justify that 
label was not the only paradox involved in their position. Many of Kosovo’s 
supporters both legitimised its statehood as a remedy against interference 
                                                
140 See e.g. Judge Cancado Trindade, pp.69, 53. Spain comment, p.5 claimed that 
international administration had already granted Kosovo ‘self-determination’. 
141  Cyprus oral, p.45; USA oral, p.38. Some claimed UNMIK’s rule had already 
irreversibly ended Serbia’s control, e.g. the Netherlands oral p.15. A similar point is 
distinguishable in the Court's final opinion, pp.34–36, as well as Finland oral, p.60. 
142 Only Serbia, p.202, brought up this point, but then to claim that Kosovo did not meet 
the criteria for statehood. For a different view on the statehood criteria, see the Czech 
Republic, p.5. 
143 For indications, see e.g. Bulgaria oral, p.22; Croatia oral, p.51; Estonia p.12; France 
p.29; Germany p.43; Ireland p.11; Japan p.6; Kosovo p.189; Luxemburg p.2; Norway 
p.17; Slovenia p.1; the UK p.12; the USA p.34. The UK, p.14, and the USA, pp.35–36 
also implied that Kosovo’s commitment to European integration added to the legitimacy 
of its statehood. The separate opinion of Judge Yusuf expressed that Kosovo’s years 
under international administration added to the grounds for possibly, exceptionally 
evaluating it as a self-determination case, p.4. See also Judge Cancado Trindade, pp.53, 
69, mentioning East Timor as well; also Helen Quane: ‘Self-determination and Minority 
Protection after Kosovo’, pp.181–212 in Summers (ed.) 2011, at p.212. 
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and denial of internal rights – and presented it as legitimate with reference 
to the sustained denial of internal rights under international statebuilding. 
Perhaps this reasoning returned the concept of self-determination to its 
international policy origins. After the First World War, Wilson had seen his 
concept of self-determination realised as ‘consent of the governed’ and the 
mandate system, with international administration of territories in the 
interest of world order. On the same legitimising basis, contemporary 
international statebuilding continued in Kosovo. 
 
The Final Word 
The Court’s advisory opinion of 22 July 2010 would offer the ICJ 
proceedings’ most authoritative expression of the language of ‘self-
determination’ and its affiliated ideas of freedom. 144  The actual word 
‘freedom’ had scarcely been cited during the ICJ proceedings; and when it 
was, the mentions were either insubstantial,145 or in the form of a brief 
addendum in the phrase ‘human rights and fundamental freedoms’. 146 
Likewise, no one had pronounced that ‘equality’ for Kosovo legitimised its 
statehood. Like ‘freedom’, ‘equality’ was mentioned rarely, in passing, and 
then to signify the equality of individuals before domestic laws, rather than 
the international equality of peoples or other collectives.147 Using language 
similar to that employed during the drafting of the UN Charter, a few 
participants had mentioned ‘sovereign equality’ together with the territorial 
integrity of states when arguing that Kosovo should not be allowed to 
violate the sovereignty of Serbia. 148  
 
In its operative part, the final ICJ opinion concentrated on Kosovo’s 
declaration of independence, and not its statehood, and addressed few of the 
arguments summarised in this chapter.149 Adopted by ten votes to four, the 
                                                
144 Final Opinion, 22 July 2010. 
145 See Belorussia oral p.32 and USA oral p.23. 
146 Austria oral p.10; also Venezuela oral p.16 and Judge Trindade, pp.22–26, 60. 
147 E.g. Albania p.19; Azerbajian p.21 
148 E.g. Spain oral p.11; Cyprus oral p.39; Vietnam oral p.17. 
149 For a useful summary of the opinion, see Robert Muharremi: ‘A Note on the ICJ 
Advisory Opinion on Kosovo’, German Law Journal, 11(8), 2010a, pp.867–880, at 
pp.871–874. For discussion, see University College London: ‘What the Kosovo 
Advisory Opinion Means for the Rest of the World’, Panel convened by Ralph Wilde, 
25 March 2011, with Marko Milanovic (from Serbia’s legal team), Anne Peters, and 
Qerim Qerimi (from Kosovo’s legal team). 
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Court’s opinion stating that Kosovo’s declaration had not violated 
international law did not explain the international meaning of ‘self-
determination’ – nor did it clarify whether Kosovo had a right to 
independence. The opinion left it to individual states to decide, as a matter 
of policy rather than law, whether to validate Kosovo’s statehood by 
granting diplomatic recognition. All these questions, the Court held, were 
outside its remit. 150  Instead, it concluded that, since neither general 
international law nor the laws applying specifically to Kosovo had 
prohibited it from declaring independence,151 its declaration of independence 
had not violated international law. This ‘minimalist’ approach sparked 
immediate criticism from scholars and from judges involved in the case.152  
 
A closer look at the Court’s opinion reveals that its language was only 
deceptively narrow, and that it did in fact express broader ideas that could 
have repercussions for the roles of self-determination and freedom in 
international affairs. For instance, the opinion stated that ‘the international 
law of self-determination’ had created ‘a right to independence for the 
peoples of non-self-governing territories and peoples subject to alien 
subjugation, domination and exploitation [...]. A great many new States have 
come into existence as a result of the exercise of this right.’153 While this 
wording may seem to merely mirror that of the 1960 Decolonisation 
Declaration, the ICJ opinion did not mention any other way of realising self-
determination except by creating new states. From the Court’s language, it 
could thus be deduced that there is no ‘internal’ variant of self-
determination: the concept means independence. 
 
Furthermore, the Court’s opinion did not present Kosovo as a sui generis 
case. It discussed the case as a matter of equal legal relevance to other cases; 
it compared it, where relevant, to previous ones, and concluded, as with 
other cases, in light of the law.154 It might have been sui generis that so 
                                                
150 Final Opinion, p.31. 
151 Notably, UNSC Resolution 1244 (1999). 
152 For Judges’ critiques, see Trindade, p.13; also Simma, p.1, Sepúlveda-Amor, p.6, 
Skotnikov, p.6. Some participants had, however, defended this approach, especially 
Austria and the UK, whose oral ‘minimalist’ case was presented by James Crawford. 
153 Final Opinion, p.30. 
154 See e.g. ibid., pp.30–31. See also Christakis 2011, p.80; Corten 2011, p.93. 
 232 
23
2 
many participants had mentioned ‘self-determination’ in their arguments 
before the Court in this non-colonial case of seeking independence. And the 
wider international handling of the Kosovo issue had indeed been unique in 
some respects. But no two cases are the same. In the end, nothing in the 
Court’s opinion indicated that Kosovo would not establish a legal precedent, 
leaving this question open.  
 
Moreover, the ICJ opinion’s ‘factual background’ summary of the case 
seemed much more in line with the picture Kosovo had presented during the 
proceedings – noting its history of oppression, UN administration, and 
exhaustion of other options – than the account given by Serbia. Perhaps this 
implied some sympathy for the ‘remedial’ case, although the Court did not 
use such language explicitly.155 In its ‘factual background’ section, the 
opinion also cited the Rambouillet Accords and the reference to ‘the will of 
the people’, although that had barely appeared in states’ arguments in the 
proceedings.156 The opinion further concluded that the principle of territorial 
integrity concerned only interstate relations, and thus did not preclude non-
state actors from declaring independence.157 
 
Above all, it was on the issue of the ‘identity of the authors of the 
declaration of independence’ that the ICJ opinion expressed ideas with 
broader implications for freedom and self-determination. This concerned the 
question of which agent had really declared Kosovo independent – a point 
that would prove to be the most controversial of all those raised in the 
case.158 During the proceedings, Serbia had argued that it had been Kosovo’s 
‘provisional’ Assembly that had issued the declaration of independence in 
                                                
155 Final Opinion, pp.21–29.  
156 Ibid., p.40. 
157  Ibid. See also Dov Jacobs: ‘International Court of Justice, Accordance with 
International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, 
Advisory Opinion of 22 July 2010’, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 
60(3), 2011, pp.799–810, at p.805; Oliver Corten: ‘Territorial Integrity Narrowly 
interpreted: Reasserting the Classical Inter-state Paradigm of International Law’, Leiden 
Journal of International Law, 24(1), 2011, pp.87–89; Anne Peters: ‘Does Kosovo Lie in 
the Lotus-land of Freedom?’, Leiden Journal of International Law, 24(1), 2011, pp.95–
108; Muharremi 2010. 
158 Final Opinion, p.36. For criticism, see especially Kohen and del Mar 2011, as well as 
Ker-Lindsay 2011, p.6. For critical legal discussions summarising the points in dispute, 
see the dissenting opinions of Judges Bennouna, p.8, Koroma, p.2 and Skotnikov, p.4, 
the declaration of Vice-President Tomka, pp.3–4, as well as the separate opinions of 
Sepúlveda-Amor, pp.5–6 and Yusuf, p.6. 
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2008. And that since this Assembly had been established by UNMIK and 
was bound by UNMIK’s legal framework, the declaration of independence 
had gone beyond the mandate of the Assembly – and had thus been 
illegal.159 If the Court had agreed with this view, its opinion would probably 
have found that the declaration had violated international law.  
 
Importantly, the Court concluded that it had not been Kosovo’s Assembly 
that had declared independence in 2008, but rather ‘persons who acted 
together in their capacity as representatives of the people of Kosovo outside 
the framework of the interim administration’.160 One implication of this was 
that those who had declared independence in 2008 had not represented ‘the 
people’ because they had originally been constituted by UNMIK: on the 
contrary, when they declared independence, they had represented the people 
of Kosovo outside of the UNMIK framework. Without elaborating further, 
the Court thus indirectly highlighted the democratic limits of UNMIK as a 
non-elected, unaccountable and unpopular structure, 161  one which had 
produced local leaders through elections tainted by fraud allegations and 
low turnouts.162 This part of the Court’s conclusion indicated that, under 
ordinary circumstances, the persons meeting in Kosovo’s Assembly building 
on 17 February 2008 could not have been described as people’s 
representatives. But when – and because – they acted on the well-
established desire of the people of Kosovo for independence163 and declared 
Kosovo independent, they became ‘representatives of the people’. 
                                                
159 Ultra vires, in legal parlance; for a summary see Serbia, comment pp.21–26. 
160 Final Opinion, p.39 
161 Surveys show that at the time of the declaration, satisfaction with UNMIK was below 
30 per cent (United Nations Development Programme: Early Warning Report, EWR 20, 
2008, p.17). See also Ivan Ingravallo: ‘Kosovo after the ICJ Advisory Opinion: Towards 
a European Perspective?’, International Community Law Review, 14, 2012, pp.219–241, 
at p.238. 
162 Interviews conducted in Kosovo in the aftermath of the 2007 and 2010 elections. For 
turnout in the 2007 election, see e.g. Reuters: ‘Record Low Turnout’, 
www.reuters.com/article/2007/11/17/us-serbia-kosovo-turnout-
idUSL1731845620071117; and B92: ‘Voting Ends in Kosovo’, both 17 November 
2007, accessed 26 September 2012. 
163 Including in the 1991 referendum. Judge Bennouna’s separate opinion, p.9, questioned 
the representativeness of the declaration by arguing that the issue of independence was 
not raised in the 2007 election campaign – however, from the 1990s onwards, an 
overwhelming range of political and civil society representatives in Kosovo had 
unanimously demanded independent statehood. Observations in Kosovo from 2006 to 
the declaration of independence. Immediately following the declaration, almost 90 per 
cent of survey respondents reported satisfaction with the way independence had been 
declared, EWR 2008, p.21; also Balkan Gallup: ‘Insights and Perceptions, Voices of the 
Balkans’, Brussels, 2008, pp.56–58. 
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It was on this point that the language of the ICJ opinion was at its most 
radical. In declaring independence, the opinion expressed, the gathering of 
persons in Kosovo had not only represented the people, but had also ‘acted 
[…] outside the framework of the interim administration’. By acting on the 
people’s will, these ‘authors’ had placed themselves – and, it could be 
assumed, the people they represented – outside the legal order within which 
they usually operated. Since the Court did not suggest that, in so doing, they 
had stepped into a legal vacuum, the inference was that this act had 
established a new legal and political order. 
 
Hence, in its Kosovo opinion, the world’s highest court, the ICJ, 
acknowledged the power of collective action based on a people’s will to 
freedom and ‘self-determination’, as Kosovo had articulated its demands 
before the court case started. The Court recognised that a people’s 
representatives can free themselves from a legal and political system of 
domination and dependence, and function as the power constituting a new 
order. 164  With this, the ICJ opinion also illuminated how ‘self-
determination’ has the potential to undermine existing international law 
from within. Although Kosovo, through its action, had not achieved a status 
of full international equality, the Court’s opinion did not bar it from doing 
so. Through these conclusions, the Court brought the radical idea of 
freedom back into international ‘self-determination’ discourse. The full 
implications of these aspects of the case, however, remain uncertain, as they 
have yet to be analytically pursued in scholarship or in law. 
 
Conclusions 
The arguments on policy and law put forward in the ICJ Kosovo 
proceedings were less consequential than the ideas of freedom inherent in 
the discourse of the case. From the perspective of international law, the 
proceedings might not even be seen as illustrating present opinio juris.165 
States’ positions might bind only themselves, if that, and it is unclear 
whether or how the case might have set a legal precedent. Policy and legal 
                                                
164 On this political function in the context of republicanism and populism, see Vatter 
2012. 
165 Author’s interviews with legal counsels in the case, September 2012. 
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arguments produced no unambiguous guidance as to the post-colonial 
applicability of self-determination, or on what ‘internal’ or ‘remedial’ self-
determination might truly mean. Politically and legally, the case 
reinvigorated the concept of ‘self-determination’ on the international stage, 
but also perpetuated its undefined and contended standing. 
 
Conceptually, however, the language of the Kosovo proceedings uniquely 
conveyed international understandings of self-determination and freedom. 
In making their cases, both sides sought legitimation for their arguments and 
ideas by referring to standards of peace, order and non-interference. Serbia’s 
supporters opposed Kosovo’s independence by warning of its security 
impact and, indirectly, the dangers the precedent of its statehood would pose 
to all countries’ freedom as non-interference. Kosovo’s backers cited similar 
standards of peace and non-interference to defend independence as an 
exceptional, sui generis remedy. All participants agreed that, outside of 
decolonisation, the concept of self-determination should first and foremost 
be realised internally – and they ranged from hesitation to outright hostility 
on whether to accord it any role outside of such a setting. 
 
And yet, the weightiest international statement from the whole case – the 
final ICJ advisory opinion – did not fully echo this liberal-conservative 
unanimity. The opinion forthrightly equated ‘self-determination’ with 
independence, leaving unmentioned any other way to realise the concept. It 
acknowledged the radical, constitutive power of a people acting on the basis 
of its will to freedom as equality and self-determination – a point 
overlooked by scholars thus far. Finally, the very fact that the language of 
‘self-determination’ was so widely used in proceedings that were seen to 
concern a case of non-colonial independence in itself indicates the tenacity 
of the radical idea.  
 
With the ICJ Kosovo case, the radical idea of freedom expressed in the 
language of ‘self-determination’ again triggered liberal-conservative 
attempts to co-opt it into a vision that could appear less challenging to 
established international affairs. Nonetheless, by targeting radical ‘self-
determination’ discourse with various attempts at dismissals and 
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reformulations, the proceedings also indicated its continued potency. And 
compared to the other, earlier international ‘self-determination moments’ 
covered in this thesis, the Kosovo case had a more radical ending. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
Ever since the concept of ‘self-determination’ became an important part of 
international discourse, agents have sought legitimation for their arguments 
and ideas on it by drawing upon ideas of freedom. Given that they have 
relied on the ideas of freedom that they have deemed most internationally 
powerful and appealing, the 20th- and 21st-century international ‘self-
determination’ discourse can shed light on key international 
conceptualisations of freedom. The present thesis has explored this hitherto 
overlooked feature of the concept of self-determination in international 
affairs. Besides examining the language of central ‘self-determination’ 
utterances and the context in which they emerged, it has identified the ideas 
of freedom that this language has relied upon for legitimation.  
 
The specific language of ‘self-determination’, in English, first appeared high 
on the international agenda during the First World War, when US President 
Woodrow Wilson internationalised the concept in response to earlier 
references by Lenin. Subsequently, Wilson’s ideas were reflected in the 
immediate post-war international policies towards Albania, before the 
League of Nations institutionally recognised the political import of the 
language of ‘self-determination’ in the 1920–1921 Aaland Islands case. In 
1945, the concept of ‘self-determination’ became part of international law 
through its inclusion in the UN Charter, where it was recognised as one of 
the purposes of the new world organisation. Following a decade of 
discussion, the UNGA Declaration on the Granting of Independence to 
Colonial Countries and Peoples (the Decolonisation Declaration) in 1960 
formally linked ‘self-determination’ with colonial independence. The 
importance of the concept in today’s international discourse was made 
evident when ‘self-determination’ became a central reference point during 
the 2008–2010 proceedings on Kosovo at the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ). 
 
All these important international expressions of ‘self-determination’ 
appeared at moments when the standards guiding world affairs were in flux, 
with states and institutions competing to re-define them. The First World 
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War and its immediate aftermath, then the post-Second World War 
international setting, the global process of decolonisation, and the security 
environment that developed in the aftermath of the Cold War were all 
contexts of this kind. Under each of these circumstances, the language of 
‘self-determination’ became an important part of the international battle of 
ideas. Over time, the status of the concept of self-determination was 
elevated from a moral and political principle to a legal, implementable right. 
As the perceived force of ‘self-determination’ grew internationally, agents’ 
stakes in legitimising their arguments and ideas on the concept were raised 
as well. 
 
At each of these major moments, the political and legal agents using the 
language of ‘self-determination’ internationally sought legitimation for their 
discourse with reference to either a radical or a liberal-conservative idea of 
freedom. Agents showed that they favoured the radical idea when they 
proposed conceptualising self-determination as a matter of equal status, as 
freedom from inequality, domination, and dependence, as well as from 
certain forms of interference with a people. Such radically framed 
arguments were always in favour of self-determination, presenting the aim 
as being full independence and freedom in the form of new state creation. 
Moreover, when this radical idea of freedom appeared in the international 
discourse on self-determination, agents seemed less worried about 
maintaining peace on the path to achieving it. 
 
By contrast, agents’ international discourse on self-determination exhibited 
the liberal-conservative idea when they expressed a preference for freedom 
as peace, in the form of stable order and non-interference with the affairs of 
established states. Advocates of this understanding of self-determination – 
sometimes in favour of, and sometimes opposed to the concept itself – 
typically argued for solutions that would not threaten existing countries, and 
that would be implemented gradually, naturally, and in an orderly fashion. 
According to which ideal these two ideas of freedom valued most, 
international statements of ‘self-determination’ tended to group themselves 
along an ‘axis’ of freedom as peace versus freedom as equality.  
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Of the two ideas of freedom employed internationally to legitimise 
arguments and ideas on self-determination over the past hundred years, the 
liberal-conservative has dominated. Not only have the discourses of most 
agents relied on it for legitimation, this idea was also the one incorporated 
into the main documents of international law citing ‘self-determination’: the 
1945 UN Charter, the 1960 Decolonisation Declaration, as well as the 1966 
International Covenants on Human Rights (ICHRs). Although in the ICJ 
Kosovo case, the Court’s final advisory opinion was more equivocal, in the 
proceedings preceding it, all states had argued within the same liberal-
conservative confines.  
 
Each ‘self-determination moment’ investigated in this thesis unfolded 
according to what was broadly the same dynamic: an international 
articulation of ‘self-determination’ that agents legitimised with reference to 
the radical idea of freedom incited attempts by other agents to co-opt the 
concept’s international meaning to a liberal-conservative outlook. All the 
moments studied here, except the most recent one, clearly ended with the 
liberal-conservative idea of freedom more authoritatively pronounced.  
 
The first time this dynamic of appropriation played out was when Wilson 
used the language of ‘self-determination’ in response to Lenin’s earlier 
discourse. That moment of internationalising the concept of ‘self-
determination’ ended with it firmly linked in the global imagination to 
Wilson’s liberal-conservative ideas. Wilson’s concept then came to be 
mirrored in the international handling of the case of Albania, and appeared 
in the League of Nations Aaland Islands case as well. Both these cases, 
however, had first been placed on the international agenda by radically 
articulated claims of peoples to self-determination. The League’s Aaland 
Islands case then created the pathway to international codification of the 
concept in the 1945 UN Charter, a document that would also come to 
embody the liberal-conservative idea. 
 
The same dynamic occurred at the UN in 1950, when a ‘self-determination’ 
statement legitimised in radical terms sparked ten years of largely liberal-
conservative attempts to re-define the concept, and fill it with non-radical 
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content. That ‘moment’ ended with incorporation of the language of ‘self-
determination’ in three UN documents of international law, all framing it in 
liberal-conservative terms.1 Finally, the impetus for the ICJ Kosovo case 
also came from radical calls for freedom as equality and ‘self-
determination’, by the people of Kosovo. During the ICJ proceedings, all 
participating states took care to employ the language of ‘self-determination’ 
in ways that would not threaten established forms of stability and non-
interference. The way that moment came to an end, however, was with a 
critical, albeit hitherto largely ignored, endorsement of key aspects of the 
radical idea of freedom. In its final advisory opinion, the world’s highest 
court implicitly acknowledged that peoples claiming ‘self-determination’ 
might indeed create new states. 
 
From this recurrent pattern, it appears that it was the radical and not the 
liberal-conservative idea of freedom that kept the language of self-
determination alive in international affairs, at different times bringing it to 
the fore. At each of the junctures, the ensuing discourse then became driven 
by a liberal-conservative aspiration to neutralise the concept of self-
determination, to disassociate it from its radicalism, and dilute or undermine 
it. Although usually ending with the liberal-conservative idea prevailing, 
these moments thus also proved the continuing importance of the radical 
idea. 
 
Apart from having introduced this dynamic into how ‘self-determination’ 
appeared in international discourse, Lenin and Wilson set the terms for the 
ideas of freedom reflected in such language. After these two men had 
expressed the two ideas of freedom with their respective discourses of ‘self-
determination’, no other moment would really add much. On the other hand, 
later international agents did not simply copy them, either. For instance, 
Lenin had legitimised his concept of self-determination as part of the 
progress towards equal freedom in socialism. He contrasted his idea of 
freedom with inequality, domination and dependence, as well as specific 
forms of interference with a group. Moreover, he justified the use of 
                                                
1 The 1960 Decolonisation Declaration and the 1966 ICHRs; see also Moyn 2010, p.117, 
describing the end of empire as an opportunity for ‘the reclamation of liberalism’ for a 
new era. 
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violence on the part of peoples seeking to break free. Wilson, by contrast, 
sought legitimation for his discourse primarily by appealing to peace and 
non-interference with bodies politic that he considered sufficiently mature. 
Stability, order and purely ‘natural’ change were the values to which Wilson 
appealed. 
 
Subsequent international discourse on self-determination perpetuated a 
conservative mix of the different ideas these two men had stood for. As 
noted, the central documents that integrated ‘self-determination’ into 
international law leaned on versions of the liberal-conservative idea 
espoused by Wilson. Expressing appreciation of the existing order, these 
documents prioritised freedom as peace and non-interference, chiefly in the 
affairs of established states. The ICJ Kosovo proceedings showed that also 
the most conservative portion of Lenin’s ideas would be internationally 
preserved. State participants in that case indicated, as Lenin’s anti-
imperialist rhetoric had done, that self-determination might be legitimate as 
the creation of new states in narrowly defined cases of interference – 
although the forms of interference emphasised by the participants in the ICJ 
case clearly differed from what Lenin had proposed. From both 
perspectives, though, the bar was set high for realising the concept. Recent 
scholarship on ‘remedial’ self-determination has put forward similar views, 
accepting the statehood connotations of the concept solely in cases of 
extraordinary interference, and for the sake of peace. The other aspects of 
Lenin’s concept, such as his condoning of violence and his ultimate aim of 
socialism, have generally been ignored. 
 
Liberal-conservative values of stability and non-interference with 
established political agents might logically be expected to appeal to those 
who profit from an order functioning on such a basis. Radical ‘equality’, by 
contrast, might be presumed to attract the less privileged, and those in 
favour of changes in existing hierarchies. Unsurprisingly, it was those who 
stood to benefit from existing systems of stability and non-interference that 
advanced the liberal-conservative idea in international ‘self-determination’ 
discourse. The prevalence of this idea thus indicated a strengthening of 
established orders and structures, and of agents that were already strong. 
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Moreover, it implied that advantaged agents managed to establish their 
preferred normative ideals as the international standards that would guide 
the arguments and ideas on ‘self-determination’.2 Indeed, it was as part of 
the consolidation of the 20th-century international order that the ‘self-
determination’ discourse overwhelmingly invoked the liberal-conservative 
idea, which left unchallenged those already well situated.  
 
More specifically, it was usually Western states that most insistently 
promoted the liberal-conservative idea of freedom with their language of 
‘self-determination’. Indeed, it was US President Wilson who introduced it 
into international ‘self-determination’ discourse in the first place. However, 
it would be an over-simplification to consider the international dominance 
of this idea as a ‘Western’ triumph. Also non-Western states – and, not least, 
the 1960 UN General Assembly as a whole, espoused the same orientation. 
To see the discourse of such agents as a product of ‘Western’ power would 
be to deprive them unreasonably of agency. Instead, it should be assumed 
that, across the geopolitical spectrum, the agents who at various times 
expressed the liberal-conservative idea had their own reasons for doing so. 
The logic of legitimation regulating their discourse would lead them to 
appeal to the idea of freedom they thought would best persuade their 
audiences. 
 
Actually, not only Western states, but nearly all state-agents citing ‘self-
determination’ in international affairs legitimised their arguments and ideas 
with reference to the standards of peace, stability and non-interference. By 
contrast, the non-state agents who demanded self-determination, as well as a 
few state actors, relied on the radical idea in calling for peoples’ equal 
status, and the creation of new states. The supremacy of the liberal-
conservative idea in the international discourse on self-determination 
therefore indicates more than a solidification of the international standing of 
specific, already privileged states. It also points to a corresponding lack of 
international recognition of non-state groups as potential agents of political 
freedom. 
 
                                                
2 See also Crawford 2000a, pp.95–97. 
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In fact, both the ideas of freedom that were used to legitimise the 
international discourse on self-determination served to strengthen states as 
the units organising international affairs. Each of the ideas’ preferred 
practical solutions to questions of self-determination gave priority to the 
concept of statehood – while disagreeing on whether to protect only those 
states that already existed, or permit the creation of new ones. The liberal-
conservative idea promoted non-interference with and stability of existing 
states, and favoured the resolution of self-determination conflicts within 
existing state boundaries. Only in exceptional cases, if it would benefit 
international order, would the liberal-conservative viewpoint permit the 
creation of new states. 
 
Also the radical idea of freedom present in international language on self-
determination concentrated on statehood. This idea called for the 
establishment of new states, either through secession of the group seeking 
freedom, or its unification with another, existing, state. So proponents of the 
radical idea, too, assumed that politics should primarily be organised along 
the lines of statehood. In its earliest form, in Lenin’s discourse, the radical 
idea had indicated that self-determination as statehood would be merely one 
step on the path towards the further, better, status of equality in 
internationalist socialism. But this ‘most radical’ version of the radical idea 
was not retained in the international language on ‘self-determination’ after 
Lenin’s time. Later radical expressions presented statehood itself as the 
primary aim of self-determination, and its ultimate destination. Moreover, 
even Lenin’s radical variant had maintained that at present, political action 
should be organised around the concept of statehood. 
 
Interestingly, the strengthening of the idea of statehood reflected in 
international discourse on self-determination occurred simultaneously with 
another international development. While the language of self-determination 
signalled a state-oriented approach to world affairs, 20th-century 
international law as well as international relations and legal scholarship 
began to devote increased attention to individuals.3  More recently, the 
                                                
3 For one useful perspective on these developments, see e.g. Costas Douzinas: ‘The 
Paradoxes of Human Rights’, Constellations, 20(1), 2013, pp.51–67. 
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previous century’s growing focus on individuals, which came to be codified 
in international human rights law, was reflected in the ‘internal’ framings of 
self-determination favoured by participants in the 2008–2010 ICJ Kosovo 
case. 4  However, recognition of individuals as subjects of international 
affairs became limited to their status as victims of abuses, and did not grant 
them active agency. This development corresponded to the liberal focus on 
freedom as non-interference, and on individuals as the most basic source of 
politics, morality and law. Whether these developments may come to create 
opportunities for broader, even radical, freedom has been disputed.5  
 
Since the end of the Cold War, the orientation towards individual human 
rights has become bound up with a re-conceptualization of international 
security. From the Cold War concentration on territorial defence, post-Cold 
War security has shifted, at least in part, to being framed in terms of 
protecting people (from state interference), and defending ‘values’.6 The 
military intervention in Kosovo, its subsequent international statebuilding, 
and the concept of Responsibility to Protect (R2P, introduced in 2001) have 
all manifested this trend.7 This security programme has been criticised for 
highlighting the predicaments of individuals in order to legitimise 
interventions in ‘failed’ states by those at the forefront of ‘the international 
community’8 – interventions ultimately implemented by powerful states 
against those seen to threaten or destabilise them through ‘interfering’ 
                                                
4 See Moyn 2010 for the emergence of international human rights, dating this to 1977, 
especially pp.4, 121. For a relevant recent theoretical perspective, see Eva Erman: 
‘Human Rights Do Not Make Global Democracy’, Contemporary Political Theory, 
10(4), 211 pp.463-481. 
5 For differing views, see Marks 2000; Boaventura De Sosa Santos: Towards a New Legal 
Common Sense, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002, especially chapter 9, 
‘Can Law be Emancipatory?’; Habermas 2010; and Douzinas 2013. 
6 For a ‘self-determination’ perspective on these developments, see James Mayall: ‘Non-
intervention, Self-determination and the “New World Order”’, International Affairs, 
67(3), 1991, pp.421–429; also Coker 2000; Andrew Williams: Failed Imagination? New 
World Orders of the Twentieth Century, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 
1998. 
7 For Kosovo, see the previous chapter, for R2P, see R2P, see International Development 
Research Centre: International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty: The 
Responsibility to Protect. Report of the International Commission on Intervention and 
State Sovereignty, Ottawa, 2001, and Spencer Zifcak: ‘The Responsibility to Protect’, 
pp.504–527 in Evans (ed.) 2010. 
8 For a summary of the rhetoric involved, see Morten Bøås and Kathleen Jennings: 
‘Insecurity and Development: The Rhetoric of the “Failed State”’, European Journal of 
Development Research, 17, 2005, pp.385-395. 
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phenomena such as refugee flows, terrorism or organised crime.9 
 
This greater international concentration on individuals as victims and states 
as principal agents has pushed to one side the kinds of groups that claim 
self-determination. Between the planes of separated individuals in their 
capacity as victims, and the non-interfered-with action of established states, 
little conceptual space was left for collectives. The parallel developments of 
emphasising individuals while boosting the idea of statehood thus seemed to 
suggest that groups that had constituted themselves by their collective will 
to ‘self-determination’ did not really count as potential agents of freedom.10 
Also international law seems to have disregarded groups created on the 
basis of willing ‘self-determination’, focusing instead on non-state groups 
defined only in terms of their intra-group identity, usually understood in 
‘national’ terms.11  
 
Regarding self-determination claimants, their shared intra-group features, 
whether defined nationally or in other ways, have generally not featured 
strongly in attempts to legitimise their demands. Instead, self-determination 
claimants have been constituted by, and sought legitimation with reference 
to, the specific political contexts in which they have collectively willed 
radical freedom. For instance, Kosovo was populated largely by Albanians: 
but there were Albanians living outside Kosovo as well; and before and 
during the ICJ case, Kosovo argued for independence principally by calling 
for freedom as equality, and later by describing the oppression practised by 
Serbia. Similarly, when former colonies called for colonial freedom in the 
1950–1960 UN debates, they usually stressed the dominating and interfering 
nature of colonialism rather than the intra-group features of colonial 
peoples.  
 
As this thesis has shown, the two men who introduced the language of ‘self-
determination’ in international affairs, Lenin and Wilson, were not 
preoccupied with the internal characteristics of a potential self-
                                                
9 See e.g. Chandler 2006 and Douzinas 2007. 
10 See also Rancière 2001, pp.5–6. 
11 As also reflected in the international codification of minority rights and the rights of 
indigenous peoples. 
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determination claimant. Lenin legitimised his advocacy of self-
determination with reference to the wider economic, geopolitical and 
historical settings in which claims might be raised. Even in arguing for self-
determination for colonies, he stressed the political and economic nature of 
colonial un-freedom, and not the intra-group specificities of the colonial 
peoples. Wilson held a comparable outlook. Although he did pronounce 
some ‘nationally’ defined criteria for boundary creation, Wilson did not 
present these as vital to his conceptualisation of self-determination. Nor did 
he adhere to such criteria in practice. In linking their respective ideas of 
freedom to the concept of self-determination, neither Wilson nor Lenin 
placed the characteristics of its possible beneficiaries at the fore. Both men’s 
ideas of self-determination were highly conditional – but the various 
conditions they proposed were generally external to the concept’s possible 
claimants. 
 
Not until the UN’s 1960 Decolonisation Declaration was the international 
spotlight put on the intra-group identity features of potential recipients of 
self-determination. That declaration narrowed down the implementable 
force of the concept to colonies whose development had been interfered 
with by an ‘outdated’ colonial regime. Hence it excluded possible claimants 
whose identities were defined in other ways. It also put those who favoured 
a different understanding of self-determination in the position of having to 
argue with reference to aspects of claimants’ character. Reflecting this 
development, many state participants in the ICJ Kosovo case presented the 
identity of the ‘authors’ of Kosovo’s declaration of independence as crucial 
with regard to determining the legitimacy of their demands. 
 
One paradoxical upshot of the domineering role of the liberal-conservative 
idea in the international discourse on self-determination was to radicalise 
the radical idea. The prevalence of the liberal-conservative idea in 
international language on self-determination intimated that ‘interference’, 
associated with war and instability, was the main challenge in international 
affairs. According to this outlook on world affairs, threats in the form of 
security risks were the major evils to be avoided. And the form of security 
preferred in this orientation was non-interference in the affairs of established 
 247 
24
7 
political and legal agents, above all states. According to this reasoning, 
security threats would justify states and institutions taking any action 
necessary to preserve the peace. 
 
Consequently, the prominence of the liberal-conservative idea made radical 
articulations of ‘self-determination’ even more powerful and threatening. 
After all, the radically legitimised ‘self-determination’ discourse aimed to 
challenge and interfere with established bodies politic, and could even 
endorse the use of force in achieving freedom as international equality. In a 
world dominated by the idea of freedom as peace, self-determination 
became a security issue.12 From the liberal-conservative standpoint, radical 
self-determination claims would pose such a threat to the international order 
and states’ peaceful freedom that it might actually be better to grant 
independence to the claimants. The Kosovo case may have illustrated this 
development when the ICJ acknowledged that a people constituted by 
willing radical self-determination could place itself outside its present legal 
and political order, and create a new one. Among legal experts and scholars 
alike, however, this final ‘twist’ to the ICJ case has gone largely unnoticed, 
leaving the possible radical implications of the case under-investigated as 
well. 
 
The dominance of the liberal-conservative idea of freedom in 20th- and 21st-
century international discourse on ‘self-determination’ implied seeing the 
outcome of peace as a greater source of legitimacy than agents’ status of 
equality. It also signalled a corresponding drop in the value of ‘equality’ as 
an international standard of legitimation.13 Nevertheless, despite having 
been mostly overshadowed by the liberal-conservative idea in the 
international discourse of the past hundred years, and having largely 
disappeared from view today, the radical idea did not vanish from 
international affairs. In fact, the widely-overlooked ending to the ICJ 
                                                
12 Also this has corresponded to broader international trends, including the securitisation of 
both international development and international statebuilding in the late- to post-Cold 
War era. See especially Mark Duffield: Development, Security and Unending War: 
Governing the World of Peoples, Polity Press, Cambridge 2007; also Bøås and Jennings 
2005. 
13 From a legal perspective, also Koskenniemi (2002, p.172) notes that international law’s 
focus on security comes at the cost of its dealing with issues of equality. 
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Kosovo case seems to have boosted the radical idea’s standing.  
 
This thesis has provided an examination of international uses of the 
language of ‘self-determination’ that has revealed the resilience and force of 
both ideas. In international discourse, the concept of self-determination still 
remains positioned in the tension between the radical and liberal-
conservative ideas of freedom. 
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